Monthly Archives: January 2013

Characteristics of FDIC Lawsuits against Directors and Officers

Posted by Noam Noked, co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on
Thursday, January 17, 2013
, , , , ,
More from: , , , ,

The following post comes to us from Katie Galley, senior vice president at Cornerstone Research. This post is based on a Cornerstone Research publication by Ms. Galley, Abe Chernin, Yesim C. Richardson, and Joseph T. Schertler.

This is the fourth in a series of reports that analyzes the characteristics of professional liability lawsuits filed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) against directors and officers of failed financial institutions. Lawsuits may also be filed by the FDIC against other related parties, such as accounting firms, law firms, appraisal firms, or mortgage brokers, but we generally do not address such lawsuits here.

Overview of Litigation Activity

FDIC litigation against directors and officers (D&O) of failed financial institutions has increased markedly in the fourth quarter of 2012, after a lull during the second and third quarters. In October, November, and through December 7, the FDIC filed nine new lawsuits against directors and officers of failed institutions. If additional lawsuits are filed in the last few weeks of December, the number of filings in the fourth quarter will be higher than in the first quarter, when nine lawsuits were filed. Twenty-three lawsuits have been filed to date in 2012. If the recent pace of new filings persists for the balance of 2012, we expect 26 lawsuits will be filed by the end of the year. This reflects an increased level of filing activity compared with 16 in 2011 and two in 2010. In total, 41 lawsuits have been filed since 2010 against the directors and officers of 40 institutions (two separate lawsuits have been filed against various IndyMac directors and officers).

READ MORE »

Enforcement Priorities in the Alternative Space

Posted by the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance & Financial Regulation, on
Wednesday, January 16, 2013
, , , , , , ,
More from:
Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Bruce Karpati, chief of the Division of Enforcement, Asset Management Unit, at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on Mr. Karpati’s recent remarks before the Regulatory Compliance Association, which are available here. The views expressed in this post are those of Mr. Karpati and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commissioners, or the Staff.

I plan to speak about the Enforcement Division’s and in particular the Asset Management Unit’s priorities in the hedge fund space. I’ll discuss the importance of specialization and expertise to this effort; the risks for investors; how these risks are informed by the hedge fund operating model; and how a hedge fund manager’s business may be at odds with the manager’s fiduciary duty to the fund. I’ll also discuss the types of misconduct we’ve seen crossing our desks in the Asset Management Unit, and I’ll conclude with certain best practices to avoid the specter of an enforcement referral or inquiry.

READ MORE »

Implications of New U.S. Derivatives Regulations on End-Users of Swaps

Posted by Noam Noked, co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on
Wednesday, January 16, 2013
, , , , , , , ,
More from: ,

The following post comes to us from John White, partner in the Corporate Department and co-chair of the Corporate Governance and Board Advisory practice at Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP. This post is based on a Cravath memorandum by William P. Rogers Jr.; the full version, including footnotes, is available here.

Introduction

In the wake of the financial crisis, both the U.S. and the EU have enacted legislation to regulate the “over-the-counter” (“OTC”) swaps market and are in the process of adopting implementing rules that will make such legislation fully effective. In the U.S., Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”), enacted on July 21, 2010, provides for the regulation of the swaps market and grants to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the “CFTC”) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC,” and with the CFTC, each a “Commission” and together, the “Commissions”) broad authority to regulate the swaps market and its principal participants. In the EU, the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (“EMIR”) is expected to become effective during 2013 and will create a regulatory framework for the swaps markets in all EU member states.

READ MORE »

Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management

Posted by R. Christopher Small, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on
Wednesday, January 16, 2013
, , , ,
More from: , ,

The following post comes to us from Qiang Cheng, Professor of Accounting at Singapore Management University; Jimmy Lee, Assistant Professor of Accounting at Singapore Management University; and Terry Shevlin, Professor of Accounting at the University of California-Irvine.

In the paper, Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we examine whether key subordinate executives can restrain the extent of real earnings management. We focus on key subordinate executives, i.e., the top five executives with the highest compensation other than the CEO, because we hypothesize that they are the most likely group of employees that have both the incentives and the ability to influence the CEO in corporate decisions. As argued in Acharya et al. (2011), key subordinate executives have strong incentives not to increase short-term performance at the expense of long-term firm value. This tradeoff between current and future firm value is particularly salient in the case of real earnings management (as compared to accruals earnings management) because over production and cutting of R&D expenditures are costly and can reduce the long term value of the firm.

The motivation for the research question is twofold. First, the majority of the papers in the literature explicitly or implicitly assume that the CEO is the sole decision maker for financial reporting quality and the impact of other executives has been generally overlooked. Recent studies argue that subordinate executives usually have longer horizons and they can influence corporate decisions through various means. We hypothesize that differential preferences arising from differential horizons can affect the extent of real earnings management. Second, while there are studies focusing on the impact of external corporate governance (e.g., board independence and institutional ownership), little is known about whether there are checks and balances within the management team. This lack of knowledge is an important omission because control is not just imposed from the top-down or from the outside, but also from bottom-up (Fama 1980).

READ MORE »

2012 Trends in Securities Class Actions

Posted by Noam Noked, co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on
Tuesday, January 15, 2013
, ,
More from: , , , ,

The following post comes to us from Dr. Ron Miller, Vice President at NERA Economic Consulting, and is based on a NERA publication by Dr. Miller, Dr. Renzo Comolli, Svetlana Starykh, and Sukaina Klein; the full document, including complete footnotes, is available here.

Update: The full-year review, which includes December 2012 statistics, is available here.

The Steady Stream of Filings Has Continued Throughout 2012

The steady stream of federal securities class actions has continued unabated throughout 2012. [1] Through the end of November, 195 securities class actions were filed in federal courts—a pace that, if continued through December, would lead to a total of 213 cases for the full year. (See Figure 1.) This would put 2012 filings just slightly below their average rate over the previous five years.


Click image to enlarge

It is noteworthy that this level of filings has been maintained even though cases related to the credit crisis, which had been prominent in recent years, have all but ended. [2] For example, of the 208 filings in 2009, 59 were related to the credit crisis; by contrast, only four cases of the 195 filed through November of this year involved such allegations. While the decline in credit crisis cases itself is not surprising, it is notable that this decline has not translated into an overall decline in federal filings. The average number of federal filings in 2005-2006, just before the crisis hit, was only 160. One might have expected the rate of filings to return to this lower level after the wave of credit crisis cases subsided, but that has not happened: the plaintiffs’ bar has found new causes of action, with merger objection cases picking up much of the slack.

READ MORE »

Runaway MAC Carve-outs

Posted by Noam Noked, co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on
Monday, January 14, 2013
, ,
More from: ,

The following post comes to us from Neil Whoriskey, partner focusing on mergers and acquisitions at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP. This post is based on a Cleary Gottlieb memorandum by Mr. Whoriskey.

The definition of “material adverse change” plays a critical role in public company merger agreements, effectively defining the situations in which a buyer may walk away from the transaction. There is significant case law defining what is (or, much more commonly, what is not) a material adverse change, but the case law only serves to interpret the agreed definitions. The agreed definitions, in turn, are typically very vague in defining what is a material adverse change (leaving lots of scope for judges), but explicit in listing the types of changes that may not be considered in evaluating whether a material adverse change has occurred. The use of these carve-outs to limit what may be considered a material adverse change has expanded significantly in recent years — arguably to a point where it may make sense for the pendulum to start to swing back.

It has been traditional for adverse effects attributable to changes in general economic conditions to be excluded in considering whether a material adverse effect has occurred, such that e.g., a loss of sales attributable to the great recession, no matter how severe, would not give buyer the right to terminate a merger agreement. This carve-out from the material adverse change definition can be grouped with others, such as carve-outs for downturns in the target industry, changes in law or accounting policies, acts of war, etc. — all of which shift to buyer the risks associated with the environment in which the target operates. What is notable is that over the last several years, not only has the percentage of deals that shift these “environmental” risks to buyer increased significantly, but MAC carve-outs that shift to buyer the risk of the deal, and (anecdotally at least) even the risk of running the business, have also increased markedly.

READ MORE »

The Procyclical Effects of Bank Capital Regulation

Posted by R. Christopher Small, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on
Monday, January 14, 2013
, , , ,
More from: ,

The following post comes to us from Rafael Repullo, Professor of Economics at CEMFI, Madrid, Spain; and Javier Suarez, Professor of Finance at CEMFI, Madrid, Spain.

The basic argument about the procyclical effects of bank capital requirements is well-known. In recessions, losses erode banks’ capital, while risk-based capital requirements, such as those in Basel II, become higher. If banks cannot quickly raise sufficient new capital, their lending capacity falls and a credit crunch may follow. Yet, correcting the potential contractionary effect on credit supply by relaxing capital requirements in bad times may increase bank failure probabilities precisely when, because of high loan defaults, they are largest. Given the conflicting goals at stake, some observers think that procyclicality is a necessary evil, whereas others think that procyclicality should be explicitly corrected. Basel III is a compromise between these two views. It reinforces the quality and quantity of the minimum capital required to banks, but also establishes that part of the increased requirements be in terms of mandatory buffers—a capital preservation buffer and a countercyclical buffer—that are intended to be built up in good times and released in bad times.

In our paper, The Procyclical Effects of Bank Capital Regulation, forthcoming in the Review of Financial Studies, we develop a model that captures the key trade-offs in the debate. The model is constructed to highlight the primary microprudential role of capital requirements (containing banks’ risk of failure and, thus, deposit insurance payouts and other social costs due to bank failures) as well as their potential procyclical effect on the supply of bank credit.

READ MORE »

SEC and Actively Managed Exchange Traded Funds

Posted by Noam Noked, co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on
Sunday, January 13, 2013
, , ,
More from: ,

The following post comes to us from Jayant W. Tambe, partner focusing on litigation concerning securities, derivatives, and other financial products at Jones Day, and is based on a Jones Day alert.

Nearly three years after the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) effectively froze the creation of actively managed and leveraged exchange traded funds (“ETFs”) that utilize options, futures, swaps, and other derivatives as part of their investment strategies, the SEC has lifted the moratorium on the use of derivatives by actively managed funds while continuing to restrict the use of derivatives by leveraged ETFs. The SEC’s decision follows a Concept Release issued last August soliciting comments on the issue from the public. ETFs, which are typically registered as open-ended investment companies under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the “’40 Act”), usually require exemptive relief from the SEC because certain common features of ETFs do not comport with the strict provisions of the ’40 Act.

On December 6, 2012, in a speech to the American Law Institute’s Conference on Investment Adviser Regulation in New York City, Norm Champ, Director of the Division of Investment Management, announced the SEC has reversed course and “will no longer defer consideration of exemptive requests under the Investment Company Act relating to actively managed ETFs that make use of derivatives.” In his speech, Director Champ made clear the SEC’s decision was subject to two important conditions, each designed to address the concerns by the SEC back in March 2010 when it first imposed the moratorium on derivatives. To that end, issuers seeking to create an actively managed ETF that employs derivatives will be required to represent: “(i) that the ETF’s board periodically will review and approve the ETF’s use of derivatives and how the ETF’s investment adviser assesses and manages risk with respect to the ETF’s use of derivatives; and (ii) that the ETF’s disclosure of its use of derivatives in its offering documents and periodic reports is consistent with relevant Commission and staff guidance.”

READ MORE »

Court Rejects ERISA Challenge to Pension De-Risking Transaction

Posted by Noam Noked, co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on
Saturday, January 12, 2013
, , ,
More from: , , , , ,

The following post comes to us from Nicholas F. Potter, corporate partner at Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, and is based on a Debevoise & Plimpton client update by Mr. Potter, Sarah A.W. Fitts, Jonathan F. Lewis, Edwin G. Schallert, Alicia C. McCarthy, and Vincent J. Bianco.

For many employers, underfunded defined benefit pension plans present significant ongoing challenges. These challenges arise not only because of the underfunding itself, but also because of the significant volatility that the underfunding can create on its balance sheet due to changes in interest rates and other key assumptions over time. An employer has always had the ability to seek to improve its longer-term financial profile by “de-risking” its pension plan through the purchase of an annuity from a suitable annuity provider that commits to pay benefits to plan participants without further financial support from the employer. The transfer of pension obligations in this manner, which may include the termination or partial termination of the pension plan, can significantly improve an employer’s financial profile. De-risking transactions have become more prominent in recent months because of two transformative transactions, one involving General Motors and the other involving Verizon. We are pleased to report that the first judicial test of these transactions in court under ERISA, the Federal benefits statute, has resulted in a victory for the parties involved in the transaction. And, while the decision was based only on a request for preliminary injunctive relief, and while future litigation will be based on the manner in which future de-risking transactions are structured (including on the key issue of annuity provider selection and suitability), the decision validates the central thesis of pension de-risking and provides an important and helpful roadmap through some of the potential ERISA challenges to these transactions.

READ MORE »

FINRA Issues Guidance for Private Placement Filings

Posted by Noam Noked, co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on
Friday, January 11, 2013
, , ,
More from: , ,

The following post comes to us from Anna T. Pinedo, partner focusing on securities and derivatives at Morrison & Foerster LLP, and is based on a Morrison & Foerster memorandum by Nilene R. Evans.

On December 3, 2012, FINRA’s new Rule 5123 went into effect. [1] The Rule requires members selling securities issued by non-members in a private placement to file the private placement memorandum, term sheet or other offering documents with FINRA within 15 days of the date of the first sale of securities, or indicate that there were no offering documents used. In connection with the effectiveness of the Rule, FINRA issued frequently asked questions (the “Private Placement FAQs”) on the process as well as rolled out the Private Placement Filing System in the FINRA Firm Gateway.

Private Placement FAQs

The Private Placement FAQs are a mix of technical filing requirements and substantive guidance. The technical questions address how firms gain access to the Private Placement Filing System, the use of third parties, such as law firms and consultants, to make the required filings, the requirement that offering documents be filed in searchable PDF format, and the maximum size of individual documents. In addition, while a firm can designate another member participating in the private placement to file on its behalf, it should arrange to receive confirmation from the designated filer in order to satisfy its own filing obligation.

The substantive FAQs include the following:

READ MORE »

Page 4 of 6
1 2 3 4 5 6