Yearly Archives: 2013

Harpooning the London Whale is no Substitute for Reform

Editor’s Note: Mark Roe is the David Berg Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, where he teaches bankruptcy and corporate law. This post is based on an op-ed by Professor Roe that was published today in The Financial Times, which can be found here.

And so the drama moves on to a courtroom. Two prime traders in JPMorgan Chase’s “London whale” misadventure have been indicted. Side plots may unfold, perhaps via extradition proceedings. But here is the big question: will the indictments lead to better, stronger financial markets? Well, yes and no.

Recall the problem: JPMorgan’s London trading desk made trades that would be profitable if the post-crisis American economy remained weak. As the economy improved, the traders sought to reverse the investments, but could not, ultimately losing the bank and its shareholders $6bn.

The indictments are not for the loss, but for deliberately misstating the size of the loss to higher-ups at the bank. That, in turn, led to misstated financial statements to the public and the bank’s regulators. Whether higher-ups pushed for lower reported losses remains to be seen.

Misleading the regulators is serious: if the losses threatened the bank itself, the regulators would have needed to know early so they could act. True, JPMorgan is well capitalised so a $6bn loss was painful but not life threatening; and, the indictment says, the deception was sized in hundreds of millions of dollars. But regulators still want to be alerted, to see if other big institutions were making similar bets. The financial crisis hit in 2008 because too many made similar (bad) bets on the American housing market’s ability to support its massive levels of poor-quality mortgage securities. An early warning system will not work if financiers hide problems.

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Managerial Incentives and Management Forecast Precision

The following post comes to us from Qiang Cheng, Professor of Accounting at Singapore Management University; Ting Luo of the Department of Accounting at Tsinghua University; and Heng Yue, Professor of Accounting at Peking University.

In our paper, Managerial Incentives and Management Forecast Precision, forthcoming in The Accounting Review, we focus on one important characteristic of management forecasts—forecast precision—and examine how managerial incentives affect the choice of forecast precision. We choose to focus on forecast precision (or specificity, as it is sometimes referred to in the literature) for two reasons. First, precision is one of the most important forecast characteristics over which managers have a great deal of discretion. Managers can issue qualitative or quantitative forecasts, and the latter may take the form of point forecasts, range forecasts, or open-ended forecasts. More than 80% of the quantitative forecasts compiled by Thomas Financial are in the range format (i.e., estimates with explicit upper and lower bounds), and there is a large degree of variation in forecast width (i.e., the difference between the upper and lower bounds). One might even argue that managers have greater discretion over the precision of their earnings forecasts than over whether to provide forecasts in the first place (Hirst et al. 2008). Managers cannot always withhold information because it is part of their fiduciary duty to update and correct previous disclosures. Furthermore, withholding information can lead to considerable litigation risks and can cause great damage to a manager’s reputation (Skinner 1994). Second, forecast precision has a significant effect on market reactions to management forecasts. A number of theoretical papers, such as Kim and Verrecchia (1991) and Subramanyam (1996), argue that the magnitude of the market reaction to a disclosure is positively related to its precision, and empirical studies examining the impact of management forecast precision on stock returns and analyst forecast revisions provide support for this argument (e.g., Baginski et al. 1993; Baginski et al. 2007).

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DGCL Amended to Authorize Public Benefit Corporations

The following post comes to us from Frederick H. Alexander, partner in the Delaware Corporate Law Counseling Group at Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell LLP. This post is part of the Delaware law series, which is cosponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Beginning on August 1, 2013, the Delaware General Corporation Law will authorize the formation of public benefit corporations. The new provisions will allow entrepreneurs and investors to create for-profit Delaware corporations that are charged with promoting public benefits. These provisions modify the fiduciary duties of directors of PBCs by requiring them to balance such benefits with the economic interests of stockholders. In addition, the new provisions will require public benefit corporations to report to their stockholders with respect to the advancement of such non-stockholder interests.

Below are a few of the more salient elements of Delaware’s public benefit corporation legislation:

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The Effect of Delaware Doctrine on Freezeout Structure and Outcomes

Guhan Subramanian is the Joseph Flom Professor of Law and Business at the Harvard Law School. The following post is based on a paper co-authored by Professor Subramanian and Fernan Restrepo of Stanford Law School. This post is part of the Delaware law series, which is cosponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Historically, buyouts by controlling shareholders (also known as “going-private transactions,” “squeeze-outs,” and hereinafter “freezeouts”) were subject to different standards of judicial scrutiny under Delaware corporate law based on the transactional form used by the controlling shareholder to execute the deal. In a line of cases dating back at least to the Delaware Supreme Court’s 1994 decision in Kahn v. Lynch Communications, a freezeout executed as a statutory merger was subject to stringent “entire fairness” review, due to the self-dealing nature of the transaction. In contrast, in a line of cases beginning with the Delaware Chancery Court’s 2001 opinion in In re Siliconix Inc. Shareholder Litigation, a freezeout executed as a tender offer was subject to deferential business judgment review.

Subramanian (2007) presents evidence that, after Siliconix, minority shareholders received less in tender offer freezeouts than in merger freezeouts. Restrepo (2013) finds that these differences in outcomes occurred only after Siliconix, and that the incidence of tender offer freezeouts increased after this opinion, also supporting the idea that controlling shareholders took advantage of the opportunity provided by Siliconix. Subramanian (2005) describes why these differences in outcomes for minority shareholders create a social welfare loss and not just a one-time wealth transfer from minority shareholders to the controlling shareholder.

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Assumption of Liabilities in Carve-out Transactions

Barbara L. Becker is partner and co-chair of the Mergers and Acquisitions Practice Group at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, and Eduardo Gallardo is a partner focusing on mergers and acquisitions, also at Gibson Dunn. The following post is based on a Gibson Dunn M&A report excerpt by Todd E. Truitt and Taylor Hathaway-Zepeda. The full publication is available here.

One of the most difficult, and therefore most heavily negotiated, issues in carve-out transactions is the division of liabilities between the parent and the carved-out business. Typically, the division of liabilities will follow the business: liabilities attributable to the parent’s business will be retained by the parent, and liabilities attributable to the subsidiary or division’s business will be assigned to the subsidiary or division. As explained below, in the case of an M&A transaction, this application can vary depending on whether the transaction is a stock sale or an asset sale. [1]

  • Stock Sale. In a stock sale, liabilities of the carved-out entity typically pass to the buyer by operation of law. The carved-out entity is acquired “as is” with all of its existing liabilities. However, to the extent the parent is creditworthy, the buyer may be able to obtain protection from certain liabilities through indemnification.
  • Asset Sale. In an asset sale, by contrast, the buyer is contractually responsible only for those liabilities that it specifically assumes as part of the negotiated asset purchase agreement. This flexibility allows the parties to choose from any number of liability arrangements, from “all liabilities resulting from the ownership and operation of the carved-out division” to only specifically enumerated liabilities in a schedule, with the parent typically providing unlimited indemnification for all other liabilities. However, even where the buyer does not expressly agree to assume any liabilities, the buyer should be aware that it may nonetheless be subject to certain successor liabilities arising out of the asset purchase. [2]
  • Applicable Law. No matter what the transaction structure, both parties should be aware that under applicable state, federal or international law, certain environmental, product and employee liabilities may pass to the buyer or be retained by the parent even if the parties have contractually provided for another allocation.

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The Role of the Media in Corporate Governance

The following post comes to us from Baixiao Liu of the Department of Finance at Florida State University, and John McConnell, Professor of Finance at Purdue University.

In an open capital market economy, guided by market signals, firms (and their managers) play an important role in the allocation of capital. Zingales (2000) proposes that the media may also play a role, perhaps positive, perhaps negative, in guiding firms (and their managers) in making capital allocation decisions. Dyck and Zingales (2002) develop this idea more fully. Given that the media collect, aggregate, disseminate, and amplify information, and to the extent that this information affects managers’ reputations, they propose that managers are sensitive to the way in which the media report and comment upon their decisions. Managers may even be sensitive to whether the media reports on their decisions at all. After all, a bad decision that goes unnoticed may be no worse than a good decision that goes equally unnoticed.

In our paper, The Role of the Media in Corporate Governance: Do the Media Influence Managers’ Capital Allocation Decisions?, forthcoming in the Journal of Financial Economics, we investigate whether, and to what extent, managers of publicly-traded U.S. corporations are sensitive to public news media in making one specific type of capital allocation decision. To wit: the decision of whether to complete or abandon a large proposed corporate acquisition that is accompanied by a negative stock market reaction at the announcement (“value-reducing acquisition attempt”). More specifically, we investigate whether the likelihood that a value-reducing acquisition attempt is abandoned is related to the level of media attention given to the attempt and to the tone of media coverage regarding the acquirer’s attempt at the time of the acquisition announcement.

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Court: Private Equity Funds Potentially Liable for Portfolio Company Pensions

The following post comes to us from Brian D. Robbins, Partner and the Head of the Executive Compensation and Employee Benefits Practice Group at Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, and is based on a Simpson Thacher memorandum.

In December 2012, we published an Alert after a Federal District Court concluded that: (1) a private equity fund was not a “trade or business” for purposes of determining whether the fund could be liable under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) for the pension obligations of one of its portfolio companies and (2) consequently, the private equity fund could not be liable for its portfolio company’s pension obligations under Title IV of ERISA, even if the fund and the portfolio company were part of the same “controlled group.” Our December Alert, which contains background on the issue and a summary of the state of the law through December 2012, may be found here. This post is to advise that the First Circuit Court of Appeals has reversed the 2012 Federal District Court opinion.

In Sun Capital Partners III LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund (No. 12-2312, July 24, 2013), the First Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that: (a) a private equity fund can be a “trade or business” for purposes of determining “controlled group” joint and several liability under ERISA and (b) as a result, the private equity fund could be held liable for the pension obligations of its portfolio company under Title IV of ERISA, if certain other tests are satisfied. Under ERISA, a “trade or business” within a “controlled group” can be liable for the ERISA Title IV pension obligations (including withdrawal liability for union multiemployer plans) of any other member of the controlled group. This “controlled group” liability represents one of the few situations in which one entity’s liability can be imposed upon another simply because the entities are united by common ownership, but in order for such joint and several liability to be imposed, two tests must be satisfied: (1) the entity on which such liability is to be imposed must be a “trade or business” and (2) a “controlled group” relationship must exist among such entity and the pension plan sponsor or the contributing employer.

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“Pay for Investment”: Looking to the Long Term

Joseph Bachelder is special counsel in the Tax, Employee Benefits & Private Clients practice group at McCarter & English, LLP. This post is based on an article by Mr. Bachelder, with assistance from Andy Tsang, which first appeared in the New York Law Journal. Work from the Program on Corporate Governance about executive compensation includes Paying for Long-Term Performance by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, discussed on the Forum here.

Today’s post considers what might be done in the design of executive pay to encourage commitment by executives to the longer-term interests of their employers.

A very interesting examination into design features in an incentive program that puts emphasis on long-term considerations of executive pay is contained in the proxy statement for Goldman Sachs. (Elements of this program discussed below have been developed by Goldman Sachs over a period of years—the CD&A section of the 2013 proxy statement provides a description of the program.) Following are two interesting aspects of that program.

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Risk Oversight; Effective Board and Committee Leadership

Jeffrey Stein is a partner in the Corporate Practice Group at King & Spalding LLP. This post is based on two reports from the Lead Director Network by Mr. Stein, Bill Baxley, and Rob Leclerc, available here and here.

Board oversight of risk and effective board and committee leadership are high priorities for virtually every board of directors. While success in these matters has always been essential to maintaining a high-performing board, how boards approach the risk oversight function and seek to maximize board and committee leadership continues to evolve. Strategic risks can threaten a company’s very existence and stakeholders continue to challenge traditional approaches to board leadership.

The Lead Director Network (the “LDN”) and the North American Audit Committee Leadership Network (the “ACLN”) met on June 4th and June 5th to discuss risk oversight and effective board and committee leadership. Following these meetings, King & Spalding and Tapestry Networks have published two ViewPoints reports to present highlights of the discussion that occurred at these meetings and to stimulate further consideration of these subjects. Separate reports address Board Oversight of Risk and Effective Board and Committee Leadership.

The following post provides highlights from the LDN and ACLN meeting, as described in the ViewPoints reports.

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ISS Releases Survey for 2014 Policy Updates

Amy Goodman is a partner and co-chair of the Securities Regulation and Corporate Governance practice group at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP. The following post is based on a Gibson Dunn alert by Ms. Goodman, Elizabeth A. Ising, and Ronald O. Mueller.

Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”), the most influential proxy advisory firm, today launched its annual global policy survey. Each year, ISS solicits comments in connection with its review of its proxy voting policies. At the end of this process, in November 2013, ISS will announce its updated proxy voting policies applicable to 2014 shareholders’ meetings.

Results from the policy survey that ISS posted on its website today will be used by ISS to inform its voting policy review. The survey includes questions on a variety of governance and executive compensation topics, including:

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