The following post comes to us from Paul L. Davies, Senior Research Fellow at Harris Manchester College, University of Oxford. He was the Allen & Overy Professor of Corporate Law from 2009 to 2014 at University of Oxford, Faculty of Law. Work from the Program on Corporate Governance about lobbying includes Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics by Lucian Bebchuk and Zvika Neeman (discussed on the Forum here).
The United States and the United Kingdom are lumped put together as ‘dispersed shareholder’ jurisdictions and contrasted with the concentrated shareholdings found in the rest of the world. This paper, Shareholders in the United Kingdom, argues that it would be better to view the UK, at least over the past half century, as a semi-dispersed rather than as simply a dispersed shareholder jurisdiction, and that there are interesting contrasts between the UK and the US experience.
Whilst the typical company listed on the main market of the London Stock Exchange certainly lacks a single (or even a cohesive small group) of shareholders with legal control, neither does the typical company display atomised shareholdings, for example, where no single shareholder holds more than 1% of the voting rights. Typically, a coalition of six or so of the largest shareholders can put together enough votes to have a fighting chance of carrying a resolution at a shareholder meeting against the wishes of the management. The question thus becomes one of the incentives and disincentives for those shareholders to coordinate their actions.