Yearly Archives: 2021

Elizabeth Holmes and The Mythology of Silicon Valley

Boris Feldman and Sarah Solum are partners at Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP. This post is based on their Freshfields memorandum.

The Theranos criminal trial is underway. Our task is not to predict its outcome or to pass judgment on Elizabeth Holmes. That is for the jury. Rather, we write to challenge what is fast becoming conventional wisdom: that Theranos is a reflection of systemic flaws in Silicon Valley and the tech industry. We dissent.

Here are a few examples. From the BBC: “in Silicon Valley, many believe that Theranos—far from being an aberration—speaks of systemic problems with start-up culture.” From the Washington Post: “the trial is …an opportunity for the Silicon Valley ethos to be held in front of a public mirror.”

There are recurrent themes in much of the media coverage:

  • Theranos was a demonstration of the Valley’s “fake it ‘til you make it” culture
  • This is what happens with tech companies because of their stealth modes and black-box technology
  • Holmes typifies “Brilliant Founder Syndrome”
  • NDAs cover up fraud

In our view, the reality is that Theranos, and its apparent misdeeds, are not emblematic of Silicon Valley.  A few points for your consideration.

READ MORE »

Hearing on Board Gender Diversity Statute

Cydney S. Posner is special counsel at Cooley LLP. This post is based on her Cooley memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Politics and Gender in the Executive Suite by Alma Cohen, Moshe Hazan, and David Weiss (discussed on the Forum here); and Will Nasdaq’s Diversity Rules Harm Investors? by Jesse M. Fried (discussed on the Forum here).

On October 19, a federal district court judge held a hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction in Meland v. Weber, a case challenging SB 826, California’s board gender diversity statute, on the basis that it is unconstitutional under the equal protection provisions of the 14th Amendment. The judge had previously dismissed the case on the basis of lack of standing, but was reversed by the 9th Circuit. What did the hearing reveal?

SideBar

As you may recall, SB 826 requires that public companies (defined as corporations listed on major U.S. stock exchanges) that have principal executive offices located in California, no matter where they are incorporated, include specified minimum numbers of women on their boards of directors. Under the law, each public company was required to have a minimum of one woman on its board of directors by the close of 2019. That minimum increases to two by December 31, 2021, if the corporation has five directors, and to three women directors if the corporation has six or more directors. The statute also requires that the office of the California Secretary of State post on its website reports on the status of compliance with the law. Under the statute, the Secretary may impose fines for violations, ranging from $100,000 to $300,000 per violation. So far, the Secretary has neither adopted regulations regarding fines or imposed fines for violations.

READ MORE »

DOJ Announces Revisions Strengthening Corporate Criminal Enforcement Policies

Jonathan Kolodner, Joon Kim, and Elizabeth (Lisa) Vicens are partners at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP. This post is based on a Cleary memorandum by Mr. Kolodner, Mr. Kim, Ms. Vicens, and Andres Saenz.

On October 28, 2021, as part of her Keynote Address at the ABA’s 36th National Institute on White Collar Crime, Deputy Attorney General Lisa O. Monaco announced the administration’s first significant changes to the DOJ’s policies on corporate criminal enforcement. [1] The announcement was accompanied by the release of a DOJ memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Monaco entitled “Corporate Crime Advisory Group and Initial Revisions to Corporate Criminal Enforcement Policies.” (the “Memorandum”). [2]

The announcement highlights departures from polices under the Trump administration and a return to corporate criminal enforcement policies in place under the prior Obama-led DOJ. Deputy Attorney General Monaco made clear that these changes are part of a broader effort to revisit, reassess, and strengthen the DOJ’s corporate enforcement policies and “invigorate” the DOJ’s prosecution of corporate criminal conduct.

Specifically, for all future DOJ investigations of corporate wrongdoing and matters pending as of October 28, 2021, three new policies will apply:

READ MORE »

Of Owners and Ownership

Paul Singer is the Founder, President, Co-Chief Executive Officer, and Co-Chief Investment Officer of Elliott Investment Management L.P. This post is based on an essay that first appeared in one of Elliott’s recent quarterly letters to investors.

Public ownership of shares is, in many ways, the essence of modern capitalism — which, along with the rule of law, has been responsible for the spectacular growth in global living standards over the past 200 years. Today, public ownership of shares is under significant pressure on a number of fronts.

A diminishing pool of public equity market investors is engaged in “active” investing (i.e., actually analyzing the merits of companies and selecting their securities accordingly). A growing plurality of investors chooses indices and engages in virtually no individual company or security analysis. This type of investing delegates security selection to small, anonymous committees at the index construction firms. Among the active investors are classic stock pickers at some mutual funds and hedge funds, a depleted cadre of analysts at investment banks and advisory firms, and a relatively small group of “activist” investors.

Activist investors do not just analyze and select securities and companies in which to invest. They also interact with company managements, publicly and/or privately, in a dialogue that the activist hopes will validate its analysis (or show why it is wrong) and lead to improvements in the company’s performance. Activists aim to influence outcomes and “make something happen” to cause a company’s share price to increase and hold its gains.

The dirty little secret about public capitalism is that many executives and directors of public companies abhor its essence: public ownership of “their” companies. Whether shareholders own shares for one minute or for 30 years, they are owners, deserving all of the privileges of ownership. Of course, their ability to exercise those privileges depends on, among other things, the rights conferred by their shares, the number of shares they are able to acquire, and their ability to voice their views and convince management and/or other shareholders (including index investors) of the merits of their analysis. However, on all of these fronts, the fundamental rights of owners are increasingly being pressured due in large part to the efforts of well-compensated corporate advisors and lobbyists, who masquerade as advocates for a new, more enlightened capitalism.

We have learned from decades of experience that most public company management teams do not like being told what to do, and they really do not like their performance to be critiqued by outsiders who have the temerity to call themselves “owners.” However, imagine if these same executives were not allowed to critique the performance of their own employees. Suppose one of these executives suggested that an employee adopt a performance-improvement plan and that employee responded by alleging that he or she was a victim of a “short-term attack,” one that focused too much on the numbers and overlooked his or her many positive intangible qualities. How would this executive react to such a response?

READ MORE »

Does Regulatory Cooperation Help Integrate Equity Markets?

Roger Silvers is a former senior economist at the Securities and Exchange Commission and is currently Assistant Professor of Accounting at the University of Utah Eccles School of Business. This post is based on his recent paper, forthcoming in the Journal of Financial Economics.

The Achilles’ heel of global markets is that no single regulator has the authority to unilaterally investigate or enforce compliance with securities laws. For regulators, the only way to restore access to information and reestablish capacities that have been severed by jurisdictional boundaries is through assistance from foreign counterparts. Even when two countries individually possess effective local regulation, the ability to address cross-border issues still depends on cooperation. Thus, instead of defining institutional features—e.g., property rights, contract enforcement, and judicial quality—as country-level factors (as in prior work), I reframe institutional features as interactive, country-pair level constructs.

An extensive body of literature studies global capital markets and argues that they help firms raise more capital at lower costs, while allowing investors to diversify their portfolios and access higher yields as compared to domestic markets. However, despite the promise of widespread benefits, empirical work consistently shows a puzzling finding: relative to theoretical benchmarks, investors overinvest in local assets and underinvest in foreign ones. Much attention has been paid to understanding why this divergence from theory is the norm, and various economic frictions have been proposed as explanations.

READ MORE »

Investment Management Regulatory Update

Gregory S. Rowland is partner, Sarah Kim is counsel, and Leon Salkin is an associate at Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP. This post is based on a Davis Polk memorandum by Mr. Rowland, Ms. Kim, Mr. Salkin, Chelsey Whynot and Amy Zhang.

Rules and regulations

SEC proposes to enhance proxy voting disclosure by investment funds and require disclosure of “say-on-pay” votes for institutional investment managers

The proposed amendments to Form N-PX would enhance the information investment funds report about their proxy votes. The proposed amendments also would require institutional investment managers to disclose how they voted on executive compensation, or so-called “say-on-pay” matters.

On September 29, 2021, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed amendments to Form N-PX to enhance the information mutual funds, exchange-traded funds (ETFs), and other registered management investment companies (collectively, funds) currently report annually about their proxy votes. The SEC also proposed new Rule 14Ad-1 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (Exchange Act) and amendments to Form N-PX to require institutional investment managers subject to Section 13(f) of the Exchange Act (managers) to report annually on Form N-PX how they voted proxies on executive compensation, or so-called “say-on-pay” matters.

READ MORE »

FSOC Issues Report Declaring Climate Change as Emerging Threat to U.S. Financial Stability

Jason Halper is partner and Sara Bussiere and Timbre Shriver are associates at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP. This post is based on their Cadwalader memorandum.

On October 21, 2021, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”), established in 2010 by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to respond to emerging threats to the stability of the U.S. financial system, [1] released a Report on Climate-Related Financial Risk (the “Report”). [2] The Report was published in response to President Biden’s Executive Order 14030 (the “Executive Order”), which recognized that the “intensifying impacts of climate change present physical risk to assets, publicly traded securities, private investments, and companies—such as increased extreme weather risk leading to supply chain disruptions,” and established the policy of the Biden Administration to “advance consistent, clear, intelligible, comparable, and accurate disclosure of climate-related financial risk[;]” “act to mitigate that risk and its drivers, while accounting for and addressing disparate impacts on disadvantaged communities and communities of color[;]” and “achieve our target of a net-zero emissions economy by no later than 2050.” The Executive Order required the Secretary of Treasury, as the Chair of the FSOC, to issue a report on the FSOC’s activities to address climate-related financial risks.

READ MORE »

Renren Settlement Highlights Increased Risk of U.S. Derivative Litigation Concerning Foreign Private Issuers

Stephen Blake and Adam Goldberg are partners and Bo Bryan Jin is an associate at Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP. This post is based on a Simpson Thacher memorandum by Mr. Blake, Mr. Goldberg, Mr. Jin, George Wang, Jonathan Youngwood, and James Kreissman. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Alibaba: A Case Study of Synthetic Control (discussed on the Forum here) by Jesse M. Fried and Ehud Kamar.

Renren, Inc. (“Renren”), a NYSE-listed Chinese company incorporated in the Cayman Islands, recently settled a shareholder derivative litigation in New York state court for at least $300 million. According to the complaint, Renren, which initially positioned itself as the “Facebook of China,” invested its 2011 NYSE IPO proceeds towards a number of ventures and became a de facto venture capital fund. The minority shareholder plaintiffs alleged that Renren’s CEO, Joseph Chen, along with certain other directors, controlling shareholders and the financial advisory company Duff & Phelps, defrauded Renren and its minority stockholders out of over $500 million in company investment assets by spinning off Renren’s assets into a private company in exchange for an undervalued cash dividend. The Renren plaintiffs asserted derivative claims under Cayman Islands law and New York law in connection with the spin-off.

This record-breaking settlement involving a U.S.-listed Chinese company comes several months after the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court affirmed a lower court’s finding that there was proper jurisdiction and standing to pursue Cayman law derivative claims in New York against Renren and its directors. See In re Renren, Inc., 192 A.D.3d 539, 140 N.Y.S.3d 701 (2021). Historically, derivative claims relating to non-U.S. companies incorporated offshore have faced significant legal hurdles in U.S. courts; these companies primarily faced exposure through federal securities litigation and SEC regulatory action. The Renren lawsuit and settlement illustrates that New York courts are increasingly willing to entertain derivative actions against non-U.S. companies, closely aligning the legal threats against the boards of such companies with that of U.S.-based and -incorporated issuers which often face secondary corporate law challenges whenever federal securities litigation is initiated.

READ MORE »

2021 U.S. Board Index

Julie Hembrock Daum and Kathleen M. Tamayo are consultants and Ann Yerger is senior adviser at Spencer Stuart. This post is based on their Spencer Stuart memorandum.

The 2021 U.S. Spencer Stuart Board Index finds boards responding to a growing chorus of calls for enhanced boardroom diversity, with men from historically underrepresented racial and ethnic communities and women comprising 72% of directors joining S&P 500 boards in the past year. But boardroom turnover remains persistently low, with new independent directors once again representing only 9% of all S&P 500 directors. As a result, changes to overall composition continue at a slow pace.

Key Takeaways – 2021 U.S. Spencer Stuart Board Index 

  • The incoming class of directors is the most diverse Nearly half (47%) of new directors are Black/African American, Asian, Hispanic/Latino/a, American Indian/Alaska native or multiracial, and 43% are women. Together directors from these historically underrepresented groups account for 72% of all new directors—up from 59% last year and 31% ten years ago.
  • Nearly all the gains in the diversity of the new class of directors are due to the increase in Black/African American directors.
    • One-third (33%) of all new independent directors are Black/African American, three times more than last year (11%) and the highest since 2008.
    • The representation of Asian directors among new directors fell slightly to 7% from 8%.
    • Hispanic/Latino/a directors make up 7% of new directors, an increase from 3% last year. The representation of Hispanic/Latino/a directors among new directors has vacillated between 3% and 5% since we began collecting this data in 2008, not reaching above 6% before this year.

READ MORE »

Roundup of Director Overboarding Policies

Holly Gregory is partner, Rebecca Grapsas is counsel, and Claire Holland is special counsel at Sidley Austin LLP. This post is based on a Sidley memorandum by Ms. Gregory, Ms. Grapsas, Ms. Holland, John P. Kelsh, Andrea L. Reed, and Christine Duque.

As public company board service has become increasingly imperative and time-consuming, proxy advisory firms and institutional investors have sharpened their focus on directors who serve on an excessive number of boards. Overboarding concerns have become a key driver for recommendations or votes against director elections in recent years. For example, in its latest investment stewardship report, BlackRock reported that it voted against 163 directors at 149 companies in the Americas on the basis of overboarding from July 1, 2020 to June 30, 2021.

Public companies must stay informed of the director overboarding policies of their key institutional investors and consider how they may impact director elections and whether the company’s own overboarding limits should be revised in light of policies in place at key investors. The chart below summarizes the overboarding policies of proxy advisory firms Glass Lewis and Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) as well as several large institutional investors.

READ MORE »

Page 11 of 90
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 90