Monthly Archives: May 2022

Addressing Market Volatility and Risk in M&A Agreements

Edward D. Herlihy is partner at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell memorandum by Mr. Herlihy and Jacob A. Kling. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Are M&A Contract Clauses Value Relevant to Target and Bidder Shareholders? by John C. Coates, Darius Palia, and Ge Wu (discussed on the Forum here); Allocating Risk Through Contract: Evidence from M&A and Policy Implications by John C. Coates, IV (discussed on the Forum here); The New Look of Deal Protection by Fernan Restrepo and Guhan Subramanian (discussed on the Forum here); and Deals in the Time of Pandemic, by Guhan Subramanian and Caley Petrucci (discussed on the Forum here).

Significant volatility continues to disrupt the equity markets, with the major stock indexes swinging multiple percentage points often on a daily basis. Inflation, rising interest rates, the Ukraine crisis, continuing effects of Covid-19, lasting supply chain issues, a difficult regulatory environment, and uncertainty regarding the global and U.S. economies have had an undeniable impact on the pace of M&A activity so far in 2022. While the opening months of 2022 have witnessed a number of significant transactions despite these headwinds, most have been all-cash deals, with only a handful of large stock or cash and stock mergers announced to date, among them the Take-Two / Zynga cash and stock transaction and, most recently, Intercontinental Exchange’s $16 billion acquisition of Black Knight announced last week. Many M&A professionals have seen at least one, and in some cases multiple, potential transactions fall victim during the negotiation stage to the effects of economic uncertainty and market volatility over the past few months, and overall M&A is down roughly 25% globally in 2022 as compared to 2021.

These issues are compounded by the increased scrutiny of and potential regulatory opposition to large scale M&A from the antitrust agencies, and the resulting extension of the interim period between transaction signing and closing. This additional regulatory delay means that transactions, and in particular deals involving stock consideration, are increasingly vulnerable to market risk over a longer time horizon. We outline below certain transaction structures that can be deployed to shift or address certain of these risks to account for the greater volatility in the current market environment. Which structure makes sense in any given transaction will depend on the parties’ objectives, the perception of the relative risks in the particular transaction, and bargaining power. Traditional fixed exchange ratio deals remain by far the most common pricing structure for all or part stock transactions, but as this period of economic, regulatory and market uncertainty persists, we expect that transaction participants may increasingly consider certain variations as possible alternatives to shift or address market risk and volatility during a protracted sign to close period.

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Liability When Stockholder’s Merger Consideration is Paid to Hackers

Gail Weinstein is senior counsel and Brian T. Mangino and Maxwell Yim are partners at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP. This post is based on a Fried Frank memorandum by Ms. Weinstein, Mr. Mangino, Mr. Yim, Randi Lally, Amber Banks (Meek), and David L. Shaw, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

In Sorenson Impact Foundation v. Continental Stock Transfer & Trust Company (Apr. 1, 2022), computer hackers intercepted the email communications of a law firm (the “Law Firm”) involved with the $130 million merger pursuant to which Tassel Parent, Inc. (the “Buyer,” a subsidiary of private equity firm KKR) was acquiring Graduation Alliance, Inc. (the “Target”). The hackers posed online as two of the Target’s actual stockholders and succeeded in having the merger consideration paid to them instead of the stockholders. The hackers were never apprehended or identified. The actual stockholders—Sorenson Impact Foundation and James Lee Sorenson Family Foundation—brought suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery against Continental Stock Transfer & Trust Company (the “Paying Agent”), the Buyer, and the Target (which was the surviving corporation and which we refer to herein, in combination with the Buyer, as the “Company”). Vice Chancellor Glasscock (i) dismissed the claims against the Paying Agent on the basis of lack of personal jurisdiction; (ii) let stand the claims against the Company; and (iii) left open the issue whether the Law Firm (which had communicated directly with the hackers) was a necessary party to the action and must be joined as a defendant.

Background. The Sorenson entities properly submitted their letters of transmittal and stock certificates to the Paying Agent, requesting payment in their name to an account at Zions Bank in Utah. Computer hackers then intercepted the Sorenson entities’ email communications with the Law Firm. (Which entity was represented by the Law Firm was in dispute.) Assuming the identity of the Sorenson entities, the hackers then communicated via email with the unsuspecting Law Firm and requested that payment of the merger consideration be changed to an international account at a Hong Kong bank. A week later, they requested that the payment be made in the name of HongKong Wemakos Furniture Trading Co. The Law Firm communicated these instructions to the Paying Agent.

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Stewardship in the Context of Geopolitical Risk

Benjamin Colton is Global Head of Asset Stewardship, Voting & Engagement, Holly Fetter is Vice President of Asset Stewardship, and Ryan Nowicki is Assistant Vice President of Asset Stewardship at State Street Global Advisors. This post is based on their SSgA memorandum.

As asset stewards, we are aware of the financial risks associated with unexpected conflict between or among nations, and, where appropriate, we may seek to mitigate relevant risks through engagements and proxy voting. On a case-by-case basis, the Asset Stewardship team will assess whether a situation constitutes a conflict that is material to our portfolio, considering indicators including whether the conflict:

  • Causes a material market disruption;
  • Disrupts the information flow such that we cannot make informed decisions;
  • Introduces reputational or headline risk to our clients; and/or
  • Results in government sanctions.

We view impacted companies as those with exposure to conflict-affected areas, meaning that they may, for example:

  • Be domiciled [1] in markets involved in conflict;
  • Generate significant revenue from local customers;
  • Employ local workforces;
  • Engage in local joint ventures and partnerships; and/or
  • Operate subsidiaries in the region.

We will implement the following framework in such instances in an effort to protect shareholder value.

Our Expectations for Impacted Companies

We expect our holdings that may be impacted by global conflicts to:

  • Manage and mitigate risks related to operating in impacted markets, which may include financial, sanctions, regulatory, and/or reputational risks, among others;
  • Strengthen board oversight of these efforts; and
  • Describe these efforts in public disclosures.

In addition to these conflict-specific expectations, our existing Guidance on Human Rights Disclosures & Practices  applies to all companies in our portfolio.

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Engaging with Vanguard

This post is an interview of John Galloway, Principal and Global Head of Investment Stewardship at Vanguard, by Allie Rutherford, Partner at PJT Camberview.

Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors by Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Scott Hirst (discussed on the Forum here); Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy by Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst (discussed on the forum here); The Specter of the Giant Three by Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst (discussed on the Forum here); and The Limits of Portfolio Primacy by Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here).

Approach to Stewardship and Engagement

Allie Rutherford: You joined Vanguard’s investment stewardship group in early 2020. It has certainly been an interesting two years in the market during that time. Can you share what has changed and what remains the same with respect to Vanguard’s approach to stewardship during your tenure?

John Galloway: By way of context, the team I lead is responsible for investment stewardship activities for Vanguard’s internally managed equity funds, which are principally index funds. Vanguard’s active funds are managed by a couple dozen external managers, and those managers have responsibility for both investment management and investment stewardship for those funds. When I speak about Vanguard’s approach to Investment Stewardship, I’m referring specifically to our internally managed equity funds.

The stewardship program at Vanguard is constantly evolving in response to new data, developing market dynamics, regulatory requirements, investor expectations, and our view of what creates (and can erode) shareholder value. At the same time, our program remains constant in our purpose to look after long-term shareholder value and to apply principles that have been in place for years.

Our core beliefs about the importance of corporate governance have not changed, nor has the focus on maximizing shareholder value over time. Companies should take comfort in our program’s focus on long-term shareholder value and consistent grounding in core governance principles – our views should never be a surprise to company leaders and you will always be able to understand how we approach an issue.

When it comes to our team, we have added new capabilities and resources in response to the rapid growth and complexity in stewardship topics and the many shareholder proposals we now evaluate. The breadth and nuance of these topics requires more company-specific engagement and policy research and development to understand the nexus between issues up for vote and long-term shareholder value. But even as topics evolve, our focus on protecting shareholder value for the investors in our funds has not changed.

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Weekly Roundup: May 6-12, 2022


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of May 6-12, 2022.

SEC’s Climate Disclosure Rules: GHG Emissions Disclosure Requirements


Assessing ESG-Labeled Bonds



Recent Ruling on Board Diversification


Performance Bounced Back—CEO Pay Up


Does Enlightened Shareholder Value Add Value?


SEC’s Climate Risk Disclosure Proposal Likely to Face Legal Challenges


Board Practices in the Digital Era: Maximizing the Benefit-to-Cost Ratio of Information Technology


How to Identify Top ESG Priorities


SEC Examination Division Focuses on ESG Investing


Fair Value Accounting Standards and Securities Litigation


How to to Prepare for the SEC’s Proposed Climate Disclosures Rules


Long-Term Incentive Plans: Payouts and Performance Alignment


BlackRock on Climate-Related Shareholder Proposals


Remarks by Chair Gensler Before the International Swaps and Derivatives Association Annual Meeting

Gary Gensler is Chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on his recent remarks before the International Swaps and Derivatives Association Annual Meeting. The views expressed in the post are those of Chair Gensler, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Staff.

Thank you for the kind introduction. It’s good to be back with the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) again.

As is customary, I’d like to note that I’m not speaking on behalf of my fellow Commissioners or the SEC staff.

Swaps emerged in the 1980s to provide producers and merchants with a way to lock in the price of commodities, interest rates, and currency rates. Our economy benefits from a well-functioning swaps market, as it’s essential that companies have the ability to manage their risks.

When I first appeared before this group, as Chair of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), Washington was still developing the regulatory response to the 2008 financial crisis. At the time, I had the honor of working with then-CFTC Commissioner Scott O’Malia, now the CEO of ISDA, on reforms to the swaps market. A decade ago, I called it a “new era for the swaps marketplace.” [1]

The financial crisis had many chapters, but a form of security-based swaps—credit default swaps, particularly those used in the mortgage market—played an important role throughout the story.

International banks were using credit default swaps to lower regulatory capital requirements and to hedge their bank loan portfolios—or so they thought.

These derivatives were at the core of what led to the $180 billion bailout of AIG, whose near-failure accelerated the crisis.

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BlackRock on Climate-Related Shareholder Proposals

Sandra Boss is Global Head of Investment Stewardship and Michelle Edkins is Managing Director of Investment Stewardship at BlackRock, Inc. This post is based on their BlackRock memorandum.

  • BlackRock Investment Stewardship (BIS) takes a case-by-case approach to shareholder proposals and, without exception, takes voting decisions on proposals as a fiduciary acting in clients’ long-term economic interests.
  • BIS continues to see voting on shareholder proposals playing an important role in stewardship.
  • Having supported 47% of environmental and social shareholder proposals in 2021, BIS notes that many of the climate-related shareholder proposals coming to a vote in 2022 are more prescriptive or constraining on companies and may not promote long-term shareholder value.

BlackRock Investment Stewardship

The assets we manage are owned by other people—our clients—who depend on BlackRock to help them achieve their investment goals. These clients include public and private pension plans, governments, insurance companies, endowments, universities, charities and, ultimately, individual investors, among others. Consistent with BlackRock’s fiduciary duty as an asset manager, BIS’ purpose is to support companies in which we invest for our clients in their efforts to create long-term durable financial performance.

BIS serves as an important link between our clients and the companies in which they invest, and the trust our clients place in us gives us a great responsibility to work on their behalf. That is why we are interested in hearing from companies about their strategies for navigating the challenges and capturing the opportunities they face. As we are long-term investors on behalf of our clients, the business and governance decisions that companies make will have a direct impact on our clients’ investment outcomes and financial well-being. In all our stewardship work on behalf of our clients, the asset owners, we therefore focus on engagement and voting outcomes that support companies’ long-term ability to maximize durable financial returns.

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Long-Term Incentive Plans: Payouts and Performance Alignment

Michael Bonner is principal and Melissa Burek is a founding partner at Compensation Advisory Partners. This post is based on their CAP memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Paying for Long-Term Performance by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried (discussed on the Forum here).

CAP analyzed payouts under long-term incentive plan performance cycles that ended in 2015 through 2020. This analysis includes 120 companies from ten industries with median revenue of $36B. We selected these companies to provide a broad representation of market practice across large US public companies.

Long-term performance plans are important performance-based tools that companies use to reward executives for achieving medium to long-term financial objectives and creating shareholder value; they often represent the most significant portion of executive compensation programs. Setting appropriate performance goals is critical to establishing a strong link between pay, performance, and shareholder outcomes. The challenge is to achieve a balance between rigor and attainability, amidst expected industry and economic factors, to motivate executives to drive long-term company performance and shareholder returns.

Key Takeaways

Based on our analysis of long-term incentive payouts from 2015-2020, the degree of difficulty, or “stretch,” embedded in long-term performance goals translates to:

  • A 95 percent chance of achieving at least Threshold performance
  • A 70 percent chance of achieving at least Target performance
  • A 20 percent chance of achieving Maximum performance

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How to Prepare for the SEC’s Proposed Climate Disclosures Rules

Jason Halper and Erica Hogan are partners and Michael Ruder is special counsel at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP. This post is based on a Cadwalader memorandum by Mr. Halper, Ms. Hogan, Mr. Ruder, and Lauren Russo.

Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here); and Stakeholder Capitalism in the Time of COVID, by Lucian Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here).

On March 21, 2022, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) proposed far-reaching amendments to Regulation S-K and Regulation S-X that would mandate significant additional climate-related disclosures for public companies. A summary of the new disclosure requirements is available in our Clients & Friends Memo dated March 23, 2022. In brief, the proposed rules would require a public company to make significant additional disclosures regarding, among other things, its board and management’s oversight of climate-related risks; its processes for identifying, assessing and managing climate-related risks; and its climate-related targets and goals. In addition, a company would be required to disclose how climate-related risks have had or are likely to have an impact on its business and consolidated financial statements, as well as on its strategy, business model and outlook. A company also would be required to disclose its greenhouse gas emissions and provide an attestation report to provide reasonable assurance, after a phase-in period, covering certain disclosed emissions.

Although the SEC’s proposal made clear that asset-backed securities issuers are not covered by the proposed rules, the SEC indicated that it is continuing to consider whether and how to apply this type of regulation to asset-backed securities issuers.

If adopted as proposed, the amendments would impose significant reporting requirements on registrants, which in turn would increase compliance costs and require additional managerial time and attention. Although the proposed rules contain various phase-in periods dependent upon filer status, there are steps, discussed below, that public companies can act on today to prepare for the new rules.

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Fair Value Accounting Standards and Securities Litigation

Richard Mergenthaler is Associate Professor in Accounting at Penn State Smeal College of Business. This post is based on a recent paper by Mr. Mergenthaler; Musaib Ashraf, Assistant Professor of Accounting and Information Systems at Michigan State University Broad College of Business; Dain Donelson, Professor of Accounting at University of Iowa Tippie College of Business; and John McInnis, Professor of Accounting at the University of Texas at Austin McCombs School of Business.

Managers, investors, auditors, and other stakeholders are concerned about the impact of fair value accounting on firms’ litigation risk (e.g., Pickerd and Piercey 2021; Christensen et al. 2012; Bell and Griffin 2012; Herz et al. 2008; Laux and Leuz 2009). This is particularly salient given U.S. accounting standards (GAAP) have shifted to require more fair value accounting. For example, GAAP requires fair value accounting to assess whether assets are impaired, value nonmonetary transactions, allocate revenue, assess and classify lease liabilities, value derivatives, value assets or liabilities held for sale, and value assets or liabilities whose valuation is highly subjective (e.g., goodwill).

The concern that fair value accounting will lead to heightened litigation risk stems from the fact that fair value accounting requires significant judgments when there are not active markets to determine the fair value of an asset or liability. Furthermore, some are concerned that marking assets and liabilities to market will lead to increased earnings volatility and thereby increased returns volatility. Increased judgment and volatility could affect litigation risk for two reasons. First, managers worry that managerial judgments inherent in fair value measurement can be second-guessed and thereby expose them to ex-post claims that their judgments were opportunistic and misleading. Second, if fair value accounting does lead to increased earnings and return volatility, then the likelihood of large stock price drops could increase–potentially leading to unwanted attention from litigators.

In our paper, we examine whether empirical evidence suggests that fair value accounting increases firms’ litigation risk. Contrary to the above-noted arguments, our paper notes that there are at least two reasons fair value accounting may actually lead to lower litigation risk for firms. First, though judgments can be second-guessed, as noted above, it is difficult to provide specific evidence of scienter because managers’ judgments are inherently subjective. Second, the underlying transactions that require fair value accounting and fair value measurements are often complex. Given this, the argument that the misstatement was simply an error made in good faith is more plausible (Donelson et al., 2012). Ultimately, it is an empirical question whether fair value accounting increases, has no effect, or decreases firms’ litigation risk.

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