Monthly Archives: May 2022

Weekly Roundup: April 29-May 5, 2022


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This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of April 29-May 5, 2022.

Stark Choices for Corporate Reform



Ten Thoughts on the SEC’s Proposed Climate Disclosure Rules





The EU Taxonomy Traffic Light


SEC Gag Orders are Against Public Policy



How to Focus the Company Around ESG Priorities


Where Nonprofits Incorporate and Why It Matters


ESG During the 2022 AGM Season

ESG During the 2022 AGM Season

Stefanie Chalk is a director and Pru Bennett and Dan Lambeth are partners at Brunswick Group LLP. This post is based on their Brunswick memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value by Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales (discussed on the Forum here); Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee by Max M. Schanzenbach and Robert H. Sitkoff (discussed on the Forum here); and Social Responsibility Resolutions by Scott Hirst (discussed on the Forum here).

While the eyes of the world are on the Russia-Ukraine war, and while companies the world over are grappling with the fallout, the 2022 AGM and proxy season is quietly getting underway.

ESG is now, without question, a mainstream lens through which companies are viewed and assessed by investors. AGMs have become firmly established as a platform for shareholders to bring key ESG issues to the attention of boards and the public.

Global ESG assets are projected to surpass $41 trillion by 2022 and $50 trillion by 2025, one-third of the projected total assets under management globally, according to Bloomberg Intelligence. ESG funds represent the fastest-growing part of the global fund market.

We expect ESG issues to rank high on this year’s AGM discussions between investors and managements, continuing a strong trend we saw in 2021, when we observed the following:

  • A higher percentage of shareholder proposals on environmental issues are winning majority support. Shareholders across Europe, the US and Australia sent a clear message through their voting that they expect companies to establish robust decarbonization strategies and plans. Around 30% of shareholder resolutions on environmental issues received majority support from investors in 2021, with resolutions on specific aspects of climate action, such as lobbying, receiving more support than resolutions on corporate climate strategy. [1]
  • The “Say on Climate” campaign is gathering pace, although it received mixed reviews depending on regional investor perspectives. Say on Climate votes that were backed by company management have received high levels of investor support, often with upwards of 90% “for” votes. [2]
  • Diversity as the key social issue, with many disclosure-related diversity resolutions receiving good support. Overall, however, most shareholder resolutions on other social issues failed to get significant or received considerably lower support than environmental resolutions. [3]

Since last year’s AGMs, we have seen significant political and regulatory changes across the world, such as broad endorsement around the globe of TCFD as a standard for climate disclosures; the merger of SASB with the IIRC and the establishment of the International Sustainability Standards Board; incoming supply chain regulation in a number of Western countries; and the EU’s detailing of its Taxonomy which stipulates which corporate activities are to be regarded as sustainable and which ones are not.

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Where Nonprofits Incorporate and Why It Matters

Peter Molk is associate professor of law at the University of Florida Levin College of Law. This post is based on a recent paper by Professor Molk, forthcoming in the Iowa Law Review.

Delaware’s dominance in the race for publicly traded company incorporations is well known. Its success in attracting other types of entities, however, is less understood but no less important. In my paper Where Nonprofits Incorporate and Why It Matters, I study the incorporation behavior of nonprofits, a trillion dollar industry that employs twelve million people and includes some of the most well-known organizations in the world. I find evidence that nonprofits, like publicly traded firms, engage in intentional and strategic incorporation decisions, although at a lower rate. I also find that nonprofits’ incorporation decisions are more consistent with choosing states that maximize nonprofits’ agency costs, rather than minimize them, representing a potential “stroll to the bottom” among nonprofit corporations. The findings raise policy issues about the state of nonprofit law and regulation that I address with attainable, evidence-based solutions.

My paper has three goals. First, I develop the theoretical case for strategic nonprofit incorporations. Just as the state of incorporation can affect publicly traded firms’ cost of capital and therefore their competitive advantage, so too can it affect nonprofits’ operations. Like with traditional corporations, nonprofits’ incorporation state determines the law that governs internal disputes and the courts that often decide those disputes. This can affect nonprofits’ capital costs; although nonprofits lack investors, they often rely as a substitute on capital donations from external donors. If a state’s law and courts offer donors strong protections—such as by imposing efficient fiduciary duties on management, providing donor standing to sue, or requiring company policies on conflicted transactions and whistleblower complaints—then nonprofits that incorporate in that state could achieve lower capital costs through higher donations. The incorporation state also determines which state attorneys general have oversight responsibility for the nonprofit’s operations, which can also impact nonprofit operations. State attorneys general are charged with primary responsibility for policing nonprofits’ operations, so incorporating in a state with strong oversight could enhance donors’, employees’, customers’, and suppliers’ trust in the nonprofit, increasing the firm’s market advantage. As a matter of organizational theory, therefore, nonprofits should prefer to incorporate in some states over others, just as with publicly traded corporations.

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How to Focus the Company Around ESG Priorities

Steven Rothstein is managing director and Yamika Ketu is an associate at Ceres; and Olivia Tay is senior consultant at Semler Brossy LLC. This post is based on a Ceres/Semler Brossy client memo and article in Corporate Board Member by Mr. Rothstein, Ms. Ketu, Ms. Tay, Melissa Paschall at Ceres, and Kathryn Neel and Blair Jones at Semler Brossy LLC.

Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy – A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo Strine (discuss on the Forum here); Stakeholder Capitalism in the Time of COVID, by Lucian Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here).

Before an organization can link executive compensation to environmental, social, and governance (ESG) goals, it must establish methodologies for identifying material ESG risks and opportunities and board oversight. Once top ESG risks and strategic opportunities have been identified, a company will need to focus action on the key issues. From the board’s perspective, this will involve two large buckets: goal setting and communication.

ESG goals tend to have long time horizons—often longer than the tenure of the current executive team. This is why we emphasize the need to institutionalize ESG oversight—so that it can be consistently applied as executives come and go. But within the tenure of the current executive team, certain actions can be incentivized so that individual leaders do their part to keep the organization on track.

Setting ESG Goals

An essential function of a corporate board is to ensure that management is setting clear, meaningful goals that address organizational priorities. In the case of ESG performance, this often includes greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction goals and diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) workforce goals, and may also include other material issues, such as water use or operational safety, depending on the industry.

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One Small Step From Financial Materiality to Sesquimateriality: A Critical Conceptual Leap for the ISSB

Frederick Alexander is Founder of The Shareholder Commons; Holly Ensign-Barstow is Director of Stakeholder Governance & Policy at B Lab. This post is based on their recent paper. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value by Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales (discussed on the Forum here); Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee by Max M. Schanzenbach and Robert H. Sitkoff (discussed on the Forum here); and Exit vs. Voice by Eleonora Broccardo, Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales (discussed on the Forum here).

Corporate social responsibility. Socially responsible investing. Environmental, social and governance (ESG) integration. Sustainable investing. These phrases refer to the need for investors to pay more attention to the environmental and social (“E/S”) impacts of the businesses in which they invest.

The growing importance of this field is evident in the creation of the International Sustainability Standards Board (the “ISSB”) to establish uniform E/S disclosure standards that companies around the world will use to report to investors. The ISSB has the critical mass of support from established market participants necessary to bring the same uniformity (and thus utility) to sustainability reporting that now exists for standard financial reporting.

This article addresses a fundamental debate over the purpose of the uniform standard and reaches the following conclusions:

Four types of impact. E/S information can travel three pathways to affect investors and a fourth to affect other stakeholders:

  1. E/S Information that impacts future cash flows from the company to investors and thus the value of the enterprise (“ESG integration” or just “ESG”).
  2. E/S information that impacts the costs that companies externalize to the economy, which affect overall securities market returns (“beta”), and thus the returns of other companies in an investor’s portfolio.
  3. E/S information that involves the residue of E/S impacts that do not affect investment returns, but that impact on other matters that are important to individual investors (“non-financial investor impacts”).
  4. E/S information that does not affect investors, but is relevant to the impact companies have on civil society and stakeholders other than investors (“stakeholder data”).

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SEC Gag Orders are Against Public Policy

Phillip Goldstein is the co-founder of Bulldog Investors. This post is based on an amicus brief in Barry D. Romeril v. Securities and Exchange Commission, submitted on behalf of Mr. Goldstein, Mark CubanElon Musk, Nelson Obus, and the Investor Choice Advocates Network (“ICAN”).

Identity and Interest of Amici Curiae [1]

Amici are Mark Cuban, Phillip Goldstein, Elon Musk, Nelson Obus, and Investor Choice Advocates Network (“ICAN”). Each of the individual amici is a sophisticated businessperson and investor who has publicly litigated against the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). ICAN is a nonprofit, public interest law firm working to expand access to markets by underrepresented investors and entrepreneurs. Amici have an interest in the outcome of this case because they believe it is important that the public and the market are able to learn of the merits—or lack thereof—of the SEC’s claims against individuals or corporations as well as details about settlement negotiations. In other words, amici appreciate that, absent a compelling reason not present here, enforcement of a “gag order” regarding a settlement agreement between a litigant and the SEC is against public policy. As market participants and adverse parties to litigation with the SEC, amici have a particular interest in fostering the ability of settling defendants to comment on the SEC’s unproven claims and the circumstances that such defendants assert caused them to settle.

Summary of the Argument

The SEC’s prohibition against settling defendants criticizing the SEC’s unproven allegations raises important First Amendment and Due Process Clause issues, as noted by the Petitioner. Amici raise a complementary consideration warranting review: there is no compelling public policy reason to enforce SEC “gag orders” against defendants who settle with the SEC. In fact, the opposite is true. In the statutes and regulations the SEC is responsible for enforcing (and by its own actions, public statements, and admissions), the SEC requires full transparency and disclosure for the benefit of participants in securities markets. There is no compelling justification for the SEC to break from this responsibility and single out for concealment and opacity information from defendants who settle with the SEC. To the contrary, preventing these settling defendants from speaking freely deprives the securities markets of potentially material information and so may harm the very market participants for whose benefit the SEC pursues transparency and disclosure. These important additional considerations weigh in favor of granting the petition.

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The EU Taxonomy Traffic Light

Francesca Odell and Maurits Dolmans are partners and Clara Cibrario Assereto is an associate at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP. This post is based on a Cleary memorandum by Ms. Odell, Mr. Dolmans, Ms. Assereto, and Andreas Wildner.

Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here); and Stakeholder Capitalism in the Time of COVID, by Lucian Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here).

Regulation (EU) 2020/852 (the “Taxonomy”) in 2020 established an EU-wide framework for classification of economic activity as environmentally sustainable (or “green”). This framework is intended to provide businesses and investors with a standardized understanding to identify sustainable financial products and investments. The ultimate purpose of the Taxonomy is to direct capital flows towards green activities, and to prevent greenwashing.

On March 29, 2022, the European “Platform on Sustainable Finance” expert group published its report on a future “Extended Environmental Taxonomy”.

The report aims to support the European Commission, as it considers whether and how to extend the Taxonomy to cover activities that have an ambiguous impact on environmental sustainability (“amber”), and those that—at the opposite extreme—have a significantly detrimental impact on the environment (“red”).

This post provides an overview of the Platform’s preparatory work, the likely structure of the Taxonomy’s future “traffic light system”, and its implications for firms.

I. Context

The EU’s Taxonomy framework (in force since 2021) so far covers only environmental sustainability objectives and environmentally sustainable activities. [1]

Article 26 of the Taxonomy (on follow-on regulatory initiatives), however, mandates the Commission to explore how to extend the Taxonomy beyond green activities, in two distinct ways:

  • To include social and governance sustainability objectives; and
  • As regards environmental sustainability objectives, to also address low-impact and red (i.e., non-“green”) activities.

We analysed the Platform’s preparatory work on social and governance sustainability (item (a)) in a recent memorandum. [2] This post addresses item (b), i.e., further work on environmental sustainability, and specifically the recent “Extended Environmental Taxonomy” report (the “Report”). [3]

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Proposed SEC Rule on Private Fund Advisers

Andrew Weiss, a Professor Emeritus of Economics at Boston University, is Chief Executive Officer of Weiss Asset Management. This post is based on his recent comment letter to the Securities and Exchange Commission.

This post is based on a comment letter that I submitted on the Security and Exchange Commission’s proposed rules governing Private Fund Advisers, File No. S7-03-22 (the “Proposed Rules”). Specifically, I am commenting below on the section of the Proposed Rules entitled Prohibited Activities, which among other things, would forbid investment advisers from charging investors in private funds for the expenses and fees associated with complying with regulations, as well as cost incurred from examinations and investigations. While I applaud the Commission for revisiting regulations to see if they need to be revised in the face of changing market conditions, I am deeply concerned that the proposals, as written, will affect the actions of fund advisers in ways that will result in material adverse consequences for the very investors that the Commission was intending to help. I believe that once the Commission is fully cognizant of the “knock-on” effects of the Proposed Rules regarding charging investors for compliance costs, those rules will be dropped from the proposed list of prohibited activities.

By way of background, for most of my adult life I was an academic economist. [1] My academic research focused on market inefficiencies, and the role for government interventions when there is asymmetric information or principal agent problems. In the case of a private fund, the investor (the principal) can’t control the actions of the adviser (the agent). My published research in referred journals, involved proving theorems showing how unfettered competition can lead to inefficient outcomes. This background has made me more supportive of the role of the Commission in correcting for market failures than might be the case had I taken a different career path.

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The Quality of Earnings Information in Dual-Class Firms

Rimona Palas is an Associate Professor and head of the Accounting Department at the College of Law and Business; and Dov Solomon is an Associate Professor and head of the Commercial Law Department at the College of Law and Business, Ramat Gan Law School. This post is based on their recent paper. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock  (discussed on the Forum here); The Perils of Small-Minority Controllers (discussed on the Forum here); and Keynote Presentation on The Lifecycle Theory of Dual-Class Structures (discussed on the Forum here), all by Lucian Bebchuk, and Kobi Kastiel.

When Google went public with a dual-class capital structure in which shares owned by the founders confer greater voting rights than shares issued to public investors, its cofounders, Larry Page and Sergey Brin, sent shareholders a letter promising to provide them with high-quality information about the company. Using the words of Warren Buffett, the chairman and CEO of Berkshire Hathaway, another dual-class firm, they promised shareholders, “We won’t ‘smooth’ quarterly or annual results: If earnings figures are lumpy when they reach headquarters, they will be lumpy when they reach you.” Page, Brin, and Buffett definitely understood the importance of quality information to their investors. But do dual-class firms really provide investors with credible financial information?

The results of previous research regarding the quality of information provided by dual-class firms have been mixed, representing two competing explanations. On one hand, agency theory suggests that the controlling shareholders of dual-class firms would be interested in providing lower-quality information to investors, while on the other hand management’s insulation from market pressures reduces the need to manipulate earnings in order to achieve short-term goals and thus increases the informativeness of the financial reports of dual-class firms.

In The Quality of Earnings Information in Dual-Class Firms: Persistence and Predictability, forthcoming in the Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting, we examine the quality of the financial reports of dual- versus single-class firms publicly traded in the U.S. over the 2012–2017 period, as measured by persistence and predictive ability of earnings and cash flows. The results are based on comprehensive information from financial statements analyzed using across-sample and within-sample tests. An additional external indicator of financial restatement filings is also used to support the results.

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Lessons from Huntsman’s Proxy Fight Victory Over Starboard

Daniel E. Wolf is partner at Kirkland & Ellis LLP. This post is based on a Kirkland & Ellis memorandum by Mr. Wolf, Edward J. Lee, Shaun J. Mathew, Evan Johnson, and Arjun Karthikeyan. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum here); Dancing with Activists by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, and Thomas Keusch (discussed on the Forum here); and Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

  • Huntsman’s recent proxy contest against Starboard marked the first time in seven years that a company achieved a complete victory at the ballot box against a prominent activist hedge fund without ISS support.

  • As the SEC’s new universal proxy regime increases leverage for activist investors, companies should carefully study the strategies and tactics that have been effective in winning proxy contests and improving leverage in settlement negotiations.

The SEC’s new universal proxy regime takes effect in September 2022, dramatically reducing the cost of admission for activists to run proxy contests. This shift is likely to have significant implications, including (1) activists launching more campaigns, particularly by first-time and non-traditional activists, (2) activists nominating more candidates in each campaign, and (3) activists more frequently obtaining at least some board representation. As the new regime increases leverage for activist investors, companies should carefully study the strategies and tactics that have been effective in winning proxy contests and improving leverage in settlement negotiations.

In September 2021, Starboard Value, one of the most prolific activist hedge funds, launched a proxy fight seeking to replace members of the board of directors of our client, Huntsman Corporation. After six months of engagement and a contentious public campaign, Huntsman prevailed at the ballot box, with its shareholders rejecting each of Starboard’s four nominees by at least a 10% margin. Huntsman’s victory marked a rare example where a company successfully prevented a prominent activist hedge fund from winning at least one seat in a proxy fight that went the distance. The win was particularly notable because it was achieved without ISS support.

While each activist engagement is different, we outline below a few lessons from Huntsman’s preparation and response to this contest that companies may wish to consider when facing an activist:

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