Yearly Archives: 2024

Relative TSR Awards: Challenges and Trade-Offs

Szu Ho is a Principal, Ira Kay is a Managing Partner, and Joadi Oglesby is a Consultant at Pay Governance LLC. This post is based on their Pay Governance memorandum.

Introduction

Thousands of companies, including more than 70% of the S&P 500 companies, grant performance stock units (PSUs) with relative total shareholder return (TSR) or stock price performance-vesting conditions. These incentives can be very motivational, help align management rewards with shareholder returns, and are strongly favored by some investors and proxy advisors. Nevertheless, differing perspectives on the value of these awards, affecting the sizing of grants, may impact the motivational power of these grants.

Companies granting relative TSR-PSUs are faced with the dilemma of how to determine the number of shares being granted. This question comes up often as compensation committees and/or management wonder if the grant date value being delivered is aligned with the intended grant value. Choosing market stock price (either as of the grant date or average toward the grant date) or a Monte Carlo valuation to determine the number of shares being granted can be more complex than one would think, given each calibration approach typically results in a different number of shares. This Viewpoint is intended to help inform companies of the various trade-offs, and it can be used as a general guide to help companies decide which approach makes the most sense for their circumstances.

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Chancery Finds Deal Price is the “Least Bad” Methodology to Appraise Fair Value of an Early-Stage Company—FairXchange

Gail Weinstein is a Senior Counsel, Philip Richter is a Partner, and Steven Epstein is a Managing Partner at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP. This post is based on a Fried Frank memorandum by Ms. Weinstein, Mr. Richter, Mr. Epstein, Steve Steinman, Roy Tannenbaum, and Peter Simmons, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

In Hyde Park v. FairXchange (July 30, 2024), the petitioner sought appraisal by the Court of Chancery of its shares of FairXchange, LLC (“FairX”), a nascent securities exchange that was acquired by Coinbase Global, Inc. Although neither party argued for reliance on the deal price to determine appraised fair value, and the court viewed the sale process as seriously flawed, the court held that reliance on the deal price was the “least bad” methodology to determine appraised fair value of an early-stage company with a plan to disrupt the market and no track record. Vice Chancellor Laster determined fair value to be equal to the deal price—$330 million (equating to $10.42 per share). The petitioner had proposed a valuation of $573 million, based on a DCF analysis; and the respondent had proposed a valuation of not more than $150 million, based on certain market-based factors.

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Audit Committee Practices Report

Krista Parsons is a Managing Director at Deloitte LLP and Vanessa Teitelbaum is a Senior Director at the Center for Audit Quality. This post is based on their Deloitte memorandum.

Key Findings

As the regulatory environment grows in complexity and organizations address new and continuing challenges, additional expectations are placed on audit committees. The scope of their responsibilities continues to expand beyond the traditional remit of financial reporting and internal controls, internal and external audit, and ethics and compliance programs.

Topics like cybersecurity, artificial intelligence (AI), and climate are now regularly showing up on many audit committee agendas, especially when it’s a matter of complying with regulatory disclosure requirements. In this report, we highlight the top five priorities—cybersecurity, enterprise risk management, finance and internal audit talent, compliance with laws and regulations, and finance transformation—that were identified by audit committee members who participated in the survey.

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A Deeper Look at the Scope, Impact, and Risks of Company Political Spending

Bruce F. Freed is President and Co-Founder and Jeanne Hanna is a Research Director at the Center for Political Accountability. This post is based on their CPA memorandum.

What exactly is the scope and impact of corporate political spending? Much has been written about the risks – legal, reputational and bottom line – faced by companies engaging in this spending. But it has been unclear how donations by publicly traded companies using treasury funds compare with donations by corporate PACs, by individuals and by labor PACs. What’s more, where is company treasury money routed? What is the role of third-party groups in company political spending? How consequential is it? What does it enable, and what does it associate companies with?

The Center for Political Accountability (CPA) has used spending at the state level for its case study. It has focused on company giving to six partisan, state-focused political committees known as 527s. These groups are the governors associations, state legislative campaign committees and attorneys general associations of both parties. They are popularly known as 527s after the section of the Internal Revenue Code under which they are governed. Contributions to, and spending by, 527 groups are publicly disclosed but difficult to track.

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DExit Drivers: Is Delaware’s Dominance Threatened?

Stephen M. Bainbridge is the William D. Warren Distinguished Professor of Law at UCLA School of Law. This post is based on his article forthcoming in the Journal of Corporation Law, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

For over a century, Delaware has dominated the competition for corporate charters. Over the last several decades, however, a number of states have attempted to chip away at Delaware’s lead. The most successful of these competitors has been Nevada, but other states such as Texas, Maryland, and Wyoming have also sought to gain incorporations. This competition recently made headlines when Elon Musk advised his followers on X.com to never incorporate their business in Delaware, which triggered discussion in both the popular and legal press about whether companies might leave Delaware for purportedly more friendly climes. My article DExit Drivers: Is Delaware’s Dominance Threatened? provides both an empirical and a qualitative analysis of firms that reincorporated from Delaware to another state between 2012 and 2024. It analyzes these firms based on size, filing status, and new state, along with their stated motivations for reincorporating.

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Weekly Roundup: August 30-September 5, 2024


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of August 30-September 5, 2024

Misalignment Under the Radar: Stealth Dual-Class Stock


The tech-forward boardroom: Fostering richer boardroom conversations on technology


SEC Files Brief in Support of Climate Disclosure Rules


Will A Bump-Up Exclusion Bar Coverage of an M&A Settlement?


Private company outlook: Governance


Proxy Season Global Briefing: Executive Pay


The Politicization of Social Responsibility


Dealing with Activist Hedge Funds and Other Activist Investors


FTC Noncompete Rule Is Set Aside, But Appeal Is Expected and States May Act


Watch Your Derivatives: The Role 13Fs Play in Detecting Shareholder Activism


Watch Your Derivatives: The Role 13Fs Play in Detecting Shareholder Activism

David Farkas is the Head of Shareholder Intelligence at Georgeson LLC. This post is based on an article that was featured in the July/August 2024 issue of The Deal Lawyers.

SEC Form 13F public filings can help companies understand whether the threat of a proxy fight is imminent and, crucially, take steps to defend themselves.

13F filings, as they’re known, reveal the share position of institutional investors or funds and help companies understand whether a specific investor is beginning to accumulate a larger portion of shares inside their firms. This is a requirement for investors with more than $100 million in equity assets under management.

However, investors do not need to disclose this information until 45 days after the quarter end. For example, if an investor acquired a 4.9% equity position in a company during the first half of January, it only needs to file a 13F with the SEC by May 15.

As a result, a significant gap exists between the point an investor builds up a position in a company and the time such share position information is available.

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FTC Noncompete Rule Is Set Aside, But Appeal Is Expected and States May Act

David E. Schwartz, Parker Rider-Longmaid, and Joseph M. Rancour are Partners at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. This post is based on a Skadden memorandum by Mr. Schwartz, Mr. Rider-Longmaid, Mr. Rancour, Tara L. Reinhart and Connor A. Riser.

On August 20, 2024, in Ryan LLC v. Federal Trade Commission, a district court in the Northern District of Texas held “unlawful and set[] aside” the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) Non-Compete Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 910.1–.6. That rule, which was scheduled to take effect on September 4, 2024, would have broadly banned virtually all noncompete clauses between employers and workers in the United States.

In Ryan, the plaintiff and plaintiff-intervenors challenged the rule as exceeding the FTC’s statutory authority and as unconstitutional and arbitrary and capricious. Siding with the challengers, the court held that the FTC exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating the rule and that the rule is arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The district court thus ordered that the rule “shall not be enforced or otherwise take effect.”

That decision tees up a likely Fifth Circuit appeal from the FTC. Meanwhile, a Florida federal district court has also preliminarily enjoined the Non-Compete Rule, while a Pennsylvania federal district court has refused to do so, suggesting a likelihood of a different result. Those proceedings thus put the focus on the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits and raise the possibility of circuit conflict.

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Dealing with Activist Hedge Funds and Other Activist Investors

Martin Lipton is a Founding Partner at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Lipton, Steve Rosenblum, Elina Tetelbaum, Karessa Cain, Carmen Lu, and Anna Dimitrijevic.

Activism has remained robust over the past year, following a post-pandemic rebound. As we have previously noted, regardless of industry, size or performance, no company is too large, too popular, too new or too successful to consider itself immune from activism. Although poor stock price performance and operational and strategic missteps can increase vulnerability, even companies that are respected industry leaders and have outperformed the market and their peers have been and are being targeted by activists. Companies of various sizes have faced and remain susceptible to attacks from multiple activists at once, whether from a “wolf pack” of activist funds acting together or independent activists “swarming” the company at the same time. And activists are not averse to waging multi-year campaigns; even companies that have successfully fended off activism may still find themselves targeted by the same or a different activist in successive years.

Amid ongoing macroeconomic uncertainty, activist theses focused on cost-cutting, capital allocation and management succession have taken a front seat next to M&A theses, particularly at companies facing cash flow headwinds and slowing revenue and margin growth. While the largest and most established activists continue to dominate activism activity, smaller and emerging activists have deployed less predictable (and often public) strategies to make their mark. Even a relatively unknown activist with a small ownership position can garner enough attention from the media to put the target company, regardless of its size, in an unwanted limelight.

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The Politicization of Social Responsibility

Todd Gormley is a Professor of Finance at Washington University in St. Louis, Manish Jha is an Assistant Professor of Finance at Georgia State University, and Meng Wang is an Assistant Professor of Finance at the University of South Florida. This post is based on their recent working paper.

Our paper analyzes whether institutional investors’ votes on environmental and social proposals, commonly referred to as socially responsible investing (SRI) proposals, differ with which political party currently controls the government of the firm’s headquarters state. We find that institutional investors are less likely to back these proposals for firms headquartered in states governed by Republican leaders. This reduced support concentrates in recent years when political rhetoric around corporate social responsibility (CSR) became more polarized and among larger institutions and firms, which tend to attract more attention from politicians.

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