Monthly Archives: January 2025

Thoughts for Boards: Key Issues in Corporate Governance for 2025

Martin Lipton is a Founding Partner at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Lipton, Steven A. Rosenblum, Karessa L. Cain, Elina Tetelbaum, and Hannah Clark.

As we look ahead to the challenges and opportunities facing boards of directors in this new year, it is illuminating to reflect on how much has changed in corporate governance. Over the last five decades, we have been on the front lines with our clients as the evolution of corporate governance has been propelled by multiple crises and systemic shocks—including the Enron and WorldCom scandals and ensuing Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, which prompted incremental layers of disclosure and regulations, followed by the financial crisis and subsequent Dodd-Frank reforms, and most recently the Covid pandemic, which intensified the spotlight on ESG and stakeholder governance. In the private ordering arena, ISS and shareholder activists were remarkably successful in changing the status quo for once-common governance features like staggered board structures, and we saw the shelving of poison pills—a defense we originated and subsequently defended in Moran, Airgas and other cases. These trends have, in turn, increased the prevalence and omnipresent threat of proxy fights. And as the corporate governance debates have continued to evolve, we have seen institutional investors become increasingly active participants, with detailed and often diverging policies setting forth their priorities, preferences and perspectives on issues ranging from climate disclosures to DEI to over-boarded directors. The compounding effect is that boards today are expected to navigate a corporate governance landscape that has become much more complex and nuanced, with an expanding set of expectations for their oversight role and responsibilities.

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Weekly Roundup: January 24-30, 2025


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This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of January 24-30, 2025

Private Equity—2024 Review and 2025 Outlook


Insider Trading Policies: A Survey of Recent Filings


Climate and Sustainability Regulations: 2024 End-of-Year Review


SEC Enforcement: 2024 Year in Review


The Impact of Impact Investing


Equity Plan Proposals: Strong Shareholder Support Continued in 2024


M&A Predictions and Guidance for 2025


Corporate Ownership and ESG Performance


S&P 500 CEO Compensation Trends


Key Considerations for the 2025 Annual Reporting and Proxy Season


How To Implement Shareholder Democracy


Americas Board Priorities 2025


Corporate Governance and the Grievance-Based Society


CEO Turnover at Dual-Class Firms


The 2025 Board Agenda


The 2025 Board Agenda

Christine Davine is a Managing Partner, Bob Lamm is an Independent Senior Advisor, and Caroline Schoenecker is an Experience Director at Deloitte LLP. This post is based on a Deloitte memorandum by Ms. Davine, Mr. Lamm, Ms. Schoenecker, and Jamie McCall.

Perhaps one practice older than predicting the future is talking about it. One of the oldest quotations about the future is attributed to Greek philosopher Heraclitus, who lived in the fifth or sixth century B.C. and is reported to have said, “The only thing constant is change.” Some years later, Shakespeare said, “The past is prologue.” However, as we consider what boards of directors will likely be dealing with in 2025, a quotation from a more modern philosopher, Jon Bon Jovi, seems particularly apt: “Map out your future—but do it in pencil.[1]

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CEO Turnover at Dual-Class Firms

Yifat Aran is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Haifa School of Law, Brian Broughman is a Professor of Law at Vanderbilt University Law School, and Elizabeth Pollman is a Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Institute for Law and Economics at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School. This post is based on their recent paper.

Dual-class structures remain a hotly contested topic in corporate governance.  Over the past two decades, the use of dual-class structures has expanded significantly, particularly among venture capital (VC) backed tech companies. Critics contend that high-vote shares increase agency costs and entrench underperforming executives. Proponents argue that dual-class structures shield founders from short-term market pressures, preserving their ability to pursue innovation and long-term growth. As a form of compromise, the current policy debate largely focuses on sunset provisions that would convert high-vote shares to single-vote shares after a set period or upon certain triggers. But regardless of their stance on dual-class structures’ merits, most participants in the debate have assumed that dual-class structures entrench founder-CEOs.

In our working paper, “CEO Turnover at Dual-Class Firms,” we analyze CEO turnover at U.S. VC-backed firms that went public between 2002 and 2020. Our findings reveal that CEOs at dual-class firms generally remain in their roles longer post-IPO compared to those at a matched set of single-class firms. However, once we account for the higher rate of M&A sales of single-class firms, this gap in CEO tenure largely disappears. More specifically, despite dual-class CEOs holding, on average, three times more voting power post-IPO than single-class CEOs, their risk of being replaced internally – where the board replaces the CEO or the CEO resigns – is not significantly different. Further, contrary to expectations, we find no evidence that a larger gap between voting rights and economic ownership reduces turnover risk. Both single- and dual-class firms are more likely to replace their CEO, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, following poor shareholder returns, and this performance sensitivity persists regardless of the CEO’s voting power—suggesting that market accountability mechanisms remain active even in dual-class structures.

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Corporate Governance and the Grievance-Based Society

Michael W. Peregrine is a Partner at McDermott Will & Emery LLP.

Edelman has prepared its on-line “Trust Barometer” survey on an annual basis for the last 25 years.  The Barometer reflects the input of over 33,000 respondents from 28 countries (including the United States).  The focus of the Barometer is to measure the influence of trust among major institutions.

As such, the Barometer has become a notable “trust” resource for corporate boards across borders and industry sectors, as they evaluate their strategies, corporate purposes and civic/social engagement.  This, as consumer trust is increasingly recognized as a significant – if intangible – asset of most business organizations.

In this regard, boards should consider “trust” as a concept separate and distinct from “reputation”.  Both are valued attributes of an effective enterprise.  But degrees of “trust” are typically generated by internal and external perceptions of organizational ethics, integrity and corporate responsibility.  Degrees of “reputation”, on the other hand, are typically generated by perceptions of the quality of a company’s goods and services, the success of its corporate strategies and initiatives, and its overall public image.  Organizational “trust” may have a significant impact on organizational “reputation”, but the opposite is not always automatic.

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Americas Board Priorities 2025

Robyn Bew is a Boardroom Advisor, Jamie C. Smith is a Director, and Barton Edgerton is the Center for Board Matters Corporate Governance Research Leader at EY. This post is based on their EY memorandum.

Leading boards will help their companies make intentional choices in order to survive and thrive in times of uncertainty.

In brief

  • Uncertainty persists as dynamic forces shape the business context. Boards will adapt their oversight to help management act with intention and confidence.
  • To support transformation, boards will guide portfolio reviews, connect oversight of technology security and innovation, and encourage talent competitiveness.
  • Boards will prioritize scenario planning on geopolitical, economic, labor and climate outcomes to build resilience and enable agility.

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How To Implement Shareholder Democracy

Luigi Zingales is the Robert C. McCormack Distinguished Service Professor of Entrepreneurship and Finance at The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, Oliver D. Hart is the Lewis P. and Linda L. Geyser University Professor at Harvard University, and Helene E. Landemore is a Professor of Political Science at Yale University. This post is based on their recent paper.

An Alternative Way to Let Investors Choose 

How should asset managers make decisions in today’s world? Last year, fifteen Republican state finance chiefs lambasted Larry Fink both for sacrificing the return of his investors to advance his climate agenda and for profiting from his investments in China at the expense of U.S. security. The Republicans wanted value maximization to trump climate considerations but not national security. One could easily imagine Democrats wanting the opposite. Meanwhile, the idea of separating value from values is unappealing to an increasing number of young investors, who care about what they buy, who they work for, and where they invest. Whichever way you look at it, gone are the days when asset managers could do their jobs unencumbered by moral and political considerations.

Large asset managers, like Blackrock, Vanguard, and State Street, have been quick to recognize the catch-22 they are in: good old value-maximization in the name of a restrictively understood “fiduciary interest” is no longer cutting it. But in turn any explicitly moralized or political use of their concentrated power puts a political target on their backs and subjects them to public opprobrium. Further, while asset manangers can provide expertise on how many dollars will be lost by pursuing an ethical or environment-friendly strategy, they cannot provide any insights, nor do they have any legitimacy, concerning whether the trade-off is worth it, i.e., whether the moral gains exceed the monetary losses, or whether the moral dimension trumps the financial one altogether.

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Key Considerations for the 2025 Annual Reporting and Proxy Season

Maia Gez, Scott Levi, and Michelle Rutta are Partners at White & Case LLP. This post is based on a White & Case memorandum by Ms. Gez, Mr. Levi, Ms. Rutta, Danielle Herrick, and Melinda Anderson.

Each year in our Annual Memo, White & Case’s Public Company Advisory Group provides practical insights on preparing Annual Reports on Form 10-Ks, Annual Meeting Proxy Statements and, for FPIs, the Annual Report on Form 20-F. This installment of our Annual Memo will focus on preparations for your Form 10-K, divided into two sections: Annual Report on Form 10-K Housekeeping Considerations in Part I below, and Disclosure Considerations in Part II below.

With the inauguration of President Trump on January 20, 2025, public companies await the impact of the new administration on the SEC. President Trump’s pick for the next SEC Chair, Paul Atkins, is an experienced appointee, having previously served as SEC Commissioner from August 2002 until 2008 as an appointee of former President George W. Bush. [1] Atkins will assume office following an unprecedented period of SEC rulemaking impacting public companies, with approximately 50 new substantive SEC rules adopted over the past four years, including three rules that were subsequently vacated by courts holding that the SEC had overreached its authority. [2] Despite an expected change in approach by the new administration away from prescriptive rulemaking and towards a more principles based approach, it is important to note that the SEC’s recent rule changes and guidance remain in effect and public companies remain subject to them, absent further action by the SEC.

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S&P 500 CEO Compensation Trends

Aubrey Bout is a Managing Partner, and Perla Cuevas and Brian Wilby are Consultants, at Pay Governance LLC. This post is based on their Pay Governance memorandum.

  • In 2023, median CEO actual total direct compensation (TDC)* among S&P 500 companies was $16.1M, reflecting an increase of 14% from prior year, driven by an uptick in long-term incentive (LTI) levels.
  • The substantial rise in CEO TDC is aligned with a notable 26% increase in 2023 total shareholder return (TSR).
  • CEO pay increases are typically correlated with strong TSR performance. In the years TSR was negative (2 of the previous 13 years), CEO pay remained relatively flat. However, in 11 years with positive TSR, CEO pay increased 6%, on average.
  • 2024 CEO pay levels will likely increase due to strong TSR of 25%. However, following the high CEO pay increases in 2023, the increase in actual 2024 CEO pay may be more modest. In 2025, following 2 years of strong TSR, we expect CEO target TDC increases will continue though the increases will likely be more modest.

*TDC = sum of base salary, annual actual bonus incentive payments, and the grant date fair value of LTI awards.

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Corporate Ownership and ESG Performance

Peter Tufano is a Baker Foundation Professor at Harvard Business School, Belen Villalonga is a Professor of Management and Organizations at New York University Stern School of Business, and Boya Wang is a Senior Researcher at the Center for Business Research, University of Cambridge. This post is based on their recent article forthcoming in the Journal of Corporate Finance.

Does ownership matter?  With average holding periods of publicly-traded stock measured in months, share ownership may not effect firm’s long-term practices and activities.  Yet, large shareholders surely have a stronger voice than others and their holding periods are considerably longer. Hence, their preferences might influence the choices made by firms, especially regarding corporate practices around environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues. Ownership might be particularly relevant when these material owners are governments, members of founding families, or executives of the firms. These and other large owners may not only care about how well their firms perform financially, but also about how they behave—or are perceived to behave. While corporate ESG scores are criticized as being imprecise—and more recently been the subject of severe political backlash—they convey important information on how firms carry out their business, what risks they assume, how they treat various stakeholders, and how they communicate all of this to the world.

We test if material owners are a key driver of firms’ policies and practices regarding corporate sustainability, given their incentives and ability to influence certain ESG initiatives. Our paper studies whether and how the presence of different types of material owners can explain the ESG choices of the businesses they own, using a sample of 3,083 public corporations from 62 different countries over 18 years.

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