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HLS Faculty & Senior Fellows
Program on Corporate Governance Advisory Board
- Peter Atkins
- David Bell
- Kerry E. Berchem
- Richard Brand
- Daniel Burch
- Paul Choi
- Jesse Cohn
- Arthur B. Crozier
- Renata J. Ferrari
- Andrew Freedman
- Ray Garcia
- Joseph Hall
- Jason M. Halper William P. Mills
- David Millstone
- Theodore Mirvis
- Philip Richter
- Elina Tetelbaum
- Sebastian Tiller
- Marc Trevino
- Steven J. Williams
Author Archives: Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation
Corporate Risk-Taking and the Decline of Personal Blame
Editor’s Note: Steven L. Schwarcz is the Stanley A. Star Professor of Law & Business at Duke University School of Law.
Federal agencies and prosecutors are being criticized for seeking so few indictments against individuals in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and its resulting banking failures. This article analyzes why—contrary to a longstanding historical trend—personal liability may be on the decline, and whether agencies and prosecutors should be doing more. The analysis confronts fundamental policy questions concerning changing corporate and social norms. The public and the media perceive the crisis’s harm as a “wrong” caused by excessive risk-taking. But that view can be too simplistic, ignoring the reality that firms must take greater risks to try to innovate and create value in the increasingly competitive and complex global economy. This article examines how law should control that risk-taking and internalize its costs without impeding broader economic progress, focusing on two key elements of that inquiry: the extent to which corporate risk-taking should be regarded as excessive, and the extent to which personal liability should be used to control that excessive risk-taking.
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Posted in Academic Research, Banking & Financial Institutions, Securities Litigation & Enforcement
Tagged Corporate liability, Liability standards, Moral hazard, Risk, Risk-taking, Securities enforcement, Shadow banking, Systemic risk
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Securities Class Action Filings—2014 Year in Review
Editor’s Note: John Gould is senior vice president at Cornerstone Research. This post discusses a Cornerstone Research report by Cornerstone Research and the Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, titled “Securities Class Action Filings—2014 Year in Review,” available here.
Number and Size of Filings
- Plaintiffs filed 170 new federal class action securities cases (filings) in 2014—four more than in 2013. The number of 2014 filings was 10 percent below the historical average of 189 filings observed annually between 1997 and 2013.
- The total Maximum Dollar Loss (MDL) of filings in 2014 was $215 billion, or 66 percent below the historical annual average of $630 billion. MDL was at its lowest level since 1997.
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Posted in Mergers & Acquisitions, Practitioner Publications, Securities Litigation & Enforcement
Tagged Class actions, Erica John Fund v. Halliburton, Halliburton, IPOs, Mergers & acquisitions, Securities litigation
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SEC Dissemination in a High-Frequency World
Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Douglas Skinner and Sarah Zechman, both of the Accounting Area at the University of Chicago, and Jonathan Rogers of the Accounting Division at the University of Colorado at Boulder.
Understanding the mechanics of public dissemination of firm information has become especially critical in a world where trading advantages are now measured in fractions of a second. In our study, Run EDGAR Run: SEC Dissemination in a High-Frequency World, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we examine the SEC’s process for disseminating insider trading filings. We find that, in the majority of cases, filings are available to private paying subscribers of the SEC feeds before they are posted to the SEC website, with an average private advantage of 10.5 seconds.
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Posted in Academic Research, Accounting & Disclosure, Securities Regulation
Tagged Disclosure, EDGAR, Filings, High-frequency trading, Information asymmetries, Information environment, Insider trading, SEC, Securities regulation
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SEC to Review Excluding Conflicting Proxy Proposals under Rule 14a-8
Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Robert B. Schumer, chair of the Corporate Department at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, and is based on a Paul Weiss client memorandum.
SEC Chair Mary Jo White has directed the Division of Corporation Finance (“Corporation Finance”) to review its position on Rule 14a-8(i)(9), which allows a company to exclude a shareholder proposal from the company’s proxy materials if it “conflicts” with the company’s own proposal to be submitted to shareholders at the same meeting. As a result of this direction, Corporation Finance will express “no views” on the application of Rule 14a-8(i)(9) this proxy season.
The catalyst for this development was a shareholder proposal submitted by proponent James McRitchie to Whole Foods Market, Inc., requesting that the company adopt “proxy access” procedures generally to allow one or more shareholders owning at least 3% of the company’s voting securities for three or more years to nominate up to 20% of the board of directors via the company’s proxy materials. Whole Foods countered with its own proposal that included significantly different share ownership and holding period thresholds and director nominee caps, but nevertheless was granted no-action relief by Corporation Finance, allowing it to exclude the McRitchie proposal under Rule 14a-8(i)(9) on the basis that it conflicted with Whole Foods’ proposal and the proposals would “present alternative and conflicting decisions for the Company’s shareholders that would likely result in inconsistent and ambiguous results”. Thereafter, Mr. McRitchie, the Council of Institutional Investors and others have called for the SEC to review its position on these “conflicts”, which SEC Chair White has now done. Corporation Finance has since effectively rescinded its no-action relief to Whole Foods and stated that it has no view of Rule 14a-8(i)(9).
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Posted in Corporate Elections & Voting, Practitioner Publications
Tagged James McRitchie, No-action letters, Proxy access, Proxy materials, Rule 14a-8, SEC, Shareholder proposals
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Does Group Affiliation Facilitate Access to External Financing?
Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Ronald Masulis, Peter Pham, and Jason Zein, all of the School of Banking & Finance at the University of New South Wales.
Across the world, difficulties in accessing external equity capital create a serious barrier to the development of new firms. In developed economies, this funding gap is bridged by angel investors and venture capitalists. In emerging economies however, contracting mechanisms and property rights protections are often insufficiently developed to support substantial venture capital activity. As a consequence, little is known about new venture funding in such economies and how external financing constraints are overcome.
In our paper titled “Does Group Affiliation Facilitate Access to External Financing? Evidence from IPOs by Family Business Groups,” which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we investigate a major source of funding support for new firms—namely, internal equity investments by business groups, especially those controlled by families, and how this facilitates access to external equity markets. Our study is motivated by the pervasive nature of business group participation in international initial public offering (IPO) markets around the world: on average, 29 percent of new issue proceeds in each country is attributable to group-affiliated firms. This raises an important question regarding the role that business groups play in assisting new firms seeking to tap public equity markets. It also raises important questions about whether ignoring the existence of business groups creates serious biases in studies of international IPO activity.
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Posted in Academic Research, Empirical Research, International Corporate Governance & Regulation
Tagged Business groups, Corporate pyramids, Emerging markets, Equity capital, Financing conditions, International governance, IPOs
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Jurisdiction Shifting—Creative Structuring Opportunities
Editor’s Note: Daniel Wolf is a partner at Kirkland & Ellis focusing on mergers and acquisitions. The following post is based on a Kirkland memorandum by Mr. Wolf, Sarkis Jebejian, and David B. Feirstein.
As we have noted in prior M&A Updates, when dealmakers face a transaction where one or both of the parties are incorporated outside the Delaware comfort zone, they often confront unexpected structuring issues unique to entities or deals undertaken in that state or country. These may include corporate law, tax, accounting or structuring concerns and, most often, the deal teams will have to adjust the transaction terms to accommodate these issues.
But a recent decision from the Virginia Supreme Court is a timely reminder that, on occasion, these issues can be managed using some resourceful and creative structuring involving shifting jurisdictions. In the case, a Virginia corporation planned to sell its assets which, under Virginia law, would trigger appraisal rights for minority stockholders. Seemingly to avoid this result, the seller undertook a multi-step restructuring ahead of the sale which began with a “domestication” under Virginia law that shifted its jurisdiction of incorporation to Delaware. Under the Virginia statute, no appraisal rights apply to such a reincorporation. Once reincorporated in Delaware, the seller continued its restructuring, ultimately selling its assets to the buyer. Notably, Delaware does not provide for appraisal rights in an asset sale. The Virginia court dismissed the minority stockholders’ argument that they were entitled to appraisal rights. It rejected a “steps transaction” argument that looked to collapse the multiple steps and focus on the substance of the transaction (i.e., a sale of the company’s assets to the buyer), favoring instead the seller’s assertion that the first-stage move to Delaware had independent legal significance and therefore was effective to shift the appraisal rights analysis to Delaware law.
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Posted in Court Cases, Mergers & Acquisitions, Practitioner Publications
Tagged Jurisdiction, Mergers & acquisitions, State law
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Wolf Pack Activism
Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Alon Brav, Professor of Finance at Duke University; Amil Dasgupta of the Department of Finance at the London School of Economics; and Richmond Mathews of the Department of Finance at the University of Maryland.
In our paper Wolf Pack Activism, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we provide a model analyzing a prominent and controversial governance tactic used by activist hedge funds. The tactic involves multiple hedge funds or other activist investors congregating around a target, with one acting as a “lead” activist and others as peripheral activists. This has been colorfully dubbed the “wolf pack” tactic by market observers. The use of wolf packs has intensified in recent years and has attracted a great deal of attention. Indeed, a recent post on this forum described 2014 as “the year of the wolf pack”.
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Posted in Academic Research
Tagged Blockholders, Hedge funds, Shareholder activism
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Regulation S-K Failure to Disclose Creates Liability Under Section 10(b)
Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Jonathan C. Dickey, partner and Co-Chair of the National Securities Litigation Practice Group at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, and is based on a Gibson Dunn publication.
On January 12, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued an unprecedented decision holding that a company’s failure to disclose a known trend or uncertainty in its Form 10-Q filings, as required by Item 303 of SEC Regulation S-K, can give rise to liability under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 2015 WL 136312 (2d Cir. Jan 12, 2015). The decision in Stratte-McClure is in direct conflict with the Ninth Circuit’s recent ruling in In re NVIDIA Corp. Securities Litigation, 768 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2014) (“NVIDIA“), the only other court of appeals decision to squarely address this issue. The Second Circuit’s decision, while affirming the dismissal of the case against Morgan Stanley, potentially exposes issuers to greater liability under Section 10(b) for alleged failures to disclose known adverse trends and uncertainties as required by Item 303, in addition to the already existing exposure to regulatory claims arising out of such alleged disclosure violations. In light of Stratte-McClure, issuers should proceed with even greater care in crafting their MD&A disclosures, and in particular their disclosures related to known trends and uncertainties.
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Posted in Accounting & Disclosure, Court Cases, Practitioner Publications, Securities Regulation
Tagged Disclosure, Financial reporting, Morgan Stanley, Regulation S-K, Risk disclosure, Section 10(b), Securities fraud, Securities regulation, U.S. federal courts
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NACD Investor Perspectives: Critical Issues for Board Focus in 2015
Editor’s Note: The following post comes from Peter Gleason, president of the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD), and is based on an NACD publication; the complete publication, including appendix and additional resources, is available here.
As part of our mission to advance exemplary board leadership, the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) engages in ongoing dialogue with major U.S. institutional investors representing approximately $14 trillion in assets under management. [1] This post reflects NACD’s perspectives on recent conversations, including group and individual discussions with eight leading investors and several roundtable meetings between investors and Fortune 500 committee chairs. Several themes emerged regarding important issues for boards to consider in preparation for the upcoming proxy season:
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Posted in Boards of Directors, Practitioner Publications
Tagged Board communication, Board leadership, Board performance, Boards of Directors, Engagement, Succession
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Engagement and Activism in the 2015 Proxy Season
Editor’s Note: David A. Katz is a partner at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz specializing in the areas of mergers and acquisitions and complex securities transactions. The following post is based on an article by Mr. Katz and Laura A. McIntosh that first appeared in the New York Law Journal; the full article, including footnotes, is available here.
As the 2015 proxy season approaches, the dominant theme appears to be the interaction between directors and investors. Though, traditionally, there was little to no direct engagement, recent experience indicates that communication between these two groups is now on the rise, in some cases resulting in collaboration. This is potentially a beneficial development, particularly insofar as it may help companies and long-term investors work together to resist pressure from activist shareholders seeking short-term profits. In the current environment where activists and hedge funds appear to wield unprecedented financial and political leverage, and the influence of proxy advisors is as significant as it is controversial, the predominant trend seems to be “toward diplomacy rather than war.” Organizations such as the Shareholder-Director Exchange, which began last year to offer guidance to shareholders and boards on direct engagement, are promoting policies that may reduce the incidence, duration, and severity of contentious public disagreements.
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Posted in Boards of Directors, Institutional Investors, Practitioner Publications
Tagged Boards of Directors, Engagement, Hedge funds, Institutional Investors, Proxy access, Proxy season, Shareholder activism
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