Author Archives: Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation

Delaware Poised to Embrace Appraisal Arbitrage

Editor’s Note: Trevor Norwitz is a partner in the Corporate Department at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz and Lecturer in Law at Columbia Law School. This post is part of the Delaware law series, which is cosponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Delaware corporations and their advisers have been eagerly awaiting the response of the Delaware legislature to the recent surge in appraisal arbitrage and judicial pronouncements allowing this activity and suggesting that lawmakers should step in if they perceive a problem. It now appears based on a proposal released by the Delaware Corporation Law Council that the legislature may act as soon as this week. If the lawmakers follow the recommendations of the Council (which they usually do) the changes will likely disappoint Delaware corporations, make mergers and acquisitions in that important state more difficult, reduce deal flow, and lead to lower prices being paid to selling shareholders. The beneficiaries of this legislation will be the small (but growing) group of short term speculators specializing in appraisal arbitrage and the advisors who support that industry. Some of the problems created by appraisal arbitrage are described in my post on this subject a few weeks ago.

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Shareholder Litigation Involving Acquisitions of Public Companies

Editor’s Note: John Gould is senior vice president at Cornerstone Research. This post discusses a Cornerstone Research report by Olga Koumrian, titled “Shareholder Litigation Involving Acquisitions of Public Companies,” which is available in full here.

A new report shows that the percentage of 2014 lawsuits filed by shareholders in M&A deals remained consistent with the previous four years, while other key indicators suggest a slowdown. The report, Shareholder Litigation Involving Acquisitions of Public Companies, released February 25, 2015 by Cornerstone Research, reveals that investors contested 93 percent of M&A transactions in 2014. Despite this typically high percentage, shareholders brought a smaller number of competing lawsuits per deal and in fewer jurisdictions, challenged fewer deals valued below $1 billion, and took slightly longer to file lawsuits.

In a significant shift from recent years, 60 percent of contested M&A deals had lawsuits filed against them in only one jurisdiction. Just 4 percent of these deals were challenged in more than two courts, the lowest number since 2007.

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German Stock Market Development, 1870-1938

Editor’s Note: Brian Cheffins is Professor of Corporate Law at the University of Cambridge. The following post is based on an article co-authored by Professor Cheffins, David Chambers of Cambridge Judge Business School, and Carsten Burhop of Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.

Since World War II, Germany’s stock market has been mostly an after-thought, despite a highly successful economy. Why might this be the case? Explanations have included the power and influence of banks, the stakeholder-oriented nature of Germany’s economy and Germany’s civil law heritage. In Law, Politics and the Rise and Fall of German Stock Market Development, 1870-1938 we argue, based on statistical analysis of a hand-collected dataset of initial public offerings (IPOs), that a combination of law and politics during the late 19th and early 20th centuries played a significant role in the evolution of German equity markets. For most of this period Germany had, contrary to the present-day pattern, a stock market that was sizeable in comparative terms. The law helped to foster this trend but legal reforms during the Nazi era reversed matters in a way that had lasting consequences.

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California Court Clarifies Scope of Class Action Judgment Reduction Provision

Editor’s Note: Brad Karp is chairman and partner at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP. This post is based on a Paul Weiss client memorandum.

In Rieckborn v. Velti plc, 2015 WL 468329 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2015) (Orrick, J.), the United States District Court for the Northern District of California clarified the scope of the judgment reduction provision that is found in almost all class action settlement agreements by holding that nonsettling defendants are entitled to a judgment reduction measured by the proportion of fault of all settling defendants, not just a dollar-for-dollar judgment reduction, on all settled claims under the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”). In so holding, the court handed a major victory to nonsettling defendants in actions under the Securities Act by granting them a favorable form of judgment reduction on claims not explicitly covered by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the “PSLRA”). The court’s opinion also makes clear that bar orders cannot preclude “independent claims” and that bar orders must be “mutual,” thereby giving guidance to the drafters of class action settlement agreements.

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A European Prospectus Revolution?

Editor’s Note: David M. Lynn is a partner and co-chair of the Corporate Finance practice at Morrison & Foerster LLP. The following post is based on a Morrison & Foerster publication by Jeremy C. Jennings-Mares and Peter J. Green.

The EU prospectus regime, based on Directive 2003/71/EC (the “Prospective Directive”) as amended, has been in place now for nearly 10 years and was due to be reviewed by the European Commission by 1 January 2016. However, the European Commission has moved forward its review, and on 18 February 2015 released a consultation [1] on possible reform of the current regime, in conjunction with its Green Paper on a possible EU Capital Markets Union, released on the same date.

The main focus of the proposed EU Capital Markets Union is on improving the access to capital markets for smaller business entities (“SMEs”), in order to broaden the range of funding without the need for bank intermediation. The European Commission considers that the review of the EU prospectus regime is a vital part of developing a Capital Markets Union and, as such, has accelerated the timing of the review by launching its consultation now.

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Keeping Pace with Digital Disruption in our Securities Marketplace

Editor’s Note: Kara M. Stein is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on Commissioner Stein’s recent address at the Practising Law Institute’s SEC Speaks in 2015 Conference, available here. The views expressed in the post are those of Commissioner Stein and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the other Commissioners, or the Staff.

Before I begin my remarks, I would like to acknowledge the remarkable and dedicated career of Harvey Goldschmid. Just a few weeks ago, Harvey visited me to discuss his perspectives on a number of timely securities law issues. His superb intellect was reinforced by his engaging personality and skill as a teacher.

Harvey’s intense passion for the securities laws and investor protection was an inspiration to many of us. In authoring a tribute to Harvey Goldschmid in 2006, SEC historian Joel Seligman labeled him one of the most influential Commissioners. [1] I couldn’t agree more.

This conference provides us with an opportunity to look backward and to look forward. As I look back over the SEC’s history, I am always impressed by the rate and degree of change.

Picture Wall Street 80 years ago—the street was filled with dozens of young men—“runners”—carrying paper back and forth between various brokers and dealers and banks and exchanges and companies that made up the securities markets. Runners were the backbone of the securities market, delivering paperwork and stock certificates at a rate of $8 per day. Maybe the telephone would ring (the desk telephone was launched in 1932) or a telegram would arrive. And investors, would look to the newspaper to decide what stocks to buy or sell.

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Shareholders in the United Kingdom

Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Paul L. Davies, Senior Research Fellow at Harris Manchester College, University of Oxford. He was the Allen & Overy Professor of Corporate Law from 2009 to 2014 at University of Oxford, Faculty of Law. Work from the Program on Corporate Governance about lobbying includes Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics by Lucian Bebchuk and Zvika Neeman (discussed on the Forum here).

The United States and the United Kingdom are lumped put together as ‘dispersed shareholder’ jurisdictions and contrasted with the concentrated shareholdings found in the rest of the world. This paper, Shareholders in the United Kingdom, argues that it would be better to view the UK, at least over the past half century, as a semi-dispersed rather than as simply a dispersed shareholder jurisdiction, and that there are interesting contrasts between the UK and the US experience.

Whilst the typical company listed on the main market of the London Stock Exchange certainly lacks a single (or even a cohesive small group) of shareholders with legal control, neither does the typical company display atomised shareholdings, for example, where no single shareholder holds more than 1% of the voting rights. Typically, a coalition of six or so of the largest shareholders can put together enough votes to have a fighting chance of carrying a resolution at a shareholder meeting against the wishes of the management. The question thus becomes one of the incentives and disincentives for those shareholders to coordinate their actions.

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Proxy Advisors Clarify Proxy Access and Bylaw Amendments Voting Policies

Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Ariel J. Deckelbaum, partner and deputy chair of the Corporate Department at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, and is based on a Paul Weiss client memorandum.

On the heels of SEC Chair White’s direction to the Division of Corporation Finance to review its position on proxy proposal conflicts under Exchange Act Rule 14a-8(i)(9), both Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) and Glass Lewis have issued clarifying policies on proxy access, entering the fray of what is becoming the hottest debate this proxy season. The publication of ISS’s updated policy in particular means that market forces may have outpaced the SEC’s review process. In order to avoid risking a withhold or no-vote recommendation from ISS against their directors, many companies will be faced with the choice of (i) including any shareholder-submitted proxy access proposal in their proxy materials (either alone or alongside a management proposal) (ii) excluding the shareholder submitted proposal on the basis of a court ruling or no-action relief from the Division of Corporation Finance on a basis other than Rule 14a-8(i)(9) (conflict with management proposal) or (iii) obtaining withdrawal of the proposal by the shareholder proponent.

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The Role of Institutional Investors in Open-Market Share Repurchase Programs

Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Thomas Chemmanur, Professor of Finance at Boston College, and Yingzhen Li of The Brattle Group.

In recent years, the number of firms undertaking stock repurchases has increased dramatically, while the proportion of firms distributing value through cash dividends has declined. The popularity of share repurchases has not been mitigated even after the passage of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Act of 2003. In our paper, The Role of Institutional Investors in Open-Market Share Repurchase Programs, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we empirically analyze whether institutions have the ability to produce information about firms announcing open-market repurchase (OMR) programs, and how their information interacts with the private information held by firm insiders (which they may attempt to convey to the equity market through a repurchase program).

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Women on US Boards: What Are We Seeing?

Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Ernst & Young LLP, and is based on a publication by the EY Center for Board Matters.

Despite the value of bringing more women onto corporate boards being increasingly recognized, US companies continue a slow march toward gender diversity. While progress is being made, it is not at the pace needed to compete with public sector approaches being taken in other markets.

This post looks at diversity in US boardrooms at the time of their 2014 annual meetings and, unless otherwise noted, reflects S&P 1500 companies. It is based on the EY Center for Board Matters’ proprietary corporate governance database. It is also part of the Center’s ongoing board diversity series and follows Diversity drives diversity: From the boardroom to the C-suite (2013) and Getting on board: Women join boards at higher rates, though progress comes slowly (2012). For EY’s global perspective, see Women on boards: global approaches to advancing diversity (2014) and Women. Fast forward (2015).

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