Yearly Archives: 2009

Corporate Transparency and Resource Allocation

This post comes from Jere R. Francis, Inder K. Khurana, Raynolde Pereira and Shawn Huang of the University of Missouri-Columbia.

In our paper Does Corporate Transparency Contribute to Efficient Resource Allocation? which was recently accepted for publication in the Journal of Accounting Research, we examine whether the country-level information environment positively affects the timely reallocation of resources in response to growth shocks (or changes in growth opportunities) by improving the transfer of resources from industries which experience negative growth shocks to those that experience positive growth shocks.

We hypothesize that if a pair of countries has a high level of corporate transparency in each country, then investors are better able to recognize and direct resources towards industries which experience positive growth shocks and away from industries which experience negative growth shocks, irrespective of financial development. Our sample consists of calculated correlations in industry growth rates for 666 country pairs based on 37 unique countries and 37 manufacturing industries for the period 1980-1990 using industry-level data from a United Nations Industrial Development Organization (2000) database. We merge these correlations with country-level measures of corporate transparency that capture the quality of the financial reporting regime, the intensity of private information collection, the quality of information dissemination structures, the level of earnings opacity and stock price synchronicity.

We find transparency is positively associated with the correlation in industry-specific growth rates across country pairs. This positive association is consistent with the notion that corporate transparency helps to channel resources to those particular industries with good growth opportunities and hence contributes to more effective inter-sector allocation of resources. These results generally hold across alternative measures of transparency. In addition, we find that the impact of corporate transparency on the co-movement in growth rates is greater for country pairs with similar levels of economic development. Third, we find that the residual transparency metrics positively explain co-movements in industry-specific growth rates among country pairs, which indicates that transparency over and above that predicted by the underlying institutions facilitates resource allocation. Finally, we measure a country’s level of ex ante growth opportunities using the price-earnings ratio of global industry portfolios weighted by a country’s industrial mix and find that it is only countries with high transparency where there is an association between ex ante global growth opportunities of firms (within a country) and the country’s realized ex post growth in real GDP per capita. This result is consistent with the argument that firms in more transparent settings are better able to exploit global growth shocks and thus achieve higher realized growth rates.

The full paper is available for download here.

SPE Assets Invaded to Benefit Affiliated Entities

In an important ruling recently issued, Bankruptcy Judge Allan L. Gropper in the Southern District of New York approved a $400 million debtor-in-possession facility for General Growth Properties, Inc., which filed the largest real-estate Chapter 11 case in U.S. history. In connection with approving the financing, Judge Gropper permitted affiliated debtors to use excess cash collateral from bankruptcy-remote special purpose entities which, to the surprise of many market participants, were included in the Chapter 11 proceedings.

Background
General Growth Properties, Inc. (the “Company”) is a publicly held shopping mall operator headquartered in Chicago. By the time of its bankruptcy filing on April 16, 2009, it was the second largest shopping mall operator in the U.S., owning more than 200 malls in 44 states, with approximately $27 billion in debt outstanding. Approximately $15 billion of its debt is in the form of collateralized mortgaged-backed securities (“CMBS”), making the Company the largest borrower in the CMBS market.[1]

In connection with seeking approval of the Company’s proposed debtor-in-possession facility (the “DIP Facility”), the Company also sought use of cash collateral from separately organized subsidiary bankruptcy-remote special purpose entities (“SPEs”), which were, to the surprise of many market participants, included in the Company’s Chapter 11 proceedings. The property owned by each of these SPEs was intended to secure only the obligations of the pre-petition lenders to the SPE owning the property (the “SPE Lenders”). Arguing that the value of the collateral in certain of the SPEs is sufficient to protect the interests of the SPE Lenders, the Company proposed that excess cash collateral from rents be made available to support the DIP Facility. In exchange, as adequate protection, the Company and the SPE Lenders consensually agreed, among other things, that (i) each of the SPE Lenders would receive a perfected first-priority post-petition lien on (a) the respective SPE’s claims against the Company resulting from the consolidation of their cash collateral in the Company’s centralized cash management system and (b) the cash in the centralized cash management system itself; (ii) each of the SPE Lenders would receive a perfected post-petition lien on properties securing a separate pre-petition facility with Goldman Sachs Mortgage Company (the “Goldman Facility”) junior to the liens securing the DIP Facility and the Goldman Facility; and (iii) the Company would continue to pay interest at the applicable non-default rates and to maintain the properties, including the payment of taxes and other operating expenses, in accordance with their pre-petition agreements.

Several pre-petition agents for the SPE Lenders (the “Pre-Petition SPE Agents”) filed objections to the Company’s proposed DIP Facility on behalf of the SPE Lenders. The Commercial Mortgage Securities Association and the Mortgage Bankers Association also filed an amici curiae brief (the “Amici Brief”) with the court addressing the implications of the proposed use of cash collateral on commercial real estate finance.

READ MORE »

Don’t Let Companies Change Shareholders’ Blank Votes

This post comes to us from James McRitchie, Publisher of CorpGov.net.

Please take a few minutes to read and submit comments on a rulemaking petition that a group of ten filed with the SEC on Friday, May 15th, to amend Rule 14a-4(b)(1). The petition seeks to correct a problem brought to our attention by John Chevedden, long-time shareowner activist. See petition File 4-583 here. Send comments to [email protected] with File 4-583 in the subject line.

The problem is that when retail shareowners vote but leave items on their proxy blank, those items are routinely voted by their bank or broker as the subject company’s soliciting committee recommends. Current SEC rules grant them discretion to do so. As shareowners who believe in democracy, we have filed suggested amendments to take away that discretionary authority to change blank votes, or non-votes, as they might be termed. We believe that when voting fields are left blank on the proxy by the shareowner, they should be counted as abstentions.

This problem is not the same as “broker voting,” which has already been repealed on “non-routine” matters and, we hope, will soon be repealed for so-called “routine” matters, such as the election of directors. For example, even though “broker voting” has been repealed for shareowner resolutions, if a shareowner votes one item on their proxy and leaves shareowner resolutions blank, unvoted, those blank votes are routinely changed to be voted as recommended by the company’s soliciting committee.

See two examples. At Interface, I voted only to abstain on ratification of the auditors. Yet, you can seeProxyVote automatically fills in my blank votes with votes as recommended by the soliciting committee. A second example, at Staples, shows much the same. You can see blank votes that are changed also include the shareowner proposal to reincorporate to North Dakota, even though such proposals are not considered routine and are not subject to “broker voting.”

Just as broker votes should be eliminated so that votes counted reflect the true sentiment of shareowners, the practice of converting blank votes to votes for management should also end.

In our petition, we also highlight a secondary concern. When shareowners utilizing the ProxyVoteplatform of Broadridge vote at least one item and leave others blank, the subsequent screen warns them that their blank votes well be voted as recommended by the soliciting committee. This provides an opportunity to the shareowner to change their blank vote before final submission, if they don’t want it to be voted as recommended.

READ MORE »

How Does Law Affect Finance?

This post comes from Vladimir Atanasov of the College of William and Mary, Bernard Black of the University of Texas at Austin, Conrad S. Ciccotello of Georgia State University and Stanley B. Gyoshev of Exeter University.

In our paper How Does Law Affect Finance? An Examination of Equity Tunneling in Bulgaria, which was recently accepted for publication in the Journal of Financial Economics, we provide a simple model which unbundles different forms of “tunneling”, the extraction of firm value by a firm’s controlling shareholders or managers, and derive how each affects firm profitability and valuation. We develop the model partly to extend existing models of tunneling, but primarily to develop predictions which we can test using a natural experiment in Bulgaria, provided by 2002 anti-tunneling reforms.

Bulgaria went through mass privatization in 1998, which was followed by extensive equity tunneling. The 2002 legal changes limit both dilution and freezeouts, and allow us to examine how specific rules can affect specific forms of tunneling, firm valuation, and firm profitability. We model and study empirically two flavors of equity tunneling: dilutive equity offerings (issuance of shares to insiders at below market value); and freezeouts (forced sale of minority shares to the controller for below market value). We find that following the change, minority shareholders participate equally in secondary equity offers, where before they suffered severe dilution; and freezeout offer prices quadruple. At the same time, return on assets declines for high-equity-tunneling-risk firms, suggesting that controlling shareholders partly substitute for reduced equity tunneling by engaging in more cash-flow tunneling. The 2002 legal changes, and controllers’ responses to them, also affect market values. Tobin’s q levels rise sharply for high-equity-tunneling-risk firms relative to low-risk firms, despite the increased cash flow tunneling in high-risk firms. These results are economically large and robust to different ways of estimating tunneling risk, and different valuation measures (price/sales, price/earnings and market/book value of equity).

Our results have implications for asset pricing research in emerging markets. In high tunneling risk markets, investors must estimate not only expected cash flows (as in any market) but also tunneling risk. We find evidence that equity tunneling risk varies widely in cross-section, and that Bulgarian investors consider this risk and update their valuation estimates when legal rules change. Equity tunneling risk, as a factor in explaining equity prices and expected returns, can complement some commonly used factors, such as market risk and momentum, and interact with others, such as firm size and book/market ratio. Size may correlate with tunneling risk (as we confirm below for Bulgaria), and high book/market ratios could reflect high tunneling risk. Investor pricing of equity tunneling risk factors can also help explain home country bias, as local investors may be better equipped to evaluate equity tunneling risk at the firm-level.

The full paper is available for download here.

Proposed Amendments to Conflicts of Interest Rules in Public Offerings

This post is by Edward F. Greene of Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP.

The SEC has issued Release No. 34-59880 soliciting comments on proposed amendments to NASD Rule 2720 that streamline the application of the Rule’s requirements to public offerings of securities in which a participating broker-dealer has a “conflict of interest.” Some of the more significant proposed amendments would:

a. exempt from the filing requirements and the qualified independent underwriter (“QIU”) requirements of NASD Rule 2720 public offerings (1) in which the FINRA member primarily responsible for managing the offering (or each co-lead, if applicable) does not have a conflict of interest, is not an affiliate of a member that has a conflict of interest and can meet the disciplinary history requirements for a QIU, (2) of investment-grade rated securities, and (3) of securities that have a bona fide public market;

b. change the definition of “conflict of interest” so that the Rule would cover public offerings in which at least five percent of the offering proceeds are directed to a participating member or its affiliates (in contrast to the current ten percent threshold set forth in Rule 5110(h) (formerly NASD Rule 2710(h)), which applies on an aggregate basis to all participating members, and which would now become part of Rule 2720);

c. modify the Rule’s disclosure requirements so that information relating to conflicts of interest is more prominently disclosed in offering documents;

d. amend the Rule’s provisions regarding the use of a QIU to focus on the QIU’s due diligence responsibilities and eliminate the requirement that the QIU render a pricing opinion;

e. amend the QIU qualification requirements to focus on the experience of the firm rather than its board of directors, prohibit a member that would receive more than five percent of the proceeds of an offering from acting as a QIU, and lengthen from five to ten years the amount of time that a person involved in due diligence in a supervisory capacity must have a clean disciplinary history; and

f. eliminate provisions in the Rule that do not apply to public offerings and instead address an issuer’s corporate governance responsibilities.

The comment period is 21 days from the date the SEC release is published in the Federal Register. Before becoming effective, any amendments to NASD Rule 2720 finally proposed by the FINRA must be approved by the SEC. A copy of SEC Release No. 34-59880 is available here.

The Battle for Shareholder Access: The Current State of Play

This post is based on a client memorandum by Charles Nathan, Alexander Cohen, Constantine Skarvelis and Raluca Papadima of Latham & Watkins LLP.

Highlights

• Shareholder proxy access is coming, and it will be the hottest issue of the 2010 proxy season. Public companies should expect, and be prepared for, the strong likelihood of shareholder proxy access in the 2010 proxy season.

• The SEC is scheduled to vote on a proposed shareholder proxy access rule tomorrow, May 20, 2009. We assume that Chairman Schapiro intends the rule to become final around the end of October—that is, in time for the 2010 proxy season.

• Senator Charles Schumer of New York has introduced a bill that, among other things, would confirm the SEC’s authority to adopt a proxy access rule and that would require the SEC to adopt rules directly regulating proxy access, rather than deferring to state law.

• The Delaware General Corporation Law has been amended to authorize companies expressly to adopt bylaws providing for shareholders access to the company’s proxy statement for director nominations.

• Most observers now believe the question is not whether there will be shareholder proxy access for 2010, but rather what it will look like. The shape of proxy access depends principally on whether the final version of the SEC rule:

• merely empowers shareholders to submit access proposals under Rule 14a-8;• provides minimum standards for proxy access, leaving many of the details of implementation to state law and “private ordering;” or

• entirely pre-empts state law by creating a full-fledged and exclusive federal regime for proxy access.

• For those who accept that shareholder proxy access is a foregone conclusion, the key is the details of how shareholder access will be implemented—the so-called “workability” issues. Workability in the context of proxy access is far more complicated than it may first appear. However, it will be the key to whether proxy access becomes, as many of its supporters assert, a sparingly used device that has the effect of instilling greater accountability of directors or, as many of its opponents fear, the progenitor of countless election contests and divided and dysfunctional boards.

Background

What is Proxy Access?
Shareholder proxy access is a proposed regime that would allow shareholders of a public company to include in a company’s proxy materials (proxy statement and proxy card) candidates for director nominated by the shareholder in opposition to the company’s candidates for election. Under the current regime, only the company’s nominees for election to the board of directors are included in company proxy materials. If a shareholder wants to nominate opposition candidates, it must prepare, pay for and distribute separate proxy materials. The obvious point of shareholder proxy access is to change the classic election contest paradigm and thereby facilitate shareholders’ ability on a virtually costless basis to elect directors who are not on the board slate.

Who are the Players?
There are six main groups of players in the proxy access struggle:

• Corporate governance activists, spearheaded by labor unions, state and local government pension funds and the Council of Institutional Investors, have been the main proponents pushing for proxy access. Although not as vocal, activist investors are also supporters of proxy access;

• The SEC, where Chairman Schapiro has announced that she views proxy access rulemaking as a key priority;

• Members of Congress, such as Senator Schumer and other prominent Democratic lawmakers, seem committed to creating a shareholder access regime of some type;

• The business community, led by the US Chamber of Commerce (the Center for Capital Market Competitiveness) and The Business Roundtable, has been strongly opposed to proxy access since the first SEC rule-making foray in 2003;

• The legal community, through its various bar associations and a number of law firms, will weigh-in on the latest round of the proxy access debate once the SEC issues its proposed rule; and

• The proxy advisory firms, most notably RiskMetrics, which will have a large say on shareholder voting on proxy access proposals and on contested director elections resulting from proxy access, are expected to support proxy access.

READ MORE »

CEOs as outside directors

This post is by René Stulz of the Ohio State University.

In our paper Why do firms appoint CEOs as outside directors? which was recently accepted for publication in the Journal of Financial Economics, my co-authors Rüdiger Fahlenbrach and Angie Low, and I investigate in detail the role of outside board members who are CEOs of U.S. public companies. Using data from 1988 to 2005 on more than 10,000 firms, we try to answer two questions. First, what determines whether an outside CEO or another person is appointed director? Second, do outside directors who are CEOs create value for minority shareholders?

Appointments of outside CEOs to boards are highly sought after by companies. Large, well-known companies tend to have active CEOs as outside members on their boards. For instance, the 2008 board of Procter and Gamble has four outside directors who are CEOs. Surprisingly, we find that the typical firm in our sample does not have any outside CEO on its board. Direct compensation is not used to equate the supply and the demand for CEO outside directors – they do not receive more direct compensation than other board members who attend the same meetings. We argue that the high demand for their services as outside directors allows CEOs to take their pick of board seats, and they will naturally choose boards that offer them the best total package for the amount of effort required and for the risk involved. We find that CEOs are most likely to join boards of large established firms that are geographically close, pursue similar financial and investment policies, and have comparable governance mechanisms to their own firms. CEO directors are also more likely to join firms which already have other CEO directors on the board. These findings are consistent with a prestige factor, indicating that CEO directors are more likely to accept additional directorships if such positions provide them with benefits such as added prestige or networking opportunities.

We find that the stock market reacts more favorably to the appointment of a CEO outside director than to the appointment of a non-CEO outside director when the firm currently has no outside CEO on its board. Such a positive market reaction is consistent with two hypotheses. Because of their current position, CEOs have an unusual amount of authority and experience. Therefore, once appointed, a CEO outside director could be valuable to the appointing firm because she can monitor and advise the incumbent management in a way that the typical outside director is not able to. We call this hypothesis the performance hypothesis. It is also possible that if a firm succeeds in recruiting a CEO to its board, it shows to the outside world that a business leader whose human capital is especially reputation-sensitive thinks highly enough of the firm to join its board. We call this hypothesis the certification hypothesis. Such certification could have value for the appointing firm even if the CEO outside director has little tangible impact on the firm after her appointment since the appointment might primarily certify the current market value of the firm.

We further test whether there is support in favor of the performance hypothesis by investigating changes in the firm’s operating performance upon appointment of a CEO director. To address endogeneity concerns, we use a matched-firm approach, a difference-in-difference approach, and an instrumental variable approach. We fail to reject the null hypothesis that the appointment of a CEO outside director has no impact on operating performance except in the case of interlocks where the appointment is followed by significantly poorer performance. Next, we examine whether CEO directors are associated with better board decision-making. First, we find little evidence of improved CEO turnover decisions, but we find some evidence that interlocks make the CEO more comfortable in her position. Second, firms with CEO outside directors do not make better acquisitions, where the quality of an acquisition is measured by the firm’s abnormal return at the time of the acquisition announcement. Finally, we find no evidence that CEO outside directors affect how the appointing firm’s CEO is compensated.

Overall, our findings are consistent with the following interpretation. The appointment of a CEO outside director helps certify the appointing company and its management, but it does not lead to measurable improvements in operating performance or corporate policies. With the certification hypothesis, CEO outside directors differ from other directors because their status and reputation enable them to credibly certify the firms that appoint them. CEO outside directors may be sought after by many firms, but they choose strategically their board seats in large, mature firms that they seem to understand, perhaps because they are worried about damage to their reputation should they be involved with a failing firm. Our results on the determinants of CEO director appointments confirm this matching process. It could be that the CEO outside director has no impact on operating performance or corporate policies, perhaps because CEO directors are simply too busy with their day job to use their prestige, authority, and experience to have a substantial impact on the boards they sit on.

The full paper is available for download here.

Directors’ Monetary Liability for Actions or Omissions Not in Good Faith

This post is by Scott J. Davis of Mayer Brown LLP.

Michael Torres, who is my colleague at Mayer Brown LLP, and I have written a paper titled Directors’ Monetary Liability for Actions or Omissions Not in Good Faith, based on a paper we submitted to the Ray Garrett Jr. Corporate and Securities Law Institute at Northwestern Law School. It has long been established that damages are available against directors when they engage in self-dealing or similar actions in situations in which they have a conflict of interest. Few issues in U.S. corporate law, however, are as controversial as whether directors should be exposed to damages for their actions or omissions in situations in which they do not have a conflict of interest. Advocates of such damages awards argue that they are appropriate in extreme cases of directorial misconduct and an important deterrent to future misconduct. Opponents of such awards argue that courts cannot reliably distinguish between extreme cases of misconduct and routine cases of negligence, and that well-qualified persons will not serve as directors if they are exposed to this type of monetary liability.

Since the enactment of section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, it has been clear that directors could still be responsible for damages for breaches of the duty of loyalty involving conflicts of interest – for example, being on both sides of a transaction to which the corporation was a party – and could not be held liable for money damages for breaching their duty of care, even if they were grossly negligent. The question was whether there was any real-world basis for imposing damages on directors in situations in which they did not breach their duty of loyalty on conflict of interest grounds.

Beginning in the middle 1990s with the Caremark decision, the Delaware courts answered that question in the affirmative by making it clear that certain conduct of directors who did not have a conflict of interest could constitute acts or omissions not in good faith that would expose them to damages. As the law has developed, there has been no bright line rule defining such conduct. Consequently, there is no shortcut to examining the cases decided inside and outside of Delaware in determining where the law now stands. Most of these cases were brought as derivative lawsuits, and the reported decisions were issued in deciding defendants’ motions to dismiss because of the plaintiffs’ failure to make a demand on the company’s board of directors. We briefly analyze a number of these decisions, dividing them into cases in which the directors are accused of failing to act and therefore violating their duty of oversight and cases in which the directors are accused of acting improperly. We reached the following conclusions from this analysis:

1. The courts are anxious to limit monetary liability for bad faith to situations in which directors knowingly countenanced wrongdoing or knowingly engaged in wrongful conduct. The test laid down in Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006), for bad faith oversight is that the directors knew that they were not discharging their obligations of oversight because they utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system or controls or, having implemented such a system or controls, consciously failed to monitor or oversee their operations. The test for bad faith action laid down in In re the Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006), is intentional dereliction of duties or a conscious disregard of one’s responsibilities. Thus, the case law, in both the oversight and the action situations, indicates that bad faith has a mens rea requirement: bad faith requires scienter, i.e., an illicit state of mind. Anything less is no more than gross negligence, which Disney defined as not bad faith.

2. However, the line between bad faith and negligence or gross negligence can be blurry, especially in merger or sale cases. It is arguably difficult to distinguish between the bad faith conduct of the director held liable in In re Emerging Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 2004 WL 1305745 (Del. Ch. 2004), for permitting an unfair transaction and the director in Gesoff v. IIC Industries, Inc, 902 A.2d 1130 (Del. Ch. 2006), or the directors in McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d 1262 (Del. Ch. 2008), who permitted unfair transactions but were exonerated because their conduct, while negligent or grossly negligent, did not rise to bad faith. It is possible that Emerging Communications is an anomaly because lawsuits challenging directors’ good faith, absent a conflict of interest, in merger and sale transactions have been mostly unsuccessful. See, in addition to Gesoff and McPadden, In re Lear Corporation Shareholder Litigation, 2008 WL 5704774 (Del. Ch. 2008), and Lyondell Chemical Company v. Ryan, 2009 WL 790477 (Del. 2009).

3. McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808 (6th Cir.), amended on denial of rehearing, 250 F.3d 997 (6th Cir. 2001), and In re Abbott Laboratories Derivative Shareholder Litigation, 325 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2001), suggest (admittedly based on a small sample) that courts outside of Delaware may be more inclined to allow oversight claims to proceed than Delaware courts are. Indeed, Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492 (Del. Ch. 2003), Stone v. Ritter, Desimone v. Barrrows, 924 A.2d 908 (Del. Ch. 2007), Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136 (Del. 2008), and In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Litigation, 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009), are all Delaware cases in which oversight claims were dismissed, with AIG Consolidated Derivative Litigation, 965 A.2d 763 (Del. Ch. 2009), being a counterexample.

4. The courts appear to be drawing a distinction between directors’ oversight or actions resulting in bad business decisions that did not result in illegality or fraud and those that did. In the former case the courts tend not to find bad faith. See Citigroup, Gesoff, Disney, McPadden, Lear and Lyondell. In the latter case the courts will find bad faith if the complaint supplies particularized allegations of a knowing failure of oversight or knowing misconduct. See McCall, Abbott, AIG, Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341 (Del. Ch. 2007), and In re Tyson Foods Consolidated Shareholder Litigation, 919 A.2d 563 (Del. Ch. 2007). The courts are concerned that the availability of damages for bad faith not lead to directors being second-guessed for business decisions that were merely wrong.

The paper is available here.

Making Investors a Priority in Regulatory Reform

Editor’s Note: The post below by Commissioner Luis Aguilar is a transcript of remarks by him at the recent 2009 Independent Directors Conference Workshop in Boston.

It is a pleasure to be here with all of you at the 2009 Independent Directors Conference Workshop to share my views on the regulatory reform issues currently being discussed. I do have to mention that all the views I express today are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Commission, the individual Commissioners, or the staff.

I welcome the opportunity to talk with you today. As a practitioner in the securities industry for thirty years who often advised boards of directors, including mutual fund boards, I am familiar with your work and know its importance. I have the utmost admiration for independent directors. You more than anyone have to exemplify the principle that — laws tell you what you can do but values inspire what you should do. As fiduciaries, you play a critical role in setting the appropriate tone at the top and overseeing some of the most important aspects of the fund’s business from keeping fees in line to negotiating important contracts.

Your efforts are crucial to safeguarding the retirement savings and investments of hard working men and women. At the end of 2008, mutual funds, including money market funds, were collectively responsible for approximately $9 trillion of investors’ monies invested in countless corporations, municipalities and myriad investment opportunities. These assets represented the savings of over 92 million individuals.

I have had the distinction of serving on the Commission during “transformational” times, to say the least. I took office at the end of July 2008 and literally my first two months were filled with unprecedented Commission action — running the gamut from being involved with some of the SEC’s largest settlements ever in cases involving Auction Rate Securities to an unprecedented amount of emergency rulemaking and Commission orders.

Now even though the financial crisis continues, the rapid response phase of the crisis is giving rise to discussions of reform resulting from that crisis. In fact, the issues being discussed could very well lead to the largest wholesale regulatory restructuring this country has seen since the great depression. For example, we at the SEC currently find ourselves enmeshed in parallel discussions about the structure of the financial regulatory system, the SEC’s role in such a system, and the regulation of entities under our jurisdiction.

Like me, you too have the opportunity and challenge of representing investors in a time of “transformation.” The global financial crisis has brought us to a point where transformation of existing financial regulation is a given.

The opportunity to take a fresh look involves all of us here today, we at the SEC, and you as fiduciaries, overseeing trillions of dollars that represent a substantial portion of our Nation’s wealth.

READ MORE »

Institutional Monitoring Through Shareholder Litigation

This post comes from C.S. Agnes Cheng of Louisiana State University, Henry Huang of Prairie View A&M University, Yinghua Li of Purdue University, and Gerald J. Lobo of the University of Houston.

Our paper, Institutional Monitoring through Shareholder Litigation, forthcoming in the Journal of Financial Economics, investigates the effectiveness of using securities class action lawsuits in monitoring defendant firms. We compare differences in (1) immediate litigation outcomes (including the probability of surviving the motion to dismiss and the settlement amount), and (2) subsequent governance improvement (specifically changes in board independence), across class action lawsuits led by institutions versus individuals. We find that securities class actions with institutional owners as lead plaintiffs are less likely to be dismissed and have larger monetary settlements than class actions with individual lead plaintiffs. We also find that after the lawsuit filings, defendant firms with institutional lead plaintiffs experience greater improvement in their board independence than defendant firms with individual lead plaintiffs.

Our paper is motivated by the lack of evidence on the effectiveness of institutional investors exercising their monitoring power through litigation. Such evidence is much needed because the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) established a preference of granting lead plaintiff status to plaintiffs with the largest financial stake in the class action, thus providing institutions an opportunity to critically affect the litigation by serving as the lead plaintiffs. Given the costs of serving as a lead plaintiff and the free rider problem, institutional investors may not want to lead class action lawsuits even if they hold the largest financial stake in the defendant firm. Consequently, it is important to provide empirical evidence on the effectiveness of institutional monitoring through class action litigation. In addition to documenting the implications of the lead plaintiff provision in the PSLRA Act, our findings also underscore the important monitoring role of institutions, from both an immediate disciplining of management as well as a long-term corporate governance perspective.

We believe a theory of why and under what conditions institutions will choose to lead a class action is important. Because of the free-rider problem, we propose that institutions will step forward to lead the class actions only when their net benefits are higher than attorney agency costs. We discuss the costs and benefits for institutional owners and develop surrogates for their incentive to serve. Our determinants model provides insights regarding institutions’ incentives to serve as the lead plaintiff. We also use this model to control for endogeneity in investigating monitoring effectiveness.

Using a sample of 1,811 securities class actions filed between 1996 and 2005, we find that when the likelihood of winning is high, the potential damage is large, and the defendant firm is important to the institutional owners, institutional owners are more likely to step forward to serve as the lead plaintiff. Specifically, we find that institutional investors are more likely to serve as the lead plaintiff when the lawsuit involves an accounting-related allegation, has an accounting firm as the co-defendant, has a longer class period, has a larger negative market reaction to the revelation event, and has a larger potential investor loss. The probability of having an institutional lead plaintiff is also higher when the defendant firm has a larger market capitalization, has a higher level of institutional holdings, and is operating in a high-tech industry.

After controlling for these determinants of having an institutional lead plaintiff in our multivariate regression analysis, we find that relative to lawsuits with an individual lead plaintiff, lawsuits with an institutional lead plaintiff are less likely to be dismissed and have significantly larger settlements. Further analysis indicates that all types of institutions show significantly better litigation outcomes with public pension funds generating the largest settlement amount. We also find that within three years of filing the lawsuit, defendant firms with institutional lead plaintiffs experience greater improvement in board independence than defendant firms with individual lead plaintiffs. These results are robust to controlling for regulatory changes in the NYSE, NASDAQ and SEC corporate governance requirements during the sample period and for determinants of having an institutional lead plaintiff.

The paper is available here.

Page 29 of 48
1 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 48