Yearly Archives: 2015

Bebchuk Leads SSRN’s 2014 Citation Rankings

Statistics released publicly by the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) indicate that, as was the case at the end of each of the seven preceding years, Professor Lucian Bebchuk led SSRN citation rankings for law professors at the end of 2014. As of the end of December 2014, Bebchuk ranked first among all law school professors in all fields in terms of the total number of citations to his work (as well as the total number of downloads of his work on SSRN).

Professor Bebchuk’s papers (available on his SSRN page here) have attracted a total of 4,314 citations. His top ten papers in terms of citations are as follows:

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Delaware Court Curtails Books & Records, Validates Board-Adopted Forum Selection Bylaws

William Savitt is a partner in the Litigation Department of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton firm memorandum by Mr. Savitt, Ryan A. McLeod, and A.J. Martinez. This post is part of the Delaware law series, which is cosponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available here.

A unanimous Delaware Supreme Court yesterday reaffirmed the ability of Delaware companies to organize corporate litigation in the Delaware courts. United Technologies Corp. v. Treppel, No. 127, 2014 (Del. Dec. 23, 2014) (en banc).

The case involved an action to produce corporate books and records under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, an increasingly frequent preliminary battleground in derivative litigation. Following a familiar pattern, stockholder plaintiffs demanded access to certain books and records of United Technologies Corporation, allegedly to assist in their consideration of potential derivative litigation. UTC asked that all demanding stockholders agree to restrict use of the materials obtained in the inspection to cases filed only in Delaware, pointing out that litigation had already been filed relating to the same matters in the Delaware courts and that any derivative lawsuit would be governed by Delaware law. Then, further evincing its concern to organize corporate governance litigation in the courts of Delaware, UTC’s board adopted a forum selection bylaw during the pendency of the Section 220 lawsuit.

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Key Points from Congress’s Roll-Back of the Swaps Push-Out

The following post comes to us from Dan Ryan, Leader of the Financial Services Advisory Practice at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, and is based on a PwC publication by Mr. Ryan, Armen Meyer, and David Kim.

On December 13, 2014, the US Senate passed an appropriations bill for the President’s signature that included a provision to roll back much of Dodd-Frank’s section 716 (i.e., the Swaps Push-Out). The initial version of the Swaps Push-Out was proposed by Senator Blanche Lincoln (Democrat of Arkansas) in 2010, during her re-election campaign, and would have prohibited bank swap dealers from receiving federal assistance from the FDIC or from the discount window of the Federal Reserve. After intense negotiation in the last days of congressional debate on Dodd-Frank, Lincoln’s version was substantially narrowed to only prohibit banks from dealing in swaps that were viewed by Congress as the most risky.

The Swaps Push-Out that ultimately passed as part of Dodd-Frank prohibited bank swap dealers (with access to FDIC insurance or the discount window) from dealing in certain swaps (or security-based swaps), including most credit default swaps (CDS), equity swaps, and many commodity swaps. Swaps related to rates, currencies, or underlying assets that national banks may hold (e.g., loans) were allowed to remain in the bank, as were swaps used for hedging or similar risk mitigation activities.

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FINRA Settles with Banks; Provides Views on Analyst Communications During “Solicitation Period”

Richard J. Sandler is a partner at Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP and co-head of the firm’s global corporate governance group. This post is based on a Davis Polk client memorandum.

In December, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority entered into settlement agreements with a number of the major banking firms in response to allegations that their equity research analysts were involved in impermissibly soliciting investment banking business by offering their views during the pitch for the Toys “R” Us IPO (which was never actually completed). FINRA rules generally prohibit analysts from attending pitch meetings [1] and prospective underwriters from promising favorable research to obtain a mandate. [2] In this situation, no research analyst attended the pitch meetings with the investment bankers and none explicitly promised favorable research in exchange for the business. However, FINRA announced an interpretation of its rules that took a broad view of a “pitch” and the “promise of favorable research.” FINRA identified a so-called “solicitation period” as the period after a company makes it known that it intends to conduct an investment banking transaction, such as an IPO, but prior to awarding the mandate. In the settlement agreements, FINRA stated its view that research analyst communications with a company during the solicitation period must be limited to due diligence activities, and that any additional communications by the analyst, even as to his or her general views on valuation or comparable company valuation, will rise to the level of impermissible activity. The settlements further suggested that these restrictions apply not only to research analysts, but also to investment bankers that are conveying the views of their research departments to the company. The practical result of these settlements will be to dramatically reduce the interaction between research analysts and companies prior to the award of a mandate.

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Compensation Season 2015

The following post comes to us from Michael J. Segal, partner in the Executive Compensation and Benefits Department of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, and is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Segal, Jeannemarie O’Brien, Andrea K. Wahlquist, Adam J. Shapiro, and David E. Kahan.

Boards of directors will soon shift attention to the 2015 compensation season. Key considerations in the year ahead include the following:

1. Be Prepared for Shareholder Activists. Companies today are more vulnerable to activist attacks than ever before. Companies should therefore ensure that they understand how their change in control protections function if an activist obtains a significant stake in the company or control of the board. A change in board composition can trigger the application of the golden parachute excise tax under Section 280G of the Internal Revenue Code and can result in negative tax consequences for executives and the company. In addition, in the age of performance awards and double-trigger vesting, clarity about the impact of a change in control on performance goals matters more than ever. Appropriate protections ensure that management will remain focused on shareholder interests during a period of significant disruption; inadequate protections can result in management departures at a time when stability is crucial.

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Ten Key Points from the FSB’s TLAC Ratio

The following post comes to us from Dan Ryan, Leader of the Financial Services Advisory Practice at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, and is based on a PwC publication by Mr. Ryan, Kevin Clarke, Roozbeh Alavi, and Dan Weiss. The complete publication, including appendix, is available here.

On November 10th, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) issued a long-awaited consultative document that defined a global standard for minimum amounts of Total Loss Absorbency Capacity (TLAC) to be held by Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs). TLAC is meant to ensure that G-SIBs have the loss absorbing and recapitalization capacity so that, in and immediately following resolution, critical functions can continue without requiring taxpayer support or threatening financial stability.

The FSB’s document requires a G-SIB to hold a minimum amount of regulatory capital (Tier 1 and Tier 2) plus long term unsecured debt that together are at least 16-20% [1] of its risk weighted assets (RWA), i.e., at least twice the minimum Basel III total regulatory capital ratio of 8%. In addition, the amount of a firm’s regulatory capital and unsecured long term debt cannot be less than 6% of its leverage exposure, i.e., at least twice the Basel III leverage ratio. In addition to this “Pillar 1” requirement, TLAC would also include a subjective component (called “Pillar 2”) to be assessed for each firm individually, based on qualitative firm-specific risks that take into account the firm’s recovery and resolution plans, systemic footprint, risk profile, and other factors.

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A Strong Cautionary Note for M&A Practitioners and Professionals

Jack B. Jacobs is Senior Counsel at Sidley Austin LLP, and a former justice of the Delaware Supreme Court. The following post is based on a Sidley update, and is part of the Delaware law series, which is cosponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available here.

The volume of Court of Chancery decisions has been proceeding apace. We have culled out two that we believe are worthy of your attention:

Cigna Health & Life Ins. Co. v. Audax Health Solutions, 2014 WL 6784491 (Del. Ch.).

This is a “must read” for all M&A and Private Equity practitioners and professionals, given the use of certain of the deal devices found to be invalid in the specific circumstances of this case.

Cigna, a large stockholder of Audax, the acquired company, sued to invalidate certain conditions of an arm’s length negotiated cash-out merger of Audax into United. Essentially, the defendant merging corporations conditioned receipt of the merger consideration not only upon surrender of the (to-be-cancelled) shares, but also upon the execution of a Letter of Transmittal, wherein each surrendering stockholder agreed to the “Obligations” set forth therein. Cigna refused to execute a Letter of Transmittal, and in response the defendants refused to pay Cigna the merger consideration. Cigna sued in the Court of Chancery for a judgment declaring the Obligations invalid and mandating payment of the merger consideration to Cigna. The Court of Chancery (V.C. Parsons) held the obligations invalid under 8 Del. C. §251 and (relatedly) for lack of consideration.

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Ownership Structure, Voting, and Risk

The following post comes to us from Amrita Dhillon, Professor of Economics at King’s College London, and Silvia Rossetto of the Toulouse School of Economics at the University of Toulouse.

In our paper Ownership Structure, Voting and Risk, forthcoming in the Review of Financial Studies, we investigate the interaction between the ownership structure of publicly traded firms and their risk profiles. In particular, we show how the potential for conflict of interest between shareholders on risk decisions may cause the emergence of activist mid-sized investors. In turn, ownership structure affects the risk decisions that firms make.

It is natural to believe that the choice of shares to hold in a company is a trade off between diversification and control: large size comes with control at the cost of diversification. Many firms, however, have mid-sized shareholders who are neither well diversified nor have control. For example, in the United States (where it is widely agreed that regulation helps dispersed ownership), 67% of public firms have more than one shareholder with a stake larger than 5%, while only 13% are widely held and 20% have only one blockholder (Dlugosz et al., 2006). In Europe (where concentrated ownership is the norm), in eight out of the nine largest stock markets of the European Union, the median size of the second largest voting block in large publicly listed companies exceeds five percent (data from the European Corporate Governance Network). Why do such mid-sized shareholders emerge?

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Did Commissioner Gallagher Violate SEC Rules?

Professor Tamar Frankel is Professor of Law at Boston University School of Law. This post offers a critique of a paper by Commissioner Daniel Gallagher and Professor Joseph A. Grundfest, described on the Forum here. Additional critiques of the paper by Professor Jonathan Macey are available on the Forum here, here and here. A reply post to Professor Macey authored by Professor Grundfest and endorsed by Commissioner Gallagher is available on the Forum here.

Recently SEC Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher issued a paper, titled Did Harvard Violate Federal Securities Law? (described on the Forum here and in a WSJ article here). The paper, co-authored with Professor Joseph Grundfest, expressed the Commissioner’s opinions regarding shareholder proposals and the Harvard Law School clinic that assisted public pension funds filing those proposals in the previous three years. The Commissioner did not mince his words. In his opinion, Harvard University and its clinic violated the securities laws by assisting proponents that failed to include references to academic studies contrary to the views of those proponents. The Commissioner was clearly presenting a threat to the University and its clinic. However, his statements also raise a number of questions about his own behavior.

To begin with, the Commissioner should have recognized that, as Professor Macey has shown in a series of posts (available on the Forum here, here, and here), his accusations are without merit and the proposals were entirely consistent with current SEC rules, policies and practices. Furthermore, in making his accusations, the Commissioner deviated from standard SEC procedures and practices.

I am unaware of any case in which a sitting SEC Commissioner released a paper accusing particular individuals or organizations of legal violations, and urging enforcement action and/or private suits against them, or used such public accusations as an instrument for urging other Commissioners or the SEC staff to change their policy. In a recent comment to the New York Times, Harvey Pitt brought up as a possible precedent a 1974 speech by then-Commissioner A.A. Sommer who expressed concerns about “going-private” transactions. However, Sommer’s speech (available on the SEC website here) did not mention (let alone accuse) any particular individuals or organizations (the only mention of any names in the Speech is in footnote citations to past court cases). There is a big difference between discussing general policy problems, which SEC Commissioners should be doing, and attacking or urging actions against particular individuals and organizations, which SEC Commissioners should not be doing.

The SEC Canon of Ethics (available here), which is binding on SEC Commissioners, warns SEC officials to be wary of using their “power to defame and destroy”. The Cannon of Ethics guides SEC officials to avoid defaming individuals or organizations. The Canon provides:

“§ 200.66 Investigations. The power to investigate carries with it the power to defame and destroy. In determining to exercise their investigatory power, members should concern themselves only with the facts known to them and the reasonable inferences from those facts. A member should never suggest, vote for, or participate in an investigation aimed at a particular individual for reasons of animus, prejudice or vindictiveness. The requirements of the particular case alone should induce the exercise of the investigatory power, and no public pronouncement of the pendency of such an investigation should be made in the absence of reasonable evidence that the law has been violated and that the public welfare demand it.”

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SEC Adopts Regulation SCI to Strengthen Securities Market Infrastructure

Annette Nazareth is a partner in the Financial Institutions Group at Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, and a former commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The following post is based on a Davis Polk client memorandum by Ms. Nazareth, Lanny A. Schwartz, Jeffrey T. Dinwoodie, and Zachary J. Zweihorn.

On November 19, 2014, the Securities and Exchange Commission unanimously voted to adopt Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity (“Regulation SCI”), a set of rules designed to strengthen the technology infrastructure of the U.S. securities markets. Regulation SCI replaces and builds on the SEC’s voluntary Automation Review Policy, which is currently mainly applicable to national securities exchanges, expanding upon existing practices and making them mandatory. Regulation SCI will apply to operators of certain alternative trading systems (“ATSs”), market data information providers and clearing agencies, in addition to national securities exchanges, subjecting these entities and, indirectly, certain officers to extensive new compliance obligations, with the goals of reducing the occurrence of technical issues that disrupt the securities markets and improving recovery time when disruptions occur.

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