Yearly Archives: 2016

Omnicare: Liability Standards for Statements of Opinion

Brad S. Karp is chairman and partner at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP. This post is based on a Paul Weiss client memorandum by Mr. Karp, Charles E. DavidowDaniel J. KramerAudra J. SolowayRichard A. Rosen, and Andrew J. Ehrlich.

On March 4, 2016, in Tongue v. Sanofi, [1] the Second Circuit interpreted and applied for the first time the Supreme Court’s decision in Omnicare Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Const. Indus. Pension Fund, [2] which addressed the circumstances under which issuers can be liable for statements of opinion or projections. The Second Circuit acknowledged that the Omnicare ruling has altered the law in the Circuit, as set forth in Fait v. Regions Financial Corp., [3] which allowed for liability only if the opinion was both (1) objectively false and (2) the speaker did not believe the statement at the time it was made. The Second Circuit observed that, under Omnicare, a plaintiff can alternatively allege that an opinion statement is false by pleading that the speaker omitted information that would render the opinion misleading to a reasonable investor.

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Weekly Roundup: March 11-March 17


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This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of March 11, 2016 to March 17, 2016.

Antitrust Enforcement of Small Acquisitions











Individuals in the Cross Hairs? What This Means for Directors

David Woodcock is a partner at Jones Day. This post is based on a Jones Day publication by Mr. Woodcock and John T. Sullivan. The complete publication, including footnotes, is available here.

Following the 2008 financial crisis, government regulators and prosecutors have been under tremendous public pressure to prosecute individuals. Senior government officials have responded by speaking forcefully about their desires to sue or prosecute more individuals. What does the government’s heated rhetoric and renewed focus on individual liability mean for corporate directors? As the chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) recently noted, “[s]ervice as a director is not for the faint of heart….”But the good news is that directors who perform their role with even a modicum of reasonableness are highly unlikely to be held personally liable in carrying out their responsibilities. Of course, most directors aspire to more than staying out of trouble. As a former SEC chairman put it: “It is not an adequate ethical standard to aspire to get through the day without being indicted.”

This post will discuss the landscape of director liability in the SEC context and provide some suggestions that may help directors minimize the risks of regulatory scrutiny.

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Business Groups in Canada: Their Rise and Fall, and Rise and Fall Again

Randall Morck is Professor of Finance at the University of Alberta. This post is based on an article authored by Professor Morck and Gloria Tian, Assistant Professor of Finance at the University of Lethbridge.

Outside the United States, seemingly independent listed firms can be controlled as a unit via pyramiding. Chart 1 illustrates: An apex firm, often a family firm, holds enough equity in each subsidiary to control its shareholder meeting, letting public shareholders own the rest (its public float). Because public shareholders rarely vote, the Canada Business Corporations Act infers control from 20% stakes, but recognizes de facto control from smaller stakes. Subsidiaries repeat this, as do their subsidiaries, their subsidiaries’ subsidiaries, and so on ad valorem. A large Canadian pyramid contained over 500 listed and unlisted firms in 16 tiers of subsidiaries at its peak around 1990.

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Board Leadership Structure: Impact on CEO Pay

Carol Bowie is Head of Americas Research at Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). This post is based on a recent publication authored by ISS U.S. Research analysts Steve Silberglied and Zachary Friesner. The complete publication is available here. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes the book Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried.

Do more titles equal higher pay? It is well-documented that U.S. CEOs’ compensation, when compared to that of the average worker, has ballooned in recent decades. Past studies of the drivers of CEO pay at public companies have largely focused on firm size, number of employees, revenues, and TSR (total shareholder return) among other factors. A recent analysis examines whether and, if so, how board structure may impact CEO compensation. Specifically, the analysis tests whether a combined CEO/chairman role correlates to higher pay, and if a particular board leadership structure has a statistically significant relationship with CEO compensation. The analysis focuses on S&P 500 companies whose board structure remained relatively constant over a recent three-year period, to provide a consistent view of the trends.

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What’s Behind the All-Time High in M&A?

Emily Liner is a Policy Advisor at Third Way. This post is based on a Third Way publication. The complete publication, including footnotes, is available here.

Headlines over the past year have been filled with news of mega-mergers. Big companies across numerous sectors and continents have been joining forces at record rates. Last year’s $5 trillion worth of deals worldwide was more than a one-third increase over 2014 and set a new high. Why the surge in M&A, and what does it mean for the broader economy?

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Succeeding in the New Paradigm for Corporate Governance

Martin Lipton is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Lipton, Sabastian V. Niles, and Sara J. Lewis. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum here), and The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value by Lucian Bebchuk (discussed on the Forum here). Critiques of the Bebchuk-Brav-Jiang study by Wachtell Lipton, and responses to these critiques by the authors, are available on the Forum here.

Recognizing that the incentive for long-term investment is broken, leading institutional investors are developing a new paradigm for corporate governance that prioritizes sustainable value over short-termism, integrates long-term corporate strategy with substantive corporate governance and requires transparency as to director involvement. We believe that the new paradigm can reduce or even eliminate the outsourcing of corporate governance and portfolio oversight to ISS and activist hedge funds.

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The Money Problem: Rethinking Financial Regulation

Morgan Ricks is Associate Professor of Law at Vanderbilt Law School. This post is based on a book authored by Professor Ricks.

In my book, The Money Problem: Rethinking Financial Regulation, recently published by the University of Chicago Press, I offer a novel take on the “shadow banking” problem—arguably the central challenge for modern financial stability policy. I contend that financial instability is, and always has been, largely a problem of monetary system design. Structural monetary reform could pave the way for a dramatic reduction in the scope and complexity of modern financial stability regulation.

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Shareholder Activism & Engagement 2016

Arthur F. Golden is the senior partner at Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP. This post is based on the introduction to a Davis Polk publication by Mr. Golden, Thomas J. Reid, and Laura C. Turano, and is reproduced with permission from Law Business Research Ltd. This article was first published in Getting the Deal Through: Shareholder Activism & Engagement 2016 (published in January 2016; contributing editors: Arthur F. Golden, Thomas J. Reid, and Laura C. Turano, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP). The complete publication is publicly available here until April 6, 2016; for further information, please visit http://gettingthedealthrough.com.

At the end of another record-breaking year for shareholder activism activity, it is appropriate that we ring in the publication of this, the inaugural edition of Shareholder Activism & Engagement, part of the Getting the Deal Through series. We are pleased to serve as editors of this volume because we believe that shareholder activism is and will remain in sharp focus in financial markets, in the C-suite and in the boardroom, and that shareholder engagement is, and will continue to be, a leading and increasingly sophisticated priority. The international approach of the Getting the Deal Through series is especially apt for this topic, which we expect to become increasingly global over time, with ‘imports’ and ‘exports’ of shareholder activism and engagement between jurisdictions. Although the United States remains its dominant market, such activism and a heightened sensitivity to shareholder engagement is truly a global phenomenon.

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Proxy Disclosure Recommendations

Steven B. Stokdyk and Joel H. Trotter are global Co-Chairs of the Public Company Representation Practice Group at Latham & Watkins LLP. This post is based on an article by Mr. Stokdyk, Mr. Trotter, Erica S. Koenig, Jean F. Meraz-Debraine, Brian Miller, and Regina Schlatter.

In February 2016, the SEC warned that among a broad selection of companies, poorly-drafted, ambiguous and sometimes incorrect proxy disclosure for the method by which votes will be counted for director elections may necessitate new, tougher disclosure rules. [1] This post offers guidance on how to avoid the most common proxy drafting pitfalls and provides tips on drafting disclosure that is both precise and compliant with proxy rules.

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