Yearly Archives: 2018

Web-Delivery of Shareholder Reports

Derek N. Steingarten and Clair E. Pagnano are partners and Jon-Luc Dupuy is of counsel at K&L Gates LLP. This post is based on a memorandum by Mr. Steingarten, Ms. Pagnano, Mr. Dupuy, and Abigail P. Hemnes.

On June 4, 2018, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) adopted Rule 30e-3 (the “Rule”) to provide mutual funds, exchange-traded funds, closed-end funds and certain registered unit investment trusts covered by the rule (“Funds”) with a new option of internet-based “notice and access” delivery of annual and semi-annual shareholder reports, conditioned on delivery to investors of a separate paper notice for each shareholder report to explain how the report can be obtained from a website or in paper form. The following is a high level summary of the Rule and its conditions, including certain differences between the final Rule and the 2015 rule proposal. The first date on which any Fund may rely on the Rule to send paper notices in lieu of shareholder reports is January 1, 2021.

In related releases, two SEC requests for public comment were announced. First, the SEC seeks public comment on additional ways to modernize fund information. Investors, academics, literacy and design experts, market observers, fund advisers, and boards of directors are invited to provide feedback on how to improve the experience of fund investors. Second, the SEC seeks comment on the framework for certain processing fees that broker-dealers and other intermediaries charge funds for delivering fund shareholder reports and other materials to investors.

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The General Counsel as Key Corporate Social Responsibility Advisor

Michael W. Peregrine is a partner at McDermott Will & Emery LLP. This post is based on an article by Mr. Peregrine; his views do not necessarily reflect the views of McDermott Will & Emery or its clients.

The general counsel’s ability to incorporate moral and ethical matters within her advice, and her accepted role as “wise counselor” to management, well-position her to be an important advisor to board and executive leadership on corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) matters.

By its nature, CSR reflects the confluence of business performance; law and regulation; corporate governance; and social and environmental goals. A company’s ability to respond to CSR depends in part on soliciting a diversity of related perspectives at the executive and board levels. These should logically include the general counsel, whose portfolio extends well beyond technical legal issues, to incorporating moral and ethical considerations in her advice to the corporation.

The managerially progressive CEO, who is sensitive to CSR principles, will support and embrace the regular and active participation of the general counsel in “C-Suite” CSR discussions.

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Chairman Clayton Testimony on the Oversight of the SEC

Jay Clayton is Chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on Chairman Clayton’s recent testimony before the House Committee on Financial Services, available here. The views expressed in this post are those of Mr. Clayton and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff.

Chairman Hensarling, Ranking Member Waters and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today [June 21, 2018] about the work of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). [1]

With a workforce of over 4,500 staff in Washington and across our 11 regional offices, the SEC oversees, among other things (1) approximately $82 trillion in securities trading annually on U.S. equity markets; (2) the disclosures of approximately 4,300 exchange-listed public companies with an approximate aggregate market capitalization of $30 trillion; and (3) the activities of over 26,000 registered entities and self-regulatory organizations. These registered entities and registrants include, among others, investment advisers, broker-dealers, transfer agents, securities exchanges, clearing agencies, mutual funds and exchange-traded funds (ETFs), and employ over one million people in the United States.

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REIT M&A in a Complex Market

Adam O. Emmerich and Robin Panovka are partners and leaders of the REIT M&A practice at Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum authored by Mr. Emmerich and Mr. Panovka.

We offer some quick observations from recent REIT deal activity, with a more fulsome discussion in our attached updated playbook:

  1. N A V are the three most misunderstood letters in the REIT lexicon, often viewed doubly incorrectly as both a floor for what a sale process should yield, and an indicator of opportunities for activists. A REIT’s so-called NAV is merely an estimate (best viewed as a range), is backward looking, typically fails to account for frictional costs, and may, in many cases, not reflect fundamental value.
  2. Activist pressure, or its threat, is often a driver, but should never be allowed to dictate results, particularly where short-termism is at play.
  3. Frictional costs can vary widely from deal to deal, depending on tax protection agreements, debt breakage, transfer taxes, severance, litigation and other issues. This should be top of the list in due diligence.
  4. Auction bidder pools vary in depth depending on the asset class and complexity involved, with some strategic buyers exercising caution, and with the larger PE firms and sovereign funds focusing rather selectively, particularly in light of unusual uncertainty around underlying value in certain asset classes. Most PE firms and sovereign funds are unwilling or unable to take down the larger or even mid-size REITs without clubbing, which obviously adds a layer of complexity and execution risk.
  5. Post-deal market checks can be an attractive tool for maximizing value, providing the benefits of an “auction with a floor.” A no-shop coupled with a two-tiered break fee (low for an initial period and then climbing to market) is sometimes a helpful compromise between go-shops and high-break-fee no-shops. Negotiating the right balance of deal protections while preserving the ability to fulfill fiduciary duties is especially important as topping bids are increasingly considered and made.
  6. Deal litigation continues to be largely inevitable, but should not be allowed to wag the dog. If a process is properly managed, the courts will afford boards wide latitude to determine how best to maximize shareholder value, with litigation/settlement costs controlled and kept to a minimum.
  7. Executive retention and termination protection issues should be considered early in the process, preferably on a clear day.

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Gender Quotas on California Boards

Ron BerenblatAndrew Freedman, and Steve Wolosky are partners at Olshan Frome Wolosky LLP. This post is based on an Olshan publication by Mr. Berenblat, Mr. Freedman, and Mr. Wolosky.

California could become the first state in the nation to enact legislation promoting gender diversity in corporate boardrooms. On May 31, 2018, the State Senate of California passed a bill that would require public companies headquartered in California to comply with certain gender quota requirements with respect to board composition.

The bill, if enacted, would require any “publicly held” domestic and foreign corporation whose principal executive offices, according to the corporation’s Form 10-K, are located in California to have a minimum of one “female” on its board of directors no later than December 31, 2019. No later than December 31, 2021, the required minimum would increase to 2 female directors for corporations with 5 directors or to 3 female directors for corporations with 6 or more directors. The bill defines a “female” as “an individual who self-identifies her gender as a woman, without regard to the individual’s designated sex at birth.” A “publicly held” corporation is defined as a corporation with shares listed on “a major United States stock exchange.”

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A Public Option for Bank Accounts (or Central Banking for All)

Morgan Ricks is Professor of Law at Vanderbilt University Law School; John Crawford is Professor of Law at UC Hastings College of Law; and Lev Menand is a lawyer in New York. This post is based on their recent paper.

Among the perks of being a bank is the privilege of holding an account with the central bank. Unavailable to individuals and nonbank businesses, central bank accounts pay higher interest than ordinary bank accounts. Payments between these accounts clear instantly; banks needn’t wait days or even minutes for incoming payments to post. On top of that, central bank accounts consist of base money, meaning they are fully sovereign and nondefaultable no matter how large the balance. By contrast, federal deposit insurance for ordinary bank accounts maxes out at $250,000—a big problem for institutions with large balances.

Our paper recently posted on SSRN, A Public Option for Bank Accounts (or Central Banking for All), argues that restricting central bank accounts to an exclusive clientele (banks) is no longer justifiable on policy grounds if indeed it ever was. We propose giving the general public—individuals, businesses, and institutions—the option to hold accounts at the central bank, which we call FedAccounts. FedAccounts would offer all the functionality of ordinary bank accounts with the exception of overdraft coverage. They would also have all the special features that banks currently enjoy on their central bank accounts, as well as some additional, complementary features. Government-issued physical currency is already an open-access resource, available to all; the FedAccount program would merely do the same for nonphysical or “account” money.

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Weekly Roundup: June 15-21, 2018


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of June 15-21, 2018.

Highlights of Proposal to Simplify the Volcker Rule




The Law and Finance of Initial Coin Offerings


Untangling the Tangled Web of Cybersecurity Disclosure Requirements: A Practical Guide



Significant Revisions of the Volcker Rule



The Effect of Enforcement Transparency: Evidence from SEC Comment-Letter Reviews



Audit Tenure and the Timeliness of Misstatement Discovery



Sandbagging in Delaware




Clarifying Appraisal Rights in Complicated Transactions



Response to U.S. Senate Banking Committee

Katherine Rabin is CEO of Glass, Lewis & Co. This post is based on Ms. Rabin’s letter to Senator Dean Heller, Chairman of the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance & Investment.

June 1, 2018

The Honorable Dean Heller
Chairman
Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance & Investment
Senate Committee on Banking
324 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Chairman Heller,

We received the letter dated May 9, 2018 regarding your review of the proxy advisory industry and the business practices of proxy advisory firms. We appreciate the opportunity to provide answers to your questions, as well as additional information about Glass Lewis.

We also wish to take this opportunity to respond to certain misleading, inaccurate and conflicted reports published by groups such as the American Council for Capital Formation (ACCF), the Manhattan Institute, Nasdaq and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. To begin with, we would like to note the following facts:

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The Federalization of Corporate Governance

Marc I. Steinberg is the Radford Professor of Law at Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law. This post relates to a recently published book by Professor Steinberg. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Federal Corporate Law: Lessons From History, by Lucian Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani.

In my recently published book, The Federalization of Corporate Governance (Oxford University Press 2018) (ISBN 978-0-19-993454-6), I explore this process of federalization in the United States from 1903 to the present. Clearly, the states, particularly Delaware, traditionally have been and continue as principal regulators of the sphere of corporate governance. Nonetheless, to an increasing degree, the federal government, the SEC, and the national stock exchanges impact corporate governance standards. The book views this federalization as an evolutionary process that commenced at the beginning of the twentieth century. Going through periods of activism, gradual transition, and stagnation, the process intensified with the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Acts.

To view these Acts as representing a revolutionary transformation with respect to federal oversight of corporate governance is an exaggeration. Rather, they symbolize a period of enhanced activism whereby this federalization process was accentuated. From a historical perspective, between 1903 and 1914, 24 bills were introduced in Congress which sought to require federal chartering and/or the implementation of federal minimum substantive standards. During that era, both Presidents Roosevelt and Taft favored federal incorporation. Between 1914 and 1930, another seven bills were introduced in Congress seeking to effectuate similar objectives—with one such bill requiring that the Federal Trade Commission approve executive officer remuneration. Interestingly, the next significant legislative effort occurred 50 years thereafter with the Metzenbaum Bill of 1980 which prescribed federal minimum standards that largely focused on adherence to fiduciary duties, including with respect to related-party transactions. Although hearings were held through the years, none of these bills were enacted.

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Clarifying Appraisal Rights in Complicated Transactions

Gail Weinstein is senior counsel, Steven Epstein and Warren S. de Wied are partners at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP. This post is based on a Fried Frank memorandum by Ms. Weinstein, Mr. Epstein, Mr. de Wied, Philip RichterAndrea Gede-Lange, and Maxwell Yim. This post is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Using the Deal Price for Determining “Fair Value” in Appraisal Proceedings by Guhan Subramanian (discussed on the Forum here).

In City of North Miami Beach Genl. Employees’ Retirement Plan v. Dr Pepper Snapple Group, Inc. (June 1, 2018), the Court of Chancery held that appraisal rights are not available to the stockholders of Dr Pepper in connection with a transaction structure (involving a reverse triangular merger and a special cash dividend to the target stockholders) which will result in the sale of control of the company.

Key Points

  • The court confirmed that the Delaware appraisal statute does not bestow appraisal rights simply upon a sale of control—rather, appraisal rights are available only under certain statutorily-specified types of transactions.
  • The court indicated that it will not “look through” a transaction structure to the “underlying economic and practical effect” in order to grant appraisal rights when they are not otherwise specifically provided under a “plain reading” of the statute.
  • The court held that appraisal rights are not available to Dr Pepper’s stockholders because Dr Pepper (as a parent of the entity actually merging) is not a “constituent corporation” in the merger. The court held that, in addition, appraisal rights are not available because the Dr Pepper stockholders are not relinquishing their shares in connection with the transaction.
  • The Dr Pepper structure may be used in conflicted controller transactions, but, in our view, it is unlikely that it would be more broadly used for the purpose of eliminating appraisal rights (as discussed below under “Practice Points”).

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