Yearly Archives: 2021

New York Court on the Enforcement of Federal Forum Provision

Andrew J. Ehrlich is partner, Brad S. Karp is partner and chairman, and Audra J. Soloway at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP. This post is based on a Paul, Weiss memorandum by Mr. Ehrlich, Mr. Karp, Ms. Soloway, Susanna M. Buergel, Daniel J. Kramer, and Geoffrey R. Chepiga.

In the wake of the Supreme Court’s holding in Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund, which held that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over claims brought under the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”), many corporations began adopting a federal forum provision (“FFP”) in their charters, requiring Securities Act claims to be brought in federal court. Those charter provisions have been upheld in a number of California state courts. In a recent decision, a New York court for the first time reached the same conclusion.

On August 31, 2021, a New York State court dismissed claims brought under the Securities Act because the defendant-issuer’s charter contained an FFP requiring Securities Act claims to be brought in federal court. The decision in Hook v. Casa Systems, Inc. [1] is the first in New York—and the first in any state court outside California—to enforce an FFP, and continues a pattern of FFP enforcement that bodes well for corporations that have adopted FFPs to avoid the risk and cost of duplicative Securities Act litigation in state courts. The decision is also notable because it dismissed the Securities Act claims as to all defendants, including the underwriters of Casa’s IPO who were not parties to the corporate charter containing the FFP.

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Data Governance Tips for Companies Following SEC’s In re App Annie

David Feder is counsel, and Tyler Newby and James Koenig are partners at Fenwick & West LLP. This post is based on a Fenwick memorandum by Mr. Feder, Mr. Newby, Mr. Koenig, Michael Dicke, and Marc Greco.

Case Overview

[The Sept. 14, 2021] U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement cease-and-desist order (OrderIn re App Annie Inc., out of the SEC’s San Francisco Regional Office, underscores the importance of taking meaningful steps to implement and abide by written policies on corporate data management and protection. The Order resolved fraud allegations that App Annie, an alternative data provider for the mobile app industry, and its co-founder and former CEO and Chairman Bertrand Schmitt (Schmitt), misused confidential data that App Annie had obtained by misrepresenting its data management and protection practices to its securities trading firm customers. The SEC ordered the company and Schmitt to pay a $10 million and a $300,000 civil fine, respectively, and barred Schmitt from serving as an officer or director of a public company for three years.

De-Identified Data Means De-Identified

Through a service called Connect, App Annie provides app analytics to companies that agree to give App Annie their app store credentials so that App Annie can collect the companies’ confidential (i.e., nonpublic) app performance data. App Annie represented to those companies that it would use the data only in aggregated, anonymized form to generate estimates of their apps’ performance for them.

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SEC Form 10-K Comments Regarding Climate-Related Disclosures

Brian V. Breheny and Raquel Fox are partners and Jeongu Gim is an associate at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. This post is based on a Skadden memorandum by Mr. Breheny, Ms. Fox, Mr. Gim, Caroline S. Kim, and Ryan J. Adams. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) and Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders?, both by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita; For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); and Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

As anticipated, the staff in the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance has begun issuing detailed comments regarding climate-related disclosures. [1] In February 2021, then Acting SEC Chair Allison Herren Lee announced that she directed the staff to “enhance its focus on climate-related disclosure in public company filings.”

To date, the comments have been issued in stand-alone letters referencing the companies’ most recent Form 10-K filings. These letters have addressed a combination, but not necessarily all, of the following topics that ask companies to:

  • Disclose considerations the company has given to providing the same type of climate-related disclosure in SEC filings as corporate sustainability reports.
  • Identify and quantify any material past and/or future capital expenditures for climate-related initiatives.
  • To the extent material, quantify or discuss the significant physical effects of climate change on the company’s property or operations.
  • To the extent material, disclose any weather-related impacts on the cost or availability of insurance.
  • Identify or quantify any material compliance costs related to climate change, including compliance costs associated with relevant environmental regulations.
  • Disclose any material litigation risks related to climate change and the potential impact to the company.
  • Disclose the material effects of transition risks related to climate change that may affect the company’s business, financial condition and results of operations, such as policy and regulatory changes that could impose operational and compliance burdens, market trends that may alter business opportunities, credit risks or technological changes.
  • To the extent material, disclose the company’s purchase or sale of carbon credits or offsets and any material effects on the company’s business, financial condition and results of operations.

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Corporate Liquidity Provision and Share Repurchase Programs

Craig M. Lewis is the Madison S. Wigginton Professor of Finance; and Joshua T. White is Assistant Professor of Finance, at Vanderbilt University Owen Graduate School of Management. This post is based on their U.S. Chamber of Commerce report. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Short-Termism and Capital Flows by Jesse Fried and Charles C. Y. Wang (discussed on the Forum here); and Share Repurchases, Equity Issuances, and the Optimal Design of Executive Pay, by Jesse Fried (discussed on the Forum here).

Corporations use stock buybacks as a means to unlock value by returning surplus cash to investors. In turn, these investors can deploy the capital to more productive uses. The popularity of stock buyback programs has attracted significant attention from academics, policymakers, and practitioners. Some vocal opponents conjecture that stock buybacks necessarily reduce investment and harm non-investor stakeholders such as employees. Although a large body of academic literature overwhelmingly refutes these claims, such vocal criticisms persist and have led some to calls for limits via taxing stock buybacks or outright bans on open market repurchases.

In this study, we present large sample evidence showing that stock buybacks have a beneficial but often overlooked effect on stock price stabilization. Using a broad sample of over 10,000 U.S.-listed
companies across a 17-year sample period of 2004 to 2020, we present strong evidence that managers strategically utilize share repurchases to increase stock liquidity and reduce volatility. The resulting stabilization in stock prices benefits all investors—including retail investors, who now account of over 20% of trading volume in U.S. equities.

Our analyses of stock buybacks have six key takeaways:

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Weekly Roundup: October 1–7, 2021


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of October 1–7, 2021.


Key Takeaways From Recent SEC Cybersecurity Charges


Chancery Court Decision on the “Effect of Termination” Provision


The HCM Funnel


SPAC Momentum Continues in Europe


The Audit Committee’s Role in Sustainability/ESG Oversight


Cybersecurity and Disclosures


The Reliability of Your Company’s Carbon Footprint


Investors and Regulators Turning up the Heat on Climate-Change Disclosures


SPACs: A New Frontier for Shareholder Activism


Director Pay Levels Were Flat Among the 100 Largest US Companies


2021 ESG + Incentives Report





CEO and Executive Compensation Practices in the Russell 3000 and S&P 500



ESG as the Driving Factor in Multi-Country Class Action Cases

Jeff Lubitz is Executive Director of ISS Securities Class Action Services; and Duncan Paterson is Head of ESG Thought Leadership Program at ISS ESG, Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. This post is based on their ISS memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value by Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales (discussed on the Forum here); and Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee by Max M. Schanzenbach and Robert H. Sitkoff (discussed on the Forum here).

Key Takeaways

  • Climate change and other ESG factors are driving a heightened focus on stewardship practices among responsible investors.
  • Investors, both passive and active, should be mindful of litigation risks and recovery opportunities in their portfolio.
  • Originally driven by climate issues, ESG-related litigation is expanding into other ESG areas and across a range of asset classes.
  • ESG event-driven security class actions are increasing in number, and capturing a broad range of global brands on a number of different topics.
  • Global corporations tend to handle class actions differently in different jurisdictions, with many being settled in the US but drawn out in other markets.
  • This practice has implications for global investors interested in expanding their stewardship and fiduciary practices to include active management of securities class action risk.

Introduction

Investors are paying increasing attention to their stewardship practices and fiduciary responsibilities in relation to securities class actions. With a settlement pipeline standing at approximately $8 billion, there is a case to be made that filing claims to recover losses incurred from fraud in securities class action cases is both a fiduciary duty and a sound business practice.

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Investor Protection in an Age of Entrepreneurship

James J. Park is Professor of Law at UCLA School of Law. This post is based on his recent paper, forthcoming in the Harvard Business Law Review.

In this age of entrepreneurship, emerging companies have created trillions of dollars in new market value. Remarkably, many of the most promising ventures have gone public without an extensive history of profitability. Indeed, many are losing significant amounts as they command valuations once reserved for blue chip corporate giants with decades of substantial profits. The undeniable success of companies like Amazon, Google and Facebook has created a template for new ventures that are able to sell shares at prices that anticipate the possibility of future wealth. Investors, mostly institutions, have reaped billions of dollars in gains as emerging companies have gone public.

The investor protection policy of federal securities regulation faces new challenges in this climate. The longstanding model where companies are only permitted to sell stock to the public after generating several years of profits and surviving scrutiny from an independent underwriter is under pressure. Rather than protecting investors, securities law seems like a barrier that delays access to promising investments. The SEC has defined investor protection so vaguely that its goals are unclear. It has no theory that explains why investors are permitted to take on some risks but not others.

This paper sets forth a conception of investor protection that better articulates the role of the securities laws in this new period of entrepreneurship. It argues that an important function of securities regulation is to distinguish between risk and uncertainty. As famously defined by the University of Chicago economist Frank Knight, a risk can be estimated and quantified while an uncertainty is not subject to meaningful estimation. Put another way, a “risk” is a “measurable uncertainty” that should be distinguished from “uncertainty” that is “immeasurable.”

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CEO and Executive Compensation Practices in the Russell 3000 and S&P 500

Matteo Tonello is Managing Director of ESG Research at The Conference Board, Inc. and Olivia Tay is Senior Consultant at Semler Brossy Consulting Group. This post is based on a Conference Board report by Mr. Tonello, Ms. Tay, Mark Emanuel, Paul Hodgson, and Todd Sirras, and relates to CEO and Executive Compensation Practices in the Russell 3000 and S&P 500: 2021 Edition, an annual benchmarking study and online dashboard published by The Conference Board, compensation consultancy Semler Brossy Consulting Group, and ESG data analytics firm ESGAUGE. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Paying for Long-Term Performance by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried (discussed on the Forum here).

CEO and Executive Compensation Practices in the Russell 3000 and S&P 500: 2021 Edition documents trends and developments in senior management compensation at 2,527 companies issuing equity securities registered with the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that filed their proxy statement in the period between January 1 and June 30, 2021, and, as of January 2021, were included in the Russell 3000 Index. The project is a collaboration among The Conference Board, compensation consulting firm Semler Brossy, and ESG data analytics firm ESGAUGE.

The following are the key findings and insights.

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Proposed Legislation to Address the Problem of Woke Corporations

Marco Rubio is U.S. Senator from Florida. This post is based on his proposed legislation before the United States Senate. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) and Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders?, both by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita; For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); and Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

The public support by large corporations for socially progressive ideologies, both in politics and business, has created a crisis of legitimacy for corporate America. By embracing the “woke” revolution that is politicizing nearly every area of Americans’ lives, corporate America has severely damaged its credibility with the rest of the country, and broken its relationship with conservatives and the Republican Party. This collapse of trust not only harms the health of our public life; it prevents large corporations from effectively serving the patriotic and necessary roles we need them to in order to advance the common good. It is time to change course.

To everyday working Americans, the examples of corporations pushing the woke revolution in our society are so plentiful that it should hardly require further explanation. But because it may be difficult to observe from the inside, a reminder of that in this forum may be helpful. According to a recent survey by American Compass, 63 percent of non-management workers want businesses to “focus on business and stay out of social justice issues” like “election reform, racial equity, and LGBTQ+ rights.” Among the workforce generally, those numbers went up to 66 percent of independents and 85 percent of Republicans. The greatest levels of support for companies taking a public stance on behalf of social justice were white, college-educated Democrats, at 77 percent.
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Testimony by Chair Gensler Before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services

Gary Gensler is Chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on his recent testimony Before the U.S. House Committee on Financial Services. The views expressed in the post are those of Chair Gensler, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Staff.

Good afternoon, Chairwoman Waters, Ranking Member McHenry, and members of the Committee. I’m honored to appear before you today for the second time as Chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission. As is customary, I will note that my views are my own, and I am not speaking on behalf of my fellow Commissioners or the staff.

We are blessed with the largest, most sophisticated, and most innovative capital markets in the world. The U.S. capital markets represent 38 percent of the globe’s capital markets. [1] This exceeds even our impact on the world’s gross domestic product, where we hold a 24 percent share. [2]

Furthermore, companies and investors use our capital markets more than market participants in other economies do. For example, debt capital markets account for 80 percent of financing for non-financial corporations in the U.S. In the rest of the world, by contrast, nearly 80 percent of lending to such firms comes from banks. [3]

Our capital markets continue to support American competitiveness on the world stage because of the strong investor protections we offer.

We keep our markets the best in the world through efficiency, transparency, and competition. These features lower the cost of capital for issuers, raise returns for investors, reduce economic rents, and democratize markets. That focus on competition is in every part of the SEC’s work, particularly with respect to market structure.

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