Yearly Archives: 2021

Dealing with Activist Hedge Funds and Other Activist Investors

Martin Lipton is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Lipton, Steven A. RosenblumKaressa L. Cain, Sabastian V. Niles, and Anna Dimitrijević. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum here); Dancing with Activists by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, and Thomas Keusch (discussed on the Forum here); and Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

Despite a short dip at the outset of the pandemic, activism has rebounded and now continues at an ever-growing intensity. As we have previously noted, regardless of industry, size or performance, no company should consider itself immune from activism. No company is too large, too popular, too new or too successful. Even companies that are respected industry leaders and have outperformed the market and their peers have been and are being attacked. And companies that have faced one activist may be approached, in the same year or in successive years, by other activists or re-visited by the prior activist.

Although asset managers and institutional investors will often act independently of activists, the relationships between activists and asset managers and investors in recent years have encouraged frequent and aggressive activist attacks. A number of hedge funds have also sought to export American-style activism abroad, with companies throughout the world now facing classic activist attacks. In addition, the line between hedge fund activism and private equity continues to blur, with some activist funds becoming bidders themselves for all or part of a company, and a handful of private equity funds exploring activist-style investments in, and engagement with, public companies.

READ MORE »

2021 ESG + Incentives Report

John Borneman is Managing Director, Tatyana Day is Senior Consultant, and Kevin Masini is a Consultant at Semler Brossy Consulting Group LLC. This post is based on a Semler Brossy memorandum by Mr. Borneman, Ms. Day, Mr. Masini, Matthew Mazzoni, and Jennifer Teefey. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) and Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders?, both by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita; For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); and Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

As the use of ESG metrics in incentive plans continues to grow, we see a diverse set of models by which companies incorporate these metrics. As with many ‘non-financial’ metrics, the use of ESG metrics within a ‘scorecard’ is a common approach, although this is certainly not the only solution. We anticipate the evolution toward incorporating more weighted and prominent ESG structures into plan design to continue to grow in the coming years.

In this post, we analyze the reported design approach to incorporating ESG metrics into incentives within the S&P 500. For purposes of this analysis, we have categorized these design approaches into four groups:

READ MORE »

Director Pay Levels Were Flat Among the 100 Largest US Companies

Dan Laddin and Matt Vnuk are partners and Whitney Cook is an associate at Compensation Advisory Partners, LLC (CAP). This post is based on their CAP memorandum.

Each year CAP analyzes non-employee director compensation programs among the 100 largest US public companies. These companies are trendsetters and can provide early insights into evolving pay practices across the broader public company marketplace. This post reflects a summary of pay levels and pay practice trends based on 2021 proxy disclosures.

Key Takeaways

  • Median Total Board Compensation remained flat versus prior year, and 75th percentile Total Board Compensation has remained flat for the past two years
  • During the last year, there were the fewest increases to board cash and/or equity retainers of any year during the last decade, in reaction to the COVID-19 pandemic and related implications
  • Shareholder approved director pay limits that apply to both cash and equity-based compensation (i.e., that apply to total pay) became majority practice in 2020

Looking Ahead

  • Reviews of director pay levels that were delayed during 2020 are again beginning to take place
  • During 2021, companies will continue to be focused on COVID-related external optics, but we do expect to see increases to director pay levels, especially at businesses less impacted by the pandemic. By 2022, we expect that companies will be back on the normal cadence of reviewing and modifying director pay every other year
  • As a result, we expect many companies will contemplate increases to director pay levels during 2021 or 2022, and year-over-year increases to director pay levels will return to historic norms

READ MORE »

SPACs: A New Frontier for Shareholder Activism

Derek Zaba, Kai Haakon E. Liekefett, and Joshua G. DuClos are partners at Sidley Austin LLP. This post is based on their Sidley memorandum, originally published in the Summer 2021 issue of IR Update. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum here); and Dancing with Activists by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, and Thomas Keusch (discussed on the Forum here).

Much has been written about the torrent of activity in special purpose acquisition vehicles (SPACs)—a type of “blank check” company.

SPACs raise money in an initial public offering (IPO), which is placed in a trust account to be used for the sole purpose of identifying, acquiring, and merging with a private target company within 18 to 24 months. The culmination of this process is called a “de-SPAC,” which is when the newly combined company becomes a publicly traded entity.

In the process, the formerly private company receives a public listing and a fresh infusion of cash from the SPAC’s trust and/or a concurrent private investment in public equity offering (PIPE), and the SPAC’s sponsor receives a hefty “promote” in the form of equity in the combined entity for putting up a modest amount of working capital funds and facilitating the transaction.

According to Bloomberg, 300 SPACs were launched in the first quarter of 2021 alone, which was more than the approximately 250 launched in 2020 (itself a banner year for SPAC launches that saw three times as many SPAC IPOs as 2019).

READ MORE »

Investors and Regulators Turning up the Heat on Climate-Change Disclosures

Jason Halper is partner and Sara Bussiere and Timbre Shriver are associates at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP. This post is based on a Cadwalader memorandum by Mr. Halper, Ms. Bussiere, Ms. Shriver, Melis Acuner, Mark Beardsworth and Kevin Roberts. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) and Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders?, both by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita; For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); and Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

As investors’ calls for greater climate-related corporate accountability grow louder, the “E” in ESG—environmental, social and governance—looms larger than ever, particularly from the perspective of directors facing oversight responsibilities and the challenge of providing adequate disclosure. That reality became even clearer when a little-known hedge fund with a relatively small stake in ExxonMobil successfully elected three insurgent directors at the company’s annual meeting after quietly garnering the support of other stakeholders by appealing to their interest in environmental and governance issues. [1]

Of course, investors have been signaling the importance of environmental issues for years. In 2007, the $240 billion California State Teachers’ Retirement System (“CalSTRS”) formed a Green Initiative Task Force focused solely on “managing sustainability-related risks, including climate risks, and taking advantage of appropriate sustainability-themed investments.” [2] Blackrock, the largest asset management company in the world by assets under management, has published guidance concerning its expectations with respect to climate-related disclosures, stating that “climate risk—physical and transition risk—presents one of the most significant systemic risk[s] to the long-term value of our clients’ investments.” [3] Earlier this year, Blackrock voted for two shareholder proposals requiring Berkshire Hathaway Inc. to issue disclosures addressing how the company is managing climate risk, noting that the company “is not adapting to a world where environmental, social, governance (ESG) considerations are becoming much more material to performance.” [4] Though neither proposal was approved, Blackrock’s dissatisfaction prompted other institutional investors to express their discontent, increasing pressure on the company to modify its approach. In 2017, research conducted by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (“SASB”) found that climate change “is likely to have material financial impacts on companies in 72 out of 79 industries, representing 93 percent of the U.S. equity market, or $27.5 trillion.” [5] And investors are increasingly demanding that companies change their approach to managing climate-related risks and more thoroughly disclosing those efforts. We expect these demands to hit a fever pitch following the “code red for humanity” recently issued by the United Nations’ recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) report and in the months leading up to the United Nations’ Conference of the Parties 26 (“COP26”) in Glasgow in November of this year. [6]

READ MORE »

The Reliability of Your Company’s Carbon Footprint

Cydney S. Posner is special counsel at Cooley LLP. This post is based on her Cooley memorandum.

Just how reliable are those carbon footprints that many large companies have been publishing in their sustainability reports? Even putting aside concerns about greenwashing, what about those nebulous Scope 3 GHG emissions? As we all know, the SEC is now is the midst of developing a proposal for mandatory climate-related disclosure. (See, e.g., this PubCo post and this PubCo post.) The WSJ reports that “[o]ne problem facing regulators and companies: Some of the most important and widely used data is hard to both measure and verify.” According to an academic cited in the article, the “measurement, target-setting, and management of Scope 3 is a mess….There is a wide range of uncertainty in Scope 3 emissions measurement…to the point that numbers can be absurdly off.”

READ MORE »

Cybersecurity and Disclosures

Paul Ferrillo is partner at Seyfarth Shaw LLP; Bob Zukis is Adjunct Professor of Management and Organization at the USC Marshall School of Business; and George Platsis is Senior Lead Technologist at Booz Allen Hamilton. This post is based on a memorandum authored by Mr. Ferrillo, Mr. Zukis, Mr. Platsis, and Christophe Veltsos.

 “The Vulcan mind meld, also known as the mind link, mind probe, mind fusion, mind touch, or simply meld, was a telepathic link between two individuals. It allowed for an intimate exchange of thoughts, thus in essence enabling the participants to become one mind, sharing consciousness in a kind of gestalt.” [1]

—The Star Trek definition of “Mind Meld”

The United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) recently issued two critical Consent Orders, First American Title [2] and Pearson, [3] both articulating the need for timely, fulsome, and accurate disclosures to the market when a data breach occurs. These two Consent Orders are the first precedents that offer guidance on what the SEC is expecting on cybersecurity risk related to what the board needs to know, when they need to know it and when they need to disclose it.

READ MORE »

The Audit Committee’s Role in Sustainability/ESG Oversight

Stephen G. Parker is Partner, and Tracey-Lee Brown and Gregory Johnson are Directors at the Governance Insights Center, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. This post is based on their PwC memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) and Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders?, both by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita; For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); and Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

Because ESG encompasses strategy, risk and opportunity, the board plays a vital role. But ESG is a broad topic, and the board should consider assigning various aspects of oversight to specific committees. Here we outline the role the audit committee can play in overseeing ESG disclosures.

Why the hype about ESG disclosures?

In recent discussions about environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues, large institutional investors have been the loudest in the push for greater corporate transparency. Investors want to know how companies are addressing ESG risks and opportunities because of their potential impact on shareholder value. Environmental issues such as climate change and social issues such as racial injustice and inequality can affect a company’s cost of capital, long term growth prospects, and ultimately, its viability. That may be one reason why one in four S&P 500 companies cited “ESG” when discussing business strategy on their earnings calls for Q4 2020 the highest in 10 years.

READ MORE »

SPAC Momentum Continues in Europe

Michael Levitt, Mark Austin, and Dr. Christoph Gleske are partners at Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP. This post is based on a Freshfields memorandum by Mr. Levitt, Mr. Austin, Dr. Gleske, Dirk-Jan Smit, Kate Cooper, and Dr. Stephan Pachinger.

Since our publication in March (US SPAC Boom Spreads to Europe), the SPAC market in Europe has continued to grow, with nearly 30 SPACs listed so far in 2021. Euronext Amsterdam has been taking the lead with over 40% of the European SPAC listings, along with three on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. In London, the Financial Conduct Authority has published its final policy statement in relation to the SPAC regime, which came into force on 10 August and looks set to encourage SPAC listings in London, with several in preparation and more being discussed.

We have updated the table which we published in March to show current trends in the features of SPACs that have listed in Amsterdam and Frankfurt, with a comparison to the typical SPAC structure in the United States. We have also included updates for how the structure has been used for London SPAC listings historically and where the requirements set out in the FCA’s recent policy statement impact that structure. We expect London market practice to change going forward to largely mirror that in other jurisdictions.

Among the four jurisdictions, Frankfurt and the US are the most similar. For a Frankfurt-listed SPAC, entities organized in Luxembourg or The Netherlands have recently been used to resemble the US SPAC structure. In addition, the Frankfurt Stock Exchange has introduced listing rules specifically for SPACs to make it easier for them to list in Frankfurt.

READ MORE »

The HCM Funnel

Greg Arnold is Managing Director and Andrew Friedlander is Senior Associate at Semler Brossy LLC. This post is based on their Semler Brossy memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) and Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders?, both by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita; For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); and Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

Investor demands, societal pressures and competition for employees are pushing boards to be intentional about where and how they focus on human capital management (HCM). Leading companies view HCM as a value driver and strategic differentiator.

Boards should view HCM topics the same way they view other key strategic items — as an essential component of company oversight. But some companies are struggling to determine where to focus and how to drive real change in the organization. Many have expanded the purview of the compensation committee to include HCM metrics and some have renamed the committee to reflect this broader oversight. Additionally, increased disclosure requirements and expectations have raised the bar for clarity on how HCM ties to the business strategy. With the growing number of HCM measures, disclosure frameworks and investor perspectives, companies need to set priorities on their differentiators and areas where improvement will drive better business performance.

READ MORE »

Page 22 of 90
1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 90