Yearly Archives: 2021

Chancery Court Decision on the “Effect of Termination” Provision

Gail Weinstein is senior counsel, and Amber Banks (Meek) and Maxwell Yim are partners at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP. This post is based on a Fried Frank memorandum by Ms. Weinstein, Ms. Banks, Mr. Yim, Andrea Gede-Lange, Shant P. Manoukian, and Bret T. Chrisope, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Are M&A Contract Clauses Value Relevant to Target and Bidder Shareholders? by John C. Coates, Darius Palia, and Ge Wu (discussed on the Forum here); and Allocating Risk Through Contract: Evidence from M&A and Policy Implications by John C. Coates, IV (discussed on the Forum here).

The Delaware Court of Chancery’s recent decision in Yatra Online v. Ebix (Aug. 30, 2021) serves as a reminder that, under the “Effect of Termination” provision in most merger agreements, a party’s termination of the agreement extinguishes all liability of both parties for pre-termination breaches of the agreement, except as the parties may have otherwise specifically provided in the agreement. The Ebix case illustrates that, depending on how the parties have drafted the provision, a party can be left with no remedy for the willful breaches and wrongful failure to close of the other party.

Ebix, Inc. allegedly had a change of heart about proceeding with its agreed acquisition of Yatra Online, Inc. after the deal became less attractive to Ebix when the COVID-19 pandemic emerged. Allegedly, Ebix then blatantly breached its representations and covenants in the Merger Agreement and “strung along” Yatra with pretextual delays while in fact Ebix never intended to close. Yatra ultimately became “fed up” with Ebix’s misconduct, and, when several renegotiated end dates had passed with no sign that Ebix intended ever to close, Yatra sued Ebix for damages and exercised its right to terminate the Merger Agreement. The court held, however, that Yatra had no remedy because it had terminated the Merger Agreement and the Effect of Termination provision, as drafted, extinguished liability for pre-termination breaches without any carveout for liability for willful breaches.

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Key Takeaways From Recent SEC Cybersecurity Charges

Michael Osnato is partner, Allison Bernbach is senior counsel and William LeBas is an associate at Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP. This post is based on their Simpson Thacher memorandum.

On August 30, 2021, the SEC announced three settlements with eight registered investment advisers and broker-dealers for violations of Rule 30(a) of Regulation S-P (the “Safeguards Rule”) and, in the case of one of the firms charged, for violations of Section 206(4) and Rule 206(4)-7 of the Advisers Act, resulting in hundreds of thousands of dollars in fines (ranging from $200,000 to $300,000) for the firms. The settlements reflect the Enforcement Division’s continued focus (for issuers and advisers alike) on cybersecurity, as well as a continued focus on advisers’ adherence to adopted policies and procedures. These actions originated in examinations and may reflect the developed expertise of the Exams Staff (working with the SEC’s specialized Cyber Unit) on cybersecurity issues.

The settlements come on the heels of a number of initiatives and publications by the SEC with respect to cybersecurity risks. [1] In its 2021 Examination Priorities, the Division of Examinations (“Examinations”) noted that it “will also focus on controls surrounding . . . the electronic storage of books and records and personally identifiable information maintained with third-party cloud service providers, and firms’ policies and procedures to protect investor records and information.” Examinations also published a January 2020 report regarding effective cybersecurity practices for market participants, as well as a COVID-related risk alert in August 2020 that included focus on cyber risks.

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Crises as Opportunities for Growth: The Strategic Value of Business Group Affiliation

Jason Zein is Associate Professor of Finance at the University of New South Wales Sydney School of Banking and Finance. This post is based on a recent paper authored by Mr. Zein; Ronald Masulis, Scientia Professor of Finance at the University of New South Wales Sydney School of Banking and Finance; Peter Pham, Associate Professor of Finance at the the University of New South Wales Sydney School of Banking and Finance; and Alvin E. S. Ang, Assistant Professor of Finance at Hang Seng University of Hong Kong School of Business.

In many markets around the world, a substantial fraction of publicly listed firms are members of family-controlled business groups. Despite widespread concerns over their corporate governance impacts, family business groups have continued to expand, with no end to their dominance in sight. For example, from 2002 to 2012, a period which includes the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the total annual sales as a percentage of GDP of the top 10 largest family business groups in South Korea increased from 53% to 80%, with two-thirds of the gain occurring after this crisis. While previous studies suggest that groups exploit their economic and political influence to perpetuate their market dominance over nongroup affiliated firms, little is known about the conditions under which groups are able to expand their market power and strengthen their competitive positions over time.

In our paper titled Crises as Opportunities for Growth: The Strategic Value of Business Group Affiliation, which is available on SSRN, we investigate whether business groups exploit crises to expand their economic power. Our study is motivated by the surprising lack of empirical evidence that links internal financing benefits of group affiliation to their product market positions. This is despite the large body of evidence in the industrial organization literature documenting that financially strong firms have a “deep pockets” advantage which enable them to capture market share from their financially constrained rivals. In a similar vein, we argue that the internal capital markets (ICMs) of business groups provide their affiliates with a clear strategic advantage during crisis periods, allowing them to capture market share from standalone rivals with limited access to external capital.

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Weekly Roundup: September 23–30, 2021


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of September 24–30, 2021.

The Impact of a Principles-Based Approach to Director Gender Diversity Policy


A New Way of Seeing Value


SEC’s Investor Advisory Committee Recommends Changes to Rule 10b5-1 Trading Plans


Five Essential Strategy Questions Boards Should Be Asking


Board Structure Is Key to Oversight


C-Suite Executives Should Fill the Trust Gap



Delaware Supreme Court Announces New Demand Futility Test




Proxy Season Climate-Related Voting Trends Report


The Deterrent Effect of Insider Trading Enforcement Actions





Statement by Chair Gensler on Proposal to Enhance Reporting of Proxy and Executive Compensation Votes

Gary Gensler is Chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on his recent public statement. The views expressed in the post are those of Chair Gensler, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Staff.

Good morning. This is an open meeting of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on September 29, 2021. I want to welcome members of the public who are listening in.

This is my first open meeting as Chair of this remarkable agency. While there will be times when we vote on rulemakings via seriatim, I like open Commission meetings. I think open meetings can bring greater transparency to our work, and the public benefits when we can open up our deliberations to them. I hope it will be the first of many during my tenure.

Today [Sept. 29, 2021], the Commission will consider a staff recommendation to propose amendments to Form N-PX to enhance the information that investment companies report about their proxy votes. The proposal also would require certain institutional investment managers to report how they vote proxies relating to certain executive compensation matters. These votes have come to be known as “say on pay.”

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Statement by Commissioner Peirce on Proposal to Enhance Reporting of Proxy and Executive Compensation Votes

Hester M. Peirce is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on her recent public statement. The views expressed in this post are those of Ms. Peirce and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff.

I want to offer my thanks to the staff of the Divisions of Investment Management and Economic and Risk Analysis and the Office of the General Counsel. I enjoyed our discussion about the proposal before us today and your thoughtful consideration of my comments. I know how much work goes into a proposal like this one, which makes it all the more difficult that I cannot support it.

One aspect of the proposal being considered today involves a statutorily mandated disclosure on “say-on-pay” votes. In a nutshell, Section 14A(d) of the Exchange Act, which the Dodd-Frank Act amended, requires every manager to report at least annually how it voted on say-on-pay matters. Regardless of whether I agree with section 951 of Dodd-Frank, it is the law, and the Commission is right in wanting to implement it.

If I had had my preference, the say-on-pay proposal would be up for Commission consideration as a standalone rulemaking. Instead, it has been joined with a wholly discretionary proposal involving a number of alterations to Form N-PX.

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Statement by Commissioner Roisman on Proposal to Enhance Reporting of Proxy and Executive Compensation Votes

Elad L. Roisman is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The following post is based on his recent public statement. The views expressed in this post are those of Mr. Roisman and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff.

Thank you, Chair Gensler, and thank you to the staff in the Division of Investment Management (the “Division”) for your hard work on the recommendation we are considering today, to propose amendments to disclosures that asset managers make with regard to their proxy voting. [1] As no recommendation gets to the Commission without scrutiny from our Division of Economic and Risk Analysis and Office of General Counsel, I would like to thank the staff in these groups for their work as well. Finally, thank you to everyone who engaged with my team and me on the matters we are considering today.

Before us is a proposal to amend our rules in two ways. First, the proposed amendments would effectuate a requirement under Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Act that we expand reporting of say-on-pay votes. I have no objection to these proposed changes. I have before expressed my strong belief that when Congress requires this agency to act, we must act. [2] This part of the proposal is a reasonable means of following Congress’s instructions. As any proposal, I am sure this one will benefit from being published for notice and comment, and I look forward to hearing how commenters believe we can improve it.

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The Vanguard 2021 Semiannual Report

John Galloway is global head of investment stewardship at Vanguard, Inc. This post is based on a publication by Vanguard Investment Stewardship.

Regional roundup

Topics and trends that shaped the global governance landscape in the first half of 2021

Good governance has never been more important. Boards of directors and company leaders continued to face challenges in the first half of the year. The pandemic disrupted operations and global supply chains and forced companies to make strategic decisions about capital allocation and executive compensation. Social issues remained in the spotlight as we saw an increase in shareholder proposals on a range of diversity, equity, and inclusion topics. Climate change proposals increased in volume, driven by Say on Climate proposals requesting that investors provide feedback on companies’ transition plans. We also engaged with company leaders on corporate political activity, human rights, and other important governance matters.

Vanguard’s Investment Stewardship team engaged with 734 companies in 29 countries and voted on 137,826 proposals at 10,796 companies in the six months ended June 30, 2021. Those engagements were made on behalf of investments that represented nearly $1.9 trillion in equity assets under management.

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The Deterrent Effect of Insider Trading Enforcement Actions

Robert H. Davidson is Associate Professor of Accounting and Information Systems at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, and Christo A. Pirinsky is Associate Professor of Finance at the University of Central Florida College of Business. This post is based on their recent paper, forthcoming in the Accounting Review. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Insider Trading Via the Corporation by Jesse Fried (discussed on the Forum here).

This study examines whether exposure to an insider trading enforcement action deters corporate insiders’ future opportunistic trading. A priori, the answer is not clear. While it is illegal for insiders to trade based on material private information, this can be difficult to establish in court. Further, many insiders continue to earn large profits from their trades, which raises questions about the effectiveness of existing regulations.

To address this question, we examine whether the enforcement of insider trading laws for illegal trades in the stock of one firm affects affiliated corporate insiders’ trading behavior in other firms unaffected by the enforcement. We then compare the trades of these ‘exposed’ insiders to the trades of their peers in these non-enforcement firms to assess whether insiders trade differently following exposure to an enforcement event. The evaluation of insider trading away from the enforcement firm alleviates concerns that our results are attributable to omitted factors related to the enforcement event or firm.

We find that the profitability of insiders’ trades decreases significantly following exposure to an enforcement event. The effect is significant when insiders buy or sell equity and is economically meaningful. For example, we estimate that after the enforcement event, treated insiders earn 7.9% lower abnormal returns over the 180 days from purchases than do control insiders in the same firm. Exposure to enforcement is also associated with smaller trade size. Our results suggest that insiders strategically assess the costs and benefits of their trades. Next, we examine whether exposure to enforcement is associated with future illegal insider trading. We find that the future conviction rate of exposed insiders is substantially lower than the conviction rate of unexposed insiders, suggesting that enforcement may deter illegal insider trading. Of the 4,544 insiders present at firms at the time of an enforcement event, only one is convicted of illegal trading in the future.

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Proxy Season Climate-Related Voting Trends Report

Chris Miller is Vice President and Jelmer Laks is an Associate with ISS Governance Research, Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. This post is based on their ISS memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value by Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales (discussed on the Forum here); and Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee by Max M. Schanzenbach and Robert H. Sitkoff (discussed on the Forum here).

Anthropocene:

“the current geological age, viewed as the period during which human activity has been the dominant influence on climate and the environment.”

Key Takeaways

  • The 2021 U.S. proxy voting season marked an escalation of shareholder engagement on climate-related issues as well as an expansion of tactics.
  • Many investors are moving beyond requests for disclosure to voting against directors for
    perceived failures of climate risk mitigation
  • The 2021 season saw the advent of the Say-On-Climate proposal, an attempt to secure a
    dedicated ballot item that would enable investors to express views on a company’s management of climate-related risks on a recurring basis.
  • The number of climate-related shareholder proposals as well as levels of support have grown over the past 3 years.
  • The recent IPCC AR6 Synthesis report and 2021 US Proxy Season trends outlined in this report demonstrate that the days of regarding climate disclosure and risk as “non-financial” niche issues targeted by a relatively small number of activists and NGOs are over.

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