Monthly Archives: February 2022

The LSE’s New Voluntary Carbon Market Solution

Amy Kennedy and Kenneth J. Markowitz are partners and Charles Smith is a contractor at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP. This post is based on an Akin Gump memorandum by Ms. Kennedy, Mr. Markowitz, Mr. Smith, Euan Strachan, Becky Skeffington, and Nadia Candelon. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) and Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders?, both by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita; For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); and Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

On November 5, 2021, the London Stock Exchange (LSE) announced that it is developing a new Voluntary Carbon Market (VCM) solution to “accelerate the availability of financing for projects that will support a just transition to a low-carbon economy”. [1] As explained in the press release announcing the VCM, the LSE’s initiative is intended to address two major challenges related to carbon mitigation projects: facilitating scalable capital formation for the development of new climate projects worldwide and establishing primary market access to a sustainable supply of high-quality carbon credits (CCs) for companies and investors. Per the announcement, the LSE believes that the VCM will enable stakeholders to “augment credible net zero transition strategies, by financing additional projects to offset unavoidable carbon emissions during their path to net zero”. [2]

Specifically, the LSE envisages that the VCM will: (i) facilitate a liquid market for listing and trading interests in carbon funds with opportunities for investors in secondary markets; (ii) provide a wide range of investment opportunities generating CCs from a diverse range of underlying carbon reduction projects offering investors the chance to gain exposure to a variety of initiatives whilst at the same time hedging their risk; (iii) provide an additional and transparent benchmark to generate a “clear price signal” for carbon; and (iv) help generate investor confidence in the carbon credit market by facilitating investment opportunities in high-quality CC-generating projects via a reputable institution within an existing regulatory framework, including well-known disclosure and governance requirements.

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Statement by Chair Gensler on Amendments to the Whistleblower Program

Gary Gensler is Chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on his recent public statement. The views expressed in the post are those of Chair Gensler, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Staff.

Today [Feb. 10, 2022], the Commission voted to propose amendments to rules governing the SEC’s whistleblower program. I support these amendments because, if adopted, they would help ensure that whistleblowers are both incentivized and appropriately rewarded for their efforts in reporting potential violations of the law to the Commission.

After the 2008 financial crisis, Congress under the Dodd-Frank Act directed the SEC to establish a whistleblower program. The Commission was directed to pay awards, subject to certain limitations and conditions, to whistleblowers who provide original information that leads to a successful enforcement involving wrongdoing in the securities markets.

Whistleblowers provide a critical public service and duty to our nation, taking personal and professional risks in doing so. Since the program’s inception, enforcement matters brought using information from whistleblowers have resulted in more than $1.3 billion that has been (or is scheduled to be) returned to harmed investors.

Today’s release would help ensure the whistleblower program’s continued success.

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SEC Proposes Cybersecurity Rules for Registered Investment Advisers and Funds

John F. Savarese and Sarah K. Eddy are partners and David M. Adlerstein is counsel at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell memorandum by Mr. Savarese, Ms. Eddy, Mr. Adlerstein, Jeohn Salone Favors, and Amanda M. Lee.

Acknowledging the gravity of cybersecurity threats to investment advisers and funds, and by extension their tens of millions of clients and trillions of dollars of assets under management, the Securities and Exchange Commission [on Feb. 9, 2022] proposed rules under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and the Investment Company Act of 1940 pertaining to cybersecurity risk management by registered investment advisers (“RIAs”) and investment companies (“funds”). The proposal complements the Biden administration’s prioritization of cyber threats to economic security (as we have recently discussed) and, as a crystallization of the SEC’s views on best practices for cybersecurity risk management, has significance beyond the investment industry. The proposal encompasses the following:

Cybersecurity Risk Management Policies and Procedures. RIAs and funds would be required to formally implement written policies and procedures to address cybersecurity risks, which should be tailored based on the applicable business operations and cybersecurity risk profile, and should be reviewed and evaluated at least annually, with the evaluation summarized in a written report. Funds’ boards of directors would also be required to approve the policies and procedures and review written reports of the evaluations. Mandatory elements of these policies and procedures would include periodic risk assessment and information systems assessment, implementation of controls designed to minimize user-related risks and prevent unauthorized access to information and systems, protocols for threat and vulnerability management, and plans for incident response and recovery.

Reporting of Significant Cybersecurity Incidents. The SEC would establish a new reporting regime whereby RIAs would be required to confidentially report to the SEC significant cybersecurity incidents within 48 hours of discovery, on a new proposed Form ADV-C, with the twin objectives of helping the SEC assess the effects of the incident on the reporting RIA, and to help the SEC obtain enhanced visibility into systemic risks.

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Statement by Chair Gensler on Beneficial Ownership Proposal

Gary Gensler is Chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on his recent public statement. The views expressed in the post are those of Chair Gensler, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Staff. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure by Lucian Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson Jr. (discussed on the Forum here); and Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Robert J. Jackson Jr., and Wei Jiang.

Today [Feb. 10, 2022], the Commission proposed to shorten the deadlines by which beneficial owners of a company — those who own at least 5 percent of the company — have to inform the public and other investors of their position. I am pleased to support this proposal because it would update our reporting requirements for modern market, reduce information asymmetries, and address the timeliness of two key filings.

In 1968, Congress mandated that large shareholders of public companies disclose information that helps the public understand their ability to influence or control that company. Under current rules, beneficial owners of more than 5 percent of a public company’s equity securities who have control intent have 10 days to report their ownership.

Congress also closed a loophole in 1977 to ensure that significant owners without control intent also provided disclosure to the market (via Schedule 13G). Congress left those filing deadlines to the discretion of the Commission.

We haven’t updated these deadlines in decades. Those decades-old rules might’ve been appropriate in the past, but I think we can update them given the rapidity of current markets and technologies.

In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, Congress came back to the issue of 13D filings. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress gave the SEC the authority to shorten the beneficial ownership reporting deadline. Today’s proposal thus makes use of that authority.

The changes in today’s proposal would reduce information asymmetries and promote transparency, thereby lowering risk and illiquidity. Specifically, it would do three things:

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Statement by Commissioner Peirce on Beneficial Ownership Proposal

Hester M. Peirce is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on her recent public statement. The views expressed in this post are those of Ms. Peirce and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff.

This proposal is characterized as modernization, but it fails to contend fully with the realities of today’s markets or the balance embodied in Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act. The proposed amendments acknowledge some of the challenges, but do not fully grapple with or resolve them in a consistent manner. Accordingly, I do not believe the proposed amendments are prudent and respectfully dissent.

Congress passed the Williams Act and enacted Section 13(d) in response to hostile takeovers in the form of cash tender offers in the 1960s. [1] The Williams Act balanced shareholders’ interest in learning of potential changes in corporate control with the benefit of allowing the party seeking to engage in a change in control of the company to keep that information private. The balance—requiring a person who has acquired five percent of a class of shares to file within ten days of that acquisition—recognizes both the need for other shareholders to know of the impending change in control and the need to allow the person seeking control to reap some of the benefit of the work it did in determining that a change in control would be beneficial.

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Weekly Roundup: February 4-10, 2022


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of February 4-10, 2022.

How Cyberattacks Target Stakeholders


ESG Engagement Success


Navigating a World Where Almost Everyone Is an Activist


Statement by Chair Gensler on Money Market Funds, Open-End Bond Funds, and Hedge Funds



The Push to Net Zero Emissions: Where the Board Comes In


M&A Predictions for 2022



Activism Landscape Continues To Evolve



Three Questions Compensation Committees Should Ask About ESG


Why the Corporation Locks in Financial Capital but the Partnership Does Not


Private Equity: 2021 Year in Review and 2022 Outlook


Delaware’s Copycat: Can Delaware Corporate Law Be Emulated?


Investors Press for Progress on ESG Matters


Statement by Chair Gensler on Cybersecurity Reforms in the Investment Management Industry


Statement by Commissioner Peirce on Private Fund Advisers Proposal


Statement by Chair Gensler on Private Fund Advisers Proposal

Gary Gensler is Chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on his recent public statement. The views expressed in the post are those of Chair Gensler, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Staff.

Today [February 9, 2022], the Commission is considering rules and amendments under the Investment Advisers Act to improve the efficiency, competition, and transparency of the activities of private funds’ advisers. I support this proposal because, if adopted, it would help investors in private funds on the one hand, and companies raising capital from these funds on the other.

Why do private funds matter?

First, they matter because they’re large, and they’re growing in size, complexity, and number. These funds, including hedge funds, private equity funds, venture capital funds, and liquidity funds, currently have approximately $18 trillion in gross assets.

Beyond their size, though, these funds matter because of what, or who, stands on either side of them. The funds pool the money of other people: the limited partners. And who are those limited partners? Sometimes, they’re wealthy individuals. Often, though, they’re retirement plans, like state government pension plans, or non-profit and university endowments. The people behind those funds and endowments often are teachers, firefighters, municipal workers, students, and professors.

And who are the people on the other side of the private funds? They’re entrepreneurs, trying to turn big ideas into big companies. They’re small business owners looking to hire employees, invest in new technologies, and grow. They’re the managers of late-stage companies, bought and sold by private equity firms.

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Statement by Commissioner Peirce on Private Fund Advisers Proposal

Hester M. Peirce is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on her recent public statement. The views expressed in this post are those of Ms. Peirce and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff.

Today’s [Feb. 9, 2022] proposal represents a sea change. It embodies a belief that many sophisticated institutions and high net worth individuals are not competent or assertive enough to obtain and analyze the information they need to make good investment decisions or to structure appropriately their relationships with private funds. Therefore, the Commission judges it wise to divert resources from the protection of retail investors to safeguard these wealthy investors who are represented by sophisticated, experienced investment professionals. I disagree with both assessments; these well-heeled, well-represented investors are able to fend for themselves, and our resources are better spent on retail investor protection. Accordingly, I am voting no on today’s proposal.

As you have heard, if finalized, the proposal would impose a host of new mandates on private fund advisers. Among other things, registered private fund advisers would have to provide to investors detailed, standardized, quarterly information on fees, expenses, and performance, including data on portfolio investment compensation; to obtain annual financial statement audits by a Public Company Accounting Oversight Board-registered auditor; and to document in writing their annual compliance reviews. The proposal would require registered private fund advisers to provide investors with an independent fairness opinion for any adviser-led secondary transaction. Further, the proposal would prohibit all private fund advisers, even those not registered with the Commission, from directly or indirectly engaging in certain sales practices, conflicts of interest, and compensation schemes, including charging certain types of fees and expenses to a private fund or portfolio investment, allocating certain fees and expenses in a non-pro rata fashion, and providing certain types of preferential treatment.

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Statement by Chair Gensler on Cybersecurity Reforms in the Investment Management Industry

Gary Gensler is Chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on his recent public statement. The views expressed in the post are those of Chair Gensler, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Staff.

Today [Feb. 9, 2022], the Commission is considering a set of comprehensive reforms to improve cybersecurity risk management for registered investment advisers, registered investment companies, and business development companies. I am pleased to support this proposal because, if adopted, it would improve advisers’ and funds’ cybersecurity risk management and incident reporting.

The SEC plays a key role as the regulator of the capital markets with regard to SEC registrants, including the entities in today’s release. Cyber risk relates to each part of our three-part mission, and in particular to our goals of protecting investors and maintaining orderly markets.

Cyber incidents, unfortunately, happen a lot. Given this, and the evolving cybersecurity risk landscape, we at the SEC are working to improve the overall cybersecurity posture and resiliency of our registrants.

Cybersecurity incidents can lead to significant financial, operational, legal, and reputational harm for advisers and funds. More importantly, they can lead to investor harm. The proposed rules and amendments are designed to enhance cybersecurity preparedness and could improve investor confidence in the resiliency of advisers and funds against cybersecurity threats and attacks.

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Investors Press for Progress on ESG Matters

Marc S. Gerber and Raquel Fox are partners at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. This post is based on their Skadden memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value by Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales (discussed on the Forum here); and Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee by Max M. Schanzenbach and Robert H. Sitkoff (discussed on the Forum here).

Takeaways

  • The SEC plans to propose an array of new disclosure requirements relating to ESG matters.
  • A record number of shareholder proposals involving environmental and social issues won majority support in 2021.
  • Institutional investors will vote against directors where companies have not met certain minimum director diversity goals or made certain ESG disclosures.
  • Investors are demanding that boards actively oversee climate risk mitigation efforts.

The second year of the Biden administration is likely to see significant and wide-ranging Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rulemaking covering various environmental, social and governance (ESG) topics, a process that is likely to be contentious and politicized. Meanwhile, investors are not waiting for SEC action. They continue taking matters into their own hands, demanding improved disclosure, greater management attention to these issues and increased board oversight, and they are voting against directors and management when they are unsatisfied. Boards of directors need to remain diligent in understanding this constantly evolving landscape, determining which ESG topics have the greatest relevance for their companies and engaging with shareholders and other stakeholders to assess their perspectives and convey the board’s robust oversight of relevant matters.

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