Monthly Archives: November 2022

Weekly Roundup: October 28-November 3, 2022


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This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of October 28-November 3, 2022

SEC’s New Pay Versus Performance Disclosure Rule: Important Things To Know


Remarks by Commissioner Uyeda at the Georgetown Law Hotel and Lodging Summit


Statement by Commissioner Peirce on Final Rule Amendments Regarding Shareholder Reports


Statement by Chair Gensler on Final Rule Amendments Regarding Shareholder Reports




Stakeholderism Silo Busting




Lessons from Twitter v. Musk on Access to Directors’ and Executives’ Emails


ESG Trends – What the boards of all companies should know about ESG regulatory trends in Europe


Remarks by Commissioner Crenshaw at the Inaugural ECGI Responsible Capitalism Summit


Twenty-Year Review of Audit and Non-Audit Fee Trends


2022 ISS Global Benchmark Policy Survey


A Survey of Private Debt Funds



Statement by Commissioner Uyeda on Final Amendments to Form N-PX


Statement by Chair Gensler on Final Amendments to Form N-PX


Statement by Chair Gensler on Final Amendments to Form N-PX

Gary Gensler is Chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on his recent public statement. The views expressed in this post are those of Chair Gensler, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Staff.

Today, the Commission will consider whether to adopt final amendments to bring greater detail, consistency, and usability to the proxy voting information reported on Form N-PX. I am pleased to support these amendments because, if adopted, they will allow investors to better understand and analyze how their funds and managers are voting on shares held on their behalf. Further, part of this final rule fulfills a mandate from Congress directing the SEC to require institutional investment managers to report votes on certain executive compensation matters, or “say on pay.”

Form N-PX was first adopted in 2003 with a basic principle: that investors be informed of how funds voted shares held on their behalf. These proxy votes include voting on boards of directors, merger proposals, or other matters.

Before adopting Form N-PX in 2003, funds didn’t have to disclose their proxy votes. In the two decades since, investors have said they would benefit from more readily usable information, and from more information.

Thus, today’s rule addresses these concerns in three key ways. First, it amends Form N-PX to provide investors with more detailed information about proxy votes. Second, it establishes 14 standardized categories in Form N-PX, creating more consistency around how funds describe their proxy votes. Third, it structures Form N-PX in a machine-readable format so that investors can analyze this information electronically.

This rulemaking also will require institutional investment managers to disclose how they voted on “say-on-pay” matters, which fulfills the mandate under section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. Additionally, the amendments require filers to disclose the number of shares that they’ve loaned to short sellers and others but not recalled, and thus were not voted by the filer. This would provide investors with additional information into how a filer’s securities lending activities may affect its proxy voting.

Together, these enhancements to Form N-PX would make it more useful, and more usable, to investors.

We benefited from more than 50 comments from the public during the rulemaking process. In particular, based on this feedback, the final version of this rule reduced the number of categories on the form and streamlined the filing process for funds and managers who have a stated policy of not voting on proxies. These changes from the proposal will make the filing process more efficient.

I am pleased to support today’s final amendments. I’d like to thank the members of the SEC staff who worked on this rule, including:

  • Christian Corkery, David Driscoll, Nathan Schuur, Tim Dulaney, Trevor Tatum, Bradley Gude, Angela Mokodean, Brian Johnson, Sarah ten Siethoff, and William Birdthistle in the Division of Investment Management;
  • Hanna Lee, Andrew Glickman, PJ Hamidi, Gregory Scopino, Alex Schiller, Julie Marlowe, Michael Willis, and Jessica Wachter in the Division of Economic Risk and Analysis;
  • Bob Bagnall, Amy Scully, Natalie Shioji, Malou Huth, and Meridith Mitchell in the Office of the General Counsel;
  • Mavis Kelly and Song Brandon in the Division of Examinations;
  • Corey Schuster and Andrew Dean in the Division of Enforcement; and
  • Dan Chang in the EDGAR Business Office.

Statement by Commissioner Uyeda on Final Amendments to Form N-PX

Mark T. Uyeda is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on his recent public statement. The views expressed in the post are those of Commissioner Uyeda, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Staff.

Thank you, Chair Gensler, and thanks to the staff for the presentation.

Today, we consider sweeping changes to fund proxy vote reporting.[1] Since 2003, registered funds have been required to report their proxy votes annually on Form N-PX by briefly identifying the proxy voting matter, and disclosing whether 1) the fund voted for, against or abstained, and 2) it voted for or against management, among other information.

In September 2021, the Commission proposed so-called “enhanced reporting” for proxy votes by requiring funds to present voting matters in a particular order and categorize them into 17 different categories. Funds also would have been required to disclose the number of votes cast, including whether these were split. More significantly, funds would have been required to disclose the number of shares on loan and not recalled, in addition to the number of shares voted.

The proposal further sought to implement the Dodd-Frank Act’s mandate for firms meeting the definition of “institutional investment manager” under section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”) to report at least annually how they voted on any “say-on-pay” vote. [2]

Before discussing the merits of the final rule, I am disappointed by the lack of a detailed comment summary. I have been involved in rulemaking at the Commission for over 16 years. A basic fundamental of good rulemaking is the preparation of a detailed comment summary. We categorize all relevant comments by specific subject matter to ensure that we have not overlooked any comments in the public file. The staff takes great care to prepare that document for its own use and for use by the Commission.

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Remarks by Chair Gensler Before the Practising Law Institute’s 54th Annual Institute on Securities

Gary Gensler is Chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on his recent public statement. The views expressed in this post are those of Chair Gensler, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Staff.

My thanks to the Practising Law Institute and the 54th Annual Institute on Securities Regulation. As is customary, I’d like to note that my views are my own, and I am not speaking on behalf of my fellow Commissioners or the SEC staff.

On May 27, 1933, when he signed the first of the federal securities laws, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt said: “This law and its effective administration are steps in a program to restore some old-fashioned standards of rectitude.”[1]

For nearly 90 years since, Congress has tasked the Securities and Exchange Commission and our dedicated staff with this “effective administration.”

We do this through overseeing markets, registering entities, enacting rules, examining against the rules, and enforcing those rules.

Today, I am going to focus on that final pillar: enforcement.

In the fiscal year that just ended on September 30, 2022, we filed more than 700 actions. We obtained judgments and orders totaling $6.4 billion, including $4 billion in civil penalties.

These numbers, though, tell only part of the story.

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A Survey of Private Debt Funds

Steven N. Kaplan is the Neubauer Family Distinguished Service Professor of Entrepreneurship and Finance at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. This post is based on a recent paper by Professor Kaplan; Joern Block, Professor at the University of Trier; Young Soo Jang, a Ph.D. Student at University of Chicago Booth School of Business; and Anna Schulze a Ph. D. Student at University of Trier. 

After the Great Financial Crisis triggered tightening of banking regulation, corporate lending has increasingly migrated out of the banking sector. Private debt (PD) funds and collateralized loan obligation funds (CLOs) are two of the major types of nonbank intermediaries that have filled this gap. Private debt funds raise capital commitments through closed-end funds (like private equity) and make senior loans (like banks) directly to, mostly, middle-market firms (i.e. firms with annual revenue between $10 million and $1 billion). According to the 2022 Preqin Global Private Debt Report, private debt is projected to become the second-largest private capital asset class by 2023, following private equity (PE).

Despite its explosive growth, the private debt market remains relatively understudied. While previous studies have broadened our understanding of the private debt market (Chernenko et al, 2022; Davydiuk et al, 2021; Jang, 2022; Loumioti, 2019; Munday et al, 2018), each looks at a different segment of the market. There still is much that is not known about private debt funds, particularly compared to other types of intermediaries (banks, PE funds, and CLOs).

Accordingly, in this post, we survey and ask a broad set of questions to a meaningful group of private debt general partners (GPs). They comprise of 38 U.S. and 153 European private debt investors managing roughly 35% of assets under management (AuM) of the private debt market. Their predominant investment strategy is direct lending where the loan is bilaterally negotiated between a borrower and a single lender (or a small group of lenders) with an expectation hold the loan to maturity, which contrasts with most bank-syndicated loans that are often traded in the secondary market. Our survey loosely follows the framework used by Gompers, Kaplan, and Mukharlyamov (2016 and forthcoming) for PE GPs and Gompers, Gornall, Kaplan and Strebulaev (2020 and 2021) for venture capital (VC) GPs.

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2022 ISS Global Benchmark Policy Survey

Subodh Mishra is Global Head of Communications and Georgina Marshall is Global Head of Research at Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. This post is based on an ISS publication by Kathy Belyeu, Michael Ellis, Hailey Knowles, and Renata Schmitt Silva.

Overview of Process and Response

This document summarizes the findings of the ISS 2022 Global Benchmark Policy Survey, which opened on August 3 and closed on Aug. 31,2022.

The survey is a part of ISS’ annual global policy development process, and was, as is the case every year, open to all interested parties to solicit broad feedback on areas of potential ISS policy change for 2023 and beyond.

We received 417 responses to the survey: 205 responses from investors and investor-affiliated organizations, 212 from non-investor respondents. Responses that lacked an email address were not accepted. Multiple responses from the same person were also not accepted; only the response submitted last was counted.

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Twenty-Year Review of Audit and Non-Audit Fee Trends

Nicole Hallas is Manager of Research Analytics, Kayla Coello is a Research Analyst and Sarah Keohane is a Data Analyst at Audit Analytics. This post is based on an Audit Analytics memorandum by Ms. Hallas, Ms. Coello, Ms. Keohane, and Ms. Watson.

Executive Summary

Introduction

Analyzing fees paid to external auditors provides insights into audit risk and auditor independence.

Audit fees are an indicator of audit complexity and risk. Higher risk audits require more auditor resources (hours, personnel, specialists, etc.) to reduce audit risk to an acceptable level. Analyzing fees by industry, company size, and location can provide insight into the level of risk and
auditor effort various sectors of publicly listed companies entail.

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Remarks by Commissioner Crenshaw at the Inaugural ECGI Responsible Capitalism Summit

Caroline A. Crenshaw is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on her recent public statement. The views expressed in the post are those of Commissioner Crenshaw, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the other Commissioners, or the Staff.

Introduction

It is a pleasure to be here today at the Inaugural ECGI Responsible Capitalism Summit. Coincidentally, this is my inaugural trip overseas as a Commissioner. I came into office in the midst of the global pandemic, so I have not had the opportunity to meet with groups of academics, policy-makers, members of industry, and the general public in-person. I am glad to be able to do so now and I hope to benefit from the ideas and discussions produced at this forum. Thank you to Professor [Marco] Becht for organizing today’s discussions, and to Professor [Eilis] Ferran for that kind introduction.

As always, I must give the standard disclaimer that the views I express today do not necessarily represent those of the Commission, my fellow Commissioners, or members of the Commission’s staff.

When I accepted the invitation to this conference, I did not realize that my remarks would precede a Nobel Laureate, Professor Oliver Hart. My praises to Professor Becht for putting together such an esteemed group. I’m pleased to precede Professor Hart, who is here today to discuss his new paper, The New Corporate Governance, co-authored with Professor Zingales, a highly accomplished professor in his own right, and the author of the renowned book Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists, as well as a co-host to a podcast that my staff and I regularly discuss. As I considered how best to contribute to today’s discussion, I turned to their work for inspiration. And I hope that I can offer you some interesting perspectives from my vantage point as a U.S. securities lawyer and policy-maker – a vantage point that is, admittedly, somewhat narrow in scope, both in terms of geography and specialized subject matter. The mission of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is to protect investors; maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitate capital formation. Although that may, at first blush, sound broad, our foundational and authorizing statutes, interpreted by the U.S. judiciary and a near-century of agency practice, provide certain bounds to carrying out that mission. This is the perspective through which I read the Hart and Zingales paper, and this is the perspective that I bring to my work as an SEC Commissioner. More specifically, this is the lens through which I consider the SEC’s proposed climate-related disclosure rule that I will discuss today.

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ESG Trends – What the boards of all companies should know about ESG regulatory trends in Europe

Alain Pietrancosta is Professor of Law at the Sorbonne Law School at the University of Paris and Alexis Marraud des Grottes is a partner at the Paris office of Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP. This post is based on their recent paper. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) and Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders?, (discussed on the Forum here) both by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita; Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock (discussed on the Forum here) by Leo E. Strine, Jr; and Stakeholder Capitalism in the Time of COVID (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita.

France and Europe are at the forefront of ESG regulation. They have taken steps that go far beyond mere reporting requirements, aiming at designing a new capitalism. This so-called responsible capitalism will have significant consequences for European companies, but also for non-European companies doing business in Europe, as the EU shows more and more inclination to enforce its ESG regulation on a worldwide basis. At a time when the United States is avidly debating the advisability of introducing climate disclosure rules for public companies, or additional information regarding professional investors’ ESG investment practices, a closer look should be taken at what Europe, led by France, has already accomplished in this area and where major current reforms are leading. From a regulatory viewpoint, this will help measure the gap between the two continents and perhaps, in some areas, draw avenues for rapprochement so that multinationals do not have to undergo a mix of regulations and ensure that neither companies nor investors are faced with a fragmented proliferation of standards, frameworks and parameters. From a practical standpoint, it is of the utmost importance for the boards of directors of multinational companies, in this period of rapid change, to identify key ESG issues and better anticipate the European regulatory efforts to green the economy.

Those who wonder what tomorrow’s ESG regulation may be like should usefully turn to the EU, which has initiated significant reforms in this area for several years, most often based on the French model. France is indeed a forerunner in terms of legal developments and an undisputed leader in social and environmental matters. It is a source of inspiration that fuels new aspirations in Europe. In this respect, it is worth noting that on June 30, 2022, the day before the end of the French presidency of the EU, the European Parliament and the Council reached an agreement on the “Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive” (CSRD) requiring large and listed companies to publish annually sustainability information, extending the scope and increasing the substance of the 2014 “Non-Financial Reporting Directive” (NFRD).

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Lessons from Twitter v. Musk on Access to Directors’ and Executives’ Emails

Gail Weinstein is Senior Counsel, and Scott B. Luftglass and Philip Richter are Partners at  Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP. This post is based on a Fried Frank memorandum by Ms. Weinstein, Mr. Luftglass, Mr. Richter, Mr. Steven Epstein, Mr. Brian T. Mangino, and Ms. Erica Jaffe and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

In a letter opinion issued in connection with discovery matters in Twitter v. Musk (Sept. 13, 2022), the Delaware Court of Chancery ruled that Twitter is not entitled to obtain Elon Musk’s communications on his email accounts at two other (i.e., non-Twitter-affiliated) companies about the deal and his intention to terminate it. The court held that the emails were protected by the attorney-client privilege and that the companies’ policies allowing company access to personal communications on the company email accounts did not defeat the privilege given that the policies were not applied to Musk.

Twitter has claimed that Musk’s termination of the merger agreement pursuant to which he agreed to acquire Twitter is invalid as his alleged reasons for terminating the agreement are a pretext for a change of heart about proceeding with the deal after a steep decline in the stock price of technology companies, including Twitter, that occurred after the agreement was signed. Musk communicated about the termination of the Twitter merger agreement on his email accounts at Space Exploration Technology Corp. (SpaceX) and Tesla, Inc.—both of which are companies that Musk controls. Musk refused to produce the emails, asserting that they were protected from disclosure under the attorney-client privilege. Chancellor Kathaleen St. J. McCormick explained that, to support a claim of attorney-client privilege, Musk had to demonstrate that he had “an objectively reasonable expectation of confidentiality in the SpaceX and Tesla emails.” The court held that, based on the expectation of privacy that Musk had with respect to his SpaceX and Tesla email accounts, his personal emails on those accounts are not discoverable by Twitter.

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