Monthly Archives: November 2022

Rare Court Decision in Regulation FD Litigation Highlights Risks of Calls with Analysts

Ning Chiu, Robert A. Cohen, and Michael Kaplan are Partners at Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP. This post is based on their Davis Polk memorandum by Ms. Chiu, Mr. Cohen, Mr. Kaplan, Martine M. Beamon, John B. Meade, and Greg D. Andres.

A federal district court decision involving alleged Regulation FD violations highlighted analysis of key elements governing the regulation relating to whether information is material and nonpublic, and provides multiple takeaways on evaluating the risk of one-on-one calls with analysts.

Background

On September 8, Judge Engelmayer of the Southern District of New York denied motions for summary judgment filed by both the SEC and the defendants in litigation alleging Regulation FD violations. The defendants included AT&T and three individuals who worked in the company’s investor relations department. The decision puts the case on a path toward trial (absent settlements).

Regulation FD prohibits a company from selectively disclosing material, nonpublic information (MNPI) to certain securities professionals or others likely to use the information to trade, such as analysts and investors, unless the company also discloses the information to the public. Although the court found the evidence overwhelmingly supported the SEC’s claims that the information at issue was both nonpublic and material, it determined that a reasonable jury could find for either side on the third element, scienter.

Because most Regulation FD cases brought by the SEC are settled, the court’s evaluation of the claims and defenses provides insight for companies deciding whether certain communications with analysts might violate Regulation FD.

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Fair Value as Process: A Retrospective Reconsideration of Delaware Appraisal

William W. Bratton is Nicholas F. Gallicchio Professor of Law Emeritus at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School. This post is based on his recent paper. This post is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Using the Deal Price for Determining “Fair Value” in Appraisal Proceedings (discussed on the Forum here) and Appraisal After Dell, both by Guhan Subramanian.

Section 262(h) of Delaware’s General Corporation Law (DCL) bids the Chancery Court in an appraisal proceeding to “determine the fair value of the shares exclusive of any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger.”  It provides no further instructions regarding the means to the end, other than an admonition to “take into account all relevant factors.”   For additional guidance on the meaning of fair value, we must consult a caselaw that stretches back in time almost a century.

There have been two intervals of disruption in this history—disruptions incident to unexpected revisions of the methodology of fair value ascertainment by the Delaware Supreme Court.  The first was the 1983 decision of Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), which withdrew a longstanding and constraining valuation mandate and much expanded appraisal’s menu of acceptable methodologies, inviting reference to state-of-the-art valuation technologies.  The intent and result were to facilitate liberality in the treatment of appraisal petitioners.  The second disruptive intervention occurred more recently, with the decision of three cases–DFC Global Corporation v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346 (Del. 2017), Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1 (Del. 2017), and Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 210 A.3d 128 (2019).  This trio of cases brings back mandatory methodology, imposing the merger price as the basis for fair value ascertainment in appraisals arising from a high-profile subset of arm’s length mergers.  The rulings substantially modify Weinberger without overruling it, lurching away from liberality of treatment.  Controversy and confusion have resulted.

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Illustrative Disclosure for the SEC’s New PVP Rules

Mike Kesner is Partner and Linda Pappas is Principal at Pay Governance LLC. This post is based on their Pay Governance memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Paying for long-term performance (discussed on the Forum here); Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation both by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried.

Introduction

During the last week of August, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) released its final set of rules regarding the mandated “Pay Versus Performance” (PVP) disclosure. The new rules are the culmination of various proposals by the SEC dating back to 2015 when the agency first responded to the Dodd-Frank legislative requirement. Pay Governance LLC prepared two recent Viewpoints summarizing our interpretation and analysis of the new disclosure requirements (see Pay Governance Viewpoint on Executive Compensation, SEC Releases Final Rules Regarding Pay-Versus-Performance (PVP) Disclosures dated August 31, 2022 and PVP Q&A: Our Interpretations of the New Pay for Performance Rules dated September 15, 2022).

We stated in the previous Viewpoints that we would supplement our commentary with follow-on analyses and insights regarding the disclosure rules, and this Viewpoint provides an example of both the required and allowed disclosure under the final rule. Regarding supplemental disclosures, the SEC has granted companies significant latitude to include “additional measures of compensation or financial performance and other supplemental disclosures provided such disclosures are clearly identified as supplemental, not misleading, and not presented with greater prominence than the required disclosure”.

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Weekly Roundup: November 4-10, 2022


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of November 4-10, 2022


Statement by Commissioner Uyeda on Final Amendments to Form N-PX


Statement by Chair Gensler on Final Amendments to Form N-PX


Losing Control? The 20-Year Decline in Loan Covenant Violations



Shareholder Voting Trends (2018-2022)


Seven Key Considerations for a Reverse Stock Split by a Delaware Corporation


Top 5 SEC Enforcement Developments


Revisiting the Effect of Common Ownership on Pricing in the Airline Industry


The Role of Long-Term Shareholder Voice




Crafting the ‘G’ in ESG: Accountability in the Boardroom


Practical takeaways of universal proxy card


Do Diverse Directors Influence DEI Outcomes?


SEC Pay Versus Performance Disclosure Requirements: Initial Observations


ESG Ratings: A Call for Greater Transparency and Precision

Jason Halper is Partner, Timbre Shriver is an Associate, and Duncan Grieve is Special Counsel at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP. This post is based on a Cadwalader memorandum by Mr. Halper, Ms. Shriver, Mr. Grieve, Sara Bussiere, and Jayshree Balakrishnan. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian Bebchuk, and Roberto Tallarita; For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian Bebchuk, Roberto Tallarita, and Kobi Kastiel; Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy – A Reply to Professor Rock (discussed on the Forum here) by Leo Strine; Stakeholder Capitalism in the Time of COVID (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian Bebchuk, Roberto Tallarita, and Kobi Kastiel; and Corporate Purpose and Corporate Competition (discussed on the Forum here) by Mark Roe.

In early 2022, the ESG ratings industry attracted attention when electric vehicle manufacturer Tesla Inc. was dropped from the S&P 500 ESG Index. Explaining its decision, S&P cited perceived deficiencies in many ESG areas, including Tesla’s lack of an internal low carbon strategy for reporting and reducing carbon emissions, insufficient codes of business conduct, claims of racial discrimination and poor working conditions at a California factory, and poor handling of a federal investigation into deaths and injuries linked to Tesla’s autopilot vehicles.[1] Tesla was not dropped from other comparable ESG indexes.[2]

The differing treatment of Tesla from an ESG rating perspective highlights several realities about the ESG rating industry: first, the fact that ESG ratings providers use different ranking methodologies often results in assigning divergent rankings to the same company. Second, lumping all of “E” and “S” together—or, at times, all of the different issues within each of these categories—can obscure the reason for a particular company’s ESG rating. The at times low correlation among ranking scores, the lack of granular information as to the basis of the rating, and, more generally, concerns around the transparency of ratings processes have led some to question the value, or how to best make use, of ESG ratings. Confusion and controversy can exist even with respect to ratings conferred by a single ESG ratings provider. Industry commentators, for instance, have raised questions regarding the S&P 500 ESG Index’s inclusion of companies such as ExxonMobil and McDonald’s (the latter of which generated more greenhouse gases than Portugal or Hungary in 2019) and the exclusion of Tesla and technology companies such as Meta.[3]

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The Corporate Contract and Shareholder Arbitration

Joseph A. Grundfest is William A. Franke Professor of Law and Business at Stanford Law School and Mohsen Manesh is Professor at University of Oregon School of Law. This post is based on their recent paper. This post is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Longstanding decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court coupled with more recent developments in the corporate law of Delaware have sparked renewed concerns that publicly traded corporations may adopt arbitration provisions precluding shareholder lawsuits, particularly securities fraud class actions. In particular, in a line of decisions spanning decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has steadily expanded the reach of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). Section 2 of that statute mandates

“[a] written provision in any … contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable…..”

Applying the FAA, the Court has upheld contractual agreements compelling arbitration of claims made under both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Indeed, the Court has gone further, ruling that an agreement to arbitrate is enforceable even when made as part of an unnegotiated contract of adhesion, even if pursuing claims through individualized, bilateral arbitration (rather than in a class proceeding) would make it uneconomical to vindicate those claims, and even if applicable state law would otherwise hold the agreement to arbitrate to be unconscionable.

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Building Effective Cybersecurity Governance

Orla Cox and Hetal Kanji are Directors of Strategic Communications, and Simon Onyons is a Managing Director at FTI Consulting. This post is based on their FTI memorandum.

Executive Summary

Digitalisation has changed the way companies operate and given rise to a rapidly evolving set of risks that companies face and must prepare for – cybersecurity risks. The increasing prevalence of cyber attacks, notably ransomware, coupled with declining availability of cyber insurance, is leaving companies increasingly exposed to the often-significant impacts of a cybersecurity incident. There is naturally a short-term financial cost – research from IBM [1] reveals that the average total cost of a ransomware breach in 2022 is $4.54 million- but reputationally the impact of an incident may be longer lasting.

Aware of how companies are increasingly exposed to cybersecurity, governments, regulators and investors alike are increasing pressure on organisations to improve their cybersecurity measures, increase transparency around disclosures, and build governance and management structures that demonstrate cybersecurity is a priority at the top levels of the organisation.

Ensuring oversight structures are in place at board level is a key feature of cyber governance. As a material risk affecting companies, boards are increasingly held accountable for ensuring the executive team is taking appropriate steps to mitigate the risk of a cybersecurity attack, and also ensuring the organisation responds appropriately in the event of an incident. Often, boards have little to no experience in this field, and whilst the dynamic nature of cyber risk means that board members are not expected to be cyber experts – though there is merit to having expertise on the board – they are expected to be able to challenge management on this topic and inform shareholders on the measures in place to mitigate the impact of cybersecurity incidents.

For many companies, the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) is the executive with accountability for cyber risk. With investors and regulators pushing for greater oversight at board level, the CISO will need to communicate cyber risk and metrics in terms that resonate with the board, and governance structures will need to prioritise engagement with the CISO on cyber risks.

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SEC Pay Versus Performance Disclosure Requirements: Initial Observations

Jordan Lute is a Research Analyst and Maria Vu is a Senior Director of Compensation Research at Glass, Lewis & Co. This post is based on their Glass Lewis memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Paying for long-term performance (discussed on the Forum here); and Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation both by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried.

Perhaps pushed by the sense of urgency brought on by November’s mid-term elections, the Securities and Exchange Commission has been on a regulatory tear. The agency’s revitalized rulemaking has seen final decisions handed down on rules that were initially mandated more than ten years ago. In this piece, we discuss one of the SEC’s latest, and longest-gestating, directives: Section 14(i), focusing on new pay versus performance disclosure requirements, as required by the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 and first proposed by the SEC in 2015.

Section 14(i): New Compensation Disclosures

On August 25, 2022, the SEC released its final rules implementing Section 14(i) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which requires companies to provide a clear description of the relationship between executive compensation and company performance. The final rules are effective for any fiscal years ending on or after December 16, 2022 and require companies to include a table in their proxy statement that reports the company’s executive compensation and various measures of corporate performance for the five most recently completed fiscal years, or the three most recently completed fiscal years for smaller reporting companies. The rules are subject to a phasing-in period.

The new table is required to incorporate several specific calculations of executive compensation, including:

  • The Summary Compensation Table (SCT) total for the principal executive officer (PEO; usually the chief executive officer),
  • The compensation “actually paid” to the PEO,
  • The average SCT total for the non-PEO NEOs, and
  • The average compensation “actually paid” to the non-PEO NEOs.

Summary Total vs Actually Paid

Compensation “actually paid” includes certain considerations for changes in pension value, above-market or preferential earnings on non-qualified deferred compensation, and changes in the value of equity awards throughout the year. Unlike the equity value reported in the Summary Compensation Table, compensation actually paid accounts for:

  • the year-end fair value of outstanding equity awards granted during the year,
  • the year-over-year change in outstanding equity awards granted in previous years,
  • the vesting date fair value of equity awards that were granted and vested during the year, and
  • the change in value of previously granted awards that vested during the year.

Given the SEC’s guidelines on the calculation of compensation actually paid, the new data point is distinct from the SCT measure of total compensation, and it may provide additional insight into the realizable value of equity awarded to the NEOs.

Measuring the Performance Element

In addition to the columns for executive compensation outlined above, the new table will include the following metrics for company performance:

  • The company’s total shareholder return (TSR),
  • The TSR of the company’s self-selected peer group,
  • The company’s net income, and
  • A self-selected financial performance metric (other than TSR and net income).

Additionally, each company will be required to report an unranked list of three to seven of the most important metrics that it uses to link executive pay outcomes to company performance. Non-financial metrics may be included in this list, however at least three of the metrics must be financial. While it is yet to be seen, this list may provide investors with a greater understanding of each company’s determination process for executive payouts.

Finally, companies will be required to provide a clear description of the relationship between executive compensation actually paid and company performance (as measured by the metrics outlined above); as well as the relationship between the company’s TSR and the TSR of a self-selected peer group over the required reporting period. These relationships may be described in graphical form, narrative form, or a combination of both.

Glass Lewis Analysis: Preliminary Thoughts

The first examples of the new disclosure will not be available until public companies file proxy statements covering fiscal years ending on or after December 16th, 2022. Thus, the value of the new disclosure is yet to be firmly established.

Nonetheless, detractors are plenty. Some of the public companies we’ve spoken to as part of Glass Lewis’ engagement program contend that the rules are unnecessary. They argue that compensation disclosure has advanced considerably since the original 2015 requirements, and much of the information the new disclosure rules call for is already part of common practice in 2022.

From our perspective, while we recognize that the landscape has shifted since 2015, we believe that standardized reporting requirements may help investors in assessing executive compensation across their portfolio. Moreover, noting that advances in compensation disclosure have not applied and maintained evenly, we are hopeful that the amendments will materially improve the level of context available in evaluating executive pay at smaller reporting companies (SRCs).

Over the last few years, SRCs have been exempt from providing a comprehensive discussion of their compensation policies and practices. While some SRCs have met the needs of their shareholders by continuing to include a complete Compensation Discussion and Analysis section in their proxy statement, we generally find that most SRCs’ compensation disclosure under the current regime is poor and does not facilitate shareholders’ ability to vote on the Say on Pay proposal in a thoroughly informed manner. This is costly for investors who, lacking clear disclosure, must expend additional time and effort in order to fulfill their fiduciary responsibilities. The new disclosure rules stop far short of reinstating a Compensation Discussion and Analysis section requirement for smaller reporting companies, of course. Yet after years of bare bones disclosure, shareholders may get a fair degree of additional context around pay practices; for example, via discussion of key metrics in determining executive pay outcomes.

Comparing Pay-for-Performance Analyses

In adopting the final rules, the SEC stated that this new reporting mandate will make the types of pay versus performance analysis done by proxy advisors like Glass Lewis or compensation consultants equally accessible to all investors in a consistent manner. However, there are some important distinctions between the different analyses.

Measuring Compensation: Whereas Glass Lewis’ Pay-for-Performance Model analysis is a snapshot of long-term granted pay relative to peers, the new disclosure rules provide a review of how reported and “actually paid” executive pay evolved over time without consideration of the peer compensation data used by the company or its compensation consultant to set pay levels.

Measuring Performance: The SEC rule only considers TSR performance on a relative basis; peer data for other metrics is excluded. The Glass Lewis analysis, in contrast, provides a snapshot of relative performance for all metrics used in the analysis. Also, to promote comparability, the Glass Lewis Pay-for-Performance Model uses a standardized rubric to determine the applicable metrics from a list of four (in addition to TSR), rather than mirroring each company’s disclosed key metrics.

The SEC’s new rules may succeed in bringing this type of analysis to the broader population — but in a distinctly different manner compared to the Glass Lewis methodology. It may also provide additional quantitative considerations for Glass Lewis’ analysis. In the absence of actual disclosure, the specifics remain to be seen. What is clear, however, is the new rules will not change Glass Lewis’ Pay-for-Performance methodology for the 2023 proxy season.

Public Company Concerns: Aligning the Timeframe & Lack of Clarity

Perhaps not surprisingly, our conversations with public companies on the matter show a lack of enthusiasm for the new disclosure requirements. An S&P 500 company we met with is considering using an index for comparison instead of a self-selected group of peers, but said the rules weren’t clear on whether this would be acceptable.

Apart from confusion as they prepare for compliance, some of the public companies we’ve engaged with conveyed their belief that the new compensation disclosure requirements will be misleading. In particular, they questioned why the SEC rules require awards based on prior year performance, but granted in the current year, to be reported alongside current year performance. These companies believe that awards based on the performance of the prior year should be considered compensation related to the prior year only, regardless of when they are granted.

This is largely an issue of perception, as most companies review the prior year’s performance to determine grant levels for the current year and continue to view awards as compensation for the year in which they are granted. Regardless, as with other types of compensation information, viewing compensation over a longer period of time such as the five years required by the new rules may help to smooth out any perceived risk of disconnect.

Integrating the New Disclosures: Wait and See

In conversation with our institutional clients following the release of the rules, we heard that granted pay, as used in Glass Lewis’ Pay-for-Performance methodology, is generally considered to be the strongest indicator of the compensation committee’s intentions. When assessing intended compensation levels, change in value of outstanding awards over time and the ending value of realized pay are both subject to too many variables outside of a company’s control. As such, we do not expect the availability of data on compensation actually paid to immediately have a fundamental impact on how most investors assess Say on Pay votes. However, the institutional investor clients we spoke to remain open to integrating this data point into their analysis, so long as its utility is demonstrated to them.

As such, the SEC’s new disclosure rules may, in time, provide another useful quantitative perspective on executive pay in the U.S. market, complementing the Summary Compensation Table total figure, granted pay as calculated under the Glass Lewis methodology, and realized pay as calculated by our partners at Diligent.

Do Diverse Directors Influence DEI Outcomes?

Joseph Pacelli is Associate Professor at Harvard Business School. This post is based on a recent paper by Professor Pacelli, Professor Wei Cai, Professor Aiyesha Dey, Professor Jillian Grennan, and Professor Lin Qiu. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Politics and Gender in the Executive Suite (discussed on the Forum here) by Alma Cohen, Moshe Hazan, and David Weiss; Will Nasdaq’s Diversity Rules Harm Investors? (discussed on the Forum here) by Jesse M. Fried; and Duty and Diversity (discussed on the Forum here) by Chris Brummer, and Leo E. Strine.

Do diverse boards foster more diverse workforces? Currently, women make up 28% of U.S. boards, and women of color, 6%. Over 1,300 directors joined their boards before the turn of the century and 40% of them are now nearing retirement. As the old guard steps down, there is a huge opportunity, now more than ever, to create more gender-balanced and diverse boards, especially as U.S. corporations face mounting pressure from various stakeholders to do so. Is it not essential, then, to determine how board diversity may, or may not, impact the internal dynamics of firms? As supporters of diversity in all forms often point out, “diversity is a fact, equity, a choice, inclusion, an action, and belonging, an outcome.” This quote highlights the challenges companies face in trying to ensure every employee can reach their full potential.  In our recent study, we examine whether diversity at the highest echelons of management encourages diversity across all levels of a company.

We focus on the depth and breadth of diversity-related initiatives, thus allowing us to assess whether greater board diversity generates trickle-down effects.  Specifically, we examine whether greater board diversity is associated with more diverse workforce hiring, more equitable pay practices, and more inclusive corporate cultures. To establish causal linkage between diverse boards and firms’ DEI practices, we introduce a novel regression discontinuity (RD) identification strategy that allows us to observe firms that quasi- randomly lie on either side of a fixed threshold. We supplement the RD analyses with existent identification strategies stemming from shifts in the supply of directors, state legislation mandating gender diversity, and social movements promoting racial and gender equality.

We propose and test three distinct channels through which diverse boards can promote work-place DEI practices within a firm. First, we adopt a broad view of diversity and predict that cognitively and demographically diverse boards can bring in a wider range of knowledge, skills, perspectives, and approaches to problem solving that improves decision-making. Next, we hypothesize and test whether specific dimensions of board diversity, related to under-represented groups (such as female and non-white directors), directly impact diversity initiatives within the firm. The second channel, labeled the “homophily” channel, is predicated on the tendency of individuals to associate, interact, and bond with others who possess similar characteristics and backgrounds. Unlike homophily, which stems from identity formation through intra-group social connections, the third channel, which we label as the “allyship” channel, occurs when a person in a position of privilege and power seeks to operate in solidarity with another marginalized group.

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Practical takeaways of universal proxy card

Louis L. Goldberg, William H. Aaronson, and Ning Chiu are Partners at Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP. This post is based on their Davis Polk memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Universal Proxies (discussed on the Forum here) by Scott Hirst.

We consider the practical takeaways of new SEC Rule 14a-19 and universal proxy card voting in contested director elections. The change to universal proxy cards is a prompt for companies to renew their focus on preparedness, including having a state of the art stock watch program in place, updating their vulnerability assessment, reviewing defenses and updating the board.

Under new SEC Rule 14a-19, universal proxy cards must now be used by management and shareholders soliciting proxy votes for their candidates in contested director elections involving domestic companies. The universal proxy card must include all director nominees presented by management and shareholders for election at the upcoming shareholder meeting.

The key difference from practice before this rule change is that shareholders previously voting by proxy in contested director elections could essentially only vote for one slate and were unable to vote for a combination of director nominees from competing slates (as they could if they voted in person at the shareholder meeting). This has meant that shareholders have had “an all or none choice” – vote the management proxy card (that would not have dissident slate names) or the dissident proxy card (that would only have dissident slate names). Using the universal proxy card, shareholders can now “pick and choose” a combination of candidates from each slate in a contested election.

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