Yearly Archives: 2022

Shareholders’ Rights & Shareholder Activism Trends and Developments

Eleazer Klein, Michael Swartz, and Adriana Schwartz are Partners at Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. This post is based on a piece by Mr. Klein, Mr. Swartz, Ms. Schwartz, and Brandon Gold.

Trends and Developments

Shareholders’ Rights and Shareholder Activism in the USA

Shareholders of public companies must navigate a complex landscape that includes both government regulation and the by-laws of the companies whose shares they hold. Two recent opinions from the Delaware Chancery Court underscore the importance for shareholders of careful timetable management and adherence to advance notice by-laws when making nominations. In addition, rules proposed by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) concerning the reporting of beneficial ownership have the potential to introduce considerable compliance challenges and impede communication between shareholders. And both developments underscore the ease with which shareholders can “foot fault”, whether with regard to company by-laws or SEC regulations.

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The ESG Fiduciary Gap

Vivek Ramaswamy is the Executive Chairman at Strive Asset Management. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian Bebchuk, and Roberto Tallarita; Does Enlightened Shareholder Value add Value (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita; Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value (discussed on the Forum here) by Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales; Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee (discussed on the Forum here) by Max M. Schanzenbach and Robert H. Sitkoff; and Exit vs. Voice (discussed on the Forum here) by Eleonora Broccardo, Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales.

The largest fiduciary breach and the most significant antitrust violation of our time may be hiding in plain sight: a small group of large asset managers are using a vast base of client funds to advocate for social agendas unrelated to those clients’ long-run financial interests.

The largest three U.S. passive asset managers—BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard, sometimes called “the Big Three”—manage approximately $20 trillion of capital on behalf of clients and exert staggering social influence on American companies. They collectively own more than 20% of the S&P 500, and, as of 2017, constitute the largest shareholder in almost 90% of those companies.

These asset managers are, first and foremost, fiduciaries for their clients. As fiduciaries, they owe their clients the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. These duties are taken from trust law, and center around a fundamental principle called the “sole interest rule.” As explained in the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, the “sole interest rule” requires fiduciaries to act “solely” and “exclusively” in the interest of the persons to whom their fiduciary duties are owed.

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Shareholder Activism in 2022

Eleazer Klein is a Partner and Brandon S. Gold and Abraham Schwartz are Associates at Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. This post is based on a piece by Mr. Klein, Mr. Gold, Mr. Schwartz, Adriana Schwartz and Mario Kranjac. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism (discussed on the Forum here); Dancing with Activists (discussed on the Forum here) both by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang; and Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System by Leo Strine.

This year, shareholder activism continued its post-COVID surge, with an increase in both the number of campaigns launched and the size of companies targeted. But while overall activity increased year-over-year, there was a decrease in the number of proxy fights, with more campaigns settling. It remains to be seen whether the onset of the universal proxy regime will reverse this (one-year) trend. Companies haven’t been waiting to find out, as the corporate weaponization of advance notice bylaws continued in 2021 and, based on recent events, seems poised to expand further in 2022. The continued slowdown in M&A activity is another trend to watch, as activist activity over the last two proxy seasons was impacted by an increase in M&A-related campaigns. On the topic of uncertainty, it is also worth noting that the effects of the SEC’s recently proposed amendments to Schedule 13D may have somewhat of a chilling effect on activist activity. Finally, ESG activism continued its march forward, but while it boasted a banner year in terms of aggregate activity, its success at the ballot box was questionable this year.

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State Regulation of ESG Investment Decision-making by Public Retirement Plans

Joshua Lichtenstein and Michael Littenberg are Partners, and Reagan Haas is an Associate at Ropes & Gray LLP. This post is based on a Ropes & Gray memorandum by Mr. Lichtenstein, Mr. Littenberg, Ms. Haas, and Jonathan Reinstein.

Introduction

The growing divide in the ESG regulatory landscape between states became clear with the passage of legislation in Maine and Texas in 2021, which adopted contradictory ESG policies for state pension fund investments. Maine enacted legislation prohibiting investment by the Maine Public Employees Retirement System in the 200 largest publicly traded fossil fuel companies, as determined by the carbon in their reserves. Additionally, the law requires the retirement sys- tem to divest from these restricted companies by January 1, 2026. Similar legislation has been proposed in California, Hawaii, Massachusetts and New Jersey, among others, in recent months.

Conversely, the approach Texas took last year (which several other states have considered since) is to prohibit the state from entering into banking and financial contracts with financial companies that boycott firearms or energy companies. Several months ago, state officials in Texas began warning financial institutions that their boycotting activities endanger these companies’ ability to do business with the state, which ultimately culminated in the publication of a list of companies considered to be boycotters. Some government entities have started preemptively excluding targeted financial institutions from bond deals to avoid having to switch underwriters once the states finalize their list of restricted institutions. The state treasurers of Louisiana, Missouri and South Carolina each recently announced certain divestitures based on the ESG views of a manager.

This divide has deepened as more than a dozen states introduced new initiatives over the last year seeking to either divest state pension funds from gun and ammunition, oil and gas, and/or coal companies or, conversely, to require state pension fund divestment from companies that boycott fossil fuel companies. At least one state, Indiana, has considered measures both to divest from fossil fuel companies and to divest from fossil fuel boycotters. In August, the State Board of Administration (SBA), the governing body of the Florida Retirement System Defined Benefit Pension Plan, revised the plan’s investment policy statement to say that investment decisions must be based only on pecuniary factors, and these do not include the consideration of the furtherance of social, political, or
ideological interests. Moreover, the SBA may not sacrifice investment return or take on additional investment risk to promote any non-pecuniary factors when making investments or proxy votes.

Beyond legislation on divestment and state contracts, states are deploying task forces, investigations and report committees to encourage or discourage ESG investing. Additionally, some pension funds are adopting their own ESG investment and proxy voting policies, notwithstanding what their state mandates say. For example, only two weeks after the Texas fossil fuel boycott divestment bill took effect, the Teacher Retirement System of Texas announced that it would consider material ESG factors in its investment decisions.

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How Much Do Investors Care About Social Responsibility?

Scott Hirst is Associate Professor of Law at Boston University; Kobi Kastiel is Associate Professor of Law at Tel Aviv University and Senior Fellow of the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance; and Tamar Kricheli-Katz is a Professor of Law at Tel Aviv University. This post is based on their recent paper. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain (discussed on the Forum here); and Stakeholder Capitalism in the Time of COVID (discussed on the Forum here), both by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita.

Perhaps the most important corporate law debate over the last several years concerns whether directors and executives should manage corporations to maximize value for investors, or to also take into account the interests of other stakeholders or society (see, e.g., Hart and Zingales, 2017; Bebchuk and Tallarita, 2020; Rock, 2021). But this raises several important questions that have received much less attention: Do individual investors themselves wish to maximize returns, or are they willing to forgo returns for social purposes? And more broadly, do market participants, such as investors and consumers, differ from donors in the ways in which they prioritize monetary gains and the promotion of social goals?

Our recent paper, How Much Do Investors Care about Social Responsibility?, attempts to answer these important questions with new empirical evidence from an experiment conducted on 279 Americans with investing experience that involved real monetary gains for participants. The experiment investigated the tradeoffs that individuals make between their own financial interests, and four different social interests—gender diversity, income equality, environmental protection, and faith-based values.

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The Current Landscape in Executive Compensation as Reflected in the 2022 Proxy Season

John Ellerman and Don Kokoskie are Partners and Ira T. Kay is Managing Partner and Founder at Pay Governance LLC. This post is based on their Pay Governance memorandum.

Introduction

Pay Governance LLC provides counsel and advice to the Board of Directors’ Compensation Committees of more than 400 prominent publicly-traded companies. We frequently are requested to attend meetings of the Compensation Committee to provide our insights and advice regarding trends and developments as well as to render technical advice and services in executive compensation. Our ongoing client work and internal research as well as the Compensation Committee meetings we have attended during the 2022 proxy season give us a comprehensive view of the prevailing issues for Compensation Committees and how these issues are shaping the design and implementation of viable and effective compensation strategies.

The 2022 proxy season has occurred during a period of economic uncertainty for many companies. Companies are struggling with a declining stock market, supply chain shortages, high interest rates, inflation, and energy uncertainty. These economic factors have been coupled with an unprecedented regulatory push from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Additionally, institutional investors and proxy advisory firms have become more demanding in their relationships with and requirements of U.S. companies, including the proper role of other stakeholder objectives vis-vis those of investors. All these factors have influenced the issues around executive pay discussed by Compensation Committees.

The purpose of this discussion paper is to summarize the most prominent issues being discussed in the Committee meetings. Most of these issues have emerged as definitive trends in executive compensation, and we expect many of them will carry over into 2023 and the years beyond.

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Activists anticipate the coming recession

Jason Booth is Vice President of Activism Editorial at Insightia, a Diligent Brand. This post is based on his Insightia memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei JiangDancing with Activists (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, and Thomas Keusch; and Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System (discussed on the Forum here) by Leo E. Strine, Jr.

Activists often describe themselves as bottom-up stock pickers whose investments will outperform irrespective of wider economic trends. But with inflation and interest rates surging, geopolitical instability, supply chain disruption, and volatile energy prices, activists are tailoring their investment targets and demands to reflect the changing macro environment.

Demands for cost-cutting and debt reduction are on the rise, as well as greater scrutiny of merger and acquisition (M&A) deals, especially in the U.K and Europe, where weak currencies have cut into earnings forecasts.

Yet, in the longer term, U.S. activists in particular look to be taking advantage of the strong dollar to make big overseas investments with an eye to a market rebound in 2023.

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A Look Back at the 2022 Proxy Season

Brigid Rosati is Managing Director of Business Development; Rajeev Kumar is Senior Managing Director; Kilian Moote is Managing Director; and Michael Maiolo is a Senior Institutional Analyst at Georgeson. This post is based on a Georgeson memorandum by Ms. Rosati, Mr. Kumar, Kilian Moote and Michael Maiolo. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Social Responsibility Resolutions (discussed on the Forum here) by Scott Hirst.

METHODOLOGY

Period Presented & Data Sources

For the 2022 proxy season, this report is based upon annual meeting results proxy year 2022, for companies within the Russell 3000 Index. Prior season data is for companies within the Russell 3000, for the full proxy season, running from July 1 — June 30 for each period presented, unless otherwise noted. For example, 2021 proxy season data is for the period from July 1, 2020 — June 30, 2021. As data for all years is based on Russell 3000 Index constituents as of proxy season 2022, such information may include minor inconsistencies compared to previous reports relating to the 2021 and 2020 proxy seasons, due to changes to index membership over time.

Shareholder proposal submission data and annual meeting results discussed herein have been sourced from ISS Corporate Solutions and supplemented by our own research through additional sources, including various proponents’ shareholder proposal submission data.

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The Hottest Front in the Takeover Battles: Advance Notice Bylaws

Lawrence A. Cunningham is the Henry St. George Tucker III Research Professor at George Washington University Law School. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers by Lucian A. Bebchuk; and Toward a Constitutional Review of the Poison Pill (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson Jr.

A hot new front is opening in the timeless fights for corporate control between supine boards and activist shareholders: advance notice bylaws that impose onerous conditions on stockholder nominations of new directors.

The battle is joined by an extreme version of such bylaws adopted by the board of Masimo Corporation, a $7 billion medical device maker led by billionaire founder Joe Kiani, after Politan Capital, a hedge fund run by veteran activist Quentin Koffey, disclosed an 8.8% stake, and Koffey expressed interest in board representation.

The Masimo bylaws purport to require that investors seeking to nominate directors to its board disclose the identities of any limited partners and plans for nominations at other companies. The board-adopted bylaw would erect a formidable obstacle to Politan’s efforts to restore discipline to a company plagued by a classic corporate problem: a powerful founder-CEO who built a once-strong company uses its cash to fund wayward corporate projects and lavish personal perks from private security to private jet travel.

The Masimo bylaw would fortify a governance battlefield already stacked against Politan, as Masimo has a staggered board as well as a poison pill. What’s more, Kiani is both chair and CEO and there is no lead independent director, and a golden parachute pays Kiani nine-figures if two of the five incumbent directors are voted out.

But even amid that arsenal, the Masimo advance notice bylaws, which are now being litigated in the Delaware Court of Chancery, resemble the “nuclear option” and offers a case study in how rational governance devices can become unduly weaponized. Historically, advance notice bylaws were intended to serve the valid purpose of administration of shareholder meetings. Without them, chaos would result from stockholders unexpectedly nominating directors from the floor. Order was maintained by requiring notice 30 days in advance.

Over time, however, incumbents gradually increased the length of the required notice, from 60 days, then 90, then 120, and several companies today demand notice over six months before an annual meeting. The required content of the notice has also expanded from originally naming the names to now calling for each nominee to complete an extensive questionnaire and for them and the nominating shareholder to provide all the information that would be required by federal securities law in a proxy statement filed with the SEC.

State corporate law grants companies and corporate boards leeway in this area, but it’s not unbridled. Delaware courts, for instance, permit an incumbent board to pose reasonable questions of nominating shareholders and nominees to assist it in preparing disclosure materials and making recommendations on how to vote.

But they draw a red line at attempts by boards to interfere with the stockholder franchise, which includes the right to vote and the right to nominate. Courts police against subterfuge by rejecting advance notice bylaws purporting innocently to require relevant information but having the clear purpose and certain effect of depriving shareholders of the opportunity to nominate directors of their choice and exercise their right to vote for directors.

Within this framework, the Masimo bylaws almost certainly cross the line, particularly in its call for a nominating shareholder to disclose its limited partners. After all, it is standard, valid practice for investment funds of all kinds to hold the identities of their investors in the strictest confidence. Limited partners opt for that status for many business and legal reasons and investment advisors have similar interests in protecting their investor lists.

Ask any investment fund—from private equity firms such as Apollo to public index funds such as BlackRock—for a list of their top twenty investors and you will be told no. Such investment funds and advisors routinely pledge such confidentiality to their investors, often formally expressed in covenants in their investment contracts. Conditioning a shareholder director nomination on disclosing its investors is therefore tantamount to denying them the opportunity to nominate anyone.

Nor does there appear to be any value to the company or its other shareholders in requiring the disclosure of a nominating shareholder’s limited partners. Limited partners are passive investors by business definition and legal classification. They do not control the nominating shareholder’s investments or strategies. Those choosing to operate differently would be obliged to make full disclosure of the facts under existing federal securities laws, making such advance notice bylaws redundant.

Equally prohibitive is conditioning such nominations on the disclosure of planned director nominations at other companies. That calls for revealing investment plans and strategies that are invariably the product of substantial, costly research and analysis. Maintaining the confidentiality of such efforts is essential to the successful deployment of capital. Compelling its disclosure undermines the business model, providing a Draconian deterrent to nominate a director. Again, it is not obvious why such other investments would generally be important to a company’s other shareholders.

A law professor known for his strong opposition to activist investors recently published an article lamenting that poison pills, another formidable defense, have proven ineffective at stopping activists and extolling the Masimo advance notice bylaws as the new weapon of choice that just might do so. The argument proves the point: bylaws such as the Masimo board adopted are Draconian showstoppers.

Advance notice bylaws will continue to be used in battles for corporate control. But they cannot be used to end them. The front is just heating up.

Activists Face an uphill battle

Jason Booth is Vice President of Activism Editorial at Insightia, a Diligent Brand. This post is based on his Insightia memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei JiangDancing with Activists (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, and Thomas Keusch; and Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System (discussed on the Forum here) by Leo E. Strine, Jr.

The recent proxy season was a challenging one for shareholder activists, despite institutional investors and proxy voting advisers backing more dissident nominees.

Activists won at least one board seat at 29% of campaigns that went to a vote or settled this proxy season, according to Insightia’s Activism module, compared to at 54% and 34% of campaigns throughout the 2020 and 2021 proxy seasons, respectively. Most of the wins were at smaller companies, while activists had less luck against bigger companies with resources to mount a vigorous defensive.

Besides stronger defenses, other reasons for the continued slowdown in activism include stock market volatility and growing economic uncertainty that has made valuing and targeting companies more difficult, according to industry players who spoke with Insightia.

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