Yearly Archives: 2025

Corporate Governance Trends in the United States

Rich Fields leads the Board Effectiveness Practice, Melissa Martin is a member of the Board Effectiveness Practice, and Rusty O’Kelley is a Managing Director, at Russell Reynolds Associates. This post is based on their Russell Reynolds memorandum.

Adapting to a new, evolving political and regulatory landscape

Governance leaders predict boards will devote substantial time to navigating the significant expected shifts in the political and regulatory spheres of the second Trump administration. Within the first days of the new administration, scores of new executive orders triggered some companies and law firms to establish “war rooms” to strategize on the policy changes likely to affect their business, customers, and clients. While impacts will vary significantly by company and industry, there is a widespread expectation that the environment will be more business friendly, with diminished regulatory demands and enforcement risks.

President Trump’s intended agency nominees signal dramatic change, such as the nomination of Paul Atkins to chair the Commission. Atkins, a former SEC Commissioner, is seen as pro-business, with the Wall Street Journal labelling him as a “regulatory skeptic.”. Most expect the SEC to minimize burdens on public companies, backing away from climate disclosure rules and likely lessening support for enforcement. Likewise, in contrast to the first term’s four Labor Secretaries (who were often perceived as anti-union), the current pick for Secretary of Labor has espoused a more measured position. Merger enforcement actions by the FTC and DOJ have already reached a near 20-year low, in part, due to strong anti-merger rhetoric, more aggressive policies, and higher procedural rules. The agencies may relax their 2023 FTC and DOJ guidelines, adopting an even less aggressive approach given the incoming administration’s stance on curtailing merger guidelines and settling merger investigations.

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Granting Favors: Insider-Driven Corporate Philanthropy

Leeor Ofer is a fellow at the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance and an S.J.D. candidate at Harvard Law School. This post is based on her recent article, forthcoming in the Ohio State Law Journal.

Corporate charitable giving has long been considered a key tool in companies’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) arsenal. Notably, in 2023, corporate giving in the United States is estimated to have exceeded $36 billion. And while corporate philanthropy can generate value for firms, their shareholders, and society at large, it can also act as a channel for corporate insiders to increase their own benefit.

For instance, under CEO Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan Chase donated millions to the American Museum of Natural History, where Dimon’s wife served on the advisory council. Similarly, Enron contributed significant sums to the University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center, where two of its directors held leadership roles. Indeed, corporate charitable donations to nonprofits affiliated with directors (“conflicted grants”/”conflicted giving”) may well represent self-dealing at shareholders’ expense. Nonetheless, under U.S. law, shareholders are not entitled to vote on, or otherwise directly participate in, the decision-making process regarding corporate philanthropy. Furthermore, because companies are not required to disclose corporate charitable gifts in their filings with the SEC, and voluntary disclosure is severely lacking, most corporate giving flies below the radar.

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SEC Staff Publishes New C&DIs on Types of Shareholder Engagement Could Cause Loss of Schedule 13G Eligibility

Amy R. Dreisiger, Joseph A. Hearn, and Dalia O. Blass are Partners at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP. This post is based on a Sullivan & Cromwell memorandum by Ms. Dreisiger, Mr. Hearn, Ms. Blass, H. Rodgin Cohen, Robert W. Downes, and Eric M. Diamond.

Today, the Staff in the Division of Corporation Finance at the Securities and Exchange Commission published one new and one revised Compliance and Disclosure Interpretation (C&DI) under Regulation 13D-G. The C&DIs address circumstances in which a greater-than-5% shareholder’s engagement with an issuer’s management could cause the shareholder to be deemed to hold the subject securities with a “purpose or effect of changing or influencing control of the issuer” and, therefore, lose eligibility to report its beneficial ownership on Schedule 13G and require it to report on the more disclosure-intensive Schedule 13D. Although the extent to which the C&DIs are expected to result in a change in practice by filers is unclear, institutional investors may wish to review their approach to interactions with companies in which they have reportable investments.

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ISS 2025 US Benchmark Policy Guidelines

Brad Goldberg and Alessandra Murata are Partners, and Michael Bergmann is a Special Counsel, at Cooley LLP. This post is based on a Cooley memorandum by Ms. Murata, Mr. Bergmann, Mr. Mencher, Beth Sasfai, Brad Goldberg, and Megan Arthur Schilling.

On December 17, 2024, one of the two most influential proxy advisory firms, ISS, released its Proxy Voting Guidelines Benchmark Policy Changes for 2025: US, Canada, and Americas Regional, which provides updates to its voting policies for the 2025 proxy season. The full 2025 ISS Benchmark Voting Policy document is expected to be published in the coming weeks. This alert provides a high-level description of the US policy updates, which will apply for shareholder meetings held on or after February 1, 2025.

Similar to 2024, ISS has introduced significantly fewer policy changes than Glass Lewis, focusing only on poison pills, special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) extensions and a change from general environmental to natural capital-related terminology. Notably, ISS has not added any policies related to artificial intelligence (AI), unlike Glass Lewis, which included new policies regarding AI board oversight and shareholder proposals.

ISS also has provided a preview of possible future policy changes regarding the use of performance-based versus time-based equity awards in US executive compensation programs in its Executive Summary Global Proxy Voting Guidelines Updates for 2025 and Process of ISS Benchmark Policy Development. In addition, ISS issued updates to its FAQs on Executive Compensation Policies and Equity Compensation Plans.

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The Industry Veteran CEO: Friend or Foe?

Jonathan Doorley is Partner and Greg Roumeliotis is a Director at Brunswick Group LLP. This post is based on their Brunswick memorandum.

Director nominees with CEO experience have long featured in Board slates put forward by activist investors. Those candidates were typically from outside the target company’s industry, and the applicability of their experience was often questioned. However, there is an emerging trend of activist investors utilizing CEOs with direct industry experience at competitor companies, and even attempting to bring back retired CEO predecessors as Directors. As the stigma of joining a dissident slate continues to dissipate, the quality of Director candidates is increasing, and they are more likely to have highly relevant industry expertise and even personal ties to the incumbent management team and Board. Companies are now sometimes fighting not just against outsiders, but against former colleagues, mentors or industry peers. This dynamic presents a new set of considerations for companies preparing for and responding to activist attacks.

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Implications of Tornetta v. Musk II for Executive Compensation and for Stockholder Ratification

Gail Weinstein is a Senior Counsel, Philip Richter is a Partner, and Steven Epstein is Managing Partner, at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP. This post is based on a Fried Frank memorandum by Ms. Weinstein, Mr. Richter, Mr. Epstein, Steven SteinmanMaxwell Yim, and Rati Ranga, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

In Tornetta v. Musk (Jan. 30, 2024, “Tornetta I”), the Delaware Court of Chancery ordered rescission of the 10-year equity compensation plan for Elon Musk (Tesla, Inc.’s chief executive) that had been approved by Tesla’s board and the stockholders unaffiliated with Musk. Under the plan, Musk was awarded several tranches of performance-vesting stock options, with an estimated value of approximately $56 billion (now worth about $100 billion based on Tesla’s current stock price). All of the stock options had vested, as Tesla met all of the growth objectives specified in the plan, but Musk had not exercised any of the options. The court’s decision eliminated all of the compensation provided for under the plan.

Following Tornetta I, Tesla provided to the stockholders additional disclosure about the compensation plan and the court’s decision, and the stockholders unaffiliated with Musk again approved the same plan, for the stated purpose of ratifying it. Tesla then requested that, in light of the stockholders’ ratification, the court revise its decision to rescind the plan. In the most recent decision in the case (Dec. 2, 2024, “Tornetta II”), the court rejected the request to revise its decision rescinding the plan.

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The Evolving Anti-DEI and Anti-ESG Landscape: Implications for the Public Sector

Allison Wyderka is the Head of Product and Research for Proxy Services, and Wickham Egan is the Director of Business Development and Operations, at Egan-Jones Ratings Company. This post is based on their Egan-Jones memorandum.

Boards will seek to minimize their legal and regulatory risks, particularly considering that DEI and ESG programs face increased hostility.

On January 21, 2025, President Donald Trump issued Executive Order 14173. [1] The main thrust of this Executive Order (“EO”) was to eliminate “illegal” Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (“DEI”) programs across all federal agencies. Additionally, the EO called for the Attorney General and heads of all agencies to “advance in the private sector the policy of individual initiative, excellence, and hard work.”

The President called for a report within 120 days of the EO that requests all agencies outline their plan to target the “most egregious and discriminatory DEI practitioners” that are part of their jurisdictions, including targeting via civil compliance investigations, litigation, regulatory action, sub-regulatory guidance, and any other strategies possible. Each agency is required to identify up to nine civil compliance investigations of publicly traded corporations, institutions of higher education (with endowments over $1B) and foundations with assets over $500 million that will also be under scrutiny.

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Weekly Roundup: February 7-13, 2025


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This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of February 7-13, 2025

Delaware’s Rocky Year–What Lies Ahead?


A New Regulatory Environment for Climate and Other ESG Reporting Rules


Delaware Court Upholds Private Equity-Led Company Sale Under Business Judgment Rule


President Trump Acts to Roll Back DEI Initiatives


Strategic Insider Trading and Its Consequences for Outsiders: Evidence From the Eighteenth Century


A Review of Director Commitments Policies, 2023 to 2024


Glass Lewis and ISS Publish 2025 Updates


Economic Surveillance using Corporate Text


Shareholder Democracy and the Challenge of Dual Class Share Structures


A Significant Shift Away From ESG and Toward Crypto Is Expected at the SEC


Corporate Climate Commitments: Empty Promises or Profit-Driven Strategy?


Voting on ESG: A Gap Becomes a Gulf


Recent Developments for Directors


Caremark’s Fractured State


The Transformation of the CEO: Global CEO Turnover Index Annual Report


The Transformation of the CEO: Global CEO Turnover Index Annual Report

Rusty O’Kelley is a Managing Director and Laura Sanderson Co-leads the Board and CEO Advisory Partners in Europe at Russell Reynolds Associates. This post is based on a Russell Reynolds memorandum by Mr. O’Kelley, Ms. Sanderson, Stephen Langton, and Sean Roberts.

Chapter One: A record year for elections and CEO turnover

With almost half the world’s population involved in national elections, 2024 was a year characterized by change, so it is perhaps no surprise to see the recent trend of high CEO turnover reach a new peak with record departures reported.

The latest figure of 202 departures significantly surpasses the six-year average of 186 and represents a 9% increase from the 2023 number. The S&P 500 is a powerful indicator of the trend, with 58 CEOs departing in 2024, a 21% increase compared to 2023—this marks the second-highest number on record and exceeds the six-year average of 52. The ASX 200 and SMI 20 also experienced record-breaking turnover, with 70% of all global indices tracked showing higher than average turnover.

However, a number of key markets are bucking this trend. For example, the FTSE 100 saw just 12 CEOs depart in 2024, a decrease of 14% compared to 2023. Similarly, the DAX 40 turnover was also low with just five CEOs departing in the last two calendar years, while the NIFTY 50 in India saw just three departures in 2024 (compared to seven in 2023).

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Caremark’s Fractured State

Itai Fiegenbaum is an Assistant Professor of Law at St. Thomas University College of Law. This post is based on his recent article forthcoming in The Business Lawyer, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Delaware’s hegemony in U.S. corporate law is indisputable. Law students are taught Delaware corporate law, and corporate law practitioners are expected to be well-versed in Delaware’s doctrinal nuances. Regardless of one’s opinion about the benefits provided by Delaware incorporation, Delaware’s preeminence has created a shared corporate law language that bridges jurisdictional boundaries.

The Caremark doctrine exemplifies this state of affairs. Chancellor Allen’s novel declaration of a proactive board-level monitoring obligation, even in the absence of suspected wrongdoing, propelled it to the pantheon of influential corporate law decisions. Caremark’s framework for assessing board liability invigorated the board’s oversight role and jumpstarted the compliance industry. Nearly three decades after it was handed down, Caremark remains a common staple in corporate law casebooks, and an accepted shorthand for the board’s oversight obligation.

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