Yearly Archives: 2026

Weekly Roundup: March 27-April 2, 2026


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This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of March 27-April 2, 2026

Oversight Failures on Workplace Misconduct Can Support Fiduciary Duty Claims




Texas Corporate Developments: What Officers and Directors Need to Know


Engines of External Governance


2025 Equity Plan Proposals: Continued Robust Shareholder Support


Ten Tactics that Unnecessarily Frustrate Activists and Impact Negotiating Leverage


The State of US Reincorporations: Post-Proxy Season 2025


Complaint Challenging Restrictions on Shareholder Proposal Rights


2026 Proxy Season Preview



Board Overload


How the C-Suite Is Evolving: NEO Titles and Compensation at US Public Companies


How the C-Suite Is Evolving: NEO Titles and Compensation at US Public Companies

Matteo Tonello is the Head of Benchmarking and Analytics at The Conference Board, Inc. This post is based on a Conference Board report developed in partnership with ESGAUGE, FW Cook, and Ropes & Gray and co-authored by Paul Hodgson, Senior Advisor, ESGAUGE, Ariane Marchis-Mouren, Senior Researcher, Corporate Governance at The Conference Board, and Andrew Jones, Principal Researcher, Governance & Sustainability Center at The Conference Board.

This report examines how the composition, compensation, and sectoral profile of named executive officers (NEOs) at US public companies have evolved since 2021, drawing on Russell 3000 and S&P 500 disclosure data to illuminate shifting C-Suite priorities and pay dynamics.

Trusted Insights for What’s Ahead®

  • Beyond the CEO and chief financial officer (CFO), business unit heads are the most prevalent NEO roles—although their prevalence has notably declined since 2021.
  • Chief legal officers (CLOs) and equivalents are a prevalent NEO role and recorded the largest absolute increase between 2021 and 2025.
  • CLOs, chief technology officers (CTOs), chief human resources officers (CHROs), and chief commercial officers (CCOs) are all increasing in prevalence as NEOs—reflecting increased corporate emphasis on enterprise risk, technology, talent, and revenue.
  • While mandates such as data, cybersecurity, and sustainability are increasingly strategic priorities, they are not consistently reflected as standalone NEO titles, suggesting these responsibilities are often embedded within broader executive roles.
  • Reported median NEO compensation rose again in 2025, with faster growth in the Russell 3000 than in the S&P 500 and strong increases for roles such as CHRO and CLO.
  • Men continue to earn more than women across the broader NEO population—with some notable exceptions—largely reflecting differences in role distribution, tenure, and concentration in the highest-paid operational and enterprise leadership positions.

NEOs at US public companies are the top executives whose compensation must be disclosed in detail under Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules, generally including the CEO, CFO, and up to three other highest-paid executive officers. This information is disclosed in the annual proxy statement (DEF 14A), primarily in the Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) and related tables; and supports shareholder oversight, proxy voting, and assessments of executive pay and accountability.

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Board Overload

Asaf Eckstein is Professor of Law at Hebrew University, Roy Shapira is Professor of Law at Reichman University, and Ariel Shillo is a Law Student at Hebrew University. This post is based on their recent article, forthcoming in the Washington University Law Review.

There is a growing asymmetry between boards’ expanded responsibilities and the structural limits on their capacity. Over the past two decades, regulators have increasingly required boards to oversee compliance across a wide range of issues.

In response to the early-2000s accounting scandals, the SarbanesOxley Act tasked boards with active oversight of financial reporting. After 9/11, regulators required bank directors to adopt and oversee their bank’s anti-money-laundering policies. The 2008 financial crisis brought on new mandates for bank boards to monitor capital adequacy on an ongoing basis. In the wake of the mid-2010s cyberattacks, financial regulators began insisting on board involvement in data security. Health regulators, following a series of Medicare fraud scandals, required hospital boards to formally approve credentialing criteria as a condition for participating in Medicare. Most recently, concerns about climate change have led international regulators to require that boards oversee and disclose their company’s climate-related risks and strategies.

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The Spinout Effect: How Activist Lineages Are Driving Growth and Outcomes

Sergi Corbatera is the Founder and CEO of DEF 14 Inc.

In startups, exceptional companies often produce a second generation of influential founders—the “PayPal mafia” being the canonical example. Activism is proving no different. When a firm develops a distinctive playbook, compounds credibility, and delivers repeated success, it does more than win campaigns. It becomes a training ground. Alumni leave with experience, networks, and reputational capital that can be redeployed into new firms, new pools of capital, and new forms of influence. In that sense, leading activist funds do not merely participate in the market; they help build it.

This report examines that dynamic through the firms launched by alumni of eight major activist platforms: Elliott, Starboard, Icahn, Trian, ValueAct, Pershing Square, JANA, and Third Point. The evidence suggests that these spinouts have become an increasingly important source of campaign activity. Their significance lies not only in number, but in function. By adding new vehicles, specialized teams, and fresh capital, spinouts expand the market’s overall activism capacity without requiring legacy firms themselves to increase public campaign volume at the same pace.

That expansion is now visible in practice. Firms such as Irenic Capital, Donerail Group, Fivespan Partners, and Ananym Capital show how experienced teams can establish credible independent platforms and secure influence through cooperation agreements, board representation, and transaction-driven campaigns, often without a prolonged proxy contest. The point is not simply that former activists are founding new firms. It is that these firms are already shaping outcomes in ways that make the market broader, more specialized, and more resilient.

For boards and advisers, the implication is immediate. Activism surveillance can no longer be organized solely around a fixed roster of incumbent names. It must also account for networks, institutional lineages, and the firms emerging from them. The most important actors in the next cycle may not always be the legacy platforms themselves, but the alumni they trained.

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2026 Proxy Season Preview

Ariane Marchis-Mouren is a Senior Researcher and Brian Campbell is a Center Leader at The Conference Board. This post is based on a report developed by The Conference Board in partnership with ESGAUGE, Russell Reynolds Associates, and the Rutgers Law School Center for Corporate Law and Governance.

The 2026 proxy season unfolds amid significant shifts in the regulatory, political, and investor landscape, reshaping how shareholder proposals are filed, evaluated, and voted. Following record activity in 2024 and a modest pullback in 2025, companies now face a proxy environment defined less by volume and more by discretion, legal complexity, and evolving investor expectations.

Trusted Insights for What’s Ahead®

  • More shareholder proposals are being resolved off the ballot rather than put to a vote. Negotiation, withdrawal, and omission increasingly shape outcomes, raising the bar for proposals to advance.
  • Procedural changes have materially reshaped the shareholder proposal process. Record no-action activity, the US Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) retreat from routine staff review, and tighter rules on exempt solicitations place greater responsibility—and risk—on issuers and proponents.
  • Voting outcomes are becoming less predictable as decision-making grows more contextual. Asset managers and proxy advisors continue to rely less on rigid policy frameworks and more on issuer-specific facts, disclosure quality, and demonstrated responsiveness.
  • Proxy disclosure is emerging as a central stewardship tool in a more constrained engagement environment. As informal engagement and procedural guardrails narrow, clear, decision-oriented proxy disclosure plays an increasingly important role in shaping investor understanding and voting behavior.

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Complaint Challenging Restrictions on Shareholder Proposal Rights

Josh Zinner is the CEO of the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR). This post is based on the text of a complaint filed by the ICCR and As You Sow.

INTRODUCTION

  1. For more than eight decades, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has safeguarded the right of shareholders in a public company to present a proposal in the company proxy statement regarding significant issues of concern. This right—enshrined in a regulation known as Rule 14a-8 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act)—has long served as a foundational mechanism for shareholder participation in corporate governance and for advancing the Exchange Act’s core goals of investor protection and transparent markets.
  2. Shareholder proposals are a critical mechanism for a company’s shareholders to raise and vote on important issues directly relevant to a company’s long-term performance and risk profile. More broadly, this process reflects a core principle of American capital markets: that investors who supply capital to public companies retain meaningful rights to protect their investment by participating in corporate governance. The transparency and accountability that follow robust shareholder rights are also a key reason that global capital flows to American markets—investors have confidence that U.S. markets provide meaningful mechanisms for disclosure, accountability, and investor protection.
  3. When a company seeks to exclude a qualified shareholder proposal from its proxy materials, it must comply with the procedural framework established by Rule 14a-8. The company must notify both the Commission and the proposal’s proponent and articulate the legal basis for exclusion. This obligation ensures that proponents have an opportunity to respond and that SEC staff can evaluate whether the exclusion is consistent with Rule 14a-8 and longstanding Commission precedent.
  4. In recent months, the SEC has adopted a new policy abandoning the requirements and procedures established by the Commission’s own regulation governing the shareholder proposal process. Rather than hearing from both sides and engaging in the review contemplated by the regulations, SEC staff now categorically issues “no-objection” letters—or effectively blesses exclusions—when companies invoke certain formulaic assertions in their submissions. This approach replaces meaningful regulatory oversight with a new, de facto rubber-stamp process that allows companies to exclude proposals without any analysis by the staff.
  5. This policy was implemented without the notice-and-comment rulemaking that is required by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) when an agency adopts or effectively alters binding regulatory standards. The APA requires federal agencies to act through transparent procedures; provide reasoned explanations for policy changes, regardless of the language the government uses to characterize them; and to give affected stakeholders an opportunity to comment before altering decades of the operation of existing regulations. The SEC circumvented the procedural safeguards of the APA and effectively changed how Rule 14a-8 operates through informal staff practice rather than through rulemaking.
  6. The result is a process that deprives shareholders of rights established by SEC regulation and decades of Commission precedent. This approach will lead to the exclusion of shareholder proposals that should be included in proxy materials, weakening a core mechanism of shareholder participation in corporate governance. In doing so, it risks undermining investor confidence in the transparency and accountability of U.S. public markets—principles that have long distinguished American capital markets globally. These outcomes are difficult to reconcile with the Commission’s statutory mission to protect investors, maintain fair and orderly markets, and facilitate capital formation.

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The State of US Reincorporations: Post-Proxy Season 2025

Samuel Nolledo is a Senior Analyst, Sarah Wenger is a Lead Analyst, and Aaron Wendt is a Senior Director of Research at Glass, Lewis & Co. This post is based on their Glass Lewis memorandum and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Key Takeaways

  • While a widespread “DEXIT” has yet to materialize, state-to-state reincorporations by U.S. public companies remain in the spotlight.
  • Of the 26 reincorporation proposals that went to a vote in the second half of 2025, 16 involved existing companies and 10 involved a SPAC or other business combination.
  • Among existing companies, the most common reasons cited for reincorporating were the jurisdiction’s legal environment (81%), Delaware’s franchise taxes and fees (50%), litigation risk (38%) and business operations (25%).
  • Only 29% of the reincorporations from the 2025 post-season involved significant or controlling shareholders, compared to 55% during the 2025 proxy season.
  • Although average support for reincorporation proposals rose to 86% in the post-season compared to 82% in proxy season, more reincorporation proposals were not approved by shareholders (four, vs. two during proxy season).

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Ten Tactics that Unnecessarily Frustrate Activists and Impact Negotiating Leverage

Christine O’Brien is a Senior Advisor and Lex Suvanto is the CEO at Edelman Smithfield. This post is based on an Edelman Smithfield memorandum by Ms. O’Brien, Mr. Suvanto, and Patrick Ryan.

Boards and management all have the same fear – the ominous news story, 13D filing, or even the first phone call when an activist investor introduces themselves as one of their largest shareholders. What happens next is swift and often sets the tone for the engagement. The Board is notified, advisors are summoned, and a defense plan is assembled. Directors are flooded with counsel from advisors who claim they know the activist best and have seen this situation many times before.

In these moments, it’s easy for Boards to slip into self-preservation mode and engage in standard defensive tactics. However, many of these well-advised tactics may jeopardize trust with the activist and ultimately reduce the company’s negotiating leverage. Rather than establishing the basis for a thoughtful exchange of ideas, some standard defense tactics can inadvertently signal resistance and bad intentions, making it more difficult to maintain a constructive dialogue that could lead to a mutually beneficial outcome.

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2025 Equity Plan Proposals: Continued Robust Shareholder Support

Linda Pappas is a Principal and Tara Tays is a Partner at Pay Governance LLC. This post is based on their Pay Governance memorandum.

Key Takeaways

  •  Nearly 25% of Russell 3000 companies submitted an equity plan proposal in 2025. Shareholder support was strong at 88% on average, and less than 1% of proposals failed to receive majority support, consistent with 2023 and 2024 levels
  • It is most common for companies to return to shareholders every 2 to 3 years to seek equity plan approvals
  • While proxy advisor opposition to equity plan proposals typically results in lower shareholder support, the proposal failure rate increases only modestly (to a failure rate of less than 4%)
  • Among the limited number of companies that failed to receive shareholder support over the last two years, approximately half were in the health care (e.g., pharma/biotech) sector
  • Companies can take several steps to improve the likelihood of a successful shareholder vote outcome, including: analyzing share reserve needs, assessing potential dilution, understanding top shareholder voting policies and proxy advisor concerns, and clearly disclosing the shareholder-friendly features of the equity plan

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Engines of External Governance

Mariana Pargendler is the Beneficial Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Elizabeth Pollman is the Perry Golkin Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School. This post is based on their recent article, forthcoming in the Georgetown Law Journal.

Who are the pivotal actors and interests shaping corporate governance? Traditional accounts focus on shareholders, directors, and officers, and treat corporate governance as largely an intra-firm issue of power, incentives, and monitoring. Recent scholarship has expanded this view by identifying additional actors and forces, including the diverse constituents of the U.S. “corporate governance machine” (such as proxy advisors, stock exchanges, stock indices, and ratings agencies), as well as international organizations that have propelled “the rise of international corporate law.” Other commonly identified influences include corporate gadflies, the state as a shareholder, and broader political-economic forces such as populism, nationalism, and geopolitics.

These accounts, however, often leave out an important part of the picture: the role of nonprofits in shaping corporate governance. In our Article, Engines of External Governance, we examine how nonprofits have become key drivers of external governance—the ways in which actors outside the firm seek to embed broader objectives into corporate decision-making. Bringing nonprofits into focus sheds critical light on corporate governance developments and their trajectory.

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