Yearly Archives: 2026

When Fiduciaries Collide: Foreshadowing a Looming Conflict in Corporate Governance

Paul Rissman is Co-Founder of Rights CoLab. This post is based on his Rights CoLab memorandum.

When Fiduciaries Collide: Foreshadowing a Looming Conflict in Corporate Governance

Envision a situation with two sets of fiduciaries, one a Delaware corporate board, the other a shareholder of the corporation who is also the trustee of a diversified retirement fund. The corporation in question generates negative externalities in the form of sub-living wages and carbon pollution, contributing to systemic macroeconomic risk[1] that reduces income growth and aggregate demand, damages productivity, and increases the likelihood of financial crises. The retirement trustee has determined that in aggregate, the economic toll of these externalities constitutes an unacceptable risk to beneficiaries’ future financial health. The trustee, in observing its duty of prudence, therefore believes these externalities should be reduced by the firms in the retirement portfolio responsible for them. The trustee additionally believes that our corporate board will not voluntarily undertake steps to reduce the externalities, as this will entail substantial cost in the form of higher labor expense and increased expenditure on pollution control equipment, or even an undesired change in the business model. Our well-diversified trustee, invested in thousands of assets, assesses that its portfolio weighting in the corporation is minuscule, so that any financial damage to the corporation itself, as a result of these increased costs, will be nothing more than a rounding error to the trustee’s portfolio as a whole. On the other hand, the trustee estimates that the pecuniary long-term damage to the overall portfolio, in the absence of systemic risk mitigation, will be significant. The trustee, cognizant of the fiduciary duty to investigate and monitor portfolio risk, engages with the corporation’s board to encourage it to reduce the firm’s externalities. As affirmed in McRitchie v. Zuckerberg, however, the corporate director’s fiduciary duty is not to any particular shareholder, but to the long-term value of the company’s shares. The board has judged that reducing the firm’s externalities would harm the long-term value of the shares, so the board refuses the demand. The trustee escalates by initiating a “vote no” campaign against the board, hoping to remove the incumbent directors and thereby shift the corporation’s behavior.

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Board Practices: Crisis Management and the Board

Natalie Cooper is a Senior Manager at Deloitte LLP and Randi Morrison is General Counsel and Chief Knowledge Officer at the Society for Corporate Governance. This post is based on a Deloitte and Society for Corporate Governance report by Ms. Cooper, Ms. Morrison, Christine Davine, Maureen Bujno, Krista Parsons, and Caroline Schoenecker.

Crisis management is a vital organizational function, enabling resilience and mitigation against potential adverse implications associated with disruptive events such as financial instability, cyberthreats, operational breakdowns, and reputational harm—any of which may jeopardize ongoing  operations and an organization’s long-term viability. The board of directors plays a crucial role in this area by providing strategic oversight, establishing governance frameworks, and making informed decisions that are important, particularly in today’s increasingly complex risk landscape.

This Board Practices Quarterly is based on a recent survey of members of the Society for Corporate Governance representing public and private companies. The survey, fielded in Q4 2025, examined organizational crisis preparedness and governance, including topics such as crisis plan formalization, types of crises addressed in the plan, management functions that participate in crisis teams, and the role of the board of directors.

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Why Shareholder-Driven Corporate Social Responsibility Failed

Mark J. Roe is the David Berg Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. This post is based on his recent article, forthcoming in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review.

A decade ago, hopes were high in some circles that pressure from the new, large, economically-powerful institutional shareholders, like BlackRock, for more corporate social responsibility—on issues like climate change, the environment, and justice—would become a major feature of the corporate landscape and move the American corporation to do what government was not doing. That hope arose because incentives emanating from America’s shareholding structure had shifted when firm-by-firm investments by large shareholding institutions evolved to market-wide, across-the-economy investments in very large portfolios. Institutional investors of this sort no longer picked stocks; they invested broadly across the stock market and the American economy. In some circles that ownership structure looked to be creating incentives for financial institutions with wide ownership to pressure the American corporation to benefit the economy overall, and not just boost the profits of their portfolio companies. In CSR circles, hopes were high that the new universal owner had incentives to fulfill social responsibility gaps seen as having been left by government.

For example, investors with across-the-economy ownership had more reason to make their companies internalize externalities; if one firm in the portfolio profited at the expense of another firm, the new investor’s profit in one would be offset by the loss in the other firm. And turning from government regulation to private pressure was needed, said many analysts and activists, because of our broken government. With deadlocked government a dead-end, the CSR and ESG movements sought to pressure large institutional shareholders in corporate America toward social progress.

Many in the new shareholder class of universal owners indeed bought into the new corporate social responsibility playbook and pressed corporate America for more socially responsible action.

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Lessons From the Skies for Executive Compensation Programs

Alessandra Murata and Michael Bergmann are Partners at Cooley LLP. This post is based on their Cooley memorandum.

As seasoned pilots know, a downward spiral often starts gradually, almost imperceptibly, unless you heed the early warning signs. If those signs are missed or ignored, trouble compounds. It’s often tough to know whether you’re really in a spiral until it starts to tighten, and at some point – sometimes seemingly suddenly – breaking free may no longer be possible.

So, you’re thinking, what does that have to do with the design and administration of executive compensation programs? Although the nexus is perhaps not immediately obvious, the hard lessons from the sky have something to teach us.

Unfortunately, unlike pilots with instruments tailored to reveal an incipient spiral, those responsible for making decisions about executive compensation programs don’t have specialized tools that can reliably identify external factors that could cause the program to misfire and fail to achieve its intended purpose. Most commonly those external factors relate to the broader macroeconomic climate – for instance, the 2008 financial crisis or, more recently, the COVID-19 pandemic. The volatility caused by financial or geopolitical shocks can easily disrupt compensation programs, leading them to a spiral toward dysfunction – for example, because of unanticipated swings in equity value or the depletion of cash reserves.

So is a spiral for compensation programs tightening? No one knows of course. The only thing that’s certain is that something will happen, even if that something is simply not much of anything. That realization will cause its own reckoning.

The lesson for executive compensation programs is to be prepared for the uncertainty and whatever may (or may not) come out of it. The playbook for that preparation is becoming well-worn, but it’s worth reviewing, particularly with the incentive award season in full swing.

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Top 5 Corporate Governance Priorities for 2026

Matteo Tonello is the Head of Benchmarking and Analytics at The Conference Board, Inc. This post is based on a report developed by The Conference Board in partnership with Heidrick & Struggles and ESGAUGE and co-authored by Bonnie W. Gwin, Vice Chair and Global Co-Managing Partner, CEO and Board Practice at Heidrick & Struggles, and Andrew Jones, Principal Researcher, Governance & Sustainability Center at The Conference Board.

Today’s corporate boards are confronting a period of unprecedented leadership churn, systemic risk, and technological disruption. This report outlines the top five governance priorities corporate directors face in 2026, based on an analysis of CEO and board-level interviews, proprietary survey data, and emerging market trends.

Top Five Governance Priorities for 2026

  1. Fortify CEO succession and leadership pipelines: A demographic wave of CEOs staying in their roles past traditional retirement age, combined with the increasing materiality of leadership quality to value, is creating an impending need for robust planning.
  2. Drive strategic board refreshment and composition: A persistent gap between the need for new board skills and the slow pace of director turnover is creating strategic vulnerabilities and attracting activist attention.
  3. Build resilience in the context of geopolitical and economic volatility: Escalating geopolitical and economic uncertainty are the paramount risks for boards for the third year in a row, demanding enhanced scenario planning and further increasing the importance of a robust leadership pipeline and new director expertise.
  4. Formalize AI governance and strategic oversight: A critical “discussion vs. action” gap in AI oversight is exposing firms to unmanaged risks and hindering their ability to capitalize on AI-driven strategic opportunities.
  5. Proactively manage shareholder activism: Sustained, high-level activism is acting as a market-enforced penalty for governance lapses, making proactive board refreshment and strategic alignment the most effective defense.

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SEC Speaks 2026: What Public Companies and Investment Advisers Need to Know

Paul Helms and Caitlyn Campbell are Partners and Jen Levengood is an Associate at McDermott Will & Schulte. This post is based on a McDermott memorandum by Mr. Helms, Ms. Campbell, Ms. Levengood, John P. Nowak, and Daniel-Charles Wolf.

The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) participated in the annual SEC Speaks conference on March 19 and 20, 2026, bringing together Commissioners  and staff to discuss recent developments and share the agency’s priorities going forward. This year’s remarks offered useful insight into enforcement risks for public companies and investment advisers, highlighting areas that may see increased scrutiny.

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Consumers Cut Back, CEOs Depart, and Boards Act

Dick Patton is a Consultant and Alex Madronal is a Director at Russell Reynolds Associates. This post is based on a Russell Reynolds memorandum.

CEO turnover in consumer companies hit a record high last year, in the face of rapid, compounding change. The job has never been harder — tenures are shortening, the environment is less predictable, and the pipeline of leaders ready and willing to step into the role is thinning.

Boards are already responding, reaching more often for leaders with prior CEO experience. But hiring differently is only part of the answer. The boards that treat succession as an ongoing discipline are positioning their organizations to navigate what comes next, rather than just reacting to it.

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Special Committees in Conflict Transactions: A Practical Guide

Maeve O’Connor and William D. Regner are Partners, and Amy Zimmerman is an Associate at Debevoise & Plimpton LLP. This post is based on a Debevoise memorandum by Ms. O’Connor, Mr. Regner, Ms. Zimmerman, and Hadel Alfagir.

Key Takeaways:

  • Special committees can be important tools for boards facing actual or potential conflicts of interest.
  • To realize their benefits, special committees should consist of only disinterested and independent directors, receive a clear and comprehensive mandate, function independently, and ensure that their work is well documented.
  • This article offers practical guidance about when to form a special committee, committee composition, advisors to the committee, and documenting the committee’s work, with a focus on Delaware law.

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DExit: So You Want to Leave Delaware? What To Consider Beyond the Legalese

Garrett Muzikowski is a Managing Director, Andrea Hearon is a Director, and Pat Tucker is a Senior Managing Director at FTI Consulting. This post is based on their FTI memorandum and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

DExit: Not Widely Adopted, But An Increasingly Popular Board Conversation

Companies are increasingly beginning to wonder if being incorporated in Delaware, compared to other jurisdictions like Nevada or Texas, is in the best interest of the Company and its shareholders.

Once an almost unthinkable conversation, boards’ and management teams’ willingness to consider reincorporation has been driven by recent legal developments in each state – namely recent legal decisions in Delaware and legislative changes from Texas and Nevada to compete for corporate charters. This topic picked up enough steam for it to earn its own nickname: “DExit,” and recent high-profile examples of companies reincorporating (or announcing their intention to reincorporate) have only further spurred this discussion.

The reasons to pursue reincorporation are different for every company, but common reasons include: incorporating in a state where the Company is based or headquartered, seeking to reduce frivolous litigation, improving predictability in “pro-business” courts, and lowering liability exposure for officers, amongst others. Nevada provides the broadest protection from statutory liability. Texas provides companies with the option to adopt minimum thresholds for shareholders to file a derivative lawsuit or a shareholder proposal, and proxy advisors may eventually have to make certain disclosures if their recommendations rely on nonpecuniary factors.

Leaving Delaware is not for every company. Delaware still is, and will remain for the foreseeable future, the default state of incorporation for publicly traded companies.

The DExit trend (if it even becomes a trend) is still in its infancy. With that said, from a very small base, the conversation continues to grow and more companies have begun asking for shareholder approval to reincorporate outside of Delaware. For the purposes of this analysis, we focused solely on reincorporation proposals from Delaware to Nevada or Texas – ignoring proposal from or to other jurisdictions. For context, the below chart includes 23 of the 36 total reincorporation proposals put forth by U.S. issuers in 2025:

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Beyond the PSU Mandate

Voytek Sokolowski is a Principal at FW Cook. This post is based on his FW Cook memorandum.

A Compensation Committee Roadmap for Evaluating Long-Term Incentives in 2026

U.S. executive compensation has come to rely heavily on Performance Share Units (PSUs). PSUs are awards of stock units which are earned based on pre-established financial and/or market goals, most commonly measured over a three-year performance period. The widespread adoption of PSUs was partly driven by proxy advisor expectations to grant at least half of executive annual long-term incentives (LTI) in PSUs. Failure to comply invited criticism and a challenged Say-on-Pay outcome, a risk few Compensation Committees were willing to endure. The result was a homogenized landscape where, for some companies, proxy advisor compliance may have taken precedence over strategic alignment.

Has the pendulum swung too far toward PSUs? Some investors think so and, in 2026, proxy advisors have signaled greater flexibility toward alternative LTI structures. This article explores why the three-year PSU model is under pressure and provides a 2026 roadmap for Compensation Committees when evaluating LTI design for 2027.

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