Yearly Archives: 2016

Prioritizing Cybersecurity: Five Questions for Portfolio Company Boards

Glenn Davis is Director of Research for the Council on Institutional Investors. This post is based on a report prepared by Mr. Davis and the CII Staff.

As the frequency and severity of cyber attacks against global businesses continue to escalate, both companies and their investors are coming to terms with a grim reality: Data breaches, or cyber incidents, are no longer a matter of if but when. Having put to rest rose-colored notions of eliminating this threat, investors are looking to boards for leadership in addressing the risks and mitigating the damage associated with cyber incidents.

Cybersecurity is an integral component of a board’s role in risk oversight. Directors have the authority, capacity and responsibility to make pivotal contributions in this area by ensuring adequate resources and management expertise are allocated to robust cyber risk management policies and practices, and ensuring disclosure fairly and accurately portrays material cyber risks and incidents.

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Creditor Rights, Claims Enforcement, and Bond Returns in Mergers and Acquisitions

Luc Renneboog is Professor of Corporate Finance at Tilburg University. This post is based on a recent paper authored by Mr. Renneboog; Peter Szilagyi, Associate Professor of Finance at CEU Business School, Central European University, and Judge Business School, Cambridge University; and Cara Vansteenkiste of Tilburg University.

The market for corporate control has become increasingly global over the past decades, with cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) now accounting for more than a third of M&A activity worldwide. To date, empirical studies that have investigated the potential cross-country spillovers in governance and legal standards mainly focused on the economic implications for shareholder wealth, relating the governance regimes in the countries of bidder and target to shareholder returns, to the takeover premium demanded by target shareholders in deals involving equity offers, to changes in the valuation of non-targeted rival firms and even of entire industries in which cross-border deals occur.

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Weekly Roundup: May 13–May 19, 2016


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This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of May 13–May 19, 2016.
















Intersection of Deal-Related Indemnification and D&O Advancement

Daniel Wolf is a partner focusing on mergers and acquisitions at Kirkland & Ellis LLP. The following post is based on a Kirkland memorandum by Mr. Wolf. This post is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

A recent Delaware case highlights potentially unexpected results from the intersection of provisions in a private company purchase agreement relating to advancement of D&O legal expenses and indemnification of a buyer for seller breaches.

Purchase agreements in many private company transactions contain some form of two seemingly unrelated provisions: (1) an agreement by the sellers to indemnify the buyer for certain losses arising out of breaches of representations and warranties made by the sellers and (2) an agreement by the buyer to maintain or assume the rights of former directors and officers of the target contained in the target’s organizational documents to indemnification and advancement of expenses for actions taken prior to closing.

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The Post Dodd-Frank Evolution of the Private Fund Industry

Wulf Kaal is professor of law at the University of St. Thomas School of Law. This post is based on a recent paper authored by Professor Kaal.

Surveys conducted in the immediate aftermath of the enactment of Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act suggested that private fund advisers successfully addressed compliance demands associated with the Dodd-Frank Act and absorbed the increased compliance costs of the registration and disclosure rules relatively quickly after registration. Refuting industry concerns over the effects of Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act on the private fund industry, the Author showed in a survey conducted in 2012 that the private fund industry adjusted well to the regulatory landscape post Dodd-Frank. For example, the 2012 survey found that private fund investors’ rate of return was not adversely impacted by the registration and disclosure requirements. While private fund adviser firms that planned a strategic response were smaller than those firms that did not plan a strategic response, respondents in the 2012 survey did not take the Dodd-Frank Act changes into account in determining the assets under management (AUM) size of their funds and did not envisage a strategic response to the Dodd-Frank Act registration and reporting requirements. Moreover, compliance cost estimates in the 2012 survey were equally moderate, suggesting total compliance costs for the majority of advisers would range from $50,000 to $200,000. The long-term implications of Title IV’s unprecedented registration and reporting obligations for the private fund industry were at the time of the 2012 survey largely unclear.

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ValueAct, Activism Tactics, and Beneficial Ownership

Ethan A. Klingsberg is a partner in the New York office of Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP. This post is based on a Cleary Gottlieb publication by Mr. Klingsberg, Steven J. Kaiser, and Elizabeth Bieber. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure by Lucian Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson Jr. (discussed on the Forum here), and Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Robert J. Jackson Jr., and Wei Jiang.

The filing by the DOJ of a complaint in federal court on April 4, 2016 against ValueAct—claiming that ValueAct’s purchase of shares of two public companies violated the HSR Act’s notification and waiting period requirements and seeking $19 million in civil penalties (based on the $16,000 per day penalty provisions of the HSR Act)—has the potential to have an immediate impact on the tactics used by brand name “activist hedge funds,” such as ValueAct, to accumulate shares without prior notice to either the issuers in question or the market generally.

As some of the activism advocates from academia have observed, the imposition of any limitations on the ability of these hedge funds to accumulate shares without prior public disclosure that these accumulations are or will be occurring “can be expected to reduce the returns to [activist] blockholders and thereby reduce the incidence and size of outside [activist] blocks as well as [activist] blockholders’ investments in monitoring and engagement.” [1] In other words, impediments to the ability to buy shares “under the radar” will hit activist hedge funds where it counts most—i.e., by increasing their upfront investment costs.

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CFPB Proposed Rulemaking on Arbitration Clauses

Brad S. Karp is chairman and partner at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP. This post is based on a Paul Weiss client memorandum by Mr. Karp, Roberto Gonzalez, Elizabeth Sacksteder, Jay Cohen, and Jane O’Brien. The complete publication, including footnotes, is available here.

On May 5, 2016, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) released a 377-page notice of proposed rulemaking that would prohibit, going forward, banks and a variety of other companies from including in contracts arbitration clauses that would prevent consumers from filing or participating in class-action litigation. According to the press release: “With this contract gotcha, companies can sidestep the legal system, avoid accountability, and continue to pursue profitable practices that may violate the law and harm countless consumers.” The proposed regulation would continue to allow companies to insist on arbitration instead of individual litigation, but would require companies to submit records related to arbitrations to CFPB for monitoring and for potential posting in some form on its website. The public will have 90 days to comment on the proposal once it is published in the Federal Register.

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The Ability of Pre-IPO Companies to Stay Private Longer

Joseph A. Hall is a partner and head of the corporate governance practice at Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP. This post is based on a Davis Polk memorandum authored by Mr. Hall, Alan F. DenenbergMichael Kaplan, Richard D. Truesdell, Jr., and Michele Luburich.

On May 3, the SEC approved rule amendments that will make it easier for many private companies to remain private, and easier for some public financial companies to terminate their SEC reporting obligations. With the adoption of these amendments, the SEC has completed the rulemaking mandated by Congress under the JOBS Act of 2012.

The amendments:

  • Increase numerical thresholds for triggering SEC reporting by pre-IPO companies, based on the extent to which the company’s investor base includes “accredited investors” and employee shareholders—providing some companies with the flexibility to stay private longer and develop a larger shareholder base before conducting an IPO;
  • Allow companies, when counting their shareholders to see if they are required to register with the SEC, to exclude securities held by persons who received them under equity compensation plans in transactions not subject to SEC registration; and
  • Make it easier for some banks, bank holding companies and savings and loan holding companies to exit the SEC reporting regime, based on the size of their shareholder base.

The amendments will become effective on June 9, 2016.

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The Fed’s Deeply Flawed Strategy for Resolving Failed Megabanks

Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. is a Professor of Law at the George Washington University Law School. This post is based on a recent article by Professor Wilmarth.

In my article SPOE + TLAC = More Bailouts for Wall Street, which was recently published in the Banking & Financial Services Policy Report, I discuss a new strategy that the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) has proposed for dealing with failures of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). My article points out a number of serious shortcomings in the Fed’s proposal and argues that significant reforms must be made before the plan is implemented.

A primary goal of the Dodd-Frank Act is to end “too big to fail” (TBTF) bailouts for systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) and their creditors. Title II of Dodd-Frank establishes the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA), which empowers the Secretary of the Treasury to appoint the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as receiver for failed SIFIs. Title II requires the FDIC to liquidate failed SIFIs and to impose any resulting losses on their shareholders and creditors. Title II establishes a liquidation-only mandate because Congress did not want a failed megabank to emerge from an OLA receivership as a “rehabilitated” SIFI.

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Frozen Charters

Scott Hirst is a Lecturer on Law at Harvard Law School, and an Associate Director of the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance. This post is based on his recent article, available here.

Earlier this month, mega-cap oil refining corporation Phillips 66, also known for its Conoco and “76” gas stations, put forward an amendment to its charter, the central document establishing the internal rules of the corporation. The board of directors and management of Phillips 66 supported and recommended the change. At the company’s annual meeting, more than 98% of the votes cast were in favor of the amendment. But the amendment failed. The company’s charter is frozen.

(Disclosure: The amendments at Phillips 66, and those at many other companies with frozen charters, followed engagement by clients of the Shareholder Rights Project during the years 2011 to 2014, during which time I served as the Project’s Associate Director). [1]

This result is the consequence of a 2012 change in New York Stock Exchange policies relating to broker voting rules. Although the change was intended to protect investors and improve corporate governance, it has had the opposite effect: a significant number of U.S. public companies are no longer able to amend important parts of their corporate charters, despite the support of their boards of directors and overwhelming majorities of shareholders. Their charters are frozen.

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