Ning Chiu is counsel at Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP. This post is based on a Davis Polk publication by Ms. Chiu. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Lucian Bebchuk’s The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, and Private Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate by Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst (discussed on the Forum here).
The 2017 season that just passed witnessed two kinds of proposals asking companies to amend existing proxy access bylaws. The first type sent to companies earlier in the season sought to amend several provisions, including requesting that the number of board seats available for nomination increase to 25% of the board instead of 20%, and also that an unlimited number of shareholders be allowed to aggregate their holdings to form a nominating group. Companies that had adopted the standard proxy access formulation of permitting a shareholder or a group of no more than 20 shareholders owning 3% or more for three years to nominate up to 20% of the board (known by the shorthand “3/3/20/20”) were denied no-action relief on the basis of substantial implementation. None of the proposals received majority support when voted on at annual meetings.