Steven M. Haas is a partner and Charles Brewer is an associate at Hunton & Williams LLP. This post is based on a Hunton & Williams publication by Mr. Haas and Mr. Brewer, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum here); The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value by Lucian Bebchuk (discussed on the Forum here); and Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).
In a recent proxy contest, a dissident stockholder brought a lawsuit against the company claiming that the company’s disclosures about certain incumbent directors were deficient. The court agreed, and enjoined the company’s annual stockholders meeting until at least 10 days after the company supplemented its disclosures. As a result of the court’s ruling, Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) reevaluated its support for the company’s nominees and changed its voting recommendation in favor of the dissident, who ultimately prevailed at the stockholders meeting. Although litigation in proxy contests—whether actual or threatened—is not new, this ruling illustrates how dissident stockholders can use offensive disclosure litigation to influence proxy advisors’ recommendations and win a stockholder vote.