Yearly Archives: 2018

Reporting Obligations of Variable Interest Entities

Jiang Bian is an associate and P. Rupert Russell is a partner at Shartsis Friese LLP. This post is based on their Shartsis Friese memorandum.

To navigate through regulatory restrictions or for strategic reasons, public companies may need to rely on entities in which they do not necessarily have an ownership interest or the majority of voting rights. For accounting purposes, a public company may need to treat such entities as variable interest entities (“VIEs”) and consolidate their results into its financial statements as appropriate. If a public company’s business involve VIEs, this can present challenges in meeting reporting obligations under the requirements of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”). This article seeks to outline considerations that a public company should take into account in determining whether and how to disclose transactions, relationships and arrangements involving VIEs.

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IRS Guidance on Section 162(m)

Arthur H. Kohn and Michael Albano are partners and Julia Rozenbilt is a practice development lawyer at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP. This post is based on a Cleary Gottlieb memorandum by Mr. Kohn, Mr. Albano, Ms. Rozenbilt, Mary Alcock, and Caroline Hayday. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The “Hidden” Tax Cost of Executive Compensation (discussed on the Forum here) by Kobi Kastiel and Noam Noked.

On August 21, 2018, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) issued Notice 2018-68 (the “Notice”), which provides initial guidance on the application of Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended by the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (“TCJA”). [1] The guidance is limited to the definition of the term “covered employees” and the application of the transition rule accompanying the TCJA amendments. Certain aspects of the Notice will be of practical significance for many companies in connection with the potential deductibility of their executive compensation, even though the amount of the lost deductions may not be material to each company from a financial perspective. The Notice states that the IRS plans to issue further guidance in the form of proposed regulations and solicits comment on certain aspects of Section 162(m) as amended that are not addressed by the Notice.

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Potential Reform to the Federal Reserve Board’s “Control Rules”

Arthur S. Long is a partner and James O. Springer is an associate at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP. This post is based on a Gibson Dunn memorandum by Mr. Long and Mr. Springer.

2018 has seen significant but pragmatic developments in the implementation of bank regulation by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve) under its new Vice Chairman for Bank Supervision, Randal Quarles. Vice Chairman Quarles has frequently touted transparency in regulation as a significant virtue, and has himself frequently adopted such transparency in his public speeches, by signaling areas that he considers a priority.

One area where the Federal Reserve has not yet published a reform is in the area of “control” under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended (BHC Act). In January, Vice Chairman Quarles suggested that it would be on his to-do list:

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Weekly Roundup: August 31-September 6, 2018


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of August 31–September 6, 2018

The Appraisal Landscape



Climate-Related Disclosures and TCFD Recommendations


The MFW Framework and Extensive Preliminary Discussions


Shareholder Collaboration



Insider Tax Effects on Acquisition Structure and Value


Risk Management and the Board of Directors



Blockchain and Smart Contracting for the Shareholder Community



Special Checklist for 2019 Annual Meeting

Martin Lipton is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum authored by Mr. Lipton.

As the Fall notice period for proxy resolutions and dissident director nominations approaches, in addition to the usual checklist for the annual meeting, it is important to keep in mind that hostile takeover approaches and activist demands backed by a threatened proxy fight are not abating. Therefore, it would be wise to review and implement the following checklist:

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Trump and Warren are Both Wrong

Jesse Fried is the Dane Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. This post was authored by Professor Fried. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Short-Termism and Capital Flows by Professor Fried and Charles C. Y. Wang (discussed on the Forum here).

President Donald Trump and Senator Elizabeth Warren rarely see eye-to-eye on policy, and frequently attack each other personally. But they have finally found common ground: both seem to believe that investors in public firms are too powerful, and the solution is to better insulate corporate directors from shareholders.

In August, each offered a proposal aimed at shielding boards from investor pressure. Senator Warren introduced legislation—the Accountable Capitalism Act—that would federalize corporate law and force all U.S.-domiciled firms with revenues exceeding $1 billion to hand over at least 40% of board seats to employees. The Act would also alter fiduciary duties to require directors to consider all stakeholders, not just shareholders. President Trump, in turn, asked the Securities and Exchange Commission to study the possibility of eliminating quarterly reporting for public firms and allowing boards to share the information with investors only semi-annually.

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Blockchain and Smart Contracting for the Shareholder Community

Christoph Van der Elst is Professor of Business Law and Economics at Tilburg Law School and Ghent University; and Anne Lafarre is Assistant Professor at Tilburg Law School. This post is based on their recent paper.

Current shareholder engagement systems face large classical inefficiencies. The involvement of intermediaries in the exercise of fundamental shareholder rights such as voting, resulting in mistakes and costly court cases, shows the “absurdness” of the current systems. In our latest paper, we provide new arguments that blockchain technology has the clear potential to solve many of the current problems.

Let’s start with an example. When DNick Plc’s annual general meeting (“AGM”) approved the resolutions to cancel its listing, a group of minority shareholders started an appraisal procedure. The shareholder register only included two shareholders: the CEO of DNick and the Bank of New York Depository (Nominees) Ltd (“BNY”). BNY, the common depository agent, held the shares on trust for the account holders with Clearstream, which is the central securities depository (“CSD”) subsidiary of Deutsche Börse, where DNick was listed. Clearstream Interests (“CIs”), held by banks and financial institutions, were traded on the Deutsche Börse. Hence, when the minority shareholders of DNick started the appraisal procedure, it were only customers of the banks that held the CIs, and, in accordance with section 112(2) of the UK CA 2006, stating that “[e]very other person … whose name is entered in its register of members, is a member of the company”, they were not members of DNick. Moreover, DNick’s articles of association stated that only the holders of an account with Clearstream were allowed to vote in general meetings or appoint a proxy. As the banks and other financial institutions that held the CIs voted in favor of the delisting, the application to the court for the cancellation of the resolutions pursuant to section 98 CA 2006 was not open. The minority shareholders of DNick Holding saw their appraisal case dismissed.

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Across the Board Improvements: Gender Diversity and ESG Performance

Cristina Banahan is an Associate and Gabriel Hasson is a Senior Associate at ISS Corporate Solutions. This post is based on an ISS Corporate Solutions memorandum by Ms. Banahan and Mr. Hasson.

Proponents of more women on corporate boards have brought forth multiple arguments that have become widely acceptable in the field of corporate governance and more broadly. First, there is the normative argument based on equity and fairness, which suggests that women and men should have an equal opportunity to attain leadership positions, including corporate board memberships. Second, expanding the perceived pool of director candidates to an under-tapped population of highly qualified women leaders opens a new source of managerial talent, who are also more representative of the general workforce and society. Third, women directors are likely to bring fresh and diverse perspectives to complex issues. Finally, the economic argument for gender diversity, backed by a growing literature [1], suggests that board gender diversity can serve as a driver for better performance and increased financial returns.

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Risk Management and the Board of Directors

Martin Lipton is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum.

I. Introduction

Overview

Political, legal and economic arenas in the U.S. and around the world have continued to evolve in response to rapidly advancing technologies. Innovation, new business models and dealmaking are transforming competitive and industry landscapes and impacting companies’ strategic plans and prospects for sustainable, long-term value creation. Tax reform has created new opportunities and challenges for companies as well. Meanwhile, the severe consequences that can flow from misconduct within an organization continue to serve as a reminder that corporate operations are fraught with risk. Social and environmental issues, including the focus on income inequality and economic disparities, scrutiny of sexual misconduct issues and evolving views on climate change and natural disasters, have become increasingly salient in the public sphere, requiring companies to exercise utmost care to address legitimate issues and avoid public relations crises and liability.

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Insider Tax Effects on Acquisition Structure and Value

Michelle Hanlon is the Howard W. Johnson Professor and a Professor of Accounting at MIT Sloan School of Management; Rodrigo Verdi is the Nanyang Technological University Professor of Accounting at MIT Sloan School of Management; and Benjamin Yost is an assistant professor of accounting at Boston College Carroll School of Management. This post is based on their recent paper.

Whether firms care about shareholder-level taxes is a longstanding question in the academic literature. In the context of acquisitions, target shareholders potentially face capital gains tax liabilities upon the sale of their shares, leading early researchers to predict that investor-level taxes should influence the acquisition price as well as the deal structure (i.e., cash versus stock payment). Despite the clear theoretical predictions, it was not until fairly recently that studies found supporting empirical evidence. In particular, the findings in two papers by Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson (2003, 2004) indicate that higher capital gains tax rates on individual shareholders are associated with higher acquisition premiums as well as a higher likelihood of tax-deferred deals. Although these findings represent important advancements in our understanding, it is plausible that the results would obtain even if managers do not really consider outsider shareholders’ taxes but rather consider primarily their own taxes. Motivated by recent literature examining the effects of individual executives on firm performance and activity, we expect insiders to care about shareholder-level taxes primarily when they bear those taxes themselves. In addition, we posit that tax-bearing insider shareholders are in a better position to take individual tax liabilities into account when negotiating a deal. Thus we extend upon and contribute to the earlier research by considering the impact of insiders’ tax liabilities on acquisition outcomes.

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