Yearly Archives: 2019

Overview of Recent Stock Exchange Proposals

Cydney S. Posner is special counsel at Cooley LLP. This post is based on a Cooley memorandum by Ms. Posner.

Time to catch up on some of the recent proposals at the Exchanges.

Nasdaq

Family member. Most recently, at Nasdaq, there is a new proposal to modify the definition of a “family member” for purposes of Listing Rule 5605(a)(2). The proposal would exclude “stepchildren” and domestic employees from the definition of “family member” in the context of defining director independence. Under the proposed new definition, a “family member” would mean a person’s spouse, parents, children, siblings, mothers and fathers-in-law, sons and daughters-in-law, brothers and sisters-in-law, and anyone (other than domestic employees) who shares the person’s home.

Rule 5605(a) identifies relationships that preclude a finding of director independence, including relationships involving a family member of the director. Currently, “family member” refers to a person’s spouse, parents, children and siblings, whether by blood, marriage or adoption, or anyone residing in such person’s home. “Children by… marriage” includes stepchildren. Nasdaq believes the category of “stepchildren” became a part of the definition in 2002 inadvertently when the definition was revised to simplify it—not with the intent of making any substantive change. That revision has apparently not worked out the way it was intended, particularly because, as revised, the Nasdaq definition was not consistent with the NYSE’s. Nasdaq also believes that the category of “stepchildren” may represent too attenuated a relationship for purposes of determining director independence. Nasdaq is now proposing to modify the definition to revert to the language of the rule before it was “simplified.”

READ MORE »

Weekly Roundup: June 21–27, 2019


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of June 21–27, 2019.

An Activist Gold Rush?



Rent-A-Center: A $1.37 BN Reminder on Reminders


The Timing of Schedule 13D





The Standard of Review for Challenged Director Compensation


Celebrity Stock Market



Do Investors Care About Carbon Risk?


OMB’s Guidance Memorandum to Independent Agencies


New SEC Interpretation of Advisers Acts



Strategies to Increase Representation of Women and Minorities—Testimony Before the Committee on Financial Services, House of Representatives

Chelsa Gurkin is Acting Director, Education, Workforce, and Income Security at the U.S. Government Accountability Office. This post is based on her recent testimony before the House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services.

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our prior work on strategies for increasing diversity on corporate boards of directors. Corporate boards take actions and make decisions that not only affect the lives of millions of employees and consumers, but also influence the policies and practices of the global marketplace. Many organizations have recognized the importance of recruiting and retaining women and minorities for key positions to improve business or organizational performance and better meet the needs of a diverse customer base. Academic researchers and others have highlighted the importance of diversity among board directors to increase the range of perspectives for decision making, among other benefits. Our prior work, however, found challenges to increasing diversity on boards and underscored the importance of identifying strategies that can improve or accelerate efforts to increase the representation of women and minorities on boards. Our reports on workforce and board diversity span multiple years and cover different industries, types of boards, and workers. These include reports examining the diversity of publicly-traded company boards (corporate boards) and the boards of federally chartered banks, such as the Federal Home Loan Banks. [1] We have also published reports on workforce diversity in the financial services and technology sectors, including representation of women and minorities in management positions, and practices to address workforce diversity challenges. [2]
READ MORE »

Why Do Investment Funds Have Special Securities Regulation?

John Morley is a Professor of Law at Yale Law School. This post is based on his recent article, published in the Research Handbook on the Regulation of Mutual Funds (2018, William A. Birdthistle and John Morley, eds.).

America’s securities laws are generic. We have only a single body of securities law for all types of companies. The two centerpieces of American securities regulation, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, regulate almost every industry imaginable, from software making to clothing retail to food service, banking, coal mining, insurance, for-profit higher education, hotels, book publishing, art dealing, and real estate investing. American securities regulation contains multitudes.

Except, that is, for one very special industry: the investment company industry. Unlike all other companies, mutual funds, closed-end funds, hedge funds and private equity funds have their own special securities regulatory regime in the form of the Investment Company Act of 1940. This act is administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission, the same agency that administers the other securities laws, but it imposes a different body of regulations in place of (and sometimes on top of) the generic securities regulations that apply to every other kind of company. No other large industry has a special securities regulatory scheme of this scope and magnitude. The investment company industry is one of a kind.

READ MORE »

New SEC Interpretation of Advisers Acts

Amran Hussein, Udi Grofman, and Marco V. Masotti are partners at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP. This post is based on a Paul Weiss memorandum by Ms. Hussein, Mr. Grofman, Mr. Masotti, Matthew Goldstein, Conrad van Loggerenberg, and Lindsey WiersmaRelated research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Trilateral Dilemma in Financial Regulation by Howell Jackson (discussed on the Forum here).

The SEC recently issued a final interpretation (the “Interpretation”) [1] of the federal fiduciary duty that an investment adviser owes to its clients under the Advisers Act. [2]

The SEC thought it would be beneficial to address in one release and reaffirm, and in some cases clarify, its understanding of certain aspects of the fiduciary duty. The SEC does not regard the Interpretation as new rulemaking or as the exclusive resource for understanding an investment adviser’s fiduciary duty, but rather views it as a summary of existing law in the area. While many practitioners may disagree with that assessment on various individual points in the Interpretation, the overall fiduciary duty described in the Interpretation is one that private fund advisers will find to be generally in line with their prior understandings.
READ MORE »

OMB’s Guidance Memorandum to Independent Agencies

Hal S. Scott is the Emeritus Nomura Professor of International Financial Systems at Harvard Law School.

This short article is intended to stimulate discussion of the Office of Management and Budget’s (the “OMB”) April 11, 2019 Memorandum (the “OMB Memo”) regarding the obligations of independent agencies. The OMB Memo was issued to all federal agencies, including independent agencies, to establish a centralized review of agency rules by OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”). The need for such review was based on OIRA’s responsibility under the Congressional Review Act (the “CRA”) to determine whether regulatory rules are “major.”

The OMB Memo raises important legal and policy questions. It could be read to require, for the first time, that independent financial regulatory agencies (“IFRAs”) conduct a cost-benefit analysis under OIRA methodology of all proposed rules, and that such analysis be reviewed by OIRA. Additionally, if OIRA were to reject the adequacy of such cost-benefit analysis, OIRA might be able to prevent the rule from going into effect. Whether such OIRA powers can be justified under the CRA is an important legal question. The OMB Memo raises further legal questions as to whether it is consistent with outstanding Presidential executive orders and is by its own terms binding on the IFRAs rather than being merely precatory. In the big picture, the question is whether the OMB Memo is consistent with the purpose of the CRA, which is to permit congressional (not executive) veto of proposed regulations, and whether it excessively infringes on the independence of the IFRAs.

READ MORE »

Do Investors Care About Carbon Risk?

Patrick Bolton is Barbara and David Zalaznick Professor of Business at Columbia Business School, and Marcin T. Kacperczyk is Professor of Finance at Imperial College London. This post is based on their recent paper. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Socially Responsible Firms by Alan Ferrell, Hao Liang, and Luc Renneboog (discussed on the Forum here), and Social Responsibility Resolutions by Scott Hirst (discussed on the Forum here).

Almost no day passes without a major news story related to climate change. This week alone Thomson Reuters reported a study that found that the Canadian permafrost is thawing 70 years earlier than forecast. Another Thomson Reuters story the same week announced that Norway’s sovereign wealth fund was to divest its $1 billion stake in Glencore as a result of tighter legislation on responsible investment adopted by Norway’s parliament. And, yet another story in Pensions & Investment magazine reported on a meeting at the Vatican of top executives of energy companies promising to provide investors better information on how they are tackling climate change.

At the same time, considerable skepticism on the importance of climate change, or more generally, environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors for investors remains. As Eccles and Klimenko (2019) point out in their recent Harvard Business Review article, The Investor Revolution: “The impression among business leaders is that ESG just hasn’t gone mainstream in the investment community.” This raises the question whether carbon risk is currently reflected in asset prices. Our paper is a first exploration into this question. We undertake a standard cross-sectional analysis, asking whether a carbon risk factor or carbon-emission characteristics affect cross-sectional U.S. stock returns.

READ MORE »

Climate Portfolio Analysis: A Multifaceted Approach to Risk

Viola Lutz is Vice President, Head of Investor Consulting and Guido Lorenzi is an associate at ISS ESG. This post is based on their ISS ESG memorandum.

Summary

Climate portfolio analytics allows investors to assess and monitor risk exposure related to several climate-related issues, including emissions exposure, and physical and transitional risk. This article demonstrates the benefits of portfolio analysis related to climate change risk by providing a comparison of greenhouse gas emissions and climate risk exposure between the S&P 500 and the STOXX 600 indexes at the end of 2018. The absolute emission exposure of the S&P 500 is approximately 45 percent lower than the emission exposure of the STOXX 600, but STOXX 600 companies manage climate risks better than S&P 500 companies. A review of absolute emissions can help investors identify the largest greenhouse gas emitters in a portfolio today, but a more comprehensive forward-looking analysis is required to identify the climate leaders and laggards of tomorrow. Emissions estimations coming from the activity of the company and climate risk management are among the recommended disclosures included in the Guidelines on Reporting Climate-Related Information published by the European Commission on June 18th 2019.

READ MORE »

Proxy Advisory Firms, Governance, Failure, and Regulation

Chester S. Spatt is the Pamela R. and Kenneth B. Dunn Professor of Finance at Carnegie Mellon University Tepper School of Business, Golub Distinguished Visiting Professor of Finance at MIT Sloan School of Management, and a senior fellow at the Milken Institute’s Center for Financial Markets. This post is based on his Milken Institute publication.

Proxy advisory firms have arisen due to market failures underlying voting and the broader system of corporate governance. However, proxy advisory firms, which are not subject to mandatory regulation, reflect market failures of their own. This analysis highlights the underlying frictions, such as the scale economies and public goods aspects to information production, the import of incentive conflicts faced by the advisory firms, the power of the proxy advisory firms, and the implications of the recommendations of the advisory firms and votes by different types of investors. Asset managers who emphasize stewardship are more supportive of management than are the proxy advisory firms. This paper also highlights the limitations of one-size-fits-all recommendations.

1. Introduction

The role of public company shareholders in voting anchors our system of corporate governance. While a public company’s day-to-day business decisions are the responsibility of management and the board of directors, shareholders vote on a number of important issues that can affect the value of their shares. Annual shareholder meetings typically include votes for or against candidates for director positions, questions related to executive compensation plans, and proposals put forth by other shareholders. Special shareholder meetings involve votes on important corporate structure matters, such as a takeover offer, that are especially time sensitive. A small number of shareholders cast their votes at the meetings in person, while the vast majority cast their votes “by proxy” (online, by mail, or by phone).

READ MORE »

Celebrity Stock Market

Victoria Schwartz is Associate Professor at Pepperdine University School of Law. This post is based on her article, recently published in the UC Davis Law Review.

We typically think of stock markets as a mechanism for connecting investors who buy and sell shares of ownership in public companies. This helps distribute the successes and share the risks of these companies across a wider range of individuals. Talented individuals with business ideas often get venture capital or other forms of investor financing for their startups, and ultimately often take their companies public. But what happens if an individual’s talent lies in a different direction such as music, or acting, or sports? Eventually these talented individuals may go on to become celebrities with extremely lucrative careers, but how do they pay the bills in the meantime? In The Celebrity Stock Market [52 UC Davis Law Review 2033 (2019)], I offer a possible solution to this problem.

The article explores the possibility of a celebrity stock market, in which investors can invest in the future of promising artists, athletes, entertainers, and other celebrities in exchange for shares in the aspiring celebrity’s future. By design, just like traditional stock markets, such celebrity stock markets would share risk between the aspiring celebrity and the investors by contractually providing the aspiring celebrity an up-front monetary payment in exchange for a share of future earnings for a contractually specified length of time. The contractually obtained interest in future earnings can then be distributed in the form of a stock-like mechanism that can be traded and whose value is linked to the earning potential and the associated personal “brand” of the aspiring celebrity.

READ MORE »

Page 49 of 95
1 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 95