Yearly Archives: 2019

The Standard of Review for Challenged Director Compensation

Amy Simmerman and John Aguirre are partners at Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati. This post is based on a Wilson Sonsini memorandum by Ms. Simmerman, Mr. Aguirre, Boris Feldman, Brad Sorrels, Ryan Greecher, and Lori Will. This post is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

On May 31, 2019, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock of the Delaware Court of Chancery issued a decision refusing to dismiss a stockholder’s fiduciary duty claims challenging the compensation of Goldman Sachs’ board of directors. [1] The case highlights the type of claim potentially available to stockholders in challenging board (and sometimes executive) compensation, and it provides important guidance for boards when considering the possibility of such a challenge. The decision also reflects the relative uptick we have seen in demands and challenges from stockholders and plaintiffs’ attorneys relating to board compensation.

Background

The Goldman Sachs decision builds on the Delaware Supreme Court’s 2017 ruling in Investors Bancorp, which concluded that director compensation involves an inherently conflicted decision on the part of a board and that, as a result, in a stockholder challenge to board compensation, a court may apply the entire fairness standard of judicial review, rather than the more deferential business judgment rule, absent adequate stockholder approval of the compensation at issue. [2] Under the entire fairness standard of review, the court examines the fairness of the compensation itself as well as the company’s processes relating to setting the compensation. Because the standard is fact-intensive and searching, it can result in protracted litigation that survives the pleadings stage. Importantly, Investors Bancorp further held that a stockholder vote approving director compensation can effectively preclude an entire fairness claim, but that the stockholder vote must approve specific amounts of compensation or self-effectuating formulas to be effective. This aspect of the ruling appeared to reverse several decisions from the Delaware Court of Chancery concluding that stockholder approval of director compensation within “meaningful limits” could eliminate entire fairness claims. Finally, the Investors Bancorp decision also permitted the plaintiff to challenge executive compensation paid to management members of the board where the board’s deliberations and approvals relating to that compensation appeared sufficiently intertwined with its decisions about director compensation.

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Scarlet Letters: Remarks before the American Enterprise Institute

Hester M. Peirce is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on her recent remarks before the American Enterprise Institute, available here. The views expressed in this post are those of Ms. Peirce and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff.

Thank you, Ben [Zycher]. I will begin with the standard disclaimer. My remarks represent my views and not necessarily those of the Commission or my fellow Commissioners.

I will next address a question that is undoubtedly in the mind of at least one person in the audience. Did her parents really do that to her? Is she named after Hester Prynne, the main character in Nathaniel Hawthorne’s Scarlet Letter? The answer is no; Hester is a family name, not a literary one. That said, I actually do not much mind the name or the question now that high school English class is a distant memory. Hester Prynne was a strong woman who accepted the consequences of her weak moment with quiet dignity.

Having a baby as the result of an extramarital affair in seventeenth-century New England and refusing to name her partner in crime brought hard-hearted, merciless condemnation from the legal and religious authorities and the society at large. The community’s morality police did not bother themselves with much of an inquiry into the facts and circumstances and certainly did not consider whether a measure of mercy might be appropriate. These self-righteous authorities instead crafted a punishment designed to underscore the vast divide between their moral purity and Hester Prynne’s obvious moral depravity. They ordered Hester to wear a scarlet letter “A” for “adultery.” That letter, elaborately embroidered by Hester’s own hand, served to facilitate social shunning, inspire incessant gossip, ensure that Hester never forgot her transgression, and inflict on its wearer deep pain and intense self-loathing. Her shame was emblazoned on her dress for all, including Hester’s young daughter, to see.

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Upstream Liability, Entities as Boards, and the Theory of the Firm

Andrew Verstein is Professor of Law at Wake Forest University School of Law. This post is based on his recent article, forthcoming in The Business Lawyer.

Directors have fiduciary duties, and the most litigated and most demanding of those duties is the duty of loyalty. The key questions for duty of loyalty litigation are director-by-director questions: Did this particular director have a conflict? Is it futile to make a demand on that particular director?

What does it mean to ask director-by-director questions if corporations have just one director, which is itself an entity? Shall we inquire about particular humans in the managing entity or limit our analysis to the entity itself? The question becomes richer and more important if the board-entities opt to bundle services: We know how to evaluate a conflict when a director urges the company to patronize her own accounting or banking firm. How should we evaluate the conflict if a managing entity opts to use its own accounting or banking department? Our conflict analysis is usually of contractual transactions but the essence of the Coasian firm is the absence of a contract to analyze. In a recently published essay, I explore how the duty of loyalty might work when entities manage entities and uncover important lessons about how loyalty works.

The impetus for the article is Outsourcing the Board, a book in which Professors Steve Bainbridge and Todd Henderson advocate that a legal entity (a “board service provider” or BSP) should be permitted to serve as the sole director of a corporate board.

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OECD Corporate Governance Factbook 2019

Mats Isaksson is Head of Corporate Governance and Corporate Finance Division and Daniel Blume and Kenta Fukami are Senior Policy Analysts at the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). This post is based on their OECD memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The “Antidirector Rights Index” Revisited by Holger Spamann and The Elusive Quest for Global Governance Standards by Lucian Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani.

The 2019 edition of the OECD Corporate Governance Factbook (the “Factbook”) contains comparative data and information across 49 different jurisdictions including all G20, OECD and Financial Stability Board members. The information is presented and commented in 40 tables and 51 figures covering a broad range of institutional, legal and regulatory provisions. The Factbook provides an important and unique tool for monitoring the implementation of the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. Issued every two years, it is actively used by governments, regulators and others for information about implementation practices and developments that may influence their effectiveness. It is divided into five chapters addressing: 1) the corporate and market landscape; 2) the corporate governance framework; 3) the rights of shareholders and key ownership functions; 4) the corporate boards of directors; and 5) mechanisms for flexibility and proportionality in corporate governance.

The corporate and market landscape

Effective design and implementation of corporate governance rules requires a good empirical understanding of the ownership and business landscape to which they will be applied. The first chapter of the Factbook therefore provides an overview of ownership patterns around the world, with respect to both the categories of owners and the degree of concentration of ownership in individual listed companies. Since the G20/OECD Principles also include recommendations with respect to the functioning of stock markets, it also highlights some key structural changes with respect to stock exchanges.

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The Timing of Schedule 13D

Samir Doshi is an associate at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on his paper, available here. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure by Lucian Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson Jr. (discussed on the Forum here) and Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon P. Brav, Robert J. Jackson Jr., Wei Jiang.

In the field of corporate law, timing is everything. Perhaps in no area is this more the case than in disclosure—specifically, the disclosure obligations of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Implemented by a phalanx of SEC rules, the Act carefully prescribes how and when an investor must make public its equity position in a company. As every introductory corporate lawyer quickly comes to know, Section 13(d) of the Act requires that any person who acquires beneficial ownership of five percent or more of an issuer’s stock file a public statement announcing such ownership “within ten days.” This congressional attempt to “ensure that shareholders [are] promptly alerted to possible change[s] in company management and corporate control” often stands at the forefront shareholder activism battles.

Despite the provision’s undeniable significance, its meaning remains uncertain. Judges and commentators cannot agree whether the statute mandates filing within ten business days or ten calendar days. While a seemingly trivial distinction, by last count the timeliness of almost fifty percent of Schedule 13D filings hinged on just this issue. And yet, there is no settled answer to a simple question: when must a Schedule 13D be filed?

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Rent-A-Center: A $1.37 BN Reminder on Reminders

Rachel Fridhandler is an associate at Sidley Austin LLP. This post is based on a Sidley memorandum by Ms. Fridhandler, Asi Kirmayer and Scott Freeman, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available hereRelated research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes M&A Contracts: Purposes, Types, Regulation, and Patterns of Practice and Allocating Risk Through Contract: Evidence from M&A and Policy Implications (discussed on the Forum here), both by John C. Coates, IV. 

Rent-A-Center Inc., a Texas based consumer goods rent-to-own retailer (R-A-C) most famous for enabling generations of North Americans to fill their homes with furniture, electronics and household appliances, agreed in June 2018 to a buyout by affiliates of the private equity firm, Vintage Capital Management, LLC (Vintage) in a deal valuing the R-A-C at $1.37 billion (including debt). The transaction, which was subject to customary closing conditions and regulatory approvals, included the nearly universal provision entitling either party to terminate the transaction if it did not close by a specified end date (which date could be extended by either party delivering a written notice to the other of its desire to extend). Perhaps unsurprisingly to readers, given the publication of this article (and many others) on what was otherwise a fairly straightforward merger, the specified end date came and went without either R-A-C or Vintage giving the other notice of a desire to extend. After complex litigation between the parties about an allegedly simple failure to give (an arguably unnecessary) notice, Vice Chancellor Glasscock, in Vintage Rodeo Parent LLC, et al v Rent-A-Center, determined that R-A-C need not go through with the sale even though the parties (at the time) had appeared to understand that the end date would be extended and had continued to work on satisfying the other closing conditions.

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Statement on the Adoption of Capital, Margin, and Segregation Requirements for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants

Hester M. Peirce is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on her recent public statement, available here. The views expressed in this post are those of Ms. Peirce and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff.

The Commission has adopted final rules governing the capital, margin, and segregation requirements applicable to security-based swap dealers (SBSDs) and major security-based swap participants under Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act. [1] Completion of this rulemaking represents a significant milestone in the Commission’s implementation of its regulatory framework for security-based swaps. I am grateful for Chairman Clayton’s leadership in moving forward on these rulemakings in a way that is both expeditious and prudent. He has facilitated dialogue both within the Commission and with our colleagues at the CFTC that has been frank and productive, and the results of that dialogue are, I think, clear in these final rules.

I would also like to express my gratitude to our staff, particularly Richard Gabbert in my office, Alan Cohen and Jeff Dinwoodie in Chairman Clayton’s office, and the staff in the Division of Trading and Markets and in the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis. I am particularly grateful for the many hours that Mike Macchiaroli, Tom McGowan, and Randall Roy spent working with my office and answering my many questions over the past several months. Throughout the course of our work on this release, I have been extremely impressed by their willingness to wrestle with difficult issues with persistence, patience, and passion for the well-being of our investors and markets. The final rules represent an enormous effort by the staff working tirelessly over the past eight months to develop a recommendation that addresses important policy goals entrusted to the Commission by Congress while also mitigating or eliminating many of the differences between our proposed approach and the approach reflected in the CFTC’s rules, a particularly important objective given that the same market participants play significant roles in both the security-based swap and swap markets.

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An Activist Gold Rush?

Wes Hall is Executive Chairman and Founder, Amy Freedman is Chief Executive Officer, and Ian Robertson is Executive Vice President of Communication Strategy at Kingsdale Advisors. This post is based on a their Kingsdale memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum here); Dancing with Activists by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, and Thomas Keusch(discussed on the Forum here); and Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

Momentum is building for M&A across the gold industry driven by the market, balance sheets, and shareholders. Behemoths Barrick Gold Corp. (NYSE: GOLD, TSX: ABX) and Newmont Mining Corp. (now Newmont Goldcorp Corp. (NYSE: NEM, TSX: NGT)) have grabbed headlines with acquisitions of Randgold Resources Ltd. and Goldcorp Inc. respectively, and the junior and intermediate space has seen a flurry of deals as well.

At the same time, shareholders have launched high profile campaigns against Detour Gold Corp. TSX:DGC), Guyana Goldfields Inc. (TSX:GUY), and Hudbay Minerals Inc. (TSX, NYSE: HBM), an integrated mining company with some exposure to gold that is nonetheless instructive, with part of the shareholders’ thesis for change related to the viability of M&A opportunities.

In fact, in the last two quarters (Q4 2018 and Q1 2019) we have seen over CAD$20 billion in deals announced in the gold industry involving Canadian listed companies [1] and 13 activist campaigns in the last 26 months, with activists scoring wins or partial wins in all but three contests. (And these are only the activist actions that we know about; based on our experience only a fraction of activist interactions ever become public.) We would note specifically that the three management wins all came at small companies while the activist wins came at relatively large companies, demonstrating that size is not a defence.

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Weekly Roundup: June 14–20, 2019


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of June 14–20, 2019.

Defined Contribution Plans and the Challenge of Financial Illiteracy


Exchanging Views on Exchange-Traded Funds


Investors Bancorp‘s Impact on Long-Term Incentive Plans



NYS Common Retirement Fund’s Climate Action Plan


Mootness Fees


Calling the Cavalry: Special Purpose Directors in Times of Boardroom Stress


Debt Default Activism: After Windstream, the Winds of Change


Do Firms Issue More Equity When Markets Become More Liquid?


U.S. Board Diversity Trends in 2019


Regulation Best Interest




Impact of the California Consumer Privacy Act on M&A



The Modern Dilemma: Balancing Short- and Long-Term Business Pressures

The Modern Dilemma: Balancing Short- and Long-Term Business Pressures

Beatriz Pessoa de Araujo is a partner at Baker McKenzie and Adam Robbins is Practice Lead, Long-Term Investing Initiatives at the World Economic Forum. This post is based on their recent World Economic Forum memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value by Lucian Bebchuk (discussed on the Forum here) and Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law by Leo E. Strine (discussed on the Forum here).

We are pleased to share the latest collaboration between Baker McKenzie and World Economic Forum in the publication of a white paper entitled “The Modern Dilemma: Balancing Short and Long Term Business Pressures“.

The leadership challenge of balancing short and long-term business pressures, and doing so in an ethical way in which both a company and its stakeholders can thrive, is a challenge that is well-known to all business leaders. To address this challenge, in 2016 the International Business Council (IBC), a community of the World Economic Forum’s most engaged CEOs, initiated the CEOs’ Modern Dilemma discussion series focused on balancing short- and long-term business pressures, and the set of business and ethical considerations imbedded within that balance.

Over the past 12 months The Forum’s Investors Team and Baker McKenzie interviewed a number of CEOs and chairpersons of the Forum’s International Business Council and the Community of Chairpersons; Baker McKenzie also surveyed legal requirements in a number of countries to understand whether reporting requirements and various other legal considerations might influence the dilemmas confronting CEOs and boards. Our examination of reporting requirements primarily concerned the shift from quarterly reporting to six monthly reporting and whether it focused on longer term viability. To complement this, we assessed a number of regulatory drivers so as to examine whether they might address or assist efforts to balance decision making around short-term and long-term interests of a company in the boardroom.

Key reflections arising from our research included:

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