Yearly Archives: 2020

SEC Tightens Regulations on Proxy Advisory Firms

David A. Bell is a partner, Ryan Mitteness is an associate, and Soo Hwang is a Senior Attorney at Fenwick & West LLP. This post is based on their Fenwick memorandum.

The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on July 22, 2020, adopted amendments tightening regulation of proxy voting advice from proxy advisory firms (Release No. 34‑89372). The final rule implements additional regulations for proxy advisory firms, but stops short of some of the proposals included in the SEC’s original proposal (and described in our prior alert).

The final rule codifies the SEC’s interpretation set forth in August 2019 (and described in our prior alert) that voting recommendations and related materials provided by proxy advisory firms are “solicitations” subject to antifraud rules. In addition, the amendments add conditions that must be met in order for proxy advisory firms to rely on the exemptions historically available to them from filing full proxy solicitation materials (a key exemption for the conduct of their business). In particular, proxy advisory firms will need to include additional conflict of interest disclosure in their vote recommendation materials, provide their recommendation materials to the subject company not later than simultaneously with delivery to the proxy advisory firms’ clients, and provide access to responses by the subject company to the advisory firms’ recommendations.

Importantly for companies, the final rule does not give subject companies the opportunity to review and comment on proxy advisory firms’ recommendations prior to publication, or to explicitly require the proxy advisory firm to include a hyperlink to a response statement from the company with such recommendations at the time that they are sent.

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Investors and Companies Can Drive ESG Metrics Forward Together

Sarah Keohane Williamson is Chief Executive Officer and Ariel Fromer Babcock is Head of Research at FCLTGlobal. This post is based on their FCLTGlobal memorandum.

Investors want standardized reporting of sustainability and other non-traditional metrics. What will that look like on a global scale?

The growing role of sustainability and non-traditional metrics to inform the engagement between public companies and investors has become a critical issue. Investors are seeking metrics to evaluate a company’s approach to sustainability and its drivers of long-term growth. But the format of these metrics and disclosures has become a sticking point among issuers, investors, and standard setters.

Most institutional investors seek information on environmental, social, and governance issues to better understand risks that could affect companies’ performance over time. These investors use such disclosures to monitor companies’ risk management, inform their votes, or make decisions on stock purchases.

What institutional investment decision-makers need is clear: quantitative, assurable, universally applicable disclosures around what really drives businesses in the long run.

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Testing the Theory of Common Stock Ownership

Fiona Scott Morton is the Theodore Nierenberg Professor of Economics at Yale School of Management and Lysle Boller is a PhD student at Duke University. This post is based on their recent paper. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy by Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst (discussed on the forum here); The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors by Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Scott Hirst (discussed on the Forum here); New Evidence, Proofs, and Legal Theories on Horizontal Shareholding by Einer Elhauge (discussed on the Forum here); and Horizontal Shareholding by Einer Elhauge (discussed on the Forum here).

In recent years, economists have become increasingly worried that the US (and perhaps global) economy is becoming less competitive. One possible reason relates to the changing ownership structure of US publicly-traded firms over recent decades. For half a century there has been a steady increase in institutional ownership in the US and a decline in the share of the average public company owned by retail investors. This changing ownership structure is closely related to the rise of diversified mutual funds, an invention that has been praised for providing consumers an inexpensive way to hold a set of diversified stocks. The broad availability of mutual funds has brought lower costs to savers, but there is a flip side to this coin—mutual funds (including index funds) often hold stakes in many competitors within the same industry. This pattern is referred to as “common ownership” or “horizontal shareholding.” The economics literature has long shown the potential for common ownership to be anticompetitive. A merger, for example, is a familiar setting where the same owner holds 100% of the two competitors; this purchase typically triggers a regulatory review due to concerns about possible declines in competition. A large institutional investor typically holds less, perhaps 4-7% of each rival, though there could be several similar investors of that size, making their total stake fairly large. For example, as of 2017, Vanguard held at least a 6% share in the six largest domestic airlines (Schmalz 2018), and Berkshire Hathaway held at least 7% in four of these same firms. The open empirical question this raises is whether there is a negative impact on product market competition from such institutional investor common ownership.
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Update on Special Purpose Acquisition Companies

Ramey Layne, Brenda Lenahan, and Sarah Morgan are partners at Vinson & Elkins LLP. This post is based on a Vinson and Elkins publication by Mr. Layne, Ms. Lenahan, Ms. Morgan, Zach Swartz, K. Stancell Haigwood, and Layton Suchma.

Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (“SPACs”) continue to be increasingly popular vehicles for entities or individuals to raise capital to pursue merger opportunities, and for private companies seeking to raise capital, obtain liquidity for existing shareholders and become publicly traded.

This post provides an update to SPAC structures and transactions since a 2018 post (Special Purpose Acquisition Companies: An Introduction) and provides an expanded discussion of considerations for De-SPAC transactions and a description of recent SEC positions.

SPAC IPO Activity and Structure

Since the beginning of 2016, each year has set a record in terms of total number of SPAC IPOs and the amount of capital raised in those IPOs. Through June 30, 2020, the year was on pace to exceed the prior year once again and, through the date of this article, the amount of capital raised in SPAC IPOs in 2020 has already eclipsed all of 2019. Since the beginning of 2020 through July 22, 2020, 48 SPAC IPOs have been completed, raising almost $18 billion in proceeds, with another $5.4 billion of SPACs on file to complete IPOs this year. SPACs have remained popular notwithstanding the COVID-related market disruption, perhaps because of the flexibility of SPACs to pivot to attractive industries based on changing market fundamentals, and in part because SPAC IPO investors have the downside protection of redemption decisions.

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Establishing Meaningful and Rigorous Financial Goals

Mike Kesner and John R. Ellerman are partners at Pay Governance LLC. This post is based on their Pay Governance memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes the book Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried; and Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried.

Introduction

In developing annual incentive plans, the review and approval of meaningful financial performance targets can be a challenging task for the Board of Directors’ compensation committee. The frequent source of these financial performance targets is the company’s annual budgeting process. These performance targets are also often the basis for providing earnings guidance to the investment community. Absolute financial targets are the most difficult to establish and are the most common type of goal used in annual incentive plans. Many companies use relative financial performance goals such as relative total shareholder return (TSR) in their compensation program, but they are more frequently found in long-term incentive plans.

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Trends in U.S. Director Compensation

Matthew Friestedt, Marc Treviño, and Melissa Sawyer are partners at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP. This post is based on a Sullivan & Cromwell memorandum by Mr. Friestedt, Mr. Treviño, Ms. Sawyer, and Heather L. Coleman.

Summary

Over the last 10 years, average U.S. public company director compensation has increased steadily, in part due to changes in board composition and governance that have increased the number and significance of board leadership positions held by non-executive directors. Over the same period, the average number of hours of work performed by directors has also increased, while the average number of board meetings and size of boards have remained stable. Future director compensation may be influenced by many variables, including the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and dynamic regulatory change in certain industries. So when setting director pay, companies should remain flexible. While peer company benchmarking can be informative, no single approach to director compensation works for every company.

Recent Director Compensation Data

Total Compensation. The total average compensation for S&P 500 non-employee directors from May 16, 2018 through May 15, 2019 was $304,856, as calculated by Spencer Stuart. The total mean compensation for Russell 3000 companies was $167,013, based on 2019 disclosure documents. The total average director compensation reflects a steady increase when compared to previous years. In 2014, the total average director compensation for S&P 500 companies was $263,748, and in 2009 it was $212,750. Even when accounting for inflation, total average director compensation has increased since 2009; similarly, the average annual additional director cash retainer increased every year except from 2018 to 2019.

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Emerging ESG Disclosure Trends Highlighted in GAO Report

Holly J. Gregory and Heather Palmer are partners and Leonard Wood is an associate at Sidley Austin LLP. This post is based on their Sidley memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); and Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee by Robert H. Sitkoff and Max M. Schanzenbach (discussed on the Forum here).

On July 6, 2020, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report evaluating the state of public company disclosures related to environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues. [1] The report, titled “Disclosure of Environmental, Social, and Governance Factors and Options to Enhance Them,” examines why investors seek ESG disclosures, how public companies disclose ESG factors, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) role in oversight of ESG disclosures, the role of nongovernmental “standard setters,” and options to improve and regulate ESG disclosures.

The GAO report surveys practices and perspectives familiar to those well versed in contemporary ESG developments while underscoring trends that may be expected to characterize the ESG disclosure landscape in the coming year and beyond. Specifically, investors will continue to pressure public companies to provide more detailed disclosure about their ESG initiatives and results of those initiatives to enable investors to track and eventually compare performance. Investors are concerned with “gaps and inconsistencies in companies’ disclosures that limit their usefulness” and comparability, suggesting that investors and other constituencies will continue to press public companies to fill those gaps and attain greater conformity in their methods of disclosure. Notwithstanding investor interest in greater conformity in standards for disclosure, voluntary disclosure under standards developed by nongovernmental “standard setters” rather than mandated SEC disclosure will be the likely platform for expanded corporate disclosures regarding ESG, at least in the near term.

This post summarizes key findings of the GAO report, discusses the implications of the report’s findings and emerging trends in ESG disclosures, and provides practical guidance for companies navigating the changing ESG disclosure landscape.

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Seeing Through the Regulatory Looking Glass: PCAOB Inspection Reports

J. Robert Brown, Jr. is a Board Member at the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. This post is based on his recent remarks to the Corporate Disclosure Policy Council and the Capital Markets Policy Council of the CFA Institute.

Thank you, Sandy [Peters] for the kind introduction.

It is a pleasure to have an opportunity to speak with you today. CFA Institute members have always been a key constituency for the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) because of your thoughtful and practical perspectives on the capital markets, investors, and the approach taken by regulators. We learn a great deal from you, and I hope, after this talk, we will learn even more.

Before I continue, I want to remind you that the views I share today are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the PCAOB, my fellow Board members, or the staff of the PCAOB.

All of us spend a tremendous amount of time focusing on quality. We all want to purchase high-quality goods and services. We strive for quality time with our family and friends, perhaps even more so in an era of COVID-19. Quality is also critical to the financial reporting process. The independent audit is a big part of ensuring that the information investors receive is reliable and high quality.

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The Other “S” in ESG: Building a Sustainable and Resilient Supply Chain

David M. Silk and Sabastian V. Niles are partners and Carmen X. W. Lu is an associate at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell memorandum by Mr. Silk, Mr. Niles, Ms. Lu, David B. Anders, and Christina C. Ma. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here) and Socially Responsible Firms by Alan Ferrell, Hao Liang, and Luc Renneboog (discussed on the Forum here).

The current pandemic, blind spots in information flows through supply lines, the shutdowns in meat processing plants around the world, the ongoing shortages in personal protective equipment and, most recently, the scandal involving British retailer Boohoo, have all underscored the importance of resilient, sustainable, legally compliant and ethical supply chains. In addition to geographic and industry-specific challenges, issues relating to health and safety, labor practices and climate risk have become top priorities for investors, regulators and consumers. Failure to ensure proper oversight and management of supply chains can result in significant reputational and economic losses, as well as regulatory scrutiny. Companies that invest in this area also benefit from competitive advantages, faster recovery from disruptions and, for those who wish to demonstrate leadership, broader impact. For many companies, the pandemic has provided new insights into their supply networks, revealed an unsettling lack of full visibility into their supply chains, and exposed weaknesses and gaps between first-tier and lower-tier suppliers. Set forth below are some considerations for boards and management teams looking to integrate supply chain considerations into their oversight of ESG matters and to understand how their companies can build back stronger and better in the aftermath of the pandemic:

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Managerial Duties and Managerial Biases

Ulrike M. Malmendier is the Edward J. and Mollie Arnold Professor of Finance at the Haas School of Business at the University of California, Berkeley; Vincenzo Pezone is Assistant Professor of Finance at the Goethe University in Frankfurt, Germany; and Hui Zheng is a PhD student at the University of California, Berkeley. This post is based on their recent paper.

One of the most striking developments in research on corporate finance and corporate governance over the last decade is the rise of behavioral finance. While earlier behavioral research had focused on psychological biases in the economic decision making of consumers or individual investors, the more recent research has provided evidence of their significant explanatory power even for top managers. Starting from virtually no published findings in finance until about 2000, Behavioral Corporate research now makes up a third to a half of the behavioral finance research in top finance and economics journals, with the majority focusing on the biases of top managers, as Malmendier (2018) documents (see Figure 3). Recent empirical work has established a significant role of managerial biases such as overconfidence, limited attention, or the sunk-cost fallacy in shaping investment, merger, and financing decisions (see, e.g., the overview in Günzel and Malmendier, 2020).

There is still one limitation to this existing research: Much of it focuses exclusively on the traits and biases of the chief executive officer (CEO). There are good reasons for this focus, namely, the central role of CEOs as the top decision makers and, more mundanely, data availability. In practice, however, other top managers, and especially other members of the C-Suite, significantly influence corporate decisions as well, and we know little about their biases and the interaction of their views and the CEO’s views.

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