Monthly Archives: July 2021

Commenters Weigh in on SEC Climate Disclosures Request for Public Input

Gabriel Rosenberg and Margaret Tahyar are partners and Betty Huber is counsel at Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP. This post is based on a Davis Polk memorandum by Mr. Rosenberg, Ms. Tahyar, Ms. Huber, Robert Cohen, Joseph Hall and Eric Lewin.

The SEC’s request for public input on climate disclosures attracted 297 institutional comments totaling 3,290 pages. The views range from questioning the SEC’s authority to imploring the SEC to mandate comprehensive, internationally aligned and assured disclosures in SEC filings. This post summarizes thirty comment letters we consider both important and representative of differing stakeholder views, in anticipation of a formal SEC proposal expected in or before October 2021.

Overview of the request for public input

The SEC took a first step toward the adoption of climate disclosure requirements by issuing a request for public input (the RFPI) on March 15, 2021. The RFPI requested comments from investors, registrants and other market participants “[i]n light of demand for climate change information and questions about whether current disclosures adequately inform investors.” To facilitate the SEC staff’s view of existing disclosure rules, the RFPI requested comment on fifteen questions, ranging from how the SEC could best regulate climate disclosures to whether the SEC should expand its focus from climate disclosures alone to a focus on environmental, social and governance (ESG) matters as part of a broader, comprehensive disclosure framework.

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Corporate Governance in the Face of an Activist Investor

Jonathan Macey is Sam Harris Professor of Corporate Law, Corporate Finance and Securities Law at Yale Law School and Professor in the Yale School of Management. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum here); Dancing with Activists by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, and Thomas Keusch (discussed on the Forum here); and Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

Among the most important issues in modern corporate governance of public companies is how such companies should respond to approaches made by activist investors. The recent responses by Duke Energy Corporation to overtures from activist investor Elliott Management are a case study in how not to deal with an activist investor.

Duke Energy is underperforming and overcompensating its executives relative to its peers. Proxy advisors have noted that there is a misalignment between executive pay and corporate performance, and pay-for-performance models show a weak connection between executive compensation and company performance.

In light of this, it was hardly a surprise when, on May 17, 2021, the activist investor Elliott Management, one of Duke Energy’s largest shareholders, disclosed that it was in touch with the Duke Energy management. Elliott Management was not seeking to launch a hostile takeover of Duke Energy. Rather, Elliott simply and modestly suggested that Duke consider a couple of options. Most importantly, Elliott’s analysis was that Duke’s geographically noncontiguous service territories in Florida and Indiana should be separated from Duke’s operations in the Carolinas.

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EESG Activism After ExxonMobil

David A. Katz is partner and Laura A. McIntosh is consulting attorney at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on an article first published in the New York Law Journal. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value by Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales (discussed on the Forum here); and Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee by Max M. Schanzenbach and Robert H. Sitkoff (discussed on the Forum here).

The high-profile ExxonMobil shareholder vote in May sent shock waves through many of corporate America’s boardrooms. While there were various factors at play in the ExxonMobil scenario, the bottom line is this: A newly launched and virtually unknown hedge fund with a tiny stake in a massive global enterprise managed to leverage environmental and governance issues into winning three board seats at the annual meeting, displacing three incumbent directors, and is now in a position to influence the strategic direction of the company. Engine No. 1 LLC accomplished the unlikely feat of electing three nominees to ExxonMobil’s board by garnering broad support from an array of sources, notably profit-oriented activists and major institutional investors.

Overall, the 2021 proxy season saw a significant increase in shareholder support for EESG-related (i.e., relating to environmental, employee, social, and governance issues) proposals compared to 2020 and 2019. The ExxonMobil proxy contest is an example of the risks and dynamics at play in the current environment.

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Weekly Roundup: July 16-22, 2021


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of July 16-22, 2021.


Chair Gensler’s Insight on the SEC’s New Regulatory Agenda



Presidio Shines Light on Key Delaware Deal Litigation Trends and Topics


Breach of Fiduciary Duties in Administering Defined Contribution Plans


What Explains Differences in Finance Research Productivity During the Pandemic?


Putting the F into ESG—The Importance of Financial Materiality in ESG Investing


President Biden’s Executive Order on Promoting Competition


SPAC IPOs and Sponsor Network Centrality


Further on the Purpose of the Corporation


Warnings Persist for Corporate Directors Evaluating LBO and Other Multi-Step Transactions


Using ESG Tools to Help Combat Racial Inequity


Speech by Commissioner Peirce on ESG Disclosure


Global Climate and Sustainability Reporting Continues to Grow


What the Shell Judgment Means for US Directors


Board’s Oversight of Racial DE&I

Board’s Oversight of Racial DE&I

Benjamin Colton is Global Co-Head of Asset Stewardship at State Street Global Advisors; Jack “Rusty” O’Kelley is Co-leader, Board & CEO Advisory Practice at Russell Reynolds Associates; and Holly Fetter is Assistant Vice President, Asset Stewardship at State Street Global Advisors. This post is based on their SSgA memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); Socially Responsible Firms by Alan Ferrell, Hao Liang, and Luc Renneboog (discussed on the Forum here); and Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

Executive Summary

  • What motivates board oversight of racial equity: The following risks and opportunities motivated directors’ increased focus on racial and ethnic diversity, equity, & inclusion (DE&I): reputation, strategy, financing, regulatory and compliance, and human capital. Directors did not cite the potential economic impact of racial inequity as a key motivator.
  • Oversight in practice: Directors referenced one or more of the three major committees—audit, compensation, and nominations and governance—as having explicit oversight of racial and ethnic DE&I. Most boards undertake a hybrid approach to oversight—discussing the issue in committee, but also making it a full-board topic. The full-board discussions often center on the interplay between DE&I and strategy and on DE&I as a component of corporate culture.
  • Where boards are focusing their attention: Directors indicated a heightened focus on racial and ethnic diversity as it relates to workforce diversity and representation; inclusion and belonging; retention, promotion and succession planning; and engagement on social and political issues. Few directors spoke about oversight of the potential impacts of their company’s products, services or operations on communities of color.
  • Metrics and performance management: Directors—especially those who sit on the compensation committee—seek to identify the proper metrics to measure progress on DE&I and then to link executive compensation to performance against those goals. Directors also described the challenge of getting good data and interpreting it correctly.
  • Challenges in a global context: Multinational corporations face a particular challenge when it comes to overseeing racial and ethnic diversity. Different regions and countries define and collect data on diversity in different ways. It is important to obtain the right data and to interpret it correctly.
  • Guidance: Our conversations with directors led to the development of “10 Responsibilities of Boards in the Effective Board Oversight of Racial and Ethnic Diversity,” a roadmap for boards that wish to elevate their focus on DE&I. We fully recognize that boards need to incorporate this guidance into their oversight practices in a way that is tailored to their particular company’s context:

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What the Shell Judgment Means for US Directors

Cynthia A. Williams is the Osler Chair in Business Law at Osgoode Hall Law School at York University; Robert G. Eccles is Visiting Professor of Management Practice at Oxford University Said Business School; and Ellie Mulholland is Director of the Commonwealth Climate and Law Initiative. This post was authored by Professor Williams, Professor Eccles, Ms. Mulholland, Sarah Barker, and Alex Cooper.

The recent decision of a Dutch court in Milieudefensie and Ors. v Royal Dutch Shell plc reinforces the expansion of tort law to climate change issues. As this application of tort increases, directors will need to be aware of and manage the increased risks in order to comply with their company law duties. Investors should also adopt a forward-looking approach to managing climate-related liability risks in their portfolios and consider whether to ask questions of investee companies in their stewardship and engagement. 

In May 2021, the Hague District Court ordered Royal Dutch Shell plc (RDS) to reduce the CO2 emissions of the Shell group by 45% by 2030, relative to 2019 levels, across all its value chain emissions (scopes 1, 2 and 3) (Milieudefensie and Ors. v Royal Dutch Shell plc C/09/571932 / HA ZA 19-379). The court found that as a result of the CO2 emissions of the Shell group, certain Dutch citizens would suffer harm, meaning RDS would fail to meet the “unwritten standard of care” in the Dutch Civil Code and fail to act in accordance with the due care exercised in Dutch society. Therefore, the court ruled that RDS must reduce the CO2 emissions of the Shell group through implementing a compliant Shell group corporate policy. The ruling is provisionally enforceable, meaning that Shell must comply with it during any appeal process.

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Global Climate and Sustainability Reporting Continues to Grow

David M. Silk and Sabastian V. Niles are partners and Carmen X.W. Lu is an associate at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Silk, Mr. Niles, Ms. Lu, and Ram Sachs.

The momentum toward universal mandatory reporting and disclosure on climate risk and sustainability has gained additional strength with recent developments at the international, domestic and state levels. These steps follow years of calls from investors for standardized and comparable climate-related disclosures.

International. In June, the G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors issued a statement calling for mandatory climate-related financial disclosures based on the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (“TCFD”) framework. The G7 also indicated support for the efforts of the International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”) Foundation to develop baseline global sustainability reporting standards that draw on the TCFD framework and to establish an International Sustainability Standards Board (“ISSB”) in connection with COP26 later this year, with the first set of ISSB standards due in mid-2022. In addition, the G7 endorsed the establishment of the Taskforce on Nature-related Financial Disclosures (“TNFD”), which seeks to build upon the TCFD framework to reach other nature-related risks, including plastics in the oceanic food chain and loss of soil fertility, with a view to releasing a disclosure framework by 2023.

Emissions-related disclosures will likely become more important for compliance with cross-border trade regulations. EU leaders have proposed various iterations of carbon pricing, including a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism that would tax goods imported into the EU based on the greenhouse gasses emitted in their production. Congressional Democrats have included a conceptually similar “polluter import fee” in proposed budget legislation, but the likelihood of passage is unclear at best.

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Speech by Commissioner Peirce on ESG Disclosure

Hester M. Peirce is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on her recent remarks before the Brookings Institution. The views expressed in this post are those of Ms. Peirce and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff.

Thank you, Aaron [Klein], for that introduction. This summer was the summer of the cicadas. The dull hum of their song permeated the solitude of an evening stroll, along with the disconcerting crunch as pedestrian attempts to avoid squashing the creatures inevitably failed. Every seventeen years the beady-eyed cicadas emerge from underground—a natural wonder, perhaps therefore to be forgiven for their uncouth habits and off-putting appearance. [1] As eighteenth century farmer and self-taught naturalist Benjamin Banneker, having observed three appearances of cicadas, wrote:

[I]f their lives are Short they are merry, they begin to Sing or make a noise from the first they come out of Earth till they die, the hindermost part rots off, and it does not appear to be any pain to them for they still continue on Singing till they die. [2]

Cicadas arrive on schedule and behave with a comfortable predictability. Banneker could be quite sure cicadas would emerge when he was 68 as they had done when he was 17, 34, and 51. [3] He feared when meeting them for the first time at 17 that they would devastate the crops, so he tried to kill as many as possible. On their second time through, though, he “had more sense than to endeavor to destroy them, knowing that they was not so pernicious to the fruit of the Earth as I did imagine they would be.” [4] He had learned their patterns and was able to measure their schedule and their activity.

People like predictable and measurable things—things that we can quantify, standardize, and compare with one another. Especially when something is important to us, even when we cannot easily categorize, measure, and identify what is coming, we nevertheless try. This tendency is evident in another phenomenon of this summer season, the loud calls for environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) disclosures to facilitate the measurement and comparison of issuers and investment products. People want hard data to allow apples to apples comparisons. [5] The natural desire for ESG certainty, however, runs into the many real-life uncertainties and complications that characterize the overflowing ESG bucket. Any ESG rulemaking will have to confront these difficult realities. Before I go there, however, I better give my standard disclaimer, which is that the views I represent are my own views and not necessarily those of the SEC or my fellow Commissioners.

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Using ESG Tools to Help Combat Racial Inequity

Adam O. EmmerichDavid M. Silk, and Sabastian V. Niles are partners at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. The following post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Emmerich, Mr. Silk, Mr. Niles, Elina Tetelbaum, and Carmen X. W. Lu. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); Socially Responsible Firms by Alan Ferrell, Hao Liang, and Luc Renneboog (discussed on the Forum here); Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

The events of last summer galvanized the nation and the world and drew much-needed attention to how systemic racism and injustice continues to burden communities of color, who also disproportionately bore the weight of the pandemic. In the months that followed, we witnessed a marked shift in corporate America. This shift was evidenced not only by the millions of dollars pledged towards fighting racial inequality but also in the growing recognition among business leaders that corporate America ought to play an active role in combatting racial injustice and inequity, both in the communities where they do business and their boards, management, workforce, business partners and customers. One year on, we review the ESG tools and approaches that have helped buttress efforts to address racial inequity and the increasing expectations of investors and stakeholders, and discuss how companies can continue to tackle these issues, including how a strong ESG oversight and governance framework can help boards and management in deciding when and how to speak out with respect to stakeholder priorities.

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Warnings Persist for Corporate Directors Evaluating LBO and Other Multi-Step Transactions

Michele C. Maman and Richard M. Brand are partners at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, and Peter S. Kaufman is President of Gordian Group LLC. This post is based on a Cadwalader memorandum by Ms. Maman, Mr. Brand, Nicholas A. Gravante and Christopher M. Floyd of Cadwalader; Mr. Kaufman, and Henry F. Owsley of Gordian Group.

I. Executive Summary.

As the year 2020 was coming to a close, District Judge Rakoff issued a decision in In re Nine W. LBO Sec. Litig., No. 20 MD. 2941 (JSR), 2020 WL 7090277 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2020) (“Nine West”) that sent some shockwaves through the M&A community with respect to the future of corporate governance in the context of director duties relating to the sale of a plainly solvent company.

As the second quarter of 2021 comes to a close, the implications and potential for far-reaching consequences of Judge Rakoff’s decision continues to draw fascinating intellectual debate amongst legal and financial advisors and corporate professionals alike, as reasonable minds differ as to whether Judge Rakoff’s decision also marked a new beginning—as with much else in 2020—for directors in their execution of applicable state-mandated duties. Indeed, the New York Times recently published an article [1] discussing Judge Rakoff’s decision and querying whether the private equity party that Wall Street has been embracing for years might be coming to an end as “[w]hat had for decades been considered a virtue—selling a company for a market-clearing price to the benefit of existing shareholders—might have become a vice.”

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