Monthly Archives: November 2021

Renren Settlement Highlights Increased Risk of U.S. Derivative Litigation Concerning Foreign Private Issuers

Stephen Blake and Adam Goldberg are partners and Bo Bryan Jin is an associate at Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP. This post is based on a Simpson Thacher memorandum by Mr. Blake, Mr. Goldberg, Mr. Jin, George Wang, Jonathan Youngwood, and James Kreissman. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Alibaba: A Case Study of Synthetic Control (discussed on the Forum here) by Jesse M. Fried and Ehud Kamar.

Renren, Inc. (“Renren”), a NYSE-listed Chinese company incorporated in the Cayman Islands, recently settled a shareholder derivative litigation in New York state court for at least $300 million. According to the complaint, Renren, which initially positioned itself as the “Facebook of China,” invested its 2011 NYSE IPO proceeds towards a number of ventures and became a de facto venture capital fund. The minority shareholder plaintiffs alleged that Renren’s CEO, Joseph Chen, along with certain other directors, controlling shareholders and the financial advisory company Duff & Phelps, defrauded Renren and its minority stockholders out of over $500 million in company investment assets by spinning off Renren’s assets into a private company in exchange for an undervalued cash dividend. The Renren plaintiffs asserted derivative claims under Cayman Islands law and New York law in connection with the spin-off.

This record-breaking settlement involving a U.S.-listed Chinese company comes several months after the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court affirmed a lower court’s finding that there was proper jurisdiction and standing to pursue Cayman law derivative claims in New York against Renren and its directors. See In re Renren, Inc., 192 A.D.3d 539, 140 N.Y.S.3d 701 (2021). Historically, derivative claims relating to non-U.S. companies incorporated offshore have faced significant legal hurdles in U.S. courts; these companies primarily faced exposure through federal securities litigation and SEC regulatory action. The Renren lawsuit and settlement illustrates that New York courts are increasingly willing to entertain derivative actions against non-U.S. companies, closely aligning the legal threats against the boards of such companies with that of U.S.-based and -incorporated issuers which often face secondary corporate law challenges whenever federal securities litigation is initiated.

READ MORE »

2021 U.S. Board Index

Julie Hembrock Daum and Kathleen M. Tamayo are consultants and Ann Yerger is senior adviser at Spencer Stuart. This post is based on their Spencer Stuart memorandum.

The 2021 U.S. Spencer Stuart Board Index finds boards responding to a growing chorus of calls for enhanced boardroom diversity, with men from historically underrepresented racial and ethnic communities and women comprising 72% of directors joining S&P 500 boards in the past year. But boardroom turnover remains persistently low, with new independent directors once again representing only 9% of all S&P 500 directors. As a result, changes to overall composition continue at a slow pace.

Key Takeaways – 2021 U.S. Spencer Stuart Board Index 

  • The incoming class of directors is the most diverse Nearly half (47%) of new directors are Black/African American, Asian, Hispanic/Latino/a, American Indian/Alaska native or multiracial, and 43% are women. Together directors from these historically underrepresented groups account for 72% of all new directors—up from 59% last year and 31% ten years ago.
  • Nearly all the gains in the diversity of the new class of directors are due to the increase in Black/African American directors.
    • One-third (33%) of all new independent directors are Black/African American, three times more than last year (11%) and the highest since 2008.
    • The representation of Asian directors among new directors fell slightly to 7% from 8%.
    • Hispanic/Latino/a directors make up 7% of new directors, an increase from 3% last year. The representation of Hispanic/Latino/a directors among new directors has vacillated between 3% and 5% since we began collecting this data in 2008, not reaching above 6% before this year.

READ MORE »

Roundup of Director Overboarding Policies

Holly Gregory is partner, Rebecca Grapsas is counsel, and Claire Holland is special counsel at Sidley Austin LLP. This post is based on a Sidley memorandum by Ms. Gregory, Ms. Grapsas, Ms. Holland, John P. Kelsh, Andrea L. Reed, and Christine Duque.

As public company board service has become increasingly imperative and time-consuming, proxy advisory firms and institutional investors have sharpened their focus on directors who serve on an excessive number of boards. Overboarding concerns have become a key driver for recommendations or votes against director elections in recent years. For example, in its latest investment stewardship report, BlackRock reported that it voted against 163 directors at 149 companies in the Americas on the basis of overboarding from July 1, 2020 to June 30, 2021.

Public companies must stay informed of the director overboarding policies of their key institutional investors and consider how they may impact director elections and whether the company’s own overboarding limits should be revised in light of policies in place at key investors. The chart below summarizes the overboarding policies of proxy advisory firms Glass Lewis and Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) as well as several large institutional investors.

READ MORE »

Optimizing The World’s Leading Corporate Law: A 20-Year Retrospective and Look Ahead

Lawrence A. Hamermesh is Executive Director of the Institute for Law and Economics at the University of Pennsylvania, and Emeritus Professor at Widener University Delaware Law School. Jack B. Jacobs is Senior Counsel at Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP, and former Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court and Vice Chancellor of the Court of Chancery. Leo E. Strine, Jr. is the Michael L. Wachter Distinguished Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School; Senior Fellow, Harvard Program on Corporate Governance; of counsel, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz; and former Chief Justice and Chancellor, the State of Delaware. This post is based on their paper forthcoming in The Business Lawyer, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

In our article, Optimizing The World’s Leading Corporate Law: A 20-Year Retrospective and Look Ahead, we look back at a 2001 article (Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law) in which two of us, with important input from the other, argued that in addressing issues like hostile takeovers, assertive institutional investors, leveraged buyouts, and contested ballot questions, the Delaware courts had done exemplary work but on occasion crafted standards of review that unduly encouraged litigation and did not appropriately credit intra-corporate procedures designed to ensure fairness. Function Over Form suggested ways to make those standards more predictable, encourage procedures that better protected stockholders, and discourage meritless litigation, by restoring business judgment rule protection for transactions approved by independent directors, the disinterested stockholders, or both.

Our current paper examines how Delaware law responded to the prior article’s recommendations, concluding that the Delaware judiciary has addressed most of them constructively, thereby creating incentives to use procedures that promote the fair treatment of stockholders and discourage meritless litigation. The continued excellence and diligence of the Delaware judiciary is one of Delaware corporate law’s core strengths.

READ MORE »

M&A/PE Update

Gail Weinstein is senior counsel and Philip Richter and Steven J. Steinman are partners at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP. This post is based on a Fried Frank memorandum by Ms. Weinstein, Mr. Richter, Mr. Steinman, Randi Lally, Roy Tannenbaum, and Maxwell Yim, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Court Finds No “Material Adverse Effect” from Drastic Reduction in Medicare Reimbursement Rate for Company’s Sole Product—Bardy v. Hill-Rom

In Bardy Diagnostics, Inc. v. Hill-Rom, Inc. (July 9, 2021), the Delaware Court of Chancery found that a more than 50% reduction in the Medicare reimbursement rate payable for the target company’s sole product did not constitute a “Material Adverse Effect” (MAE) under the parties’ merger agreement, primarily because it did not have “durational significance.” Although the target’s revenues dramatically declined due to the rate decrease, the court emphasized that the company had continued to grow.

Background. After performing extensive due diligence, Hill-Rom, Inc. agreed to acquire Bardy Diagnostics, Inc. for $350 million plus additional compensation through an earnout based on 2021 and 2022 revenue. Hill-Rom believed that Bardy had significant growth potential, but did not expect that Bardy would be profitable for several years. Bardy’s sole product was a medical patch used to detect heart problems; and its largest source of revenue was Medicare reimbursements for the patch. The Medicare reimbursement rate for the patch was set by a private entity authorized by Medicare to fulfill this function. For almost a decade, the rate had been about $365 per patch. In late January 2021, two weeks after the merger agreement was signed, the rate was reduced by about 86%.

Hill-Rom claimed that Bardy had suffered an MAE as a result of the rate reduction and refused to close. Bardy brought suit seeking specific performance of the agreement and damages for Hill-Rom’s failure to close. By April 2021, the reimbursement rate for the patch was increased to $133 (about three times the January rate, but still less than half the historic rate). Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights III held that Bardy had not suffered an MAE. The court ordered Hill-Rom to close and awarded damages to Bardy in the form of prejudgment interest on the deal price.

READ MORE »

Weekly Roundup: November 5-11, 2021


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of November 5-11, 2021.

Quantifying the High-Frequency Trading “Arms Race”


Remarks by Chair Gensler at the Securities Enforcement Forum


SEC Modernizes Filing Fee Rules


Corporate Board Practices in the Russell 3000, S&P 500, and S&P Mid-Cap 400


Comments at SEC Speaks Signal Significant Policy Changes


BlackRock’s Recent Move Could Benefit Shareholder Activists in Election Contests


SEC Staff Limits Exclusion of “Social Policy” Shareholder Proposals


Mandatory Corporate Carbon Disclosures and the Path to Net Zero



SPAC Sweeps


Pay, Productivity and Management


New DOL Proposal on ESG Investing and Fiduciary Exercise of Shareholder Rights


Investor Behavior in the 2021 Proxy Season


What Is CEO Overconfidence? Evidence from Executive Assessments


ESG Governance: Board and Management Roles & Responsibilities


ISS Proposes Benchmark Voting Policy Changes for the 2022 Proxy Season


Statement by Commissioner Crenshaw on DeFi Risks, Regulations, and Opportunities


Remarks by Chair Gensler At the Institutional Limited Partners Association Summit

Gary Gensler is Chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on his recent remarks at the Institutional Limited Partners Association Summit. The views expressed in the post are those of Chair Gensler, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Staff.

Thank you. As is customary, I will note that I am not speaking on behalf of the Commission or SEC staff.

Today, I’d like to talk about private funds, and the importance of certain of these funds—in particular, private equity and hedge funds—to our capital markets.

Why do these funds matter?

First, they matter because they’re large, and they’re growing in size, complexity, and number. Altogether, U.S. private funds have gross assets under management of $17 trillion with net assets of $11.5 trillion. [1] The sheer size and transaction activities of these funds represent a critical portion of our overall capital markets.

Hedge funds have gross assets of at least $8.8 trillion and net assets valued at about $4.7 trillion. Private equity funds gross assets of $4.7 trillion and net assets of $4.2 trillion. [2]

More than those figures, though, these funds matter because of what, or who, stands on either side of them.

The funds pool the money of other people: the limited partners. Many of these limited partners may be in the audience today.

READ MORE »

Statement by Commissioner Crenshaw on DeFi Risks, Regulations, and Opportunities

Caroline A. Crenshaw is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on her recent public statement. The views expressed in the post are those of  Commissioner Crenshaw, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the other Commissioners, or the Staff.

Whether in the news, social media, popular entertainment, and increasingly in people’s portfolios, crypto is now part of the vernacular. [1] But what that term actually encompasses is broad and amorphous and includes everything from tokens, to non-fungible tokens, to Dexes to Decentralized Finance or DeFI. For those readers not already familiar with DeFi, unsurprisingly, definitions also vary. In general, though, it is an effort to replicate functions of our traditional finance systems through the use of blockchain-based smart contracts that are composable, interoperable, and open source. [2] Much of DeFi activity takes place on the Ethereum blockchain, but any blockchain that supports certain types of scripting or coding can be used to develop DeFi applications and platforms.

DeFi presents a panoply of opportunities. However, it also poses important risks and challenges for regulators, investors, and the financial markets. While the potential for profits attracts attention, sometimes overwhelming attention, there is also confusion, often significant, regarding important aspects of this emerging market. Social media questions like “who in the U.S. regulates the DeFi market?” and “Why are regulators involved at all?” abound. These are crucial questions, and the answers are important to lawyers and non-lawyers alike. This article attempts to provide a short background on the current regulatory landscape for DeFi, the role of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and highlights two important hurdles that the community should address. [3]

READ MORE »

ISS Proposes Benchmark Voting Policy Changes for the 2022 Proxy Season

Trevor S. Norwitz and Sabastian V. Niles are partners and Justin C. Nowell is an associate at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell memorandum by Mr. Norwitz, Mr. Niles, Mr. Nowell, and Ram Sachs.

Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) recently released its proposed voting policy changes for the 2022 proxy season and has invited comments from issuers, shareholders and other market participants. The proposed changes focus on climate, board diversity and uneven voting rights in multi-class share structures. Final voting policies are expected to be released shortly following the end of the comment period on November 16, 2021, and final policies would generally apply to shareholder meetings held on or after February 1, 2022. The proposed changes follow the release of ISS’s 2021 Global Benchmark Policy Survey and its inaugural 2021 Global Policy Survey on climate. The surveys’ findings had led to expectations of more significant policy revisions for the U.S. market that reached environmental, social and governance (ESG) performance metrics in executive compensation, racial equity audits and virtual-only meetings, among other topics.

Notable takeaways from the proposed changes for the U.S. market include:

Climate

In line with prior efforts to elevate risk oversight of environmental and social issues, and ISS’s survey results, the proposed policies heighten board accountability for climate risk and performance, and provide new criteria for assessing “say-on-climate” proposals, whether management or shareholder- sponsored.

READ MORE »

ESG Governance: Board and Management Roles & Responsibilities

Jurgita Ashley is Partner and Co-chair of the ESG Collaborative at Thompson Hine LLP, and Randi Val Morrison is Senior Vice President at the Society for Corporate Governance. This post is based on their Thompson Hine/Society for Corporate Governance memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) and Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders?, both by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita; For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); and Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

I. Introduction

As with other matters, the role of the board of directors regarding environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) issues is that of oversight. ESG encompasses a broad set of issues, ranging from human capital and compensation issues, to climate change, deforestation, and water and waste management, to supply chain management. Some of these issues are interrelated, and many are continually evolving.

There is no consensus on the key topics and issues encompassed within each of the “E,” “S,” or “G” categories (in fact, it may be easier to try to identify issues that are NOT encompassed within one or more of those categories). Investors’ and other stakeholders’ views differ widely—and are

changing regularly—with regard to which topics and issues are most important for corporate disclosure and investment purposes. Additionally, the importance of ESG issues may vary significantly depending upon company specifics, including industry, size, geographic scope, business operations, and business model (e.g., franchised vs. not).

As a result of the breadth of issues potentially encompassed within the term “ESG,” company-specific variations, the lack of investor consensus on preferences and priorities, and the continually evolving nature of this area, determining how to effect board oversight of ESG issues and how to develop and implement an effective ESG governance structure can be a challenge. At the same time, ESG issues are discussed in boardrooms with increasing frequency, [1] and many companies are considering enhanced board oversight of, and management responsibility for, business-relevant ESG issues. [2]

This post discusses various approaches to board oversight of ESG issues (Part II) and management implementation of ESG strategy (Part III), accompanied by relevant benchmarking information. [3]

READ MORE »

Page 5 of 8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8