Yearly Archives: 2021

SEC Continues to Scrutinize Earnings Management Through Its EPS Initiative

Jina Choi is partner and Andre Fontana is an associate at Morrison & Foerster LLP. This post is based on their Morrison & Foerster memorandum.

On August 24, 2021, the SEC announced a settled enforcement action against Pennsylvania-based Healthcare Services Group, Inc. (HCSG) and its former CFO for accounting and disclosure violations that resulted in the company reporting inflated earnings per share (EPS) that met research analysts’ consensus estimates for multiple quarters. The SEC also charged HCSG with failing to keep accurate books and records and sufficient internal accounting controls, and charged its former controller with causing those violations.

Following two cases from last year, the action against HCSG is the third enforcement action—and likely not the last—resulting from the SEC’s EPS Initiative, which was created to use data analytics to uncover potential accounting and disclosure violations caused by earnings management practices. In the three cases brought under the EPS Initiative, each issuer had patterns of meeting or slightly exceeding consensus EPS estimates for consecutive quarters, followed by significant drops in EPS. The consequences have not been mild: the three companies caught in the crosshairs of the EPS Initiative paid a total of over $12 million in penalties and charges were brought against individual officers who agreed to pay significant fines as well as to be denied the privilege of appearing or practicing before the Commission as an accountant, with permission to reapply after one to three years.

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NYSE Restores Thresholds for Related Party Transactions

Brian Breheny, Raquel Fox, and Marc Gerber are partners at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. This post is based on a Skadden memorandum by Mr. Breheny, Ms. Fox, Mr. Gerber, Andrew Brady, Caroline Kim, and James Rapp.

On August 19, 2021, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) filed an immediately effective rule change (Rule Proposal) restoring a transaction value and materiality threshold for related party transactions that require independent directors’ review.

The Rule Proposal, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), amended Section 314.00 of the NYSE Listed Company Manual. [1] The Rule Proposal addresses concerns raised by NYSE-listed companies following previous amendments to the listing standard approved by the SEC on April 2, 2021. Those amendments revised Section 314.00 to (i) require the audit committee or another independent body of the board of directors to conduct “a reasonable prior review and oversight” of related party transactions and (ii) defined related party transactions as transactions required to be disclosed pursuant to Item 404 of Regulation S-K or, with respect to foreign private issuers, Item 7.B of Form 20-F. The NYSE’s amendments, however, removed the transaction value or materiality thresholds under the respective SEC provisions that excluded small and nonmaterial transactions from the disclosure requirement. [2]

The Rule Proposal reinstates those thresholds so that the scope of related party transactions subject to independent directors’ review under Section 314.00 is again aligned with the SEC disclosure rules. The NYSE came to appreciate that removing the thresholds was “inconsistent with the historical practice of many listed companies, and has had unintended consequences” of creating a “significant compliance burden for issuers with respect to small transactions that are considered immaterial for purposes of other regulatory requirements.”

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Remarks by Chair Gensler Before the Investor Advisory Committee

Gary Gensler is Chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on his recent public statement. The views expressed in the post are those of Chair Gensler, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Staff.

Thank you for the kind introduction. I’d like to note that my views are my own, and I’m not speaking on behalf of my fellow Commissioners or the staff.

I’m glad to participate in my second meeting of the Investor Advisory Committee. I thank the members for your time and willingness to represent the interests of American investors. Investor protection is at the heart of the SEC’s three-part mission.

Today, I’d like to discuss a few areas related to topics you’re discussing today, including the behavioral design of online trading platforms, 10b5-1 plans, and SPACs. I also look forward to your readout from your panel discussion on the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.

Behavioral Design of Online Trading Platforms

In the last few years we’ve seen a proliferation of trading apps, as well as wealth management apps and robo-advisers, that use various practices to develop and provide investment advice to retail investors.

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Financial Reporting and Moral Sentiments

Radhika Lunawat is Assistant Professor of Accounting and Economics at the University of California-Irvine Paul Merage School of Business; Timothy W. Shields is Associate Professor of Accounting at Chapman University and the Economic Science Institute; and Gregory Waymire is Asa Griggs Candler Professor of Accounting at Emory University Goizueta Business School and the Economic Science Institute. This post is based on their recent paper, forthcoming in the Journal of Accounting & Economics.

Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.

—Louis Brandeis (1914, 92)

We experimentally evaluate whether financial reporting has economic value in a sparse setting where contracting is not possible. We hypothesize that financial reporting leads a manager to alter her behavior in anticipation of an investor’s evaluation of the manager’s conduct, as revealed by financial reporting. The desire to be viewed positively by others will lead the manager to take actions that benefit investors.

Our experimental predictions derive from the hypothesis that people desire to take altruistic actions and to be seen doing so. We define a moral sentiment as a feeling (both emotional and cognitive) that another person is intentionally benefited or harmed by an action that serves to determine the propriety of that action. Moral sentiments develop because an actor believes that an altruistic action is inherently satisfying regardless of whether anyone discovers that the action was taken. Furthermore, they will be viewed positively by others if they learn of the action taken.

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Weekly Roundup: September 3–9, 2021


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of September 3–9, 2021.

What Do You Think About Climate Finance?



Silicon Valley 150 Risk Factor Trends Report



SEC Sanctions Company for Hypothetical Cyber Risk Factor



Five Simple Rules for Post-IPO Pay


Getting Back to the Long Term



Three Opinions on Fraud on the Board


2021 Proxy Season Review: Say on Pay Votes and Equity Compensation


Controlling Externalities: Ownership Structure and Cross-Firm Externalities


SEC Advances Broad Theory of Required Disclosures of Security Incidents


The New Corporation: How “Good” Corporations are Bad for Democracy


13F Filing Analysis (2Q 2021)

13F Filing Analysis (2Q 2021)

Jim Rossman is Managing Director and Head of Shareholder Advisory; Mary Ann Deignan is Managing Director; and Christopher Couvelier is Director at Lazard. This post is based on their Lazard memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum here); Dancing with Activists by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, and Thomas Keusch (discussed on the Forum here); and Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

Executive Summary

  • Rule 13F-1 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires institutional investors with discretionary authority over more than $100 million of public equity securities to make quarterly filings on Schedule 13F
    • Schedule 13F filings disclose an investor’s holdings as of the end of the quarter, but generally do not disclose short positions or holdings of certain debt, derivative and foreign listed securities
    • Filing deadline is 45 days after the end of each quarter; filings for the quarter ended June 30, 2021 were due on August 16, 2021
  • Lazard’s Capital Markets Advisory Group has identified 12 core activists, 30 additional activists and 20 other notable investors (listed below) and analyzed the holdings they disclosed in their most recent 13F filings and subsequent 13D and 13G filings, other regulatory filings and press reports
    • For all 62 investors, the focus of Lazard’s analysis was on holdings in companies (excluding SPACs) with market capitalizations in excess of $500 million
  • Lazard’s analysis, broken down by sector and by company, is enclosed. The nine sector categories are:
    • Consumer
    • FIG
    • Healthcare
    • Industrials
    • Media/Telecom
    • PEI
    • Real Estate
    • Retail
    • Technology
  • Within each of these sectors, Lazard’s analysis is comprised of:
    • A one-page summary of notable new, exited, increased and decreased positions in the sector
    • A list of companies in the sector with activist holders and other notable investors
  • Companies are listed in descending order of market capitalization
    • Lazard will continue to conduct this analysis and produce these summaries for future 13F filings
    • The 13F filing deadline for the quarter ending September 30, 2021 will be November 15, 2021

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The New Corporation: How “Good” Corporations are Bad for Democracy

Joel Bakan is Professor at the University of British Columbia Peter A. Allard School of Law. This post is based on his recent book. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) and Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders?, both by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita; For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); and Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

On August 19, 2019, the Business Roundtable, led by JPMorgan Chase’s Jamie Dimon and composed of more than two hundred of America’s top CEOs, heralded the dawn of a new age of corporate capitalism. Henceforth, the CEOs proclaimed, the purpose of publicly traded corporations would be to serve the interests of workers, communities, and the environment, not only their shareholders. The declaration capped a two-decades-long trend of corporations claiming to have changed into caring and conscientious actors, ready to lead the way in solving society’s problems. I call it the “new” corporation movement.

To find out more about it, I visited the movement’s global hub, the World Economic Forum’s annual meeting in Davos, founded and run by economist Klaus Schwab, who originated the idea of ‘stakeholder capitalism’. “Companies recognize that they have a special responsibility in the world, social and environmental responsibility,” Schwab told me in an interview. “Today it is, and has to be, part of corporate action and decision-making.” Everyone I met in Davos agreed. Richard Edelman, for example, told me how today’s corporations embrace social and environmental values as core values, “in the supply chain, in the hiring practices, throughout the corporation,” no longer just as peripheral “philanthropic exercises.” Michael Porter added “it’s quite remarkable how big a shift that’s been—the corporation has really reshaped and redefined itself.”

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SEC Advances Broad Theory of Required Disclosures of Security Incidents

Fran Faircloth and Nameir Abbas are associates at Ropes & Gray LLP. This post is based on their Ropes & Gray memorandum.

A recent SEC settlement has again demonstrated the Commission’s continued attention to public companies’ disclosures of cybersecurity incidents and its commitment to a broad notion of what constitutes such an incident. On August 16, the SEC entered a settlement agreement with Pearson plc, a UK-based educational publishing company that is publicly traded on both the London Stock Exchange and New York Stock Exchange via ADRs. While Pearson made no admissions in the agreement, it will pay a $1 million civil penalty to settle the SEC’s allegations that Pearson misled investors in its disclosures related to a 2018 cybersecurity breach.

Five key aspects of this settlement merit attention from a cybersecurity perspective because they are arguably more aggressive than the practices that have developed under state data breach laws:

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Controlling Externalities: Ownership Structure and Cross-Firm Externalities

Dhammika Dharmapala is the Paul H. and Theo Leffmann Professor at the University of Chicago Law School and Vikramaditya Khanna is William W. Cook Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School. This post is based on their recent paper. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors by Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Scott Hirst (discussed on the Forum here); and Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy by Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst (discussed on the forum here).

Our new working paper on “Controlling Externalities: Ownership Structure and Cross-Firm Externalities” develops a general conceptual framework for understanding how firms’ ownership structure and corporate law affect the internalization of cross-firm externalities and proposes a new metric (called “Controller Wealth Concentration”) designed to provide a simple characterization of the incentives of controllers in this regard. We use this metric—and other sources of evidence—to argue that the prevalence of controlling shareholders around the world (including at many important US firms) poses a significant challenge to the internalization of cross-firm externalities through the influence of diversified owners such as index funds. Further, this suggests that working toward better regulation and liability regimes may be inescapable, even though these have their own challenges.

In recent years, debates over the social purpose of corporations have taken center stage in both public discourse and in corporate law scholarship. This development has been spurred by rising concern about externalities generated by the activities of corporations, such as those associated with climate change and harmful speech. A central underlying premise of these debates is that government regulation and liability regimes appear not to be functioning sufficiently well to force firms to internalize these externalities. There is thus rising interest in exploring alternative mechanisms. In particular, a rapidly growing body of scholarship argues that index funds increasingly approximate diversified “universal owners” with incentives to maximize portfolio value (and thus to internalize cross-firm externalities).

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2021 Proxy Season Review: Say on Pay Votes and Equity Compensation

Marc Treviño and Jeannette Bander are partners and June Hu is an associate at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP. This post is based on a Sullivan & Cromwell memorandum by Mr. Treviño, Ms. Bander, Ms. Hu, Aaron Levine, and Rebecca Rabinowitz.

Say-on-Pay Votes:

  • Public companies continue to perform strongly, with support levels averaging 93% and less than 3% of companies failing
  • Continuing turnover in failed votes, with 79% of companies that failed last year achieving over 70% support this year and no companies failing in both 2020 and 2021
  • ISS negative recommendations highlight continued importance of pay-for-performance assessment, with the most important factor continuing to be alignment of CEO pay with relative total shareholder return
  • The most important qualitative factors are performance standards that are deemed not sufficiently rigorous or are not sufficiently disclosed, followed by the use of subjective criteria for determining compensation
  • ISS also frequently cited the adjustment of previously granted awards, often due to the impact of COVID-19

Equity Compensation Plans:

  • Broad shareholder support for equity compensation plans, with only three Russell 3000 companies failing to obtain shareholder approval for an equity compensation plan, and overall support levels at Russell 3000 and S&P 500 companies averaging around 91%

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