Zhihong Chen is Associate Professor of Accounting at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology; Ningzhong Li is associate professor, at the University of Texas at Dallas Naveen Jindal School of Management; and Jianghua Shen is Assistant Professor of Accounting at Xiamen University. This post is based on their recent paper, forthcoming in the Journal of Law and Economics.
Nevada is second to Delaware in attracting out-of-state incorporations, with 8% of all public incorporations by firms in states outside the firms’ headquarters states. In June 2001, Nevada changed its state corporate law by substantially reducing the legal liability for breaching fiduciary duties (the legislative change, hereafter). Under the new Nevada corporate law, by default, directors and officers (D&Os) of firms incorporated in Nevada are not liable for breaching their fiduciary duties unless their behaviors involved intentional misconduct, fraud, or a knowing violation of law, whereas prior to the change, by default, D&Os have such liability. This legislative change was implemented swiftly and applied to all firms incorporated under Nevada corporate law without a requirement for shareholder approval. In our paper forthcoming in the Journal of Law and Economics, we use the exogenous decrease in legal liability of D&Os due to the legislative change to study how litigation risk affects loan contract terms and related borrower-lender agency conflicts.
Agency theory suggests that borrowers and lenders have major conflicts when borrowers are insolvent or close to insolvency. To the extent that D&Os owe fiduciary duties to the lenders when a borrowing firm is insolvent and possibly when it is in the “zone” or “vicinity” of insolvency, the legislative change reduces the lenders’ legal tools to enforce their rights. Therefore, we predict that the legislative change will exacerbate borrower-lender conflicts. Anticipating the increased conflicts, lenders will impose more unfavorable loan contract terms, such as higher interest rates and more restrictive covenants.