Yearly Archives: 2021

Shareholder Proposal No-Action Requests in the 2021 Proxy Season

Marc S. Gerber is partner and Ryan J. Adams is an associate at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. This post is based on their Skadden memorandum.

As calendar year-end companies received shareholder proposals for their 2021 annual meetings, they faced a variety of uncertainties and challenges, including navigating the COVID-19 pandemic, addressing the racial inequities brought to the fore by the killings of George Floyd and others, and steering through a hyper-partisan and unprecedented U.S. presidential transition. The shareholder proposals received by companies reflected many of these broad themes.

Unlike in the prior three years, the staff of the Division of Corporation Finance (Staff) of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) did not issue new guidance regarding companies’ ability to exclude shareholder proposals from their proxy statements heading into the 2021 season. Although this may have hinted at some stability in the no-action process, that was not to be the case. The Staff issued significantly fewer no-action response letters than in previous years, opting instead to respond mostly through informal decisions that were included in a chart on the SEC’s website. Because these informal responses provided the Staff’s conclusions without additional explanation, the Staff’s reasoning in a number of decisions was unclear.

Nevertheless, whether by response letter or chart entry, there were a number of notable no-action decisions and trends. As in prior years, many of these concerned the ability to exclude proposals as relating to a company’s ordinary business. In addition, some related to procedural items that might have seemed fairly straightforward. Reviewing the guideposts provided by Staff decisions from the 2021 proxy season helps in attempting to understand the Staff’s current approach to shareholder proposals.

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Ripples of Responsibility: How Long-Term Investors Navigate Uncertainty With Purpose

Matt Leatherman is Director, Ariel Babcock is Head of Research, and Victoria Tellez is Senior Research Associate at FCLTGlobal. This post is based on a FCLTGlobal memorandum by Mr. Leatherman, Ms. Babcock, Ms. Tellez, and Sam Sterling. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum here); and Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

Investment organizations around the world face an array of ever-changing external expectations. These expectations go well beyond traditional notions of achieving return targets or liability matching and can create important responsibilities that are broader than fiduciary duty or asset stewardship. Ripples of Responsibility provides tools for understanding and fulfilling these responsibilities. Together with our members and others, we have piloted this publication’s toolkit in workshops focused on six different domains of responsibility: economic impact at home and abroad, equity lending and stewardship, impasses in corporate engagement, racial and gender diversity of portfolio companies, climate and environmental impact, and reputation management.

The way that investment organizations navigate existing responsibilities and new expectations that arise has a tremendous effect on their long-term success.

When an investment organization fails to fulfill true responsibilities, staff can become distracted from their long-term focus, interrupting the organization’s long-term investment strategy. Consequences also can include turnover in leadership or responses by legal or regulatory authorities that narrow the discretion of leadership. Yet positive cases of investment organizations meeting evolving expectations abound: two examples are Future Fund’s efforts to ensure that external managers steward its reputation appropriately and the New Zealand Super Fund’s participation in the national response to social media firms live streaming the Christchurch atrocity. [1] [2]

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The U.S. Moving Toward Adopting New Climate Disclosures

J. Paul Forrester, Andrew Olmem, and Christina Thomas are partners at Mayer Brown LLP. This post is based on a Mayer Brown memorandum by Mr. Forrester, Mr. Olmem, Ms. Thomas, and Meicy Hui.

On June 21, 2021, US financial regulators met with US President Joe Biden to discuss the US economy and update him on their efforts to address climate-related risks. According to the White House readout of the meeting, the regulators said “they were making steady progress” on implementing President Biden’s executive order on climate-related risk. The briefing follows last week’s passage of HR 1187, the Corporate Governance Improvement and Investor Protection Act, by the US House of Representatives [1] by a vote of 215 to 214. HR 1187 would mandate that the SEC create an ESG disclosure regime for public companies and provides numerous statutory requirements for those disclosures, including climate-related disclosures. Although the bill is unlikely to become law due to expected opposition in the US Senate, which requires a 60-vote supermajority to pass legislation, the passage of the HR 1187 by the House—combined with President Biden’s focus on climate-related risks in his meeting with financial regulators—should bolster and influence the US Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) ongoing development of new ESG disclosure requirements for US public companies under its existing statutory authorities. With regulators telling President Biden that they are “making steady progress,” new disclosure requirements for US public companies appear to be just around the corner.

Addressing climate change has become a central focus of US policymakers. President Biden has made addressing climate change a top domestic policy priority. As part of implementing this policy, on May 20, 2021, he signed an executive orders directing federal financial regulators to take a broad range of actions to assess and respond to climate-related financial risks, including enhancing the disclose of climate-related financial risks. [2] Concurrently, the State of California is also putting pressure on the federal government to adopt climate disclosure requirements by advancing its own legislation, the Climate Corporate Accountability Act (CCAA) [3], that would impose disclosure obligations on any California company and any company doing business in California. Whether California will ultimately adopt the CCAA once the SEC adopts its anticipated climate disclosure requirements is unclear. Nevertheless, California companies and companies doing business in California should be aware that the possibility exists for the adoption of overlapping federal and state disclosure rules.

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Weekly Roundup: July 2–8, 2021


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of July 2–8, 2021.









Shareholder Liability and Bank Failure




CEO Succession Practices in the Russell 3000 and S&P 500 2021 Edition



2021 ESG & Incentives Report


Proxy Advisory Firms and Corporate Shareholder Engagement


The Opportunity for SEC Regulation of Climate Disclosures

The Opportunity for SEC Regulation of Climate Disclosures

Lesley Hunter is Vice President of Programs and Content Strategy at the American Council on Renewable Energy (ACORE). This post is based on her ACORE memorandum.

Corporate risk exposure to climate change is becoming ever more central to companies’ bottom lines. As a result, investors, governments and the public increasingly expect information from companies on climate risks, strategies and scenario planning.

To help mitigate long-term risks, companies are adopting aggressive sustainability targets and considering environmental, social and governance (ESG) criteria to better evaluate the impact of their activities and investments. The potential allocation of ESG funds to renewable energy investment presents an opportunity to enhance the growth of climate-friendly energy resources.

However, the requirements of existing, voluntary frameworks for corporate climate disclosure are sometimes inconsistent, and the quality of reporting uneven. Sustainability investments, therefore, do not necessarily result in direct greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions. Investors need more consistent, comparable, transparent and forward-looking corporate disclosures they can evaluate objectively.

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Proxy Advisory Firms and Corporate Shareholder Engagement

Aiyesha Dey is Høegh Family Associate Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School; Austin Starkweather is Assistant Professor of Finance at the University of South Carolina Darla Moore School of Business; and Joshua White is Assistant Professor of Finance at Vanderbilt University Owen Graduate School of Management. This post is based on their recent paper.

The market power of proxy advisory firms has attracted considerable attention from academics, practitioners, and regulators. A large body of research shows that recommendations by proxy advisors—such as those by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)—can substantially influence shareholder voting outcomes (e.g., Malenko and Shen, 2016). The academic literature, however, is mixed on whether their recommendations are value-enhancing, with some linking their advice to standardized executive pay plans and reduced company value (e.g., Larcker, McCall, and Ormazabal, 2015). Such criticisms and a decade-long review by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) culminated in the promulgation of restrictive amendments to proxy advisory rules in July 2020 that SEC Chair Gary Gensler recently indicated the Commission may revisit.

In our research paper, Proxy Advisory Firms and Corporate Shareholder Engagement, we consider the role of proxy advisors through a different lens. Specifically, we examine whether and how proxy advisors influence companies’ shareholder engagement activities. Given the recent increase in demand for shareholder engagement by market participants and regulators, the findings of our research can add to our understanding of whether proxy advisors can have a disciplinary spillover effect by inducing desirable company behavior.

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2021 ESG & Incentives Report

John Borneman is Managing Director, Tatyana Day is Senior Consultant, and Olivia Voorhis is a Consultant at Semler Brossy Consulting Group LLC. This post is based on a Semler Brossy memorandum by Mr. Borneman, Ms. Day, Ms. Voorhis, Kevin Masini, Matthew Mazzoni, and Jennifer Teefey. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); Socially Responsible Firms by Alan Ferrell, Hao Liang, and Luc Renneboog (discussed on the Forum here); and Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

“I cannot recall a time where it has been more important for companies to respond to the needs of their stakeholders. We are at a moment of tremendous economic pain. We are also at a historic crossroads on the path to racial justice—one that cannot be solved without leadership from companies.”
— Larry Fink, 2021 Letter to CEOs

At the start of the new decade, corporate engagement with environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) issues was already accelerating—part of a large large-scale shift in corporate purpose toward responsibility to a broad group of stakeholders. 2020 had a profound impact on corporate governance and responsibility, with the pandemic shining a spotlight on health and safety and the national focus on racial justice drawing sharp attention to diversity and inclusion in corporate America.

As a result, ESG has become one of the most prominent set of issues discussed in boardrooms across the country over the past year. As stakeholder and investor focus on these issues continues to increase, corporate leadership has worked to demonstrate their commitment to progress. Inclusion of ESG metrics in incentive compensation is often seen as a key part in publicly demonstrating this commitment. As a result, ESG metrics have proliferated throughout incentive plans.

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Indirect Investor Protection

Holger Spamann is the Lawrence R. Grove Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. This post is based on his recent paper.

In a paper just posted on SSRN, I argue that the central mechanisms protecting most investors in public securities markets—beyond deterring theft, fraud, and fees—are indirect. They do not rely on actions by the investors or by any private actor directly charged with looking after investors’ interests, such as their fund managers. Rather, investors’ main protections are provided as a byproduct of the (mostly) self-interested but mutually and legally constrained behavior of (mostly) sophisticated third parties without a mandate to help the investors, such as speculators, activists, and plaintiff lawyers. This elucidates key rules, resolves the mandatory vs. enabling tension in corporate/securities law, and exposes passive investing’s fragile reliance on others’ trading.

My argument that the key protective mechanisms are indirect contrasts with the standard view in most policy discourse. According to the standard view, investors are protected directly by the governance rights and information that companies provide them, and by the investment professionals—particularly fund managers—that they may employ to digest this information and exercise their rights. But retail investors cannot possibly digest the necessary information themselves. Their fund managers might, but theory and empirics suggest they will be at most partially effective. Passive (index) funds eschew selection of investments by definition and, competing on costs, have low incentives, if any, to exercise governance rights. Actively managed funds have better but, barred from charging performance fees, still weak incentives, and in any event have historically been mostly inactive in governance and notoriously underperformed the market, at least net of fees. Some other institutional investors are more able, but many struggle as much as retail funds, or more.

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CEO Succession Practices in the Russell 3000 and S&P 500 2021 Edition

Matteo Tonello is Managing Director of ESG Research at The Conference Board, Inc., Jason D. Schloetzer is Associate Professor of Business Administration at the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown University, and Francine McKenna is an independent journalist and Adjunct Professor of international business in the MBA program at American University’s Kogod School of Business. This post is based on CEO Succession Practices in the Russell 3000 and S&P 500: 2021 Edition, published by The Conference Board, Heidrick & Struggles, and ESGAUGE.

CEO Succession Practices in the Russell 3000 and S&P 500: 2021 Edition reviews succession event announcements about chief executive officers made at Russell 3000 and S&P 500 companies in 2020 and, for the S&P 500, the previous 19 years. The project is a collaboration among The Conference Board, executive search firm Heidrick & Struggles, and ESG data analytics firm ESGAUGE.

Data from CEO Succession Practices in the Russell 3000 and S&P 500: 2021 Edition can be accessed and visualized through an interactive online dashboard. The dashboard is organized into five parts.

Part I: CEO Succession Rates illustrates year-by-year succession rates and examines the effects on those rates of firm performance and CEO age—two critical determinants of top leadership changes. The section also includes details on forced versus voluntary CEO successions.

Part II: CEO Profile provides demographic statistics on CEOs currently serving in the Russell 3000 and S&P 500 indexes—including their age, age diversity, gender, tenure, and tenure diversity.

Part III: Departing CEOs and Part IV: Incoming CEOs are similarly structured, with the demographic profile of departing and incoming CEOs, the balance between incoming and departing female CEOs, and a review of the reasons (where stated) for CEO departures.

Part V: Placement Type and Other Practices complements the information of the previous sections with data on CEO placement type (whether an inside promotion or an outside hire), the tenure-in-company of inside CEO appointments, the inside appointment of “seasoned executives” who have been with the company for 20 years or longer, and the appointments as CEO of non-executive directors. The section ends with data on other succession practices, such as the joint election of incoming CEOs as board chairs, the choice of interim CEOs during phases of leadership transition, and the quarterly distribution of CEO succession announcement and effectiveness dates.

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Supreme Court Gives More Tools for Defendants to Challenge Class Certification in Securities Fraud Cases

Stephen L. Ascher and Ali M. Arain are partners and Reanne Zheng is an associate at Jenner & Block LLP. This post is based on a Jenner memorandum by Mr. Ascher, Mr. Arain, Ms. Zheng, and Howard S. Suskin. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Rethinking Basic by Lucian Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell (discussed on the Forum here).

Introduction

On June 21, 2021, the US Supreme Court issued its decision in Goldman Sachs Group Inc. v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System, [1] providing guidance to lower courts regarding class certification in securities fraud class actions. On balance, the opinion favors defendants, and potentially signals a backlash against the tide of securities fraud class actions based on vague and generic misstatements. Importantly, the Court instructed that all relevant evidence should be considered when making the class certification decision, sending a message that lower courts must grapple with and cannot ignore relevant evidence at the class certification stage simply because it overlaps with the merits-related evidence. The Court also stressed that the generic nature of a misrepresentation is often important evidence of lack of price impact, which lower courts should consider when deciding whether to grant or deny a class certification motion.

Although the Supreme Court’s decision was not as sweeping as the defendants wanted, it does signal the Supreme Court’s concern that companies are too frequently held liable for securities fraud as a result of adverse legal or business developments, even where the company had never made any specific statements about the matters in question.

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