Yearly Archives: 2021

Congress Passes the “Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act”

Andrew Olmem, Christina Thomas, and Jason Elder are partners at Mayer Brown LLP. This post is based on their Mayer Brown memorandum.

Foreign public companies listed in the United States may soon face delisting if their auditors cannot comply with US investor protection laws. On December 2, 2020, the US House of Representatives passed by voice vote the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act (HFCAA), which would require auditors of foreign public companies to allow the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to inspect their audit work papers for audits of non-US operations as required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley). If a company’s auditors fail to comply for three consecutive years, then the company’s shares would be prohibited from trading in the United States. The legislation passed the Senate in May and is now being sent to President Donald Trump, who is expected to sign it into law.

The HFCAA aims to address restrictions China has placed on the PCAOB’s ability to inspect or investigate PCAOB-registered public accounting firms in connection with their audits of Chinese companies. Sarbanes-Oxley created the PCAOB “to oversee the audit of public companies that are subject to the securities laws, and related matters, in order to protect the interests of investors and further the public interest in the preparation of informative, accurate, and independent audit reports for companies the securities of which are sold to, and held by and for, public investors.” [1] Specifically, the PCAOB is responsible for registering public accounting firms, establishing standards applicable to the preparation of audit reports for companies, conducting inspections and investigations of public accounting firms to ensure they are complying with those standards, and bringing enforcement actions when they are not. [2]

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Office of Investor Advocate Report on Activities

Rick Fleming is Investor Advocate at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on the 2020 Office of Investor Advocate Report on Activities. The views expressed in this post are those of Mr. Fleming and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff.

Like the other offices and divisions of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the COVID-19 pandemic necessitated changes to our work environment, with team members working remotely through much of the fiscal year. The pandemic also affected our workload. For example, we organized and hosted two ad hoc virtual meetings of the Investor Advisory Committee (IAC) so that its members could provide timely, on-the-ground feedback to the Commission regarding the impacts of COVID-19 on businesses and financial markets.

We commend the Commission for its response to the challenges of the pandemic. Staff and leadership of the Commission reacted quickly to changing dynamics, and they demonstrated remarkable commitment and flexibility. This alleviated many of the strains in the financial system that could have had devastating consequences for investors.

On the other hand, the rulemaking agenda of the SEC was often disappointing for investor advocates this year. As described in this report, the Commission engaged in numerous rulemakings of a deregulatory nature. While these typically were characterized as efforts to “modernize” or “streamline” regulations, they often had the effect of diminishing investor protections. Meanwhile, several modernizations sought by investors were not addressed. For example, the Commission did not prioritize repairs to the antiquated infrastructure of the proxy voting system, bypassed opportunities to make disclosures machine-readable, and failed to establish a coherent framework for the disclosure of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) matters that could influence a company’s long-term performance.

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Corporate Governance Survey — 2020 Proxy Season Results

David A. Bell is partner at Fenwick & West LLP. This post is based on his Fenwick memorandum.

As outside legal counsel to a wide range of public companies in the technology and life sciences industries, many of which are based in Silicon Valley, Fenwick has collected information on corporate governance in order to counsel our clients on best practices and industry norms. We have collected this data since 2003 and believe this unique body of information is useful for all Silicon Valley companies as well as other public companies in the United States and their advisors.

Fenwick’s annual survey covers a variety of corporate governance practices and data for the companies included in the Standard & Poor’s 100 Index (S&P 100), which are often presented as a desired norm, compared to the technology and life sciences companies included in the Fenwick – Bloomberg Law Silicon Valley 150 List (SV 150), where the needs and circumstances of public companies can be quite different.

Comparative data is presented for the S&P 100 companies and the SV 150, as well as trend information over the history of the survey. In a number of instances the report also presents data showing comparison of the top 15 (which are of a scale similar to the S&P 100), top 50, middle 50 and bottom 50 companies of the SV 150 (in terms of revenue), illustrating the impact of scale on the relevant governance practices.

This in-depth survey was developed as a resource for board members, senior executives, in house legal counsel and their advisors, based in Silicon Valley and throughout the United States.

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A Letter to the SEC Chairman

Elizabeth Warren is U.S. Senator from Massachusetts. This post is based on her letter to outgoing SEC Chairman Jay Clayton.

I am writing in regards to the notice that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or the Commission) will, on Wednesday, December 16, 2020, consider adopting rules that “will require resource extraction issuers to disclose payments made to the U.S. federal government or foreign governments for the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals.” [1] While these rules are mandated by Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), [2] which requires “that all oil, gas, and mineral companies on the

U.S. stock exchange disclose any payments they make to foreign governments for licenses or permits for development,” [3] the SEC’s proposal fails to combat corruption and hold bad actors accountable. Instead, the SEC’s proposal “would make such disclosures so general as to be of little value.” [4] Rather than rushing to push through a grievously flawed final rule in the final few days of the Trump administration and your tenure as SEC chair, the Commission should not hold a vote on the rule until these concerns are addressed.

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The New Paradigm in the C-Suite and the Boardroom

Martin Lipton is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell memorandum by Mr. Lipton, Steven A. Rosenblum, and Karessa L. Cain. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here);  For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); and Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism by Leo E. Strine, Jr (discussed on the Forum here).

In October of 2015, we issued a paper—Will a New Paradigm for Corporate Governance Bring Peace to the Thirty Years’ War?—in which we questioned whether the growing recognition by investors of the adverse effects of short-termism and activism on corporate performance, as evidenced by the excessive risk-taking that culminated in the 2008-2010 financial crisis, would mitigate or reverse the acute pressure felt in C-suites and boardrooms to maximize near-term value for shareholders. In reflecting on this question with the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that much has changed since 2015, and there has been real progress toward restoring a more long-term, sustainable orientation. Yet, at the same time, it remains to be seen whether ESG, stakeholder governance and other principles of the new governance paradigm will continue to gain traction and have a concrete, enduring impact on the long-term foundation of our economy and society—including in terms of employee well-being, environmental sustainability, infrastructure and other capital investments, and long-term competitiveness.

Indeed, the concept of shareholder primacy, and the empowerment of shareholders in pursuit of short-term agendas, has deep roots in our business culture. It had been popularized by Milton Friedman in the 1960s, it soon dominated the thinking in the business schools, and it fueled the takeover activity of the 1970s and 80s. Shareholder primacy was embraced by both the Council of Institutional Investors and Institutional Shareholder Services when they were established in 1985, and drove the evolution of corporate governance through the balance of the century and until the financial crisis.

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Weekly Roundup: January 1–7, 2020


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of January 1–7, 2020.

Preparing Your 2020 Form 20-F



Preparing for Shareholder Activism in 2021


Appraisal Waivers


BlackRock’s 2021 Policy Guidance


Up or Out: Resetting Norms for Peer Reviewed Publishing in the Social Sciences




Say-on-Pay Votes and Compensation Disclosures


Effective Delegation in Advisory Agreements


Rethinking Corporate Prosecutions


Another Year of Virtual Shareholder Meetings


Board Memo 2021: A Guide to Taking On the Recovery Era


Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock

Leo E. Strine, Jr., the former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, is a Senior Fellow at the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance; Ira M. Millstein Distinguished Senior Fellow at the Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Governance at Columbia Law School; Michael L. Wachter Distinguished Fellow in Law and Policy at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School; and Of Counsel at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on his recent paper. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here); Purpose With Meaning: A Practical Way Forward by Robert Eccles, Leo E. Strine, Jr., and Timothy Youmans (discussed on the Forum here)The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); and For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here).

In his excellent article, For Whom is the Corporation Managed in 2020?: The Debate Over Corporate Purpose, Professor Edward Rock articulates his understanding of the debate over corporate purpose and surfaces four separate, but related, questions that views as central to that debate:

First, what is the best theory of the legal form we call “the corporation”? Second, how should academic finance understand the properties of the legal form when building models or engaging in empirical research? Third, what are good management strategies for building valuable firms? And, finally, what are the social roles and obligations of large publicly traded firms?

Professor Rock argues that “populist pressures” have led contestants to the debate to confuse the separate questions he highlights. He finishes by fearing that these populist pressures could bring about changes to long-standing principles of American corporate governance that would result in more harm than benefit.

In Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy, I reply to and echo Professor Rock’s depiction of the current state of corporate law in the United States, applauding his willingness to be accurate about the actual state of affairs in a debate where all too many obscure the state of the law. I also accept Professor Rock’s contention that finance and law and economics professors tend to equate the value of corporations to society solely with the value of their equity. But, I employ a less academic lens on the current debate about corporate purpose, and am more optimistic about proposals to change our corporate governance system so that it better supports a fair and sustainable economy.

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Board Memo 2021: A Guide to Taking On the Recovery Era

Pamela Marcogliese and Ethan Klingsberg are partners and Elizabeth Bieber is counsel at Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP. This post is based on their Freshfields memorandum.

Managing environmental, social and governance considerations

While ESG has been steadily increasing in importance year after year, the pandemic has catapulted the “E” (environmental) and the “S” (social) to the top of board agendas. As boards and management teams prepare for, and adapt to, the recovery period ahead, strategic and deliberate management and disclosure of E and S topics will provide a competitive advantage. In particular, boards should be mindful that:

  • investors and proxy advisory firms alike will be carefully scrutinizing executive compensation-related modifications in the proxy season ahead, and therefore companies should carefully craft disclosure explaining any changes;
  • as a result of mounting pressure from investors and other stakeholders—as well as recently adopted SEC rules focused on human capital management—companies will need to disclose more information about how they manage their most important asset, their workforce;
  • companies will also need to steer clear of new trends in litigation focused on diversity by ensuring they have a robust process for developing internal diversity-related goals and for disclosing their diversity initiatives, as well as avoid allegations of human rights violations by reviewing the adequacy of corporate compliance and supply chain programs;
  • investors and other stakeholders are expecting to see additional climate and other environmental-related disclosures, especially as the SASB and TCFD frameworks gain increasing traction, and the SEC is expected to adopt climate-related environmental disclosure requirements in 2021; and
  • there is mounting evidence that this focus on ESG and sustainability has concrete economic benefits for companies, as those with better ESG profiles and track records tend to have equity (and debt) that trades more favorably than companies with poorer performance, underpinning the expectation that the growing trends of green and other sustainability bonds will continue in 2021.

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Another Year of Virtual Shareholder Meetings

Brian V. Breheny and Joseph M. Yaffe are partners and Caroline S. Kim is an associate at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. This post is based on a memorandum by Mr. Breheny, Mr. Yaffe, Ms. Kim, and other Skadden attorneys.

During the first half of 2020, the number of public companies holding virtual annual meetings sky rocketed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, increasing almost fivefold compared to the 2019 calendar year, with Broadridge Financial Solutions, a public corporate services company (Broadridge), alone hosting nearly 1,500 virtual shareholder meetings. [1] Looking ahead, due to the uncertainty relating to the COVID-19 pandemic, companies should prepare for the possibility of needing to hold virtual annual meetings during the 2021 proxy season. [2]

Lessons From 2020 Virtual Meetings

Despite how quickly many companies had to shift their annual meetings from an in-person to a virtual format during the 2020 proxy season, companies were generally able to successfully hold virtual annual meetings and allow investors to participate. Some companies experienced technical issues or had difficulty scheduling their virtual meetings, however, due to the influx of companies relying on the same technology to hold such meetings. To prevent these issues from occurring this upcoming season, companies should engage early with virtual meeting service providers to schedule their meetings, discuss how best to handle technical difficulties, and learn how virtual meeting platforms have evolved in response to company and investor feedback during the 2020 proxy season. In addition, companies should consider investor feedback regarding their 2020 shareholder meetings when drafting related proxy statement disclosure and planning for their next meeting.

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Rethinking Corporate Prosecutions

John C. Coffee, Jr. is Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law and Director of the Center on Corporate Governance at Columbia University Law School. This post is based on his recent book, Corporate Crime and Punishment: The Crisis of Underenforcement.

Today, a familiar pattern plays out over and over in corporate prosecutions. A U.S. Attorney’s Office begins an investigation and quickly finds its scope will overwhelm their logistical capacity. For example, it may be a Foreign Corrupt Practices case that spans six countries and three continents, has thousands of documents, millions of emails, and at least 50 persons (speaking eight languages) who need to be questioned at length. The U.S. Attorney can assign three AUSAs to this case and hopefully find some FBI agents and maybe an SEC staffer or two to work on it. That is a mismatch.

As a result, almost inevitably in the case of larger corporations with decentralized structures, the U.S. Attorney will agree to the defendant hiring an independent law firm to conduct a detailed investigation and prepare a lengthy and costly report (which can cost up to a $100 million). The implicit deal is that the prosecutors will approve a deferred prosecution agreement that spares the company a criminal conviction (and thus the risk of collateral civil liability in follow-on actions). As a result, much of the investigatory work traditionally conducted by prosecutors has now been outsourced—delegated to private counsel hired by the defendants. Critics have claimed that this de facto system reflects political cowardice or agency capture of the enforcers. They may be sometimes correct, but the bigger problem is logistics. In the Lehman investigation, where the company was bankrupt and could not pay for an expensive investigation, neither the SEC nor the U.S. Attorney did much of anything. The final Lehman CFO was not even interviewed. Eventually, the bankruptcy court retained Jenner & Block to serve as an examiner, and it diligently prepared a thorough report, which took 130 of its attorneys, 14 months, and resulted in a $53.5 million fee to that firm. Even if one suspects that that fee was slightly padded (as bankruptcy examiner fees tend to be), that is several orders of magnitude above what a federal agency can afford.

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