Subodh Mishra is Managing Director at Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. This post is based on an ISS memorandum by Fassil Michael, Head of Thought Leadership for ISS Governance.
Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Politics and Gender in the Executive Suite (discussed on the Forum here) by Alma Cohen, Moshe Hazan, and David Weiss; Will Nasdaq’s Diversity Rules Harm Investors? (discussed on the Forum here) by Jesse M. Fried; and Duty and Diversity (discussed on the Forum here) by Chris Brummer and Leo E. Strine, Jr.
The summer of 2020 was a turning point in the push for corporate diversity and inclusion initiatives. The tragic murder of George Floyd and the reactions that followed it resulted in demands for racial equality and anti-racism measures that resounded across the globe, including the corporate world.
Subsequently, many companies pledged to do their part to address inequalities and, likewise, many investors began to seriously reflect on their racial and ethnic diversity policies. Some investors adopted or strengthened their proxy voting policies demanding greater transparency from their portfolio companies around racial and ethnic diversity information, believing that which cannot be measured cannot be managed. Others adopted explicit requirements on board diversity in the form of minimum absolute number or percentage of corporate board seats going to racially/ethnically diverse director candidates. As the ISS board diversity data shows, there has been visible progress since 2020 in the number of racially/ethnically diverse directors on US company boards, and this uptick in diversity and inclusion initiatives has been dubbed by some “The George Floyd Effect”.
Taking a measurement point at the end of every US proxy season, two years on, the results show racial/ethnic diversity increases on U.S. boards, both at large- and mid-caps. The graph below shows that the percentage of Russell 3000 companies with no racial/ethnic diversity on their boards went down from 38 percent in 2020 to 10 percent in 2022. The percentage of companies with one racially/ethnically diverse director increased slightly from 32 percent in 2020 to 35 percent in 2022. Additionally, the percentage of companies with two or more racially/ethnically diverse directors went up from 29 percent in 2020 to 55 percent in 2022.
SEC Proposed Reforms of SPACs: A Comment from Andrew Tuch
More from: Andrew Tuch
Andrew F. Tuch is Professor of Law at Washington University in St. Louis. This post is based on his comment letter submitted to the SEC. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes SPAC Law and Myths (discussed on the Forum here) by John C. Coates, IV.
The Securities and Exchange Commission released proposed rules for special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs), shell companies, and projections (the Release). In a comment letter I filed with the SEC, I provide a critical assessment of this proposal.
The Commission proposed far-reaching changes intended to enhance investor protections and align disclosure and liability rules in de-SPACs more closely with those in traditional IPOs. An under-appreciated feature of the proposed reforms is that they would subject de-SPACs to provisions closely modeled on Rule 13e-3 of the Exchange Act, which applies to going-private transactions, including management buyouts. Intended to tackle potential conflicts of interest and other abuses, Rule 13e-3 requires extensive disclosures about the substantive fairness of going-private transactions and must be carefully navigated by transaction planners. Although I discuss other aspects of the proposed reforms in my comment letter, I focus here on the proposed rules modeled on Rule 13e-3.
Of these rules, proposed Items 1606 and 1607 are the most important. They would require SPACs to state whether they reasonably believe the de-SPAC and any related financing transaction are fair to the SPAC’s unaffiliated security holders and to discuss the material factors upon which such belief is based (Item 1606). They would also require SPACs to state whether the SPAC or SPAC sponsor has received any report, opinion, or appraisal from an outside party relating to the transaction and summarize that third party opinion, among other matters (Item 1607).
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