Yearly Archives: 2022

Top 5 SEC Enforcement Developments

Haimavathi MarlierJina Choi, and Michael Birnbaum are Partners at Morrison & Foerster LLP. This post is based on their Morrison & Foerster memorandum.

In order to provide an overview for busy in-house counsel and compliance professionals, we summarize below some of the most important SEC enforcement developments from the past month, which was an active one as the SEC Division of Enforcement closed out its fiscal year. This month we examine:

  • A rare Regulation FD action that could be headed to a jury trial;
  • Charges against a broker-dealer and investment adviser for failing to guard 15 million customers’ personally identifiable information, or “PII”;
  • An insider trading action involving an allegedly improper Rule 10b5-1 plan;
  • A significant negligence settlement against a major aerospace company and its former CEO for failing to disclose safety issues in public statements regarding airplane crashes; and
  • A settlement with 16 registrants assessing penalties totaling more than $1 billion for employees’ use of off-channel, and therefore unpreserved, communications to conduct firm business.

1. Reg FD Litigation Appears to Be Headed to Trial After SDNY Judge Dismisses Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment

On September 8, 2022, Judge Engelmayer of SDNY denied cross-motions for summary judgment in SEC v. AT&T, Inc. et al. and set a Reg FD litigation on a course to trial for the first time. As discussed in detail in MoFo’s recent client alert, in March 2021, the SEC filed a complaint against AT&T and three investor relations (IR) executives alleging violations of Reg FD, which prohibits a public company from providing selective disclosures of MNPI to particular persons outside the company, without also disclosing such information to the public. The SEC alleged that, in March and April of 2016, AT&T and members of its IR department violated Reg FD by disclosing AT&T’s “projected and actual financial results” to “stock analysts from approximately 20 Wall Street firms on a one-on-one basis” in an effort to lower consensus revenue estimates for Q1 2016 so that AT&T would not fall short. According to the complaint, AT&T’s conduct came on the heels of missed consensus revenue estimates in two of the previous three quarters. As alleged, AT&T’s selective disclosures of MNPI prompted these analysts to significantly reduce their revenue estimates for Q1 2016, and AT&T ended up exceeding these projections by 0.1%.

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Seven Key Considerations for a Reverse Stock Split by a Delaware Corporation

Jeremy Barr is Counsel, Valerie Ford Jacob is Global Co-head of Capital Markets & Partner, and Pamela Marcogliese is a Partner at Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP. This post is based on their Freshfields memorandum and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Given recent stock market declines, many listed companies currently trade at substantially reduced share prices relative to earlier in 2022. Reduced share prices can cause many challenges for a listed company, one of which is that if a company listed on the NYSE or Nasdaq trades below $1.00 per share over 30 consecutive trading days, the company may be delisted by the applicable exchange. One of the principal ways companies seek to increase their share price and, if applicable, maintain their listing eligibility is by implementing a reverse stock split (sometimes referred to as a share consolidation). Below, we discuss some of the key issues for a board of directors and management team to consider when weighing the costs and benefits of a reverse stock split.

What is a reverse stock split?

In a reverse stock split, a company reclassifies its issued and outstanding shares into a smaller number of shares (for instance, every five outstanding shares are reclassified into one share). When the reverse stock split becomes effective, outstanding shares are exchanged for a lower quantity of shares based on the designated ratio, and these “post-split” shares trade under a new CUSIP number. At least at the outset, the company’s stock price increases in the same proportion as the number of shares decreases.

What triggers delisting on the NYSE or Nasdaq?

Both the NYSE and Nasdaq require listed companies to maintain a share price above $1.00.

  • The NYSE will issue a deficiency letter to a listed company if the average closing price of its shares is less than $1.00 over a 30 consecutive trading-day period. NYSE listed companies must notify the NYSE within 10 business days of receipt of the deficiency notice of either their intent to cure or to be subject to the exchange’s suspension and delisting procedures. NYSE listed companies have six months to cure the deficiency following receipt of the deficiency letter. The cure period can be extended to the company’s next annual meeting if a shareholder vote is required to approve the reverse stock split (even if beyond six months from receipt of the deficiency letter).
  • Nasdaq will issue a deficiency letter to a listed company if its shares fail to satisfy the $1.00 minimum closing bid price requirement for 30 consecutive business days. Like companies listed on the NYSE, Nasdaq listed companies have a 180-day period to cure the deficiency following receipt of the deficiency letter. However, unlike the NYSE, a second 180-day period is available for companies listed on the Nasdaq Capital Market tier if the company satisfies the $1 million market value of publicly held shares requirement and meets all other initial inclusion requirements of the Nasdaq Capital Market (other than the $1.00 closing bid). Companies listed on the Nasdaq Global Select Market or Nasdaq Global Market tiers that are unable to comply with the initial 180-day compliance period may transfer to the Nasdaq Capital Market to take advantage of the additional 180-day compliance period offered by that tier.

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Shareholder Voting Trends (2018-2022)

Matteo Tonello is Managing Director of ESG Research at The Conference Board, Inc. This post relates to Shareholder Voting Trends Live Dashboard, an online dashboard published by The Conference Board in partnership with ESG data analytics firm ESGAUGE and in collaboration with Russell Reynolds Associates and Rutgers Center for Corporate Law and Governance. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Social Responsibility Resolutions (discussed on the Forum here) by Scott Hirst.

This post provides an overview of shareholder resolutions filed at Russell 3000 and S&P 500 companies through mid-July 2022, including trends regarding the volume and topics of shareholder proposals, the level of support received by those proposals when put to a vote, and the types of proposal sponsors. The report is accompanied by a Live Dashboard, which contains the most current figures and enables data cuts by market index, business sectors, and company size groups. Please refer to the dashboard for the most recent data.

This commentary offers insights for what may lie ahead in the following areas:

  • The continued increase in the number of shareholder proposals related to social and environmental policies of the company.
  • Shareholder expectations regarding climate-related targets and disclosure.
  • The success of many shareholder proposals on civil rights or racial equity audits.
  • The alignment of corporate political activity and the firm’s stated values.
  • The pressure on smaller public companies to endorse governance practices that are now widely used by their larger counterparts.
  • The emerging link between softening support for director elections and company say-on-pay support levels, on the one hand, and investors’ dissatisfaction with corporate ESG performance, on the other.

The project is conducted by The Conference Board and ESG data analytics firm ESGAUGE, in collaboration with leadership advisory and search firm Russell Reynolds Associates and Rutgers University’s Center for Corporate Law and Governance (CCLG).

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Lawsuit Against Meta Invokes Modern Portfolio Theory To Protect Diversified Shareholders

Frederick Alexander is the CEO of The Shareholder Commons. This post is based on the class action filed against the directors of Meta Platforms (formerly Facebook, Inc.), and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

New Lawsuit Argues that Directors Failed to Consider Portfolio Impacts of Corporate Decisions

On Monday, October 3, a class action was filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery against the directors of Meta Platforms (formerly Facebook, Inc.), alleging that they breached their fiduciary duties by ignoring the impact of the company’s operations on the diversified portfolios of its shareholders. Among other matters, the McRitchie v Zuckerberg complaint challenges (1) the conduct revealed by Frances Haugen, the “Facebook Whistleblower,” (2) the large distributions of cash made to shareholders through stock repurchases, and (3) the board’s rejection of shareholder proposals that would have helped discern the broader impact of the company’s business model.

The complaint is based on the traditional shareholder primacy model, which provides that directors have fiduciary duties to the holders of a company’s residual equity–generally its common shareholders. It does not seek to expand those duties to encompass other stakeholders. However, the complaint does drill down on an issue that courts have yet to fully address: the fiduciary implication of the fact that modern investors are generally diversified, so that their interests extend beyond (and may be in opposition to) the maximization of the value of future cash flows to be received from owning a company’s shares.

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Losing Control? The 20-Year Decline in Loan Covenant Violations

Tom Griffin is an Assistant Professor of Finance at Villanova University, Villanova School of Business, Greg Nini is an Associate Professor of Finance at Drexel University, LeBow College of Business, and David Smith is the Virginia Bankers Association Eminent Professor of Commerce at the University of Virginia, McIntire School of Commerce. This post is based on their recent paper

In our paper, Losing Control? The 20-Year Decline in Loan Covenant Violations, we show that the annual proportion of U.S. public firms that report a financial covenant violation dropped by nearly 70% over the last 20 years. Given that these “tripwires” serve as an important tool for lenders seeking to protect their financial claim prior to payment default, the secular trend has drawn concern from policymakers and industry professionals. For example, a member of the U.S. Senate Banking Committee warned that “the large leveraged lending market exhibits many of the characteristics of the pre-2008 subprime mortgage market. These loans are generally poorly underwritten and include few protections for lenders.”

We highlight that the role of financial covenants in incomplete contracting theory is not to grant decision rights to lenders in as many states as possible, but rather to allocate control to the party with greatest incentive to make a value-maximizing decision. Borrowers retain decision rights in normal states because their payoff structure generally incentivizes joint surplus maximization, but lenders have the right to intervene when incentive conflicts are likely to bias borrowers toward inefficient behavior. Since agency problems worsen as borrowers approach financial distress, the transfer of control rights is contingent on a signal that imperfectly captures the underlying economics of the borrower.

Adopting terminology from medical diagnostic testing, a more restrictive covenant package is beneficial because it has a lower probability of a false negative outcome, in which the borrower is distressed but fails to violate a covenant. However, we stress that a more restrictive covenant package is costly because it creates a higher probability of a false positive outcome, in which the borrower violates despite not being financially distressed.

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Weekly Roundup: October 28-November 3, 2022


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of October 28-November 3, 2022

SEC’s New Pay Versus Performance Disclosure Rule: Important Things To Know


Remarks by Commissioner Uyeda at the Georgetown Law Hotel and Lodging Summit


Statement by Commissioner Peirce on Final Rule Amendments Regarding Shareholder Reports


Statement by Chair Gensler on Final Rule Amendments Regarding Shareholder Reports




Stakeholderism Silo Busting




Lessons from Twitter v. Musk on Access to Directors’ and Executives’ Emails


ESG Trends – What the boards of all companies should know about ESG regulatory trends in Europe


Remarks by Commissioner Crenshaw at the Inaugural ECGI Responsible Capitalism Summit


Twenty-Year Review of Audit and Non-Audit Fee Trends


2022 ISS Global Benchmark Policy Survey


A Survey of Private Debt Funds



Statement by Commissioner Uyeda on Final Amendments to Form N-PX


Statement by Chair Gensler on Final Amendments to Form N-PX


Statement by Chair Gensler on Final Amendments to Form N-PX

Gary Gensler is Chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on his recent public statement. The views expressed in this post are those of Chair Gensler, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Staff.

Today, the Commission will consider whether to adopt final amendments to bring greater detail, consistency, and usability to the proxy voting information reported on Form N-PX. I am pleased to support these amendments because, if adopted, they will allow investors to better understand and analyze how their funds and managers are voting on shares held on their behalf. Further, part of this final rule fulfills a mandate from Congress directing the SEC to require institutional investment managers to report votes on certain executive compensation matters, or “say on pay.”

Form N-PX was first adopted in 2003 with a basic principle: that investors be informed of how funds voted shares held on their behalf. These proxy votes include voting on boards of directors, merger proposals, or other matters.

Before adopting Form N-PX in 2003, funds didn’t have to disclose their proxy votes. In the two decades since, investors have said they would benefit from more readily usable information, and from more information.

Thus, today’s rule addresses these concerns in three key ways. First, it amends Form N-PX to provide investors with more detailed information about proxy votes. Second, it establishes 14 standardized categories in Form N-PX, creating more consistency around how funds describe their proxy votes. Third, it structures Form N-PX in a machine-readable format so that investors can analyze this information electronically.

This rulemaking also will require institutional investment managers to disclose how they voted on “say-on-pay” matters, which fulfills the mandate under section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. Additionally, the amendments require filers to disclose the number of shares that they’ve loaned to short sellers and others but not recalled, and thus were not voted by the filer. This would provide investors with additional information into how a filer’s securities lending activities may affect its proxy voting.

Together, these enhancements to Form N-PX would make it more useful, and more usable, to investors.

We benefited from more than 50 comments from the public during the rulemaking process. In particular, based on this feedback, the final version of this rule reduced the number of categories on the form and streamlined the filing process for funds and managers who have a stated policy of not voting on proxies. These changes from the proposal will make the filing process more efficient.

I am pleased to support today’s final amendments. I’d like to thank the members of the SEC staff who worked on this rule, including:

  • Christian Corkery, David Driscoll, Nathan Schuur, Tim Dulaney, Trevor Tatum, Bradley Gude, Angela Mokodean, Brian Johnson, Sarah ten Siethoff, and William Birdthistle in the Division of Investment Management;
  • Hanna Lee, Andrew Glickman, PJ Hamidi, Gregory Scopino, Alex Schiller, Julie Marlowe, Michael Willis, and Jessica Wachter in the Division of Economic Risk and Analysis;
  • Bob Bagnall, Amy Scully, Natalie Shioji, Malou Huth, and Meridith Mitchell in the Office of the General Counsel;
  • Mavis Kelly and Song Brandon in the Division of Examinations;
  • Corey Schuster and Andrew Dean in the Division of Enforcement; and
  • Dan Chang in the EDGAR Business Office.

Statement by Commissioner Uyeda on Final Amendments to Form N-PX

Mark T. Uyeda is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on his recent public statement. The views expressed in the post are those of Commissioner Uyeda, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Staff.

Thank you, Chair Gensler, and thanks to the staff for the presentation.

Today, we consider sweeping changes to fund proxy vote reporting.[1] Since 2003, registered funds have been required to report their proxy votes annually on Form N-PX by briefly identifying the proxy voting matter, and disclosing whether 1) the fund voted for, against or abstained, and 2) it voted for or against management, among other information.

In September 2021, the Commission proposed so-called “enhanced reporting” for proxy votes by requiring funds to present voting matters in a particular order and categorize them into 17 different categories. Funds also would have been required to disclose the number of votes cast, including whether these were split. More significantly, funds would have been required to disclose the number of shares on loan and not recalled, in addition to the number of shares voted.

The proposal further sought to implement the Dodd-Frank Act’s mandate for firms meeting the definition of “institutional investment manager” under section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”) to report at least annually how they voted on any “say-on-pay” vote. [2]

Before discussing the merits of the final rule, I am disappointed by the lack of a detailed comment summary. I have been involved in rulemaking at the Commission for over 16 years. A basic fundamental of good rulemaking is the preparation of a detailed comment summary. We categorize all relevant comments by specific subject matter to ensure that we have not overlooked any comments in the public file. The staff takes great care to prepare that document for its own use and for use by the Commission.

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Remarks by Chair Gensler Before the Practising Law Institute’s 54th Annual Institute on Securities

Gary Gensler is Chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on his recent public statement. The views expressed in this post are those of Chair Gensler, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Staff.

My thanks to the Practising Law Institute and the 54th Annual Institute on Securities Regulation. As is customary, I’d like to note that my views are my own, and I am not speaking on behalf of my fellow Commissioners or the SEC staff.

On May 27, 1933, when he signed the first of the federal securities laws, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt said: “This law and its effective administration are steps in a program to restore some old-fashioned standards of rectitude.”[1]

For nearly 90 years since, Congress has tasked the Securities and Exchange Commission and our dedicated staff with this “effective administration.”

We do this through overseeing markets, registering entities, enacting rules, examining against the rules, and enforcing those rules.

Today, I am going to focus on that final pillar: enforcement.

In the fiscal year that just ended on September 30, 2022, we filed more than 700 actions. We obtained judgments and orders totaling $6.4 billion, including $4 billion in civil penalties.

These numbers, though, tell only part of the story.

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A Survey of Private Debt Funds

Steven N. Kaplan is the Neubauer Family Distinguished Service Professor of Entrepreneurship and Finance at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. This post is based on a recent paper by Professor Kaplan; Joern Block, Professor at the University of Trier; Young Soo Jang, a Ph.D. Student at University of Chicago Booth School of Business; and Anna Schulze a Ph. D. Student at University of Trier. 

After the Great Financial Crisis triggered tightening of banking regulation, corporate lending has increasingly migrated out of the banking sector. Private debt (PD) funds and collateralized loan obligation funds (CLOs) are two of the major types of nonbank intermediaries that have filled this gap. Private debt funds raise capital commitments through closed-end funds (like private equity) and make senior loans (like banks) directly to, mostly, middle-market firms (i.e. firms with annual revenue between $10 million and $1 billion). According to the 2022 Preqin Global Private Debt Report, private debt is projected to become the second-largest private capital asset class by 2023, following private equity (PE).

Despite its explosive growth, the private debt market remains relatively understudied. While previous studies have broadened our understanding of the private debt market (Chernenko et al, 2022; Davydiuk et al, 2021; Jang, 2022; Loumioti, 2019; Munday et al, 2018), each looks at a different segment of the market. There still is much that is not known about private debt funds, particularly compared to other types of intermediaries (banks, PE funds, and CLOs).

Accordingly, in this post, we survey and ask a broad set of questions to a meaningful group of private debt general partners (GPs). They comprise of 38 U.S. and 153 European private debt investors managing roughly 35% of assets under management (AuM) of the private debt market. Their predominant investment strategy is direct lending where the loan is bilaterally negotiated between a borrower and a single lender (or a small group of lenders) with an expectation hold the loan to maturity, which contrasts with most bank-syndicated loans that are often traded in the secondary market. Our survey loosely follows the framework used by Gompers, Kaplan, and Mukharlyamov (2016 and forthcoming) for PE GPs and Gompers, Gornall, Kaplan and Strebulaev (2020 and 2021) for venture capital (VC) GPs.

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