Yearly Archives: 2023

Securities Law Precedents, Legal Liability, and Financial Reporting Quality

Allen Huang is ​a Professor of Accounting at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. This post is based on an article forthcoming in Review of Finance by Professor Huang, Benedikt Franke, Reeyarn Zhiyang Li, and Hui Wang.

In the U.S., securities class actions (SCAs) are one of the most significant sources of legal liability for firms, allowing investors to potentially recoup investment losses caused by securities law violations. Although every legal system has a legislature that passes new securities laws and statutes, the doctrine of stare decisis grants judicial precedents a pivotal role in defining what qualifies as a securities law violation in the U.S. common-law system. Under the doctrine, each court should apply the principles and rules established in its own or a higher court’s prior rulings when deciding a case. Thus, the collection of rulings affects private enforcement of securities law and shapes firms’ litigation environment.

In a forthcoming article at the Review of Finance, we exploit the variations in securities law precedents across the U.S. Courts of Appeals—the circuit courts—to investigate how regional courts’ historical rulings influence firms’ legal liabilities related to financial misreporting. Despite the Supreme Court having ultimate jurisdiction over all cases, circuit courts effectively act as arbiters for the majority of SCAs. Each circuit establishes precedents through rulings on cases with distinct facts. Because case facts and random factors, such as the case sequence or judge assignments, affect ruling outcomes, each circuit’s precedent evolves in an idiosyncratic and path-dependent manner. The resulting different interpretations of the same securities law induce within-country and over-time variations in firms’ expected litigation costs associated with securities law violations.

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Important MFW Developments

Gail Weinstein is Senior Counsel, Steven Steinman and Steven Epstein are Partners at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP. This post is based on a Fried Frank memorandum by Ms. Weinstein, Mr. Steinman, Mr. Epstein, Erica Jaffe, Shant P. Manoukian, and Maxwell Yim, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

The MFW framework provides a pathway to business judgment review, rather than entire fairness review, of transactions involving a conflicted controller or a conflicted board (i.e., where a controller, or a majority of the board, has a personal interest in or will receive a non-ratable benefit from the transaction). The MWF prerequisites for business judgment review of such a transaction are that the transaction was, from the outset, conditioned on approval by both (i) an independent special committee of directors that fulfilled its duty of care and (ii) a majority of the unaffiliated stockholders in a fully informed, uncoerced vote. If such a transaction is challenged, and the MFW prerequisites were met, then any fiduciary breaches by the controller or directors are “cleansed”—with the result that any claims of breach of fiduciary duties are dismissed at the early pleading stage of litigation.

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Standardization and Innovation in Venture Capital Contracting: Evidence from Startup Company Charters

Robert Bartlett is the W. A. Franke Professor of Law and Business and faculty co-director of the Arthur and Toni Rembe Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford Law School. This post is based on his recent paper.

In 2003, a group of approximately two dozen lawyers specializing in venture capital (VC) finance embarked on a mission to standardize the financing documents utilized by VC firms for investments in US-based startups. The primary objective was to mitigate the transaction costs associated with memorializing the non-binding term sheet negotiated between a company and a VC investor. While a term sheet typically outlines the standard economic and governance terms (e.g., valuation, type of liquidation preference, the number of investor- and founder-appointed directors), translating these core “deal” terms into definitive financing documents often entailed further negotiation. This additional negotiation occurred as both investor and company counsel sought to converge on the precise contractual language that would legally govern the investment. The standardization project aimed to curtail this latter form of negotiation by establishing a standard “template” for each of the five documents used in US VC finance. Since December 2003, the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA) has hosted these templates on its website, leading to their colloquial reference as the “NVCA financing documents.”

In a forthcoming chapter written for The Research Handbook on the Structure of Private Equity and Venture Capital (B. Broughman and E. de Fontenay, eds.), I investigate the extent to which this standardization project has succeeded over the past two decades. To do so, I turn to a dataset of nearly 5,000 charters negotiated by VC investors and startup companies between 2004 and 2022 in connection with a company’s VC financing. While most contracts utilized in VC finance are not publicly available, a defining feature of a company’s charter is that it is both publicly-available and plays a pivotal role in VC financial contracting. In particular, a VC financing will require a startup to amend its charter to authorize a new class of securities that will be sold to investors (typically convertible preferred stock). Moreover, because the charter must define the rights, preferences and restrictions that apply to these securities, negotiation of the charter constitutes one of the most important facets of a VC financing transaction. For this reason, central to the NVCA financing documents is the NVCA model charter.

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2024 U.S. Proxy Season: Proxy Voting, Governance, and ESG Matters

Laura D. Richman is a Counsel at Mayer Brown LLP. This post is based on a Mayer Brown memorandum by Ms. Richman, Jennifer J. CarlsonLawrence A. CunninghamAnna T. Pinedo, and David A. Schuette.

Proxy Voting Matters

SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS

Shareholder Proposals in the 2023 Proxy Season. In November 2021, the staff of the Division of Corporation Finance (the “Staff”) of the SEC issued Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14L (“SLB 14L”),[1] rescinding Staff Legal Bulletins Nos. 14I, 14J and 14K. This action reversed positions the Staff had taken since 2017, with respect to the ordinary business grounds for excluding shareholder proposals from company proxy statements pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(7) and the economic relevance grounds for excluding shareholder proposals pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(5).

Specifically, SLB 14L announced that when evaluating whether a proposal may be excluded pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(7), the Staff “will no longer focus on determining the nexus between a policy issue and the company, but will instead focus on the social policy significance of the issue that is the subject of the shareholder proposal.” SLB 14L also applied a “measured approach to evaluating companies’ micromanagement arguments for exclusion pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(7), recognizing that proposals seeking detail or seeking to promote timeframes or methods do not per se constitute micromanagement.”

In addition, SLB 14L specified that proposals raising issues of broad social or ethical concern related to the company’s business may not be excluded under the economic relevance tests set forth in Rule 14a-8(i)(5), even if the relevant business falls below the “economic thresholds” specified by that ground for exclusion. SLB 14L has made it much more difficult for companies to exclude proposals under Rule 14a-8(i)(7) or Rule 14a-8(i)(5), particularly shareholder proposals addressing climate change or other environmental, social and governance (“ESG”) issues. For additional information regarding SLB 14L, see our Legal Update, “SEC Staff Issues Legal Bulletin Announcing Shift in Shareholder Proposal Review Process Ahead of 2022 Proxy Season,” dated November 8, 2021.[2]

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The Social Costs (and Benefits) of Dual-Class Stock

Gregory H. Shill is a Professor of Law at the University of Iowa College of Law. This post is based on his recent paper. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock (discussed on the Forum here), The Perils of Small-Minority Controllers (discussed on the Forum here), and Keynote Presentation on The Lifecycle Theory of Dual-Class Structures (discussed on the Forum here) all by Lucian Bebchuk and Kobi Kastiel.

Dual-class stock structures allow founders to sell equity in their company without giving up control. These devices accomplish this by creating one class of stock with extra voting rights for founders and another with lesser voting rights for the general public—or no votes at all. They enable a giant company to be legally controlled by just two people (in the case of Google, for example) or even a single man (e.g., Facebook). More and more technology companies have selected these structures at the initial public offering stage, including Palantir, Snapchat, Lyft, Airbnb, and Dropbox (as well as Google and Facebook), and in 2020 they accounted for a majority of the IPO market by value.

Dual-class stock has attracted considerable academic attention for its potential to insulate the founder’s idiosyncratic vision from market pressures—for good and for ill. However, the focus of these agency costs critiques is on the dual-class structure’s effects inside the firm. In a forthcoming article, I argue that important social implications of dual-class stock overflow the boundaries of the firm—in brief, that the structure generates the potential for significant benefits and costs for society. The article advocates for changes to SEC regulations to help mitigate the social costs and increase the social potential of dual-class stock.

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Boards Confront Evolving Risks and Pressures During Another Disruptive Year

Amy Rojik is Director and Founder of the BDO Center for Corporate Governance. This post is based on her BDO memorandum.

Amid ongoing volatility, boards are continuing to address an evolving risk landscape and contend with pushback on how environmental, social, and governance (ESG) risk factors should be addressed. While oversight of enterprise risk management is part of the board’s mandate, executing that remit has become a delicate balancing act.

As Blackrock CEO Larry Fink wrote in his 2023 letter to investors, many clients “want access to data to ensure that material sustainability risk factors that could impact long-term asset returns are incorporated into their investment decisions.” However, companies have also faced an increase in anti-ESG shareholder proposals, and Fink stated in June, “I’m not going to use the word ‘ESG’ because it’s been misused” for political gain. Despite “ESG” perhaps becoming a loaded term, it’s critical that directors not overlook material ESG risk factors.

BDO conducts periodic surveys of public company board directors to understand what they’re seeing in terms of emerging trends, significant risks, and opportunities, as well as how they are preparing to address them. Our latest Spring 2023 BDO Board Pulse Survey highlights several evolving risk areas during ongoing economic uncertainty.

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Statement by Chair Gensler on Final Rules Regarding Short Sale Activity

Gary Gensler is Chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on his recent statement. The views expressed in this post are those of Chair Gensler, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff.

Today, the Commission is voting to adopt rules to broaden the scope of short sale-related data available to regulators as well as the investing public. I am pleased to support this adoption because it will enhance the transparency of this important area of our markets.

In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, Congress directed the SEC to enhance the transparency of short selling of equity securities. In particular, the Dodd-Frank Act included a new Exchange Act section, 13f-2, which mandated that the SEC write rules for institutional investment managers’ disclosures of their short selling-related data. Congress did so even though the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) already had been making some disclosures with regard to short sale transactions.

Separately, since 1978, investment managers have had to report their long positions quarterly on so-called 13f filings. When Congress in Dodd-Frank mandated that the SEC write rules with regard to short selling disclosure, they did so by amending that same section, 13f. Congress, however, said that such reporting of short selling should be done monthly at a minimum.

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Statement by Commissioner Uyeda on Final Rules Regarding Short Sale Activity

Mark T. Uyeda is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on his recent statement. The views expressed in the post are those of Commissioner Uyeda, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Staff.

Thank you, Chair Gensler. Section 13(f)(2) of the Exchange Act requires the Commission to prescribe rules providing for the public disclosure of the name of the issuer and the title, class, CUSIP number, and aggregate amount of the number of short sales of each security, and any additional information determined by the Commission.[1] Section 13(f)(3) then provides the Commission with authority to exempt any institutional investment manager or security or any class of the foregoing from any or all of the provisions of Section 13(f) or the rules thereunder.[2] Notably, in enacting the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress did not limit the Commission’s exemptive authority under section 13(f)(3) as it did in other areas, such as with respect to certain swaps and derivatives where Congress did specifically curtail Commission authority to issue exemptive relief.

Had the Commission simply implemented the statute by requiring the specific reporting items enumerated by Congress in the Dodd-Frank Act, my views would be very different. But the Commission proceeds to go above and beyond what is required by law by relying on a broad grant of discretionary authority.[3] This grant of authority—which permits the Commission to require the disclosure of “any additional information determined by the Commission”—is so broad that an ambitious regulator could interpret it to permit the Commission to require the disclosure of almost any information imaginable. I believe that such ambitious interpretations are unwise.

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2023 Proxy Season Review

Chuck Callan is a Senior Vice President of Regulatory Affairs and Mike Donowitz is a Vice President Regulatory Affairs at Broadridge Financial Solutions. This post is based on their Broadridge memorandum.

Highlights from the 2023 Proxy Season

Shareholder support overall is at its lowest level in five years. Support is lower for management proposals and for shareholder proposals alike. We believe this is due—at least in part—both to a decline in market valuations (support for directors and Say-on-Pay proposals generally tracks stock price movements) and a general decrease in support for ESG proposals because many companies have taken steps to be more proactive and transparent.

Specifically, the data shows that:

  • Expectations of directors are increasing. 654 directors failed to attain majority support, the greatest number in five years.
  • Support has declined for Say-on-Pay. 131 Say-on-Pay proposals failed to receive majority support. The average level of support (at 86.3%) was the lowest in five years.
  • More shareholder proposals and less support. While there were more shareholder proposals (588) than at any time over the past five years, shareholder support for them fell to 24.6% on average (a 10 percentage point drop from last season).
  • The climate has cooled for ESG. Support for environmental and social proposals decreased to 25.5%, on average, from 30% the prior season and was the lowest in five years. And support for corporate political spending proposals decreased by 11 percentage points to 27.1%, on average, from 38% the prior season (the lowest in five years).
  • More retail investors are finding their voice. Retail share ownership is at its highest level in five years. As a group, retail investors held 31.5% of the shares in the 2023 proxy season (up from 29.6%, five years ago) while institutions held the balance (at 68.5%). Voting participation by retail shareholders inched up to 29.6% of the shares they hold from 29.4% last year.

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Weekly Roundup: October 6-12, 2023


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of October 6-12, 2023

The DNA of 2023 U.S. Sustainability Reports


AI and the Role of the Board of Directors


What’s Next for Diversity Shareholder Proposals


Expecting Corporate Prosociality


2024 U.S. Proxy Season: Recent Proxy and Annual Report Developments


Reducing the Risk of ‘Greenwashing’ Litigation and Defending Actions That Are Filed


State of Cyber Awareness in the Boardroom


Statement by Commissioner Peirce on Final Rules Regarding Beneficial Ownership


Statement by Chair Gensler on Final Rules Regarding Beneficial Ownership


Attacks on ESG Investing are also attacks on company support for Sustainability


Investors Press U.S. Boards To Separate Chair, CEO Roles


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