Monthly Archives: November 2023

Cyber Governance: Growing Expectations for Information Security Oversight and Accountability

Subodh Mishra is Global Head of Communications at Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) Inc. This post is based on an ISS Corporate Solutions memorandum by Liam Hardy, Senior Associate, ISS Corporate Solutions.

Digital technology impacts businesses in myriad ways. The internet enhances the interconnectedness of people, systems, and processes, leading to added value for the products and services that make up economic activity. At the same time, this dependency exposes corporate issuers to an increasing amount of information security-related risk, raising alarm among stakeholders. Strong oversight to help mitigate this risk is becoming critical to the health of corporations and thus is viewed increasingly as a key governance issue. Such oversight should be structural and rooted in a company’s leadership and organizational design, including the board. While disclosure trends suggest that businesses are closing the gap with expectations, many companies may find areas for improvement.

Good information security oversight should seek to reduce a company’s potential risk of harmful economic outcomes. Cybersecurity breaches can cause widespread damage to operations, resulting in significant costs and damages.[1] The heightened threat of a breach has spurred greater scrutiny of companies’ programs and practices from proxy advisors, regulators, and investors. As a result, companies are building into their disclosures more comprehensive reporting of mitigation efforts. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced new rules in July 2023, requiring public companies to disclose their information security risk management strategies and governance practices annually, and quickly report any material cybersecurity incidents (see ISS Insights: SEC Cybersecurity Rules Set New Hurdles for Public Companies).[2] As these mandates come into effect, businesses should consider not only how to comply with the new rules, but also how they can best demonstrate robust information security governance.

READ MORE »

Divestment and Engagement: The Effect of Green Investors on Corporate Carbon Emissions

Matthew Kahn and John Matsusaka are Professors at the University of Southern California and Chong Shu is a Professor at the University of Utah. This post is based on their recent NBER and SSRN working paper. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, Scott Hirst; Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence and Policy (discussed on the Forum here); Big Three Power, and Why it Matters (discussed on the Forum here); and The Specter of the Giant Three (discussed on the Forum here) both by Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst; and The Limits of Portfolio Primacy (discussed on the Forum here) by Roberto Tallarita.

Green investors, frustrated with what they see as inaction by governments, increasingly seek to use capital markets to pressure companies to combat climate change. These efforts have brought to the surface an important debate about what is the most effective strategy – should investors divest from fossil companies in order to deprive them of capital and free up resources for clean energy, or should they acquire fossil fuel stocks and use their ownership rights to press for emission cuts?

In a new empirical study we examine the competing arguments in this debate. We estimate how corporations adjusted their carbon emissions in response to a change in the composition of their shareholders: did they reduce emissions when green investors divested or when they invested? The evidence points to a clear conclusion: engagement is better than divestment for investors that want companies to reduce carbon emissions. Green investors make companies greener.

READ MORE »

Unlocking Hidden Value Through Engagement

Kei Okamura is a Portfolio Manager at Neuberger Berman. This post is based on his Neuberger Berman memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, Scott Hirst; Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence and Policy (discussed on the Forum here) and The Specter of the Giant Three (discussed on the Forum here) both by Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst; and The Limits of Portfolio Primacy (discussed on the Forum here) by Roberto Tallarita. 

Reforms could continue to drive performance, particularly in a small to mid cap space that is ripe for engagement-driven capital efficiency gains.

The long-overlooked Japanese equity market’s resilient performance in the first half of 2023 caught many global investors off guard, driven by a healthy economy, monetary policy normalization, favorable geopolitical conditions and, importantly, unprecedented regulatory reforms. Now, we believe this performance strength is likely to continue, particularly in the small to mid cap space where companies show potential to benefit from constructive engagement.

In this white paper, we explore our market views, and provide case studies and takeaways for global investors considering constructive discourse with Japanese management.

The long-overlooked Japanese equity market’s resilient performance in the first half of 2023 caught many global investors off guard. A combination of a healthy macro economy, monetary policy normalization and favorable geopolitical conditions acted as a catalyst in the initial phase of the rally. However, of particular surprise to many investors was the unprecedented regulatory reforms targeting Japanese companies’ capital mismanagement. We believe this helped drive the Topix and Nikkei 225 benchmarks to test multidecade highs on the back of foreign investor inflow levels not seen since the heyday of Abenomics in the mid-2010s.

READ MORE »

SEC Clawback Rules: Practical Considerations and FAQs

Keith Halverstam, Maj Vaseghi, and Jenna Cooper are Partners at Latham & Watkins LLP. This post is based on a Latham memorandum by Mr. Halverstam, Ms. Vaseghi, Ms. Cooper, Joel Trotter, Holly Bauer, and Colleen Smith. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Rationalizing the Dodd-Frank Clawback (discussed on the Forum here) by Jesse Fried.

TheFAQsofferpracticaladviceforlistedcompaniesimplementingcompliantpolicies.

KeyPoints:

  • By December 1, 2023, all companies listed on the NYSE or Nasdaq must adopt clawback policies that comply with listing standards mandated by the SEC (the SEC Clawback Rules).
  • ThisrequirementtoadoptnewcompliantclawbackpoliciesappliestoallUS-listedcompanies, including listed foreign private issuers (FPIs).

Adopting a Clawback Policy

1. When will companies need to publicly disclose their policies?

Companies must file their policy as an exhibit to their first annual report filed on or after December 1, 2023 (Form 10-K for US domestic issuers, Form 20-F for FPIs, Form 40-F for filers under the multijurisdictional disclosure system (MJDS), and Form N-CSR for registered management investment companies).

The SEC Staff has clarified that companies need not provide checkbox and other clawback-related disclosure “until they are required to have a recovery policy under the applicable listing standard” — that is, December 1, 2023, even though the rules and forms already include checkboxes and other disclosure requirements. See Compliance and Disclosure Interpretation (C&DI) 121H.01 (emphasis added).

We believe the guidance in C&DI 121H.01 resolves any ambiguity potentially arising under the SEC releases approving the Nasdaq and NYSE listing standards, in which the SEC provided that listed issuers must provide “the required disclosures in the applicable Commission filings on or after the effective date of October 2, 2023” (emphasis added). In particular, C&DI 121H.01 clarifies that compliance with the required disclosures, including the exhibit filing, is not expected until December 1, 2023, when the recovery policy becomes mandatory under the listing standards.

READ MORE »

Understanding the Corporate Transparency Act’s Company Reporting Obligations

Nathan Barnett and Daniel J. Bell are Partners and Sebastian Orozco Segrera is an Associate at McDermott Will & Emery LLP. This post is based on their McDermott memorandum.

Beginning January 1, 2024, the US Corporate Transparency Act (CTA) will require “reporting companies” to submit a report to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) containing personal information about the reporting company’s “beneficial owners.” Reporting companies formed before January 1, 2024, will have until January 1, 2025, to file their initial report with FinCEN. Willful failure to comply with reporting obligations can result in steep financial penalties. Proposed regulations issued on September 27, 2023, extend the period for which reporting companies formed on or after January 1, 2024, and before January 1, 2025, must file their initial report to within 90 days of the company’s formation. Reporting companies formed on or after January 1, 2025, must file an initial report within 30 days of the company’s formation.

READ MORE »

Weekly Roundup: October 27-November 2, 2023


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of October 27-November 2, 2023

Implementation of Share Buybacks and Their Impact on Corporate Governance


Anthropic Long-Term Benefit Trust


Corporate Governance Standards Proposed by FDIC


Political grammars of justification and cost-benefit analysis in SEC rulemaking


Strive Asset Management vs. Engine No. 1: How Did the Activists Vote?


Machine-Learning the Skill of Mutual Fund Managers


The Compensation Committee’s Evolving Role in Human Capital Management


From Transcripts to Insights: Uncovering Corporate Risks Using Generative AI


SPARCs: An Attractive Alternative to Traditional SPACs?



SEC charges executives with fraudulent revenue recognition practices


SEC charges executives with fraudulent revenue recognition practices

Cydney S. Posner is Special Counsel at Cooley LLP. This post is based on her Cooley memorandum.

As part of its fiscal-year-end enforcement surge, the SEC filed charges against three former executives of Pareteum Corporation, a telecommunications and cloud software company, for fraudulent revenue recognition practices—a settled action against the former controller and a complaint against the former CFO and former Chief Commercial Officer (also, formerly CEO).  As described in the complaint, the SEC charged the former executives with orchestrating a fraudulent scheme to overstate revenue by recording revenue from non-binding purchase orders and concealing the practice from the company’s auditors. From 2018 through mid-2019, the SEC alleged, the defendants’ improper revenue recognition practices resulted in the company’s overstating revenue by “approximately $12 million for fiscal year 2018 (60% of the ultimately restated revenue), and by approximately $30 million for the first and second quarters of 2019 (91% of the ultimately restated revenue).” In addition, the former CFO, the SEC charged, did not establish sufficient internal accounting controls to assess whether revenue should be recognized under GAAP. According to the press release, Pareteum previously settled with the SEC on accounting and disclosure fraud charges in 2021 and filed for bankruptcy in 2022. Notably, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the SDNY has announced parallel criminal charges against the former CFO and CCO. According to the Associate Director of Enforcement for the SEC’s Philadelphia Regional Office, as the SEC alleged in its complaint, “Pareteum’s executives artificially inflated Pareteum’s revenue numbers to create the illusion of robust revenue growth….Investors should be able to trust public companies to issue truthful and accurate financial statements, and we will hold accountable any executives who abuse that trust and defraud investors.”

READ MORE »

A Hard Look at Portfolio Primacy Theory As a Financial Rationale for SEC-Mandated ESG Disclosure

Amanda M. Rose is Professor of Law at Vanderbilt University Law. This post is based on her article forthcoming in the Columbia Business Law Review. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) and Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders? (discussed on the Forum here) both by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita; Stakeholder Capitalism in the Time of COVID (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita; The Limits of Portfolio Primacy (discussed on the Forum here) by Roberto Tallarita; and Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock (discussed on the Forum here) by Leo E. Strine, Jr.

The Securities & Exchange Commission (“SEC”) is poised to adopt a controversial set of new disclosure mandates related to climate change, and pressure is on for the SEC to adopt additional ESG disclosure mandates. Given limitations on the scope of the SEC’s rulemaking authority, ESG disclosure advocates—which include many of the largest traditional asset managers—often argue that ESG disclosure mandates would serve the interests of purely financially motivated investors, and the SEC has explicitly justified its proposed climate-related disclosure mandates in terms of their financial significance to investors. Some allege that this is subterfuge, that in fact those calling for SEC-mandated ESG disclosures are motivated by a desire to promote other policy objectives, or to advance their own personal financial interests rather than those of investors. In my forthcoming article, A Hard Look at Portfolio Primacy Theory as a Financial Rationale for SEC-Mandated ESG Disclosure, I sidestep this heated, and increasingly partisan, question, and instead subject one popular financial argument for SEC-imposed ESG disclosure mandates to much-needed analytical rigor.

READ MORE »

SPARCs: An Attractive Alternative to Traditional SPACs?

Mike Nordtvedt and Rezwan Pavri are Partners and Austin March is an Associate at Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati. This post is based on a WSGR memorandum by Mr. Nordtvedt, Mr. Pavri, Mr. March, Bryan King, Heath DeJean, and Sally Yin. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes SPAC Law and Myths (discussed on the Forum here) by John C. Coates, IV.

On September 29, 2023, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) declared effective a registration statement for Pershing Square SPARC Holdings, Ltd., which is contemplating a unique variation on the traditional special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) structure. This variation, called a SPARC—or special purpose acquisition rights company—was spearheaded by billionaire investor Bill Ackman through his investment fund, Pershing Square Capital Management, L.P., and was designed to address several pain points for SPACs, which have lost popularity after frenzied activities in 2020 and 2021.

Ackman’s SPAC, Pershing Square Tontine Holdings, previously gained notoriety in 2020 as the largest ever SPAC with $4 billion raised, but that capital was ultimately returned to investors in 2022 after the SPAC failed to consummate a business combination within the prescribed time period.

What Is a SPARC?

Like a traditional SPAC, a SPARC is a shell company that is seeking to identify and combine with a private company, with the post-combination entity being a capitalized public company. Unlike a traditional SPAC, a SPARC does not raise any public capital at its onset.

More specifically, pursuant to its effective registration statement, the Pershing Square SPARC is distributing special purpose acquisition rights at no cost to former investors in Ackman’s dissolved SPAC. These acquisition rights will provide the holder, among other things, the opportunity to purchase securities in connection with a future business combination by the SPARC at the same price as the SPARC sponsor.

READ MORE »

From Transcripts to Insights: Uncovering Corporate Risks Using Generative AI

Alex Kim is a PhD Student, Maximilian Muhn is an Assistant Professor of Accounting, and Valeri Nikolaev is James H. Lorie Professor of Accounting and FMC Faculty Scholar at University of Chicago, Booth School of Business. This post is based on their recent paper.

In an era marked by political turbulence, climatic unpredictability, and rapid technological transformations, corporations are subject to multi-dimensional risks. As these risks have become more and more complex and important over time, they have profound implications for sustainable growth and stakeholder value. Therefore, in our latest study “From Transcripts to Insights: Uncovering Corporate Risks Using Generative AI”, we examine the potential of Generative AI technologies, specifically large language models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT, to assess corporate risks from firm disclosures, assisting stakeholders in making well-informed decisions amidst rising uncertainty.

Recent studies develop textual measures of corporate risks generally by calculating dictionary-based bigram frequencies. This methodology relies on the coexistence of risk-related terminologies within pre-constructed lexical dictionaries. For instance, bigram-based search algorithm recognizes instances where “economic policy” is cited alongside the term “risk”. Such literature has undeniably enhanced our comprehension of corporate risks. Yet, what we find in our study is that AI can offer deeper, more sophisticated insights into textual data, providing a layered understanding of diverse corporate risks.

READ MORE »

Page 5 of 5
1 2 3 4 5