Yearly Archives: 2023

Mission and Goals of the Racial Justice Initiative

Olivia Knight leads As You Sow’s Racial Justice Initiative. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto TallaritaHow Much Do Investors Care about Social Responsibility? (discussed on the Forum here) by Scott Hirst, Kobi Kastiel, and Tamar Kricheli-Katz; and Social Responsibility Resolutions (discussed on the Forum here) by Scott Hirst.

Racial Justice — As You Sow

In May 2020, the world witnessed the horrific death of George Floyd, shocking Americans into confronting the racial injustice experienced by Black Americans daily. This event forced a re-evaluation of our most fundamental beliefs and institutions and became a catalyst for change. As You Sow, the nation’s leading non-profit in shareholder advocacy, created the Racial Justice Initiative to hold corporations accountable on the racial justice statements issued in response to George Floyd’s murder and the national uprising demanding eradication of systemic racism. Corporate public statements of support for Black communities were released quickly, some as vague and noncommittal as the corporate actions that followed. Other companies expressed profound commitments to sustained efforts to eliminate systemic racism and are actively working on promoting racial justice. The purpose of the Initiative is to monitor these corporate responses and follow up with companies to ensure that the statements of support for racial justice are translated into concrete actions that truly promote equity thereby helping them on the path to end corporate complicity in systemic racism.

Corporate Engagement on Racial Equity and Diversity, Equity and Inclusion

There is growing acknowledgement that systemic racism is the underlying cause of discrimination and injustice, and that corporations are complicit in perpetuating systemic racism. Despite the well-documented material benefits that companies gain through diversification, corporations have been slow to realize the critical role they play in perpetuating systemic racism. First steps have been taken by many companies by acknowledging the inequities that exist and expressing a willingness to change. Our role, as shareholder advocates, is to educate companies so they can examine the implicit biases built into their systems. The Racial Justice Initiative helps companies achieve an antiracist perspective to enhance their business models and create a direct positive impact on the lives of all stakeholders. 

Since 2020 the Racial Justice Initiative has developed Racial Justice Scorecards on the Russell 1000, which track publicly available information on key actions related to racial equity, diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) disclosure and policies, and environmental justice. We update our data quarterly, giving companies we engage with the opportunity to improve throughout the year. We conduct our annual deep-dive research from May – September. Our Scorecards serve as educational tools, guidelines to help a variety of stakeholders understand and gauge corporate progress on racial equity.

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Environmental, Social Policy & Related Corporate Governance Issues in Proxy Season 2023

Heidi Welsh is the Executive Director at the Sustainable Investments Institute. This post is based on the Proxy Preview report, an annual collaboration between the Sustainable Investments Institute, Proxy Impact, and As You Sow.

This post includes the executive summary and overview sections from Proxy Preview report, an annual collaboration between the Sustainable Investments Institute (Si2), Proxy Impact and As You Sow.  Si2 authored the Proxy Preview forecast of the proxy season, with data as of mid-February.

 Eighty-five additional proposals have come to light since February, mostly from anti-ESG proponents (see separate post). 

 Figure 1 provides an updated overview of proxy season results as of May 31, 2023, but this post otherwise reflects the state of proposals in February, with a few exceptions as noted.

Proxy Preview Executive Summary

As of mid-February, shareholder proponents had filed at least 542 shareholder resolutions on environmental, social and related sustainable governance issues for the 2023 proxy season, about the same as in 2022; by the end of May this rose to 626—clearly on track to exceed last year’s unprecedented final total of 627. A shift at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) dramatically cut the number of proposals omitted in 2022 and far fewer companies submitted challenges in 2023.  As of May 31, 2023, 43 proposals had been omitted, compared with 39 in all of 2022.  The lower number of withdrawals apparent in February has continued and as of May 31, only 222 have been withdrawn or were not voted for other reasons, compared to 275 in all of 2022. Addition negotiations in engagements continued, but overall agreements seem less likely in 2023.

Record high votes on many issues in 2021 appear to have prompted both more filings in 2022 and — to some extent — more expansive proposals. After the average vote then fell, though, proponents reframed some 2023 requests to be less specific, but what appears to be an anti-ESG contagion nonetheless appears to have persuaded a number of big investors not to support shareholder proposals this year.  While the war in Ukraine and a tumultuous energy market might have affected climate change proposals, the impact seems broader even though the fundamental risks and opportunities posed by ESG issues remain unchanged and have even grown more urgent in the intervening year.

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Weekly Roundup: May 26-June 1, 2023


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of May 26-June 1, 2023

Modernization of Beneficial Ownership Reporting Rule Proposal


Florida Passes Farthest-Reaching Anti-ESG Law to Date


Significant Amendments to Private Fund Adviser Reporting on Form PF


The Imperfect CEO


It’s Time to Call a Truce in the Red State/Blue State ESG Culture War


Disloyal Managers and Shareholders’ Wealth



New Disclosures in Periodic Reports on Share Repurchases


2023 Say on Pay & Proxy Results


Officer Exculpation Under Delaware Law—Encouraging Results in Year One


2023 Proxy Season: More Proposals, Lower Support


Anti-ESG Shareholder Proposals in 2023


Anti-ESG Shareholder Proposals in 2023

Heidi Welsh is the Executive Director at the Sustainable Investments Institute. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto TallaritaHow Much Do Investors Care about Social Responsibility? (discussed on the Forum here) by Scott Hirst, Kobi Kastiel, and Tamar Kricheli-Katz; and Social Responsibility Resolutions (discussed on the Forum here) by Scott Hirst.

While much recent public controversy about sustainable investment focuses on climate change and fossil fuel companies, almost all shareholder proposals from organizations opposed to ESG investment considerations instead are about social policy.  While “regular” ESG proposals generally offer ideas for how to address various corporate policies—voicing different ideas for new policies, actions or disclosures—the anti-ESG proponents ask companies to stop doing things.  Theirs is a “just say no” campaign.

Generally speaking, the anti-ESG proponents seek to roll back the clock to a mid-20th century world where businesses operated with little consideration of their social and environmental impacts.  The needle has moved, however; investors with trillions of AUM now routinely examine corporate impacts on society and the natural world.  The cutting-edge debate is not about if there are impacts, but rather about the nature of systemic economic risk from climate change, human capital management and other issues.  Proponents with anti-ESG ideas have gained little recent traction with investors at large in proxy season, even though like-minded politicians have had some success in passing state laws eschewing ESG considerations in the investment process.

More proposals, meager support:  The volume of proposals from “anti-ESG” proponents has more than doubled in the last three years, growing to 79 and up from 30 just three years ago.  Only eight such proposals went to votes in 2021 but more than four dozen are on track for votes in 2023.  Support levels have not budged significantly, with 36 votes as of May 31 earning average support of 2.8 percent—half what is needed to qualify for resubmission in the first year.  Average support has dropped from last year’s already meager 3.5 percent.  (Figure 1.) 

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2023 Proxy Season: More Proposals, Lower Support

Paul Washington is Executive Director of the ESG Center at The Conference Board, Inc. Merel Spierings is Researcher at the ESG Center. This post relates to Shareholder Voting Trends Live Dashboard, an online dashboard published by The Conference Board in partnership with ESG data analytics firm ESGAUGE and in collaboration with Russell Reynolds Associates and Rutgers Center for Corporate Law and Governance.

We are continuing to see a flood of shareholder proposals in 2023.  Thus far this year, shareholders have filed 803 proposals at Russell 3000 companies, compared to 801 through in the first half of 2022. That’s more than the 798 proposals filed in all of 2021.

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Officer Exculpation Under Delaware Law—Encouraging Results in Year One

Brian V. Breheny, and Allison L. Land are Partners and Ryan J. Adams is Counsel at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. This post is by Mr. Breheny, Ms. Land, Mr. Adams, Alexander J. Vargas and Melanie Yeames, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Effective August 1, 2022, Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law (the “DGCL”) was amended to permit Delaware corporations to exculpate certain senior officers, to provide them with protection from liability for monetary damages that is similar to the protection that has been available for directors under the DGCL for nearly 40 years.  To provide for officer exculpation, however, a Delaware corporation must amend its certificate of incorporation, which requires stockholder approval.  Heading into the 2023 proxy season, it was unclear how many Delaware corporations would seek to take advantage of this new officer exculpation provision and, if so, whether their stockholders and the proxy advisory firms would support proposed amendments to certificates of incorporation to effect this change.  With many annual meetings completed, initial results have been very encouraging.  To date, over 260 publicly traded Delaware corporations have proposed amendments to their certificates of incorporation to provide for officer exculpation, and have submitted such proposed amendments to their stockholders for approval at their 2023 annual meeting.  With nearly half of those annual meetings completed, the vast majority of such proposals have received stockholder approval, often by an overwhelming majority of the votes cast.

Background

Section 102(b)(7) of the DGCL was amended less than a year ago to authorize exculpation of certain senior officers of Delaware corporations from personal liability for monetary damages in connection with breaches of their fiduciary duty of care (the “Officer Exculpation Amendment”).  This was viewed by many as a welcome and necessary change, putting such senior corporate officers on similar footing with directors, who have long been afforded protection from personal liability, [1] although the officer exculpation provisions are more limited than the protection available to directors.[2] In recent years, the frequency with which officers of public corporations have been targets of stockholder lawsuits has increased significantly, emphasizing the need to provide them with protection from personal liability.

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2023 Say on Pay & Proxy Results

Todd Sirras is a Managing Director, Austin Vanbastelaer is a Senior Consultant, and Justin Beck is a Consultantat Semler Brossy LLC. This post is based on a Semler Brossy memorandum by Mr. Sirras, Mr. Vanbastelaer, Mr. Beck, Kyle McCarthy, Nathan Grantz, and Anish Tamhaney.

2023 Say on Pay Results

BREAKDOWN OF SAY ON PAY VOTE RESULTS

Russell 3000 companies (1.5%) have failed Say on Pay thus far in 2023. Since our last report, seven companies have failed Say on Pay: BlackLine, CME Group, Equifax, Pitney Bowes, Prologis, Simon Property Group, and Telos

SAY ON PAY OBSERVATIONS

  • The current failure rate (1.5%) is 130 basis points lower than the failure rate at this time last year (2.8%)
  • The percentage of Russell 3000 companies receiving greater than 90% support (78%) is higher than the percentage at this time last year (75%)
  • The current Russell 3000 average vote result of 91.4% is 220 basis points higher than the index’s year-end average vote in 2022, and the current S&P 500 average vote result of 89.3% is 210 basis points higher than the year-end average vote in 2022
  • The average Russell 3000 vote result thus far in 2023 is 210 basis points higher than the average S&P 500 vote result

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New Disclosures in Periodic Reports on Share Repurchases

Eric Orsic, Heidi J. Steele, and Diana Douglas are Partners at McDermott Will & Emery LLP. This post is based on their MWE memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Short-Termism and Capital Flows (discussed on the Forum here) by Jesse M. Fried, and Charles C.Y. Wang; and Share Repurchases, Equity Issuances, and the Optimal Design of Executive Pay (discussed on the Forum here) by Jesse M. Fried.

On May 3, 2023, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted amendments to the share repurchase disclosure rules that require the disclosure of daily share repurchase activity on a quarterly basis by domestic issuers and foreign private issuers and on a semi-annual basis by registered closed-end management investment companies (Listed Closed-End Funds). Domestic issuers are required to comply with these amendments beginning with their first periodic report that covers the first full fiscal quarter commencing on or after October 1, 2023. Foreign private issuers are required to file a new Form F-SR on a quarterly basis to comply with the amendments beginning with their first full fiscal quarter that commences on or after April 1, 2024, and must provide additional disclosures in their first Form 20-F following their first Form F-SR filing. Listed Closed-End Funds must comply beginning with their Form N-CSRs that cover the first six-month period that starts on or after January 1, 2024.

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Shareholder Activism: What Investors Seek, Which Companies Are Targeted, and How Stocks Perform

David Kostin is Chief US Equity Strategist and Jenny Ma is a US Equity Strategist at Goldman Sachs. This post is based on their Goldman Sachs memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang; Dancing with Activists (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, and Thomas Keusch; and Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System by Leo E. Strine Jr.

  • Shareholder activism surged during 2022 but the pace moderated in 1Q 2023. Activists launched 148 campaigns against 120 distinct US corporations during 2022, a roughly 20% year/year jump, ranking among the top 5 most active years since 2006. During 1Q 2023, investors launched 27 campaigns against 26 companies, a 24% decline from 4Q 2022.
  • A changing regulatory landscape and an uncertain macro environment should support shareholder activism in 2023. The Universal proxy took effect last fall and will embolden activists during the upcoming proxy season. The valuation decline and increased cost of capital means activist investors will focus on profitability and idiosyncratic opportunities of potential targets.
  • Our analysis covers 2,142 shareholder activism campaigns launched since 2006 with a corporate valuation demand against Russell 3000 companies.
  • For INVESTORS: The median stock targeted by activist investors outperformed its sector by 3pp in the week after the launch of a campaign. However, excess returns were short-lived and typically turned negative after six months. While 69% of targeted stocks outperformed during the first week, after one year only 42% of stocks outperformed their respective sectors and the median stock lagged by 5 pp. A wide performance distribution exists for both successful and unsuccessful activist campaigns and varies by type of activist demand. While the median activist target lagged its sector, the average activist target outperformed by 4 pp over 12months. The asymmetric nature of returns suggests that “piggyback” portfolio managers with a consistent approach to investing in activist targets can generate positive returns over time.
  • For MANAGEMENTS: We identify four metrics relative to the sector median that are associated with an increased likelihood of becoming an activist target: (1) Slower trailing sales growth, (2)lower trailing EV/sales multiple, (3) weaker trailing net margin, and (4) trailing 2-yearunderperformance. Note that low realized sales growth relative to the sector median is the metric most associated with a target company’s share price outperformance following the launch of an activist campaign. Exhibit 19 lists 116 stocks that have experienced at least 10 pp slower realized sales growth relative to its sector median over the past 12 months and at least one source of vulnerability.

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Disloyal Managers and Shareholders’ Wealth

Eliezer M. Fich is Professor of Finance at Drexel University LeBow College of Business, Jarrad Harford is Professor of Business Administration at the University of Washington Foster School of Business, and Anh L. Tran is a Professor of Finance at City University of London Bayes School of Business. This post is based on their article forthcoming in the Review of Financial Studies. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Monetary Liability for Breach of the Duty of Care? (discussed on the Forum here) by Holger Spamann.

The corporate opportunity doctrine prohibits officers, directors, and other fiduciaries from personally benefiting from business opportunities that belong to the corporation. This doctrine derives from the long-standing duty of loyalty to the corporation that binds all corporate fiduciaries. In 2000, States, beginning with corporate law standard-setter Delaware, passed corporate opportunity waiver (COW) laws that explicitly permit companies to waive this duty of loyalty for managers and fiduciaries who find new business opportunities in the course of their conduct for the company. As a result, COWs enable fiduciaries to seize for themselves a business opportunity that would otherwise benefit the corporation and its shareholders. In the Review of Financial Studies article titled “Disloyal managers and shareholders’ wealth,” we examine the impact of these waiver laws on corporate innovation and growth strategies at public traded firms.

State legislators noted that the corporate opportunity doctrine left firms, particularly small ones, without contracting flexibility when, for example, pursuing funding from individuals or venture capitalists who might have varied business interests and therefore overlapping duties of loyalty. The waiver laws aimed to help small, emerging firms, but were written with unrestricted applicability to all firms. At larger firms, where contracting flexibility to raise capital is not an issue, the impact is uncertain because the net effect of agency conflicts weighed against the benefits of the waiver is an empirical question. To inform this question, we investigate the corporate opportunity waiver laws’ net effect on a large panel of publicly traded U.S. firms, exploiting the laws’ staggered adoption by nine states between 2000 and 2016.

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