Gilles Chemla is a Professor of Finance at Imperial College, Alejandro Rivera is an Associate Professor of Finance at UT-Dallas, and Liyan Shi is the Shubham Singhal and Jenny Cordina Assistant Professor of Economics at Carnegie Mellon University. This post is based on their recent article, forthcoming in the Journal of Finance.
Executive compensation remains one of the most contentious topics in finance. The debate is usually polarized between two views. On one side, the “shareholder view” argues that high pay is an efficient market outcome—the necessary price for scarce talent in a competitive world. On the other side, the “managerial power view” argues that high pay is the result of rent extraction by entrenched CEOs taking advantage of weak boards.
In our recent paper, Too Much, Too Soon, for Too Long: The Dynamics of Competitive Executive Compensation (Journal of Finance, 2025), we propose a novel perspective. We show that even when boards are perfectly independent and markets are perfectly competitive, the equilibrium CEO compensation package is inefficient.
Specifically, we find that in a competitive market, executives are paid too much, receive their pay too soon, and keep their jobs for too long relative to what is socially optimal.
The Mechanism: Externalities through Outside Options
Why does competition lead to inefficiency? The answer lies in pecuniary externalities, the ripple effects that one firm’s contract choices have on the wider labor market via the outside options available to corporate executives. READ MORE
