Monthly Archives: January 2026

The Dual-Class Stock Revolution

Sharon Hannes is a Professor of Law at Tel Aviv University, and Adi Libson is a Lecturer of Law at Bar-Ilan University. This post is based on their recent paper.

We examine one of the most significant developments in U.S. capital markets: the rise of dual-class share (DCS) structures in initial public offerings. In the mid-1990s, only a small fraction of IPOs used dual-class; in recent years the figure has hovered around a quarter to a third of new listings. While the costs and benefits of dual-class have been heavily debated, far less attention has been paid to a prior question: why has this structure become so prevalent, and why now?

The leading recent explanation, associated with Dhruv Aggarwal and co-authors, focuses on founder bargaining power. Abundant private capital and lower capital requirements allow founders to delay going public and to insist on control-enhancing mechanisms, such as dual-class, as a condition for listing.

We argue that this explanation is only part of the picture. Even if founders can demand more, it is not obvious why they choose to “spend” their bargaining power on voting rights rather than on additional cash-flow rights. A larger equity stake for founders without a wedge between control and ownership would fortify incentives while limiting entrenchment. The founder-bargaining power account does not explain why such elevated bargaining power buys control rather than cash. READ MORE »

New Year, New Proxy Voting Landscape

Loren Braswell is Counsel at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Ms. Braswell, Adam O. Emmerich, David A. Katz, and Elina Tetelbaum.

As companies, investors and regulators celebrate the new year, changes are already underway for the 2026 proxy season:

  • The Wall Street Journal has reported that JPMorgan Chase’s asset-management unit is cutting ties with proxy advisory firms and will use an internal artificial-intelligence-powered platform called Proxy IQ to assist on U.S. company votes. The bank will utilize Proxy IQ to manage voting, as well as analyze data for more than 3,000 annual company meetings and provide recommendations to portfolio managers, replacing the typical roles of ISS and Glass Lewis. This development comes after President Trump recently issued an Executive Order titled “Protecting American Investors From Foreign-Owned and Politically Motivated Proxy Advisors,” which targets proxy advisory firms as “regularly us[ing] their substantial power to advance and prioritize radical politically-motivated agendas.”

While the use of AI in proxy voting is in its nascent stages, we can expect to see more investors developing their own internal AI models for data analysis and voting. There may also be opportunities for companies to use AI to better engage with investors and predict voting outcomes.

READ MORE »

Weekly Roundup: January 2-8, 2026


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of January 2-8, 2026

ISS Publishes 2026 Benchmark Policy Changes


Would Your Company Want To Stop Filing Quarterly Reports if No Longer Required?


2026 SEC Division of Examinations Priorities


Key Shareholder Activism Trends to Watch in 2026



2025 Silicon Valley 150 Corporate Governance Report


Proxies for Politics


Executive Order Targeting ISS and Glass Lewis: Impact on the 2026 Proxy Season and Beyond



What CHRO Compensation Tells Us About a Firm’s Human Capital Strategy


Institutional Investor Engagement and Stewardship


Glass Lewis Publishes 2026 Benchmark Policy Guidelines


Under Pressure: Global CEO Pay Tectonics


Under Pressure: Global CEO Pay Tectonics

Robin Ferracone is the Founder and CEO, Brian Bueno is the Sustainability Practice Leader, and Ryan Resch is a Senior Partner at GECN Group. This post is based on a GECN Group memorandum by Ms. Ferracone, Mr. Bueno, Mr. Resch, Michael Robinson, and Gabe Shawn Varges.

INTRODUCTION

GECN Group conducts annual research on global trends in executive compensation and governance across leading economies on five continents. This year’s research considers how CEO compensation and incentive structures are shaped by both local and global forces.

Our analysis recognizes that attracting, retaining, and motivating the world’s better leaders is fundamental to long-term value creation and corporate sustainability.

Competition for executive talent is increasingly international, as companies and their leaders seek to compete in a global marketplace. This persists even as geopolitical headwinds – such as tariffs and immigration restrictions – threaten to disrupt traditional talent flows.

Navigating these challenges requires globally experienced and adaptable leadership, underscoring the need for compensation strategies that are competitive and responsive.

Meanwhile, governance standards are influenced by capital flows, institutional investors, and shifting political norms. Despite convergence in some areas, there remain significant opportunities for CEO pay arbitrage. Some talent is not globally mobile and some companies are not yet fully accessing the worldwide talent pool. Yet, it stands to reason that capital follows opportunity created by leaders attracted and retained to create value for shareholders.

READ MORE »

Glass Lewis Publishes 2026 Benchmark Policy Guidelines

David Bell and Elizabeth Gartland are Partners, and Wendy Grasso is a Corporate Governance Counsel at Fenwick & West LLP. This post is based on their Fenwick memorandum.

What You Need To Know

  • Glass Lewis has released its 2026 Benchmark Policy Guidelines, with “noteworthy revisions” focused on mandatory arbitration provisions and pay-for-performance methodology, as well as clarifying amendments to the sections dealing with shareholder rights, majority voting for director elections, amendments to charters and bylaws, supermajority vote requirements, and shareholder proposals.
  • The updated policies will generally apply to shareholder meetings taking place after January 1, 2026.

On December 4, Glass Lewis updated its benchmark proxy voting guidelines. The updates applicable to U.S. companies are briefly summarized below.

READ MORE »

Institutional Investor Engagement and Stewardship

Caio de Oliveira is the Head of the Sustainable Finance and Corporate Governance Team, and Adriana De La Cruz and Hitesh Tank are Policy Analysts at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). This post is based on their OECD report.

The evolution of the institutional investor landscape

The OECD Institutional Investor Engagement and Stewardship report examines how institutional investors engage with listed companies and how effective stewardship can strengthen the long-term efficiency and resilience of capital markets.

Institutional investors play a key role in capital market efficiency by supporting price discovery, capital allocation, and corporate discipline. Asset managers hold 65% and 59% of the listed equity in the United States and the United Kingdom, respectively, and they hold at least 30% of the listed equity in several other advanced markets (Figure 1). The increased ownership by asset managers is also visible in emerging markets such as South Africa (28%), Brazil (23%) and India (21%). Asset owner institutions hold 41% of the listed equity in Luxembourg and at least 10% in several other markets.

READ MORE »

What CHRO Compensation Tells Us About a Firm’s Human Capital Strategy

Charles G. McClure is an Associate Professor of Accounting at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. This post is based on a recent paper by Professor McClure, David F. Larcker, James Irvin Miller Professor of Accounting, Emeritus, at Stanford Graduate School of Business, Shawn X. Shi, Assistant Professor of Accounting at the University of Washington Foster School of Business, and Edward M. Watts, Assistant Professor of Accounting at Yale School of Management.

For years, boards, investors, and firms have said that people are a firm’s most important asset. Today, that claim is increasingly reflected in governance decisions, with boards routinely discussing workforce strategy alongside capital allocation, technology, and risk management. This shift reflects the rise of the knowledge economy and intensifying competition for skilled workers, the so-called “war for talent.” Yet for all the attention human capital receives, much of this discussion remains qualitative, with firms emphasizing culture, training, and engagement in ways that are difficult to compare across firms or tie to concrete governance choices.

This growing focus on human capital has elevated the role of the Chief Human Resource Officer (CHRO), who oversees employees. Not every firm has a CHRO, and even among those that do, the role varies widely in scope and influence. That said, over the past decade, CHROs have become increasingly common in firms and far more involved in strategic decisions, including large-scale reorganizations, culture initiatives, and succession planning. In many organizations, the CHRO now sits alongside the CFO and COO as a core member of the top management team, reflecting the growing belief that how firms manage people is central to long-run success.

At the same time, firms differ markedly in how they structure the CHRO role. In some companies, the CHRO is a strategic partner with meaningful authority and resources. In others, the role remains more administrative, even as firms publicly emphasize the importance of people and culture. This variation raises an important governance question: When is human capital management truly prioritized?

Our paper addresses this question by focusing on the CHRO pay ratio, defined as the CHRO’s total compensation relative to the CEO’s. This ratio reflects how firms allocate resources to the executive responsible for their human capital. READ MORE »

2025 Corporate Governance Practices and Trends in Silicon Valley and at Large Companies Nationwide

David A. Bell is a Partner and Co-Chair of Corporate Governance, and Wendy Grasso is Corporate Governance Counsel at Fenwick & West LLP. This post is based on their Fenwick memorandum.

Corporate governance practices vary significantly among public companies. This reflects many factors, including:

  • Differences in their stage of development, including the relative importance placed on various business objectives (for example, a focus on growth and scaling operations may be given more importance at early-stage companies);
  • Differences in the investor base;
  • Differences in expectations of board members and advisors to companies and their boards, which can vary by a company’s size, age, stage of development, geography, industry and other factors; and
  • The reality that corporate governance practices that are appropriate for large, established public companies can be meaningfully different from those for newer, smaller companies.

Since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which signaled the initial wave of this century’s corporate governance reforms among public companies, each year, Fenwick has surveyed the corporate governance practices of the companies included in the Standard & Poor’s 100 Index (S&P 100) and the technology and life sciences companies included in the Fenwick – Bloomberg Law Silicon Vally 150 List (SV 150). [1]

Significant Findings

Most of the governance practices and trends from 2024 continued in the 2025 proxy season. Notable observations for 2025 are described below.

Comparative data is presented for the S&P 100 companies and for the technology and life science companies included in the SV 150, as well as trend information. In a number of instances, we also present data showing comparison of the top 15, top 50, middle 50 and bottom 50 companies of the SV 150 (in terms of revenue), [2] illustrating the impact of company size or scale on relevant governance practices.

Observations for 2025 include:

  • The percentage of SV 150 companies with dual-class voting stock structures dropped slightly, but these structures continue to be an important long-term trend among Silicon Valley technology companies, though it is still a minority of companies. Throughout the past decade, the SV 150 saw a sharp increase in the prevalence of dual-class voting structures (from 2.9% in 2011 to 30.4% in 2024). However, for the 2025 proxy season, the number of SV 150 companies with dual class voting stock structures dropped to 27.3%. This rate continues to greatly surpass the rate of the S&P 100 (which has fluctuated between 7% and 12% since 2011 (10.1% in 2025).
  • Classified boards remain significantly more common among technology and life sciences companies in the SV 150 than among S&P 100 companies. Their use has steadily increased in the SV 150, from 45.9% in 2015 to 54.7% in the 2025 proxy season (up from 54.1% in the 2024 proxy season, but down from 56% in the 2023 proxy season). Companies in the bottom 50 of the SV 150 were more likely to have classified boards than the larger SV 150 companies, although the percentage decreased slightly (74.0% of companies in the bottom 50 of the SV 150 had classified boards in the 2025 proxy season, compared to 71.4% in the 2024 proxy season).
  • The percentage of women board members for the SV 150 and S&P 100 remained flat in 2025 compared to 2024, with both groups showing similar levels of representation. The percentage of women serving on boards of SV 150 companies was 33.1% in both 2025 and 2024. The percentage of women serving on boards of S&P 100 companies was 34.8% in 2025 and 33.8% in 2024.
  • A majority of companies in the S&P 100 and SV 150 continue to have majority voting. Ninety-six percent of companies in the S&P 100 had majority voting in 2025 (same as 2024). Fifty-one point three percent of companies in the SV 150 had majority voting in 2025 (compared to 51.4% in 2024).
  • S&P 100 companies continue to be more likely to combine the board chair and chief executive officer (CEO) roles than SV 150 companies. In the 2025 proxy season, 60.6% of S&P 100 companies had combined the roles of board chair and CEO (up from 58.0% in 2024), while 41.3% of SV 150 companies had done so (down from 43.2% in 2024).

1 The S&P 100 is a cross section of the very largest public companies in the United States across industries. The SV 150 is comprised of the 150 largest Silicon Valley-based public technology and life sciences companies by revenue. Compared to the S&P 100 (or the broader S&P 500), SV 150 companies are on average much smaller and younger, have much lower revenue, and are concentrated in the technology and life sciences industries. The 2025 constituent companies of the SV 150 range from Apple and Alphabet, with revenue of approximately $396B and $350B, respectively, to Planet Labs PBC and PROCEPT BioRobotics Corp., with revenue of approximately $244M and $225M, respectively, in each case for the four quarters ended on or about December 31, 2024. Apple went public in 1980, Alphabet (as Google) in 2004, Planet Labs in 2021, and PROCEPT BioRobotics Corp. in 2021, with the top 15 companies averaging approximately 20 more years as public companies than the bottom 15 companies in the SV 150. Apple’s and Alphabet’s peers include companies in the S&P 100, of which they are also constituent members (16 companies were constituents of both indices for the survey in the 2025 proxy season), where market capitalization averages approximately $452B. Planet Lab’s and PROCEPT BioRobotics’ peers are smaller technology and life sciences companies with market capitalizations well under $1B, many of which went public relatively recently. In terms of number of employees, SV 150 companies average approximately 14,000 employees, ranging from Electronic Arts, ranked 34th in the SV 150, with 450,000 employees spread around the world, to Upstart Holdings, ranked 107th in the SV 150, with 126 employees in the U.S., as of the end of their respective fiscal years. (go back)

2 The top 15, top 50, middle 50 and bottom 50 companies of the SV 150 include companies with revenue in the following respective ranges: $27.6B or more; $3.3B or more; $717M but less than $3.0B; and $224M but less than $694M. The respective average market capitalizations of these groups are $899.1B, $319.6B, $9.6B and $2.7B. (go back)

Executive Order Targeting ISS and Glass Lewis: Impact on the 2026 Proxy Season and Beyond

Scott A. Barshay, Carmen X. Lu, and Francis F. Mi are Partners at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP. This post is based on their Paul Weiss memorandum.

The Trump Administration last week issued an executive order with the goal of eventually curtailing the influence of Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. (“ISS”) and Glass, Lewis & Co. LLC (“Glass Lewis”). Among other things, the executive order seeks to rein in the proxy advisors’ support for diversity, equity and inclusion (“DEI”) and environmental, social and governance (“ESG”) initiatives, which have become increasingly misaligned with the priorities of mainstream institutional investors in recent years. The order also seeks to require proxy advisors to provide much‑needed enhanced disclosures on their recommendations, methodology and conflicts of interest and hold them accountable for material misstatements or omissions under federal securities antifraud rules.

In the near-term, the executive order may decrease proxy advisor support for DEI- and ESG-related matters and empower the SEC to limit the use of shareholder proposals to advance such causes. With the influence of proxy advisors potentially waning as a result of SEC and other administrative actions, companies facing activist pressure may also be less inclined to settle with activists. Over the medium- and longer-term, the executive order’s focus on the proxy advisors’ role in helping coordinate voting decisions among investors may accelerate the ongoing shift away from one-size-fits-all “benchmark” proxy voting policies to policies tailored for individual institutional clients. The expansion of custom voting policies could be highly consequential for investor voting practices, shareholder engagement, and the tactics and outcomes of future proxy contests. READ MORE »

Proxies for Politics

Jill Fisch is the Saul A. Fox Distinguished Professor of Business Law at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School and Adriana Z. Robertson is the Donald N. Pritzker Professor of Business Law at the University of Chicago Law School. This post is based on their recent paper.

The shareholder proposal process is under renewed scrutiny. Critics argue that Rule 14a-8 has been captured by a small group of activist proponents pursuing agendas unrelated to shareholder value, while defenders characterize recent regulatory reforms as attacks on shareholder rights. Policymakers, meanwhile, are actively considering further changes. Yet much of this debate proceeds without a textured understanding of how the shareholder proposal process works in practice.

In Proxies for Politics, we seek to fill that gap by studying one of the most prominent—and puzzling—categories of shareholder proposals: proposals requesting corporations to disclose their political activity. Political disclosure proposals have been among the most frequently submitted shareholder proposals over the past decade and have received consistently substantial shareholder support. At the same time, they lack the obvious economic salience of merger votes and the headline-grabbing political resonance of climate or diversity proposals.

Our study combines empirical analysis with qualitative insights drawn from extensive conversations with participants across the proxy ecosystem. We analyze all political disclosure proposals submitted at S&P 500 companies over a nine-year period (2014–2023), including proposals that were voted on, withdrawn, or omitted. Our analysis explores the nature of the proponents, the role of governance entrepreneurs, the targeting of issuers and the consequences of the proposal process, including the substantial role of proposals that are settled and withdrawn. READ MORE »

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