Monthly Archives: September 2018

Volcker Rule 2.0: A Significant but Unfinished Proposal

George Madison and Michael Lewis are partners and William Shirley is counsel at Sidley Austin LLP. This post is based on a Sidley memorandum originally published on Bloomberg Law.

The federal agencies responsible for implementing the Volcker Rule—the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)—recently proposed significant changes to the final rule that they adopted in 2013. At that time, the agencies were charged with a difficult task: implementing a provision of the Dodd-Frank Act that was hastily and broadly drafted, despite its changing fundamentally the way that large banking organizations operate by preventing them from engaging in proprietary trading or investing in hedge funds and private equity funds (called “covered funds” in the final rule). In those circumstances, the agencies produced, perhaps inevitably, a final rule that was highly complex and burdensome, and that may well have resulted in unintended consequences.

READ MORE »

Will Warren’s Accountable Capitalism Act Help? The Answer is No.

Denise Kuprionis is President of The Governance Solutions Group (GSG). This post is based on a GSG memorandum by Ms. Kuprionis, originally published on The Conference Board’s Governance Center blog.

U.S. Sen. Elizabeth Warren has proposed legislation that would require all companies with more than $1 billion in annual revenue to secure a charter from a newly established Office of United States Corporations. It’s hard to think of a sillier idea. I don’t disagree with her proposition that we “need to end the harmful corporate obsession with maximizing shareholder returns at all costs.” However, I believe federalization of all large corporations, which would likely morph into all corporations, will not accomplish this goal, will not improve corporate governance and will not make our country better for middle class Americans, her target group of beneficiaries.

READ MORE »

The Rise of Fiduciary Law

Tamar Frankel is Professor of Law Emerita Boston University School of Law. This post is based on a paper by Professor Frankel.

Introduction

Fiduciary rules appear in family law, surrogate decision-making, laws of agency, employment, pensions, remedies, banking, financial institutions, corporations, charities, not for profit organizations, medical services and international law. Fiduciary concepts guide areas of knowledge: economics, psychology; moral norms; and pluralism. Fiduciary law was recognized in Roman law and the British common law. It was embedded decades ago in religious Jewish, Christian, and Islamic laws. Internationally, fiduciary law appears in European, Chinese, Japanese and Indian laws.

What explains the expansion and predicts the future of fiduciary principles? Part One offers a short description of fiduciary relationships. Part Two describes the growth of expertise in living beings—from genetic to chosen cooperative specialization. Part Three notes the law’s encouragement of the relationships while discouraging its potential abuses. Part Four highlights criticisms of fiduciary law. Part Five speculates about the future of fiduciary law.

READ MORE »

Reporting Obligations of Variable Interest Entities

Jiang Bian is an associate and P. Rupert Russell is a partner at Shartsis Friese LLP. This post is based on their Shartsis Friese memorandum.

To navigate through regulatory restrictions or for strategic reasons, public companies may need to rely on entities in which they do not necessarily have an ownership interest or the majority of voting rights. For accounting purposes, a public company may need to treat such entities as variable interest entities (“VIEs”) and consolidate their results into its financial statements as appropriate. If a public company’s business involve VIEs, this can present challenges in meeting reporting obligations under the requirements of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”). This article seeks to outline considerations that a public company should take into account in determining whether and how to disclose transactions, relationships and arrangements involving VIEs.

READ MORE »

IRS Guidance on Section 162(m)

Arthur H. Kohn and Michael Albano are partners and Julia Rozenbilt is a practice development lawyer at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP. This post is based on a Cleary Gottlieb memorandum by Mr. Kohn, Mr. Albano, Ms. Rozenbilt, Mary Alcock, and Caroline Hayday. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The “Hidden” Tax Cost of Executive Compensation (discussed on the Forum here) by Kobi Kastiel and Noam Noked.

On August 21, 2018, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) issued Notice 2018-68 (the “Notice”), which provides initial guidance on the application of Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended by the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (“TCJA”). [1] The guidance is limited to the definition of the term “covered employees” and the application of the transition rule accompanying the TCJA amendments. Certain aspects of the Notice will be of practical significance for many companies in connection with the potential deductibility of their executive compensation, even though the amount of the lost deductions may not be material to each company from a financial perspective. The Notice states that the IRS plans to issue further guidance in the form of proposed regulations and solicits comment on certain aspects of Section 162(m) as amended that are not addressed by the Notice.

READ MORE »

Potential Reform to the Federal Reserve Board’s “Control Rules”

Arthur S. Long is a partner and James O. Springer is an associate at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP. This post is based on a Gibson Dunn memorandum by Mr. Long and Mr. Springer.

2018 has seen significant but pragmatic developments in the implementation of bank regulation by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve) under its new Vice Chairman for Bank Supervision, Randal Quarles. Vice Chairman Quarles has frequently touted transparency in regulation as a significant virtue, and has himself frequently adopted such transparency in his public speeches, by signaling areas that he considers a priority.

One area where the Federal Reserve has not yet published a reform is in the area of “control” under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended (BHC Act). In January, Vice Chairman Quarles suggested that it would be on his to-do list:

READ MORE »

Weekly Roundup: August 31-September 6, 2018


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of August 31–September 6, 2018

The Appraisal Landscape



Climate-Related Disclosures and TCFD Recommendations


The MFW Framework and Extensive Preliminary Discussions


Shareholder Collaboration



Insider Tax Effects on Acquisition Structure and Value


Risk Management and the Board of Directors



Blockchain and Smart Contracting for the Shareholder Community



Special Checklist for 2019 Annual Meeting

Martin Lipton is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum authored by Mr. Lipton.

As the Fall notice period for proxy resolutions and dissident director nominations approaches, in addition to the usual checklist for the annual meeting, it is important to keep in mind that hostile takeover approaches and activist demands backed by a threatened proxy fight are not abating. Therefore, it would be wise to review and implement the following checklist:

READ MORE »

Trump and Warren are Both Wrong

Jesse Fried is the Dane Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. This post was authored by Professor Fried. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Short-Termism and Capital Flows by Professor Fried and Charles C. Y. Wang (discussed on the Forum here).

President Donald Trump and Senator Elizabeth Warren rarely see eye-to-eye on policy, and frequently attack each other personally. But they have finally found common ground: both seem to believe that investors in public firms are too powerful, and the solution is to better insulate corporate directors from shareholders.

In August, each offered a proposal aimed at shielding boards from investor pressure. Senator Warren introduced legislation—the Accountable Capitalism Act—that would federalize corporate law and force all U.S.-domiciled firms with revenues exceeding $1 billion to hand over at least 40% of board seats to employees. The Act would also alter fiduciary duties to require directors to consider all stakeholders, not just shareholders. President Trump, in turn, asked the Securities and Exchange Commission to study the possibility of eliminating quarterly reporting for public firms and allowing boards to share the information with investors only semi-annually.

READ MORE »

Blockchain and Smart Contracting for the Shareholder Community

Christoph Van der Elst is Professor of Business Law and Economics at Tilburg Law School and Ghent University; and Anne Lafarre is Assistant Professor at Tilburg Law School. This post is based on their recent paper.

Current shareholder engagement systems face large classical inefficiencies. The involvement of intermediaries in the exercise of fundamental shareholder rights such as voting, resulting in mistakes and costly court cases, shows the “absurdness” of the current systems. In our latest paper, we provide new arguments that blockchain technology has the clear potential to solve many of the current problems.

Let’s start with an example. When DNick Plc’s annual general meeting (“AGM”) approved the resolutions to cancel its listing, a group of minority shareholders started an appraisal procedure. The shareholder register only included two shareholders: the CEO of DNick and the Bank of New York Depository (Nominees) Ltd (“BNY”). BNY, the common depository agent, held the shares on trust for the account holders with Clearstream, which is the central securities depository (“CSD”) subsidiary of Deutsche Börse, where DNick was listed. Clearstream Interests (“CIs”), held by banks and financial institutions, were traded on the Deutsche Börse. Hence, when the minority shareholders of DNick started the appraisal procedure, it were only customers of the banks that held the CIs, and, in accordance with section 112(2) of the UK CA 2006, stating that “[e]very other person … whose name is entered in its register of members, is a member of the company”, they were not members of DNick. Moreover, DNick’s articles of association stated that only the holders of an account with Clearstream were allowed to vote in general meetings or appoint a proxy. As the banks and other financial institutions that held the CIs voted in favor of the delisting, the application to the court for the cancellation of the resolutions pursuant to section 98 CA 2006 was not open. The minority shareholders of DNick Holding saw their appraisal case dismissed.

READ MORE »

Page 6 of 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7