Monthly Archives: September 2018

CEO Pay Trends

Alex Knowlton is a Senior Research Analyst at Equilar Inc. This post is based on an Equilar memorandum by Mr. Knowlton, Amit Batish, Courtney Yu, Elizabeth Carroll, Hailey Robbers, and Joseph Kieffer.

With Say on Pay now a regular part of the executive compensation landscape, companies have a clear understanding of how shareholders view chief executive pay. Since the implementation of Say on Pay in accordance with the enactment of Dodd-Frank, over three-fourths of large-cap companies have received at least 90% of shareholder approval, while chief executive officer (CEO) compensation has continued to increase with each passing year.

However, despite the overall increase in total CEO compensation, the composition of CEO compensation, especially equity, has seen updates to reflect the modern pay landscape. Say on Pay provides shareholders an outlet to voice opinions on CEO compensation, and companies, for the most part, listen. For example, compensation tied to specific performance goals became increasingly prevalent with each passing year, evidenced by almost 90% of Equilar 500 CEOs receiving an award tied to some performance metric in 2017. As awards have more often than not hinged upon some performance metric, time-based awards, specifically option awards, continually decreased in prevalence. Additionally, plan-based bonuses and performance incentives have seen a higher, widespread usage, while discretionary bonuses still remain few and far between.

READ MORE »

Weekly Roundup: September 7–13, 2018


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of September 7–13, 2018.


IRS Guidance on Section 162(m)



The Rise of Fiduciary Law



Volcker Rule 2.0: A Significant but Unfinished Proposal


Non-Shareholder Voice in Bank Governance: Board Composition, Performance and Liability



State Law Implementation of The New Paradigm



Citizens United as Bad Corporate Law



Complementary Macroprudential Regulation of Nonbank Entities and Activities


The Search for Meaningful Director Compensation Limits

Rebecca Burton is a lead associate and Michael Bowie is a senior associate at Willis Towers Watson. This post is based on a Willis Towers Watson memorandum by Ms. Burton and Mr. Bowie. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Growth of Executive Pay by Lucian Bebchuk and Yaniv Grinstein and Paying for Long-Term Performance by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried (discussed on the Forum here).

Total pay for non-employee directors continues to grow at a modest but steady rate, driven by increases to the annual cash retainer and the value of annual equity grants. Not all aspects of director compensation and corporate governance remain predictable, however. Annual compensation for directors continues to be a hot topic for shareholders and boards alike, precipitated by the ongoing attention to shareholder lawsuits that allege “excessive” pay for board members. This mutual interest has prompted boards to look for ways to mitigate exposure to lawsuits involving director pay programs; the most visible result is the swift action taken in adopting annual compensation limits specific to directors.

READ MORE »

Complementary Macroprudential Regulation of Nonbank Entities and Activities

Jeremy Kress is Assistant Professor of Business Law at the Stephen M. Ross School of Business at the University of Michigan; Patricia McCoy is the Liberty Mutual Insurance Professor of Law at Boston College Law School; and Daniel Schwarcz is Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota Law School. This post is based on their recent paper.

The 2008 financial crisis demonstrated unequivocally that nonbank financial firms such as investment banks and insurance companies can threaten the global economy. After the crisis, Congress created the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to address emerging forms of nonbank systemic risk. Congress gave FSOC two powers to achieve this objective. The first, dubbed an entity-based approach, empowers FSOC to designate individual nonbank systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) for macroprudential regulation by the Federal Reserve. The second, known as an activities-based approach, allows FSOC to recommend that federal regulators implement new rules governing specific financial activities to contain systemic risk.

READ MORE »

The Legality of Mandatory Arbitration Bylaws

Andrew Rhys Davies is a partner at Allen & Overy LLP. This post is based on an Allen & Overy memorandum authored by Mr. Rhys Davies originally published in the New York Law Journal.

There has been renewed interest in whether the SEC should allow a U.S. company to conduct a registered initial public offering if its bylaws require shareholders to arbitrate federal securities claims. In April 2018, SEC Chair Jay Clayton said that resolving this knotty issue is not a priority for the Commission, but the Supreme Court’s May 2018 pro-arbitration decision in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018), may embolden an IPO candidate to force the issue.

In Epic Systems, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) requires a court to enforce an employment agreement that requires an employee to bring federal employment claims in a bilateral arbitration against the employer, and to dismiss a federal class action brought in violation of such an agreement. As the Supreme Court reaffirmed, a plaintiff faces a “stout uphill climb” to show that some other federal statute (in this case, the National Labor Relations Act) overrides the FAA and guarantees the right to litigate in court or to bring class claims in arbitration. Id. at 1264. Indeed, over the last thirty years, the Supreme Court has rejected “every” attempt to “conjure conflicts between the [FAA] and other federal statutes.” Id. at 1627 (emphasis in original).

READ MORE »

Citizens United as Bad Corporate Law

Jonathan R. Macey is the Sam Harris Professor of Corporate Law, Corporate Finance & Securities Law at Yale Law School; and Leo E. Strine, Jr. is Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, the Austin Wakeman Scott Lecturer on Law and a Senior Fellow of the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance. This post is based on their recent paper. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending and Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, both by Lucian Bebchuk and Robert Jackson (discussed on the Forum here and here), and Corporate Politics, Governance, and Value Before and after Citizens United by John C. Coates.

In our paper Citizens United as Bad Corporate Law, we show that Citizens United v. FEC, arguably the most important First Amendment case of the new millennium, is predicated on a fundamental misconception about the nature of the corporation. Specifically, Citizens United v. FEC (558 U.S. 310 (2010), which prohibited the government from restricting independent expenditures for corporate communications, and held that corporations enjoy the same free speech rights to engage in political spending as human citizens, is grounded on the erroneous theory that corporations are “associations of citizens” (See 558 U.S. 310 at 356) rather than what they actually are: independent legal entities distinct from those who own their stock.

READ MORE »

A Proposed Alternative to Corporate Governance and the Theory of Shareholder Primacy

John R. Ellerman is a partner and Ira T. Kay is a managing partner at Pay Governance LLC. This post is based on their Pay Governance memorandum.

On August 15, 2018, U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts introduced proposed legislation, the Accountable Capitalism Act, in the U.S. Senate. The legislation would require all U.S. corporations with $1 billion or more in annual revenues to obtain a federal charter as a “United States corporation” and would obligate corporate directors to consider the interests of all corporate stakeholders in their corporate governance activities. [1]

That same day, Senator Warren presented an opinion editorial in The Wall Street Journal citing her rationale. Senator Warren opines that shareholder primacy, a corporate governance concept, has shortchanged American workers since the early 1980s with wage stagnation (despite corporate productivity increasing over the same period). Senator Warren believes the proposed legislation will shift American companies to a “benefit corporation” governance model. This is where corporate directors will be required to consider all corporate stakeholders—employees, customers, shareholders, communities—in company decisions or be subject to the threat of shareholder suits. [2]

READ MORE »

State Law Implementation of The New Paradigm

Martin Lipton is a founding partner, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy, and Ryan A. McLeod is a partner at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum authored by Mr. Lipton and Mr. McLeod.

With the (1) embrace of corporate purpose, ESG, and long-term investment strategy by BlackRock, State Street and Vanguard, (2) adoption and promotion by the World Economic Forum of The New Paradigm: A Roadmap for an Implicit Corporate Governance Partnership Between Corporations and Investors to Achieve Sustainable Long-Term Investment and Growth, (3) enactment of a benefit corporation law by Delaware and some thirty states, (4) introduction of legislation by Senator Warren to achieve stakeholder corporate governance by way of mandatory federal incorporation, and (5) formation of Focusing Capital on the Long Term, Coalition for Inclusive Capitalism and Investors Stewardship Group, it is clear that we are at a new inflexion point in the development of corporate governance. We are ready to abandon Milton Friedman’s 1970 dictum that the sole purpose of the corporation is to maximize profits for the shareholders—a dictum that ruled thinking in business schools, law schools, on Wall Street, and in boardrooms until proven invalid by the 2008 fiscal crisis and recent studies discrediting so-called empirical “evidence” used to justify attacks by activist hedge funds designed to force companies to engage in financial engineering to create short-term profits. We can achieve the objectives of The New Paradigm and the objectives of corporate managers who want to be able to operate free of Wall Street’s focus on short-termism and free of attacks, and threats of attacks, by activist hedge funds. And we can do it without mandatory federal incorporation infringing on state corporation law or state corporate governance jurisprudence. It can, and should, be done by states, and especially Delaware, by doing the following:

READ MORE »

Engaging with Rakhi Kumar of State Street Global Advisors

Andrew Letts is a partner at CamberView Partners. This post is based on a CamberView memorandum that features an interview with Rakhi Kumar, Senior Managing Director at State Street Global Advisors.

Andrew Letts: Rakhi, thank you for taking the time to speak with us. Many of the people who will read this will be familiar with your team’s work. We’re hoping to take a deeper dive into how the investment stewardship team evaluates companies and the approaches you take. To start off, let’s go back a few years. When I was at State Street Global Advisors, you and I did a lot of work together on the governance issues of the day, topics such as board tenure, executive compensation and sustainability. Since you took over the investment stewardship team in 2014, how would you characterize the evolution of State Street’s approach to these issues?

Rakhi Kumar: The main evolution I would point to is that we have established a prioritization framework, where we take a risk-based approach to both sector and thematic reviews. We are trying to mitigate ESG risk in our portfolio and we are trying to be more active and focused about how we do that. In engagement, we talk about the topics we want to discuss and we speak with the issuers that we want to meet with—85 percent of our engagements are proactive and about issues that are important to us.

READ MORE »

Non-Shareholder Voice in Bank Governance: Board Composition, Performance and Liability

Paul L. Davies is Allen & Overy Professor of Corporate Law Emeritus at the University of Oxford and Klaus J. Hopt is Emeritus Professor at the Max Planck Institute of Foreign Private and Private International Law. This post is based on a recent paper by Professor Davies and Professor Hopt. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Regulating Bankers’ Pay by Lucian Bebchuk and Holger Spamann (discussed on the Forum here).

In the welter of financial sector reforms which followed the financial crisis—enhanced capital and liquidity rules, resolution mechanisms based on bail-in debt, new macro-prudential powers for regulators—the governance of banks received only non-star billing. In one sense this was surprising since the empirical data showed that banks with the “best” corporate governance, assessed on the conventional shareholder-centric basis, performed worse on average in the crisis than banks with “sub-optimal” governance structures. In other words, there seemed to be a tension between conventional good corporate governance and financial stability goals. Restructuring bank governance so as to be less shareholder focused might therefore be a useful reform. In our paper, Non-Shareholder Voice in Bank Governance: Board Composition, Performance and Liability, we analyse what has, could and should be done to move bank governance in the proposed direction.

READ MORE »

Page 5 of 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7