Monthly Archives: May 2019

Weekly Roundup: May 17–23, 2019


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This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of May 17–23, 2019.





A “Draft Review” as a Safeguard on Proxy Advisors



Evaluating Corporate Compliance—DOJ Guidelines for Prosecutors


Unleashing the Power of Diversity Through Inclusive Leadership



Global Divestment Study


Share Buybacks Under Fire


SEC Guidance on Auditor Independence



The Specter of the Giant Three


Seven Venial Sins of Executive Compensation


Simplified Disclosure for Acquisitions and Dispositions


ESG in Money Markets



Event-Driven Litigation Defense


Distressed M&A—The Rules of the Road



Sunsets, Russets, and Rule Resets

Sunsets, Russets, and Rule Resets

Hester M. Peirce is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on her recent remarks at the CARE Conference, available here. The views expressed in this post are those of Ms. Peirce and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff.

Thank you, Peter [Easton] for that kind introduction. I appreciate the chance to be with you at today’s conference to discuss Hot Topics at the Securities and Exchange Commission. It is a small population of people who would describe anything the SEC does as hot, but I suspect there are more than a few in this room who might be a part of that unusual crowd. Given that we share an interest in these issues, I hope that we can keep the conversation as interactive as possible, but I will start with a few observations about SEC rulemaking and the SEC’s agenda. Before I begin, I must give the standard disclaimer that the views that I represent are my own and do not necessarily represent those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or my fellow Commissioners.

I talk frequently about my home state of Ohio. In the ensuing conversations, I have learned that people from the coasts do not know a lot about the middle of the country. “Ohio? That’s the state that grows all the potatoes, right?” My response usually goes something like: “No, actually, that’s Idaho, which is about 1600 miles away from my beloved Buckeye state.” Were someone to make that mistake today, I might respond with a bit more enthusiasm: “Actually, you are thinking of Idaho, which does have lots of potatoes, but doesn’t have any regulations.” That would be a slight exaggeration. Last month, Idaho’s legislature did not reauthorize the rules on the state books, which meant, absent emergency action to retain them, they would all expire in July. [1] Idaho’s rules sunset every year unless they are reauthorized. Usually they are. This year, they were not. Most rules likely will remain on the books through a temporary workaround, but the governor announced that he would “use the unique opportunity to allow some chapters of Idaho Administrative Code that are clearly outdated and irrelevant to expire on July 1, 2019.” [2]

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The Causal Mechanisms of Horizontal Shareholding

Einer Elhauge is the Petrie Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. This post is based on his recent paper.

Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Horizontal Shareholding (discussed on the Forum here) and New Evidence, Proofs, and Legal Theories on Horizontal Shareholding (discussed on the Forum here), both by Einer Elhauge; The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors by Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Scott Hirst (discussed on the Forum here); and Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy by Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst (discussed on the forum here).

As I have shown in another paper, repeated empirical studies confirm that, in concentrated markets, higher levels of horizontal shareholding make anticompetitive effects more likely. Nonetheless, some critics argue that we should delay enforcement action until we have more proof on the causal mechanisms by which horizontal shareholders influence firm behavior. In my new paper, The Causal Mechanisms of Horizontal Shareholding, I show that these critiques are mistaken.

The Ample Evidence on Causal Mechanisms

Institutional investors now cast 93% of shareholder votes at S&P 500 firms and are increasingly diversified in ways that give them horizontal shareholdings. The weight that firms put on the profits of other firms can range from 0% (if the firms are totally separately owned) to 100% (if one firm 100% owns the other). Horizontal shareholdings have risen so much that by 2017 the average weight that an S&P 500 firm put on the profits of other firms in their industry was 75%. There are multiple mechanisms by which horizontal shareholders use this power to influence firms.

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Distressed M&A—The Rules of the Road

Ricky Mason is partner, Amy Wolf is of counsel, and Joe Celentino is an associate at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on their Wachtell Lipton memorandum.

The topic of the complete publication (available here) is mergers and acquisitions where the target company is “distressed.” Distress for this purpose means that a company is having difficulty dealing with its liabilities—whether in making required payments on borrowed money, obtaining or paying down trade credit, addressing debt covenant breaches, or raising additional debt to address funding needs.

Distressed companies can represent attractive acquisition targets. Their stock and their debt often trade at prices reflecting the difficulties they face, and they may be under pressure to sell assets or securities quickly to raise capital or pay down debt. Accordingly, prospective acquirors may have an opportunity to acquire attractive assets or securities at a favorable price. This outline considers how best to acquire a distressed company from every possible point of entry, whether that consists of buying existing or newly issued stock, merging with the target, buying assets, or buying existing debt in the hope that it converts into ownership.

Some modestly distressed companies require a mere “band-aid” (such as a temporary waiver of a financial maintenance covenant when macroeconomic forces have led to a temporary decline in earnings). Others require “major surgery” (such as where a fundamentally over-levered company must radically reduce debt).

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Event-Driven Litigation Defense

Julie G. Reiser and Steven J. Toll are partners at Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC. This post is based on their recent Cohen Milstein memorandum.

The authors address criticism of shareholder lawsuits presented in two recent reports by the U.S. Chamber’s Institute for Legal Reform (“ILR”). Released in October 2018 and February 2019, the ILR reports emphatically urge Congress, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and federal judges to act to curb a “contagion” of “abusive” securities class action litigation.

Reiser and Toll focus on securities lawsuits that have been targeted by the ILR as nuisance cases that warrant legislative intervention. These “event-driven” lawsuits seek to compensate shareholders, who allege that a company has recklessly concealed or misrepresented business or operational risks, leading to a catastrophic event that, among other things, drives down the company’s stock price. Examples include the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster, where the company for years had failed to implement safety systems despite repeated public claims to the contrary. Reiser and Toll find that the ILR relies on flawed logic and circular reasoning to argue that the legislature must intervene to limit these cases rather than allowing the courts to make such determinations. Indeed, many of these suits provide an important remedy for investors and have resulted in large settlements that could not have been achieved otherwise.

The purported mission of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Institute for Legal Reform (“ILR”) is to bring about “civil justice reform” by, among other things, lobbying Congress to limit investors’ access to the courthouse. For decades, the ILR has allied itself with powerful publicly traded corporations under the pretext of protecting their defrauded investors. The ILR’s latest campaign, like so many of its previous endeavors, relies on the illogical premise that investors and the economy are harmed by securities fraud litigation rather than by corporate fraud and malfeasance. In two reports authored by Mayer Brown Partner Andrew Pincus, A Rising Threat the New Class Action Racket that Harms Investors and the Economy (October 2018) [1] and Containing the Contagion, Proposals to Reform the Broken Securities Class Action System (February 2019) [2], the ILR asserts that the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”) has failed to curtail meritless securities lawsuits and that Congress therefore must place additional constraints on investors’ ability to hold companies accountable for fraud.

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Bankruptcy as Bailout: Coal Company Insolvency and the Erosion of Federal Law

Joshua C. Macey is a Postdoctoral Associate at Cornell Law School and Jackson Salovaara works in the renewable energy industry. This post is based on their recent article, forthcoming in the Stanford Law Review.

Almost half of all the coal produced in the United States is mined by companies that have recently gone bankrupt. As we explain in a recent article in the Stanford Law Review, those bankruptcy proceedings have undermined federal environmental and labor laws. In particular, coal companies have used the Bankruptcy Code to evade congressionally imposed liabilities requiring that they pay lifetime health benefits to coal miners and restore land degraded by surface mining. Using financial information reported in filings to the Securities and Exchange Commission and in the companies’ reorganization agreements, we show that between 2012 and 2017, four of the largest coal companies in the United States succeeded in shedding almost $5.2 billion of environmental and retiree liabilities. These regulatory debts constituted 22% of the total debt discharged.

Coal companies disposed of these regulatory obligations by placing them in underfunded subsidiaries that they later spun off. When the underfunded successor companies liquidated, the coal companies that originally incurred the obligations managed to get rid of their regulatory obligations without defaulting on the pecuniary debts they owed to their creditors. Peabody Energy pioneered this strategy in 2007, when it spun off a subsidiary called Patriot Coal. Patriot received 13% of Peabody’s coal reserves, 40% of its healthcare obligations, and $233 million in environmental clean-up costs. A year later, Arch Coal divested itself of 12% of its assets and 97% of its retiree and healthcare liabilities by giving those assets and liabilities to Patriot. At that point, Patriot held more than $2 billion in environmental and healthcare liabilities that had originally been incurred by Peabody and Arch. When Patriot filed for bankruptcy, first in 2012 and again in 2015, it wiped out legacy Arch and Peabody environmental and retiree obligations. Similarly, when Peabody itself filed for bankruptcy in 2016, it shifted hundreds of millions of dollars in environmental obligations onto a subsidiary called Gold Fields, which was spun off as a liquidating trust. Gold Fields had assets of roughly $6 million against claims of almost $13 billion, including at least $745 million in environmental claims.

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ESG in Money Markets

Pia McCusker is Senior Managing Director and Global Head of Cash Management at State Street Global Advisors. This post is based on a publication prepared by State Street Global Advisors. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Socially Responsible Firms by Alan Ferrell, Hao Liang, and Luc Renneboog (discussed on the Forum here).

  • Environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors significantly influence the sustainability of returns in all asset classes, and cash management plays a critical role in a fully developed investment portfolio.
  • Data limitations, regulatory constraints and logistical challenges related to portfolio construction and collateral analysis make it difficult to apply ESG scoring to money market funds.
  • State Street Global Advisors’ proprietary, multi-source R-Factor scoring framework provides the foundation for innovative, scalable ESG-focused investment cash solutions.

Why ESG Matters in Cash Management

At State Street, our core mission is to invest responsibly on behalf of our clients and enable economic prosperity and social progress. We believe that environmentally efficient, socially aware and well-governed firms are best positioned to withstand emerging risks and capitalize on new opportunities, especially over the long term. Our heritage of ESG investing has spanned more than 30 years, and we currently manage nearly $179 billion in ESG assets [1] in mandates spanning index and active equity, fixed income, multi-asset, quantitative equity and cash strategies.

We believe that ESG factors are applicable to all investment strategies across asset classes. We also believe that cash management is central to a fully developed investment portfolio. That’s why we are developing cash management strategies that meet our ESG standards as well as our investors’ needs.

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Simplified Disclosure for Acquisitions and Dispositions

Marcel Fausten, Joseph A. Hall, and Michael Kaplan are partners at Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP. This post is based on their Davis Polk memorandum.

On May 3 the SEC proposed amendments to the financial disclosure requirements relating to acquisitions and dispositions of businesses. The proposed amendments are intended to reduce the costs and complexity of required financial disclosure and should reduce the circumstances under which financial statements for acquired businesses need to be filed. The SEC previously requested comment in 2015 on the effectiveness of financial disclosure requirements for entities other than the registrant, including for acquisitions and dispositions, as part of its ongoing disclosure effectiveness initiative pursuant to its mandate under the FAST Act of 2015 to modernize and simplify public- company reporting requirements. This proposal incorporates the SEC’s consideration of comments received from Davis Polk and others in response to that request.

We believe this proposal is a step in the right direction of easing the burden of complying with current financial disclosure requirements for acquisitions and dispositions without meaningfully impacting the flow of material information to investors. Significantly, the proposed amendments would:

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Seven Venial Sins of Executive Compensation

John Roe is Head of ISS Analytics, the data intelligence arm of Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. This post is based on an ISS Analytics memorandum by Mr. Roe. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes the book Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, and Paying for Long-Term Performance (discussed on the Forum here), both by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried.

Compensation disclosures have grown significantly over the last decade (mostly for the better), and they continue to evolve with the ongoing engagement between companies and shareholders. Certain compensation practices are known for raising investor concerns, leading to difficult conversations between investors and boards and higher levels of investor opposition of executive pay programs. But beyond outright egregious practices, a careful review of the diverse set of compensation programs available may reveal some compensation practices that do not appear as significantly concerning but can raise pointed questions about a compensation program’s alignment with shareholders’ interests.

We call these potential transgressions the venial sins of executive compensation, and they are based on opinions and observations formed after several years of experience reviewing executive compensation disclosures and discussing compensation practices with investors. None of these opinions reflect an official ISS position or a preview of upcoming ISS voting policy, but they are meant to highlight potential risks related to otherwise sound incentive structures, as observed by the author.

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The Specter of the Giant Three

Lucian Bebchuk is the James Barr Ames Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance, and Director of the Program on Corporate Governance, both at Harvard Law School. Scott Hirst is an Associate Professor of Law at the Boston University School of Law and Director of Institutional Investor Research at the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance. This post is based on their forthcoming article, available here.

Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors by Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Scott Hirst (discussed on the Forum here); Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy by Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst (discussed on the forum here); The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of Twelve by John Coates; and New Evidence, Proofs, and Legal Theories on Horizontal Shareholding by Einer Elhauge (discussed on the Forum here).

We recently posted on SSRN our study The Specter of the Giant Three. The study will be published in a Boston University Law Review symposium issue on institutional investors.

Our study examines the substantial and continuing growth of the so-called “Big Three” index fund managers—BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street Global Advisors. We show that there is a real prospect that the Big Three will grow into the “Giant Three,” and that they will come to dominate shareholder voting in most significant public companies.

Our new study is part of a larger, ongoing project on stewardship by index funds and other institutional investors in which we have been engaged. This study complements our earlier study of index fund stewardship, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence and Policy, forthcoming later this year in the Columbia Law Review. That study of index fund stewardship builds, in turn, on the analytical framework put forward in our 2017 article with Alma Cohen, The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors.

We begin by analyzing the drivers of the rise of the Big Three, including the structural factors that are leading to the heavy concentration of the index funds sector. We then provide empirical evidence about the past growth and current status of the Big Three, and their likely growth into the Giant Three. We extrapolate from past trends to estimate the future growth of the Big Three. We estimate that the Big Three could well cast as much as 40% of the votes in S&P 500 companies within two decades. We argue that policymakers and others must recognize—and must take seriously—the prospect of a Giant Three scenario. The plausibility of this scenario exacerbates concerns about the problems with index fund incentives that we identify and document in our earlier work.

A more detailed overview of our analysis follows:

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