Yearly Archives: 2019

2019 Proposed Amendments to DGCL

John Mark Zeberkiewicz is a Director and Brigitte Fresco is Counsel at Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A. This post is based on their Richards, Layton & Finger memorandum and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Legislation proposing to amend the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware (the “General Corporation Law”) has been released by the Corporate Council of the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Association and, if approved by the Corporation Law Section, is expected to be introduced to the Delaware General Assembly. If enacted, the 2019 amendments to the General Corporation Law (the “2019 Amendments”) would, among other things, (i) add new provisions relating to the documentation of transactions and the execution and delivery of documents, including by electronic means, and make conforming changes to existing provisions; (ii) significantly revise the default provisions applicable to notices to stockholders under the General Corporation Law, the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws, including by providing that notices may be delivered by electronic mail, except to stockholders who expressly “opt out” of receiving notice by electronic mail; (iii) consistent with the foregoing, update the provisions governing notices of appraisal rights and demands for appraisal; (iv) update the procedures applicable to stockholder consents delivered by means of electronic transmission; (v) clarify the time at which a unanimous consent of directors in lieu of a meeting becomes effective; and (vi) make various other technical changes, including with respect to incorporator consents and the resignation of registered agents.

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Regulators Join in Event-Driven Securities Litigation

Michael S. Flynn, James P. Rouhandeh, and Michael Kaplan are partners at Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP. This post is based on their Davis Polk memorandum.

In recent years, plaintiffs have increasingly filed securities litigation in response to reports of bad actions within companies. This phenomenon is known as “event-driven” securities litigation, with a claim generally based on the theory that the company must have known that it was committing bad acts and should have told its investors of the alleged misconduct. Commentators have pejoratively dubbed this the theory that “everything is securities fraud.”

On March 14, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) joined this trend and filed suit against Volkswagen AG, alleging fraud in connection with offerings of the company’s corporate and collateralized debt.

The SEC’s civil suit against Volkswagen, two of its financing subsidiaries and its former CEO, Martin Winterkorn, was filed more than two years after Volkswagen admitted to criminal wrongdoing related to the use of software “defeat devices” to evade emissions tests of the company’s diesel vehicles. The SEC alleges that Volkswagen made false statements related to its compliance with environmental regulations and omitted information regarding its use of “defeat devices” in connection with corporate debt offerings in 2014 and 2015. The SEC also alleges fraud in relation to a Volkswagen subsidiary’s sponsorship during the same period of asset-backed securities (“ABS”) that included the company’s diesel vehicles as collateral. The SEC seeks injunctive relief, disgorgement, civil penalties and, in the case of Winterkorn, a bar from serving as an officer or director of a U.S. public company.

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Noteworthy Developments in 2018 Affecting Executive Pay

Joseph Bachelder is special counsel at McCarter & English LLP. This post is based on a memorandum by Mr. Bachelder. Andy Tsang, a senior financial analyst with the firm, assisted in the preparation of this post. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Stealth Compensation Via Retirement Benefits; the book Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation; and Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, all by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried.

This post reports on tax and securities law developments in 2018 affecting executive compensation.

1. Tax Developments

Change in the Corporate Tax Rate.

Effective for taxable years beginning after Dec. 31, 2017, the ordinary income tax rate for corporations is 21 percent. This replaces the prior ordinary income tax rate structure for corporations that ranged from 15 percent to 35 percent. This change is contained in §13001 of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (Public Law No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (Dec. 22, 2017)) (the 2017 Tax Act).

In consequence of this change, annual incentive plans based on an increase in a corporation’s 2018 earnings over 2017 earnings, if not already modified, may need to be modified. The same is true for long-term incentive plans that are based on a corporation’s change in earnings over a multi-year period that includes a year after 2017 over a base that includes a year, or a period of years, prior to 2018.

On Aug. 21, 2018, the IRS issued Notice 2018-68 providing initial guidance on amendments to Internal Revenue Code §162(m) by §13601 of the 2017 Tax Act (the IRS Guidance).

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The Rise of Books and Records Demands Under Section 220 of the DGCL

Roger A. Cooper is partner and Vanessa C. Richardson, and Kimberly Black are associates at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP. This post is based on their Cleary Gottlieb memorandum, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

In recent years, in part in response to decisions like Corwin that have raised the pleading standard for stockholder plaintiffs, the Delaware courts have encouraged stockholders to seek books and records under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) before filing stockholder derivative or post-merger damages suits, and—in response—each year more stockholders have done so. As a result of this trend, we have already seen several important decisions addressing books and records demands in 2019. These decisions have (i) clarified the types of documents that may be obtained, including (in some limited circumstances) personal emails or text messages; (ii) explained when a stockholder’s demand will be denied as impermissibly lawyer-driven (and when it will not be); and (iii) described the threshold showing of suspected wrongdoing that stockholders must make. As the plaintiffs’ bar makes more use of Section 220, these are important issues for boards of directors to consider.

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Weekly Roundup: April 5–11, 2019


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of April 5–11, 2019.


Review and Analysis of 2018 U.S. Shareholder Activism


Merger Agreement Termination based on Plain Contract Language



Going for Gold: Global Board Culture and Director Behaviors Survey


Framework for “Investment Contract” Analysis of Digital Assets


Hedging Climate News


Profiles of Selected Shareholder Activists



Enhanced Scrutiny on the Buy-Side


The SEC “Through the Eyes of Management”


Encouraging Smaller Entrants to Our Capital Markets


Private Equity and Activism


The Perils of Pinterest’s Dual-Class Structure


SECret Garden: Remarks at SEC Speaks



The SEC v. Mark Cuban

The SEC v. Mark Cuban

Marc I. Steinberg is the Radford Professor of Law at Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law. This post is based on his recently published book, The Securities and Exchange Commission v. Cuban—A Trial of Insider Trading.

In my recently published book, The Securities and Exchange Commission v. Cuban—A Trial of Insider Trading (Twelve Tables Press 2019) (ISBN 978-1-94607-4249), I focus on the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) enforcement action against Mark Cuban for allegedly engaging in illegal insider trading. This litigation was far from standard fare. Unlike the vast majority of SEC enforcement actions that are settled pursuant to the consent negotiation process whereby the respondent neither admits nor denies the Commission’s allegations of misconduct, Cuban declined to settle and proceeded to trial. After several years of contentious litigation where he spent $12 million in legal fees, Cuban was vindicated with a favorable jury verdict. The SEC’s case against Cuban raises questions focusing on the scope of this nation’s insider trading laws, the strategic litigation decisions made, the significant costs of defending one’s good reputation, and the proper limits of governmental prosecutorial discretion.

This book addresses many of the complexities of this litigation saga. As an experiential source, the book includes excerpts of pertinent documents from the SEC investigative stage through the entry of judgment. These documents—comprised of pleadings, motions, witness testimony, oral arguments, and jury instructions—are instructive. To add flair, the documents have greater interest due to the contentious nature of this litigation and the identity of the defendant: Mark Cuban, a well-known entrepreneur and investor whose ownership interests include the National Basketball Association’s (NBA) Dallas Mavericks. Mr. Cuban’s media persona includes being a principal investor on the reality television program Shark Tank and performing on Dancing with the Stars.

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Executive Long-Term Incentive Plans

Joseph Kieffer is a Senior Research Analyst at Equilar Inc. This post is based on an Equilar memorandum by Mr. Kieffer, Alex Knowlton, Amit Batish, Brianna Ang, Leah Wright and Charlie Pontrelli. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Paying for Long-Term Performance by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried (discussed on the Forum here) and Share Repurchases, Equity Issuances, and the Optimal Design of Executive Pay by Jesse Fried (discussed on the Forum here).

The optimization of pay structures for executives and upper-level management has played a prevalent role in the duties of compensation committees in recent years. From the restructuring of the compensation portion of the proxy statement to the introduction of Say on Pay and everything in- between, checks and balances regarding compensation have come in waves,

and shareholders have increasingly held boards more accountable because of it. As a result, board members—and specifically compensation committee members—have had to walk a thin line between attracting talent and overpaying executives, and the most effective strategy to achieve that has been basing rewards on company performance and the creation of shareholder value.

Designing an effective long-term incentive plan (LTIP) can be very difficult, as boards must be aware of the potentially high costs that come with an over- zealous LTI design. Similarly, boards must be privy to the gains associated with an effective plan, both for shareholders and the executives themselves. Consequently, compensation committees must work diligently to determine multiple factors in an LTI plan. Committees must select the correct metric(s) on which to base performance, the weighting of that metric compared to total performance, set the targets, thresholds and maximums for each award and lastly measure these goals to appropriate payouts.

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SECret Garden: Remarks at SEC Speaks

Hester M. Peirce is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on her recent remarks at SEC Speaks 2019, available here. The views expressed in this post are those of Ms. Peirce and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff.

I would like to begin with the standard disclaimer plus an additional one that ties with the theme of this speech. The views I represent are my own and not necessarily those of the Commission or my fellow Commissioners. The supplemental disclaimer is that the views of the staff are not necessarily those of the Commission either.

My cousin recently reminded me of a well-known children’s book, The Secret Garden by Frances Hodgson Burnett. The book tells the story of a troubled, young girl who finds herself living with her widowed uncle and troubled cousin on an estate in the wind-swept British moors. The estate has a number of gardens, but one of them has been sealed shut for ten years. The garden is walled and any sign of the erstwhile door is obscured. Even speaking of the garden seems to be frowned upon. Without giving too much of the story away, the girl manages to find the garden door and its buried key. She shares the secret with her cousin and a friend with a green-thumb, and the garden flourishes under its new caretakers, who in turn flourish. By reminding me of this story, my cousin got me thinking about the secret gardens at the SEC, gardens that have been sealed up longer and that are not as rosy or good for the health as the one in the classic story. These gardens are the topic about which I would like to speak today.

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The Perils of Pinterest’s Dual-Class Structure

Lucian Bebchuk is the James Barr Ames Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance and Director of the Program on Corporate Governance, Harvard Law School. Kobi Kastiel is Assistant Professor of Law at Tel Aviv University, and a Research Fellow at the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance.

This post is the third in which they analyze the terms of dual-class IPOs by major companies, following their earlier posts on The Perils of Dell’s Low-Voting Stock and The Perils of Lyft’s Dual-Class Structure (discussed on the Forum here and here). Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock (discussed on the Forum here), and The Perils of Small-Minority Controllers (discussed on the Forum here), both by Lucian Bebchuk and Kobi Kastiel, and the keynote presentation on The Lifecycle Theory of Dual-Class Structures.

Pinterest, Inc. (“Pinterest”), the digital pin board company, is about to go public with a dual-class structure in an IPO valuating it at over $10 billion. This post focuses on the governance costs and risks that Pinterest’s public investors should expect to face down the road.

Our analysis builds on our earlier research work on multiclass structures, including The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock (Virginia Law Review 2017) and The Perils of Small-Minority Controllers (Georgetown Law Journal 2019). Below we identify and analyze in turn two significant problems:

  • Tiny-minority controllers: Although Pinterest’s co-founders will hold together only a minority of voting power immediately following the IPO, the company’s IPO structure will enable them to become majority controllers over time, and to retain such a lock on control while holding only a tiny ownership stake of the company’s equity capital (less than 5%); and
  • Extremely long-lasting lock on control: Pinterest’s co-founders will be able to retain control for an extremely long period, which could well last for five or six decades, even if they become value-decreasing leaders.

Each of these governance risks can be expected to both (i) decrease the expected per share future value of Pinterest by increasing agency costs and distortions, and (ii) increase the discount to a per-share value of Pinterest at which low-voting shares of Pinterest will trade. Each of these effects would operate over time to reduce the market price at which the low-voting shares of public investors would trade. These effects should thus be taken into account by any public investors that consider holding Pinterest shares.

Expected Emergence of Tiny-Minority Controllers

Post-IPO, Pinterest will be a publicly traded dual-class company in which public investors hold low-voting shares entitling them to one vote per share. Pinterest’s three co-founders, as well as a host of venture capital investors, will hold high-voting shares entitling them to 20 votes per share. In the case of Pinterest, the design of its governance structure can be expected to produce what we define as tiny-minority controllers (see the typology we introduced in The Perils of Small-Minority Controllers).

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Private Equity and Activism

Amadeus Moeser is an associate at Sidley Austin LLP. This post is based on a Sidley memorandum by Mr. Moeser and Michael Olaya.

The relationship between private equity funds and activist hedge funds has always been double-edged. While in the past, engagements of activists often led to the sale of a target company or less profitable operations of a company to private equity funds, many go-private transactions have been opposed by activists trying to improve the terms of the deal and companies brought private equity funds in as “white knights” during a hostile takeover. However, tensions seem to be slowly disappearing as the transitions between activist hedge funds and private equity funds become blurred. Private equity funds are beginning to adopt activist tactics and activists are increasingly engaging in private equity transactions.

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