Yearly Archives: 2020

Weekly Roundup: October 30–November 5, 2020


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This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of October 30–November 5, 2020.


SEC Brings Enforcement Action Against Fund Manager for Single 13D Violation


Proposed HSR Rule Change Would Benefit Activists


Politics and Purpose in Corporate America


Incorporating Human Capital Management Disclosures into a Company’s Annual Report


The PCAOB’s Revised Research and Standard-Setting Agendas


2020 Annual Corporate Directors Survey



Pandemic Preparation: 72-Hour Response Plan to Government Inquiry



Trump Legacy: Boom in Corporate Political Disclosure


Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund ESG Activism and the New Millennial Corporate Governance


Statement by Commissioner Lee on Amendments to the Exempt Offering Framework



Next-Generation Cybersecurity Disclosures for Publicly Traded Companies


Catastrophe Bonds, Pandemics, and Risk Securitization


Unions Are Democratically Organized, Corporations Are Not




Determining Fair Value in Appraisal Proceedings

Determining Fair Value in Appraisal Proceedings

Jason Halper is partner and Sara Bussiere and Timbre Shriver are associates at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP. This post is based on their Cadwalader memorandum, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Using the Deal Price for Determining “Fair Value” in Appraisal Proceedings (discussed on the Forum here) and Appraisal After Dell, both by Guhan Subramanian.

On July 9 and October 12, 2020, the Delaware Supreme Court added two more opinions to its growing suite of recent appraisal decisions underscoring the prominence of market-based factors in determining fair value. In Fir Tree Value Master Fund, LP v. Jarden Corp., the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Vice Chancellor Slights’ finding that Jarden’s unaffected stock market price was the most reliable indicator of fair value under the facts presented there. In Brigade Leveraged Capital Structures Fund and Brigade Distressed Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Stillwater Mining Co., the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s reliance on deal price for its fair value determination and confirmed that deal price remains the most reliable indicator of fair value if the seller runs an appropriate, conflict-free sales process.

After Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, lnc., in which the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s reliance on the unaffected stock price for fair value and found instead that the merger consideration minus deal-specific synergies was the more reliable indicator of fair value, many speculated that transaction price would be the primary source of fair value evidence going forward. In Jarden, however, the Delaware Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Chancery’s decision that deficiencies in Jarden’s sales process undermined the reliability of the deal price as evidence of fair value, which in turn supported the Court of Chancery’s determination to consider other evidence. The Court of Chancery found-and the Delaware Supreme Court agreed-that in light of a sub-par sales process, Jarden’s pre-announcement market price was the most reliable indicator of fair value given that Jarden stock traded in an efficient market and in the absence of material, non-public information.

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Where Do Institutional Investors Seek Shelter when Disaster Strikes? Evidence from COVID-19

Stefano Ramelli is a PhD candidate in Finance at the University of Zurich. This post is based on a recent paper authored by Mr. Ramelli; Simon Glossner, Post-doctoral research associate at the University of Virginia Darden School of Business; Pedro Matos, John G. Macfarlane Family Chair and Professor of Business Administration and Academic Director of Richard A. Mayo Center for Asset Management at the University of Virginia Darden School of Business; and Alexander F. Wagner, Professor of Finance at the University of Zurich and Swiss Finance Institute.

Institutional investors increasingly play a central role in US stock markets, with institutional ownership rising from below 40% in 1980 to over 75% nowadays. In Glossner, Matos, Ramelli, and Wagner (2020), we examine the outbreak of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic—a truly exogenous shock—as a powerful setting to learn more about their behavior. Did institutional investors run for the exits and sell equities, given the heightened level of uncertainty, or instead took a contrarian approach (buying when other market participants were selling, potentially seeing through the temporary nature of the pandemic)? Did institutions sell stocks indiscriminately or rebalance their equity portfolios in a “flight to quality”, favoring stocks perceived to be more “resilient”? And who took the other side of their trades?

We first looked at whether institutional ownership (IO) was a key explanatory variable for stock returns in the COVID-19 crash. Figure 1 shows that the IO level at the end of 2019 was associated with a significant stock underperformance during the COVID-19 market crash, net of the combined effects of other firm and industry characteristics. How did this vary across types of institutions? We find that stocks held more by active investors (vs. passive) investors, short-term investors (vs long-term), or those institutions that had previously experienced higher outflows during the Great Financial Crisis of 2007/2008 performed worse in the COVID-19 “Fever period” (from February 24 through March 20 of 2020, as defined by Ramelli and Wagner, 2020).

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Safe Harbor for Permissible Capital-Raising Activities by Unregistered Finders

Spencer G. Feldman is a partner at Olshan Frome Wolosky LLP. This post is based on his Olshan memorandum.

Recognizing the longstanding need for a new approach to the regulation of finders who help smaller businesses raise early stage capital, the SEC has published a notice of a proposed exemptive order and request for comment to formalize the regulatory status of unregistered finders. The proposed finders exemption from broker-dealer registration would facilitate a role for unregistered finders in the capital-raising process and clarify the circumstances under which issuers can legally compensate finders who comply with specified conditions. The author’s thoughts on the proposed finders exemption follow a summary of the rule proposal.

On October 7, 2020, the Securities and Exchange Commission published its long-awaited rule proposal to provide a safe harbor exemption permitting an individual acting as an unregistered financial intermediary, or “finder,” to engage in capital-raising activities on behalf of smaller private companies without registering as a broker-dealer. [1] The SEC’s proposal (Release No. 34-90112, File No. S7-13-20) reflects several decades of thinking by the SEC staff, various government-business and bar association committees, numerous law professors and securities lawyers, who have acknowledged the role of finders in locating and referring capital to small businesses but have disagreed on the appropriate level of regulation to protect investors. In the capital markets today, there is no general guidance on finders from the SEC, other than interpretive positions taken by the SEC staff in no-action letters, prompting some to refer to the use of finders as the “gray market.”

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Unions Are Democratically Organized, Corporations Are Not

David Madland is senior fellow, Malkie Wall is research associate, and Danielle Root is associate director at the Center for American Progress. This post is based on a CAP memorandum by Mr. Madland, Ms. Wall, Ms. Root, and Sam Berger. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides? by Lucian Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson Jr. (discussed on the Forum here); and The Politics of CEOs by Alma Cohen, Moshe Hazan, Roberto Tallarita, and David Weiss (discussed on the Forum here).

In establishing the rules that govern engagement with the democratic process— including laws related to elections, campaign finance, and lobbying—unions and corporations are often lumped together under the incorrect assumption that these two types of organizations are roughly equivalent and thus should be subject to similar rules. For example, prior to the Supreme Court’s Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission decision, unions and corporations were subject to identical limits on their ability to spend general treasury funds on federal elections, and since the decision have been equally free to use their general funds on political expenditures.

Efforts to equate corporate and union political activity date back to at least the 1940s with the passage of the 1943 Smith-Connally Act, which barred unions from making contributions to federal candidates in the spirit of parity with the Tillman Act’s limitations on corporate contributions, and the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act, which prohibited any independent expenditures by corporations and labor unions. As former professor of constitutional law at American University Rep. Jamie Raskin (D-MD) explains, the false equivalence between unions and corporations “has sunk deeply into American legal, political, and social consciousness, weakening the sense of unions as organic democratic institutions in civil society … while aggrandizing the political power of CEOs of large companies who are increasingly, if bizarrely, treated as leaders of civic membership associations.”

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Catastrophe Bonds, Pandemics, and Risk Securitization

Steven L. Schwarcz is Stanley A. Star Distinguished Professor of Law & Business at Duke University School of Law. This post is based on his recent paper.

Insurance is the tried-and-true strategy for protecting against infrequent but potentially devastating losses. In theory, governments could protect against the potential economic devastation of future pandemics by requiring businesses to insure against pandemic-related risks. In practice, however, insurers do not currently offer pandemic insurance. Insurers fear their industry does not have the capacity to provide coverage.

In Catastrophe Bonds, Pandemics, and Risk Securitization, I focus on using risk securitization—a relatively recent and innovative private-sector means of insuring otherwise “uninsurable” risks—to insure pandemic-related risks. Risk securitization depends on investor demand to purchase catastrophe (“CAT”) bonds. Capital market investors have shown high demand, for two reasons. First, CAT bonds provide a diversified return because natural catastrophes occur randomly and are not correlated with standard economic risks; therefore, CAT-bond returns are largely uncorrelated to the returns of equity securities and conventional corporate bonds. Second, CAT bonds have provided strong returns to investors.

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Next-Generation Cybersecurity Disclosures for Publicly Traded Companies

Paul Ferrillo is partner at McDermott Will & Emery LLP; Bob Zukis is Adjunct Professor of Management and Organization at the USC Marshall School of Business; and Christophe Veltsos is a professor at Minnesota State University.

In 2018 the SEC issued its second round of guidance (the “2018 SEC Cyber guidance”) to registrants on what they expected cybersecurity disclosures to address in forthcoming periodic filings. The 2018 SEC Cyber Guidance followed guidance issued in 2011 and came shortly after the 2017 Equifax breach in acknowledgment that “Cybersecurity risks pose grave threats to investors, our capital markets and country,” as they stated in the guidance. With a focus on the materiality of cybersecurity risk and the importance of both the timely escalation of cyber incidents to the Board of Directors and the public disclosure of incidents to the markets, the 2018 SEC guidance was an important second step in imposing additional accountability around governing this significant business risk.

EY recently issued a research report on actual cybersecurity disclosures for 76 of the Fortune 100 companies from 2018 through May 2020 [1]. A few things stand out from the EY research. First, all of the companies in their research disclosed cybersecurity as a risk factor from 2018 through 2020, which was the focus of the 2011 SEC guidance. Only one company in 2020 did not disclose data privacy as a risk factor.

Second, there is a wide range of variance in the practices that are being disclosed for board oversight of cybersecurity and its risk management. In general, the data tells us that cyber risk oversight and management practices likely lag disclosure practice.

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Statement by Chairman Clayton on Harmonizing, Simplifying and Improving the Exempt Offering Framework

Jay Clayton is Chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on Chairman Clayton’s recent public statement. The views expressed in this post are those of Mr. Clayton and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff.

Good morning. This is an open meeting of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission under the Government in the Sunshine Act.

Today we consider a recommendation from the Division of Corporation Finance that would harmonize, simplify and improve various structural and procedural aspects of our exempt offering framework under the Securities Act of 1933. The recommended amendments reflect a comprehensive, retrospective review of a framework that has, over time, unfortunately become difficult to navigate, for both investors and businesses, particularly smaller and medium-sized businesses. Some have referred to it as a “patchwork”—I will explain this in a bit more detail later. Today’s amendments would rationalize that framework, increase efficiency and facilitate capital formation, while preserving or enhancing important investor protections.

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Statement by Commissioner Lee on Amendments to the Exempt Offering Framework

Allison Herren Lee is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on her recent public statement. The views expressed in the post are those of Commissioner Lee, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the other Commissioners, or the Staff.

For decades, private offerings were the exception to the rule in our securities regime. The registration and reporting provisions in the federal securities laws are designed to level the playing field by requiring issuers to provide all investors with reliable, timely, and material information about investments. The public markets are designed to, and to a remarkable degree succeed at, offering a fair shake to the so-called mom-and-pop investor vis-à-vis a wealthy hedge fund. [1] What’s more, the discipline imposed by public markets drives more efficient capital allocation, which in turn drives our economy.

Exempt private offerings have traditionally served an important role in providing capital for smaller and medium-sized companies, often along their path to the public markets. It is well understood that retail investors operate at a severe disadvantage in the private market because of information asymmetries and other power imbalances. [2] Historically, the primary protection against this power imbalance was to limit private companies to capital raised from investors that are large or sophisticated enough to compete, or wealthy enough to bear the cost if they lose out. In recent years, however, the exception (or exemptions from registration) have swallowed rule, with statutory and regulatory changes steadily chipping away at restrictions on private offerings and exposing more and more retail investors to their risks.

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Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund ESG Activism and the New Millennial Corporate Governance

Michal Barzuza is Nicholas E. Chimicles Research Professor of Business Law and Regulation at the University of Virginia School of Law; Quinn Curtis is Albert Clark Tate, Jr., Professor of Law at the University of Virginia School of Law; and David H. Webber is Professor of Law at the Boston University School of Law. This post is based on their recent paper, forthcoming in the Southern California Law Review. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee by Max M. Schanzenbach and Robert H. Sitkoff (discussed on the Forum here); Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy by Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst (discussed on the forum here); and Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value by Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales (discussed on the Forum here).

Our new paper Shareholder Value(S): Index Fund ESG Activism and The New Millennial Corporate Governance forthcoming in the Southern California Law Review documents and explains the increasing role of large index fund managers in promoting ESG issues at major companies. While often viewed as quiet on key corporate governance issues, we show that these asset managers aggressively press companies to address ESG concerns, especially board diversity and—more recently—climate change. Notably, we show that to promote ESG goals the big three challenged management by withholding votes from directors in uncontested elections, a channel of index fund activism that has not been examined in the existing literature.

We argue that index fund activism on ESG issues is a result of asset managers being locked in competition for the assets of the millennial generation. Millennials, more than their forebearers, integrate social values into their economic decisions. BlackRock CEO Larry Fink has said “[T]he sentiments of these generations will drive not only their decisions as employees but also as investors, with the world undergoing the largest transfer of wealth in history: $24 trillion from baby boomers to millennials.” Given the commodification of index funds and the inability to compete on returns, signaling commitment to ESG values provides an important competitive dimension to index fund operators. We analyze how this largely overlooked dimension influences index funds’ incentives and provide supportive data. Given the potential negative implications of being seen to lag on social issues among a generation in which cancel culture is predominant, the stakes for asset managers are extremely high.

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