Yearly Archives: 2020

Weekly Roundup: October 23–29, 2020


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This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of October 23–29, 2020.

The Power of the Narrative in Corporate Lawmaking


The Dangers of Buybacks: Mitigating Common Pitfalls


COVID-19 and Inequality: A Test of Corporate Purpose


The Next Frontier for Representations and Warranties Insurance: Public M&A Deals?


Time to Unlock the Hidden Value in Your Board




The Economics of Soft Dollars: A Review of the Literature and New Evidence from the Implementation of MiFID II


From Shareholder Primacy to Stakeholder Capitalism


NYSE Extends Waiver of “Related Party” and “20%” Stockholder Approval Rules


Short-Termism, Shareholder Payouts, and Investment in the EU


Statement by Chairman Clayton on Regulation Best Interest and Form CRS



Changes to Shareholder Proposal Eligibility Rules



Disclosures in Shareholder Lawsuits


U.S. Compensation Policies and the COVID-19 Pandemic


Engaging with Wellington Management Company

Krystal Berrini is a partner at PJT Camberview. This post is based on a PJT Camberview memorandum that features an interview with Carolina San Martin, Hillary Flynn and Chris Goolgasian, members of the ESG Research and Climate Research teams at Wellington Management Company. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee by Max M. Schanzenbach and Robert H. Sitkoff (discussed on the Forum here); and Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value by Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales (discussed on the Forum here).

Krystal: How is the ESG Research team structured within Wellington? 

Carolina: At Wellington, we see ESG research as an investment research capability that can support better investment decisions and help us deliver on our firm’s mission to exceed our clients’ investment expectations. To do this, our ESG analysts work closely with our equity and credit analysts to bring the ESG issues we think matter most to bear on investment decisions and drive better outcomes. All of us sit together within our central Investment Research team, and we believe that collaboration across equity, credit, and ESG research can lead to a deeper understanding of the investment mosaic through expertise in each dimension. Our ESG Research team currently has 8 sector ESG experts focused on both research and stewardship—engagement and proxy voting—across public and private markets. We also have a dedicated Climate Research team that focuses on the potential impacts of climate change across the capital markets and on our clients’ portfolios across sectors.

Krystal: How is ESG integrated into the investment process at Wellington?

Carolina: Our ESG integration philosophy comes down to two core beliefs that act as our North Star. First is a belief that material E, S, and G issues are strategic business issues that can impact performance. This is why we have a dedicated team of experts to identify them, analyze them, and bring insights to our portfolio managers (PMs) so they can be taken into account in investment decisions. Second is a belief that it doesn’t stop at the research—as our clients’ fiduciaries, we have a responsibility to give feedback to companies when they can improve, using the tools of voting and engagement, because when they perform better on ESG issues that are most relevant to financial outcomes, our clients should benefit.

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U.S. Compensation Policies and the COVID-19 Pandemic

Subodh Mishra is Managing Director at Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. This post is based on an ISS memorandum by Institutional Shareholder Services’ Global Policy Board. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Paying for Long-Term Performance by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried (discussed on the Forum here); the book Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried; and Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried.

1. How should this FAQ document be referenced?

This FAQ post serves as general guidance as to how ISS U.S. Benchmark Research may approach COVID-related pay decisions in the context of ISS’ pay-for-performance qualitative evaluation (as applicable to meetings covered under U.S. Benchmark Research policy). As discussed further below, ISS’ qualitative evaluation will take into consideration the impact on company operations as a result of the pandemic. As in the past, an elevated concern from the quantitative screen will continue to result in a more in-depth qualitative review of the company’s pay programs and practices.

ISS endeavored to provide this preliminary FAQ ahead of the regular annual FAQ update expected to be published in December, in order to sooner inform investors, companies, and their advisors on these issues. The guidance laid out in this FAQ has been shaped by feedback from direct discussions with investors in various roundtables as well as the annual policy survey. However, nothing in this post should be construed as a guarantee as to how ISS Research may recommend on a given proposal. If you have questions about this post, please contact the ISS Help Center.

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Disclosures in Shareholder Lawsuits

Boris Feldman and Doru Gavril are partners and Elise Lopez is an associate at Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP. This post is based on a Freshfields memorandum by Mr. Feldman, Mr. Gavril, Ms. Lopez, and Drew Liming.

On October 8, 2020, a new Ninth Circuit ruling deepened a circuit split over whether allegations in another civil lawsuit could constitute a corrective disclosure in a securities fraud class action. See In re BofI Holding, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 31938 (9th Cir. Oct. 8, 2020) (the panel was comprised of Judges Paul J. Watford, Market J. Bennett, and Kenneth K. Lee, with Lee concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Ninth Circuit joins the Sixth Circuit in declining to adhere to a categorical rule that allegations in a civil suit can never constitute corrective disclosures. Id. at *20 (citing Norfolk Cty. Ret. Sys. v. Cmty. Health Sys., 877 F.3d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 2017)). The Eleventh Circuit remains at the other end of the spectrum, holding that, as a matter of law, allegations from civil suits cannot constitute corrective disclosures, even partial. See Sapssov v. Health Mgmt. Assocs., 608 F. App’x 855, 863 (11th Cir. 2015) (noting that “a civil suit is not proof of liability”). As a reminder, a corrective disclosure occurs when “information correcting the misstatement or omission that is the basis for the action is disseminated to the market.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e)(1).

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ESG & The 2020 U.S. Presidential Election

Heidi DuBois is Executive Vice President of ESG, Alex Heath is Executive Vice President of Purpose, and Jill Fisher is Senior Account Supervisor of Reputation at Edelman. This post is based on their Edelman memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); Socially Responsible Firms by Alan Ferrell, Hao Liang, and Luc Renneboog (discussed on the Forum here); Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value by Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales (discussed on the Forum here); and Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism by Leo E. Strine, Jr (discussed on the Forum here).

How we got here.

For years, the investment community has been increasingly focused on the impact that Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) issues, like environmental stewardship, labor practices and anti-corruption can have on a company’s ability to generate long-term value.

In 2016, the United Nations introduced its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)—goals for the long-term interest of society, guiding both mandatory and voluntary disclosure requirements for business leaders and corporate reporting.

In 2019, the Business Roundtable made waves by declaring that the era of shareholder primacy is over—meaning that CEOs must lead their companies for the benefit of all stakeholders, including customers, employees, suppliers and communities.

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Changes to Shareholder Proposal Eligibility Rules

Elizabeth Bieber is counsel, Andrea Basham is counsel, and Jack Liechtung is an associate at Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP. This post is based on their Freshfields memorandum.

Going into the 2022 annual meeting season, shareholder proposal eligibility criteria under Rule 14a-8 is going to change. [1] On September 23, 2020, the SEC released final rules amending Rule 14a-8—the culmination of a multi-year process to modernize the rule, which governed unchanged for more than two decades. The SEC initially proposed amendments in November 2019 and the recently released final rules are substantially similar to the 2019 proposal, which, among other amendments, implement a slide scale eligibility test that inversely correlates length of ownership to the required equity stake, limits shareholder proposals to one “person,” and raises the resubmission threshold.

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The Impact of COVID-19 on Shareholder Activism in the Retail Industry

Keith E. Gottfried is partner at Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. This post is based on his Morgan Lewis white paper. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Dancing with Activists by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, and Thomas Keusch (discussed on the Forum here).

The primary focus of many retailers in the near term will likely be on staying afloat and addressing their liquidity needs, the health and safety of their employees and customers, the overall health of their businesses, and how best to pivot their business models to adapt to shifting consumer preferences and expectations in the wake of the ongoing coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. However, as the retail industry has been upended by the pandemic as never before, and taking into consideration that almost all well-known activist investors have a longstanding interest in the retail sector, retailers should also be concerned with how the turmoil caused by the pandemic has made them attractive targets for activist investors. It is also likely that the recent proliferation of special purpose acquisition companies (SPACS), particularly SPACS with an expressed interest in consumer-facing companies or SPACS formed by well-known activist investors with retail industry experience, may be a strong catalyst for increased shareholder activism in the retail industry.

Current Situation

The retail industry is clearly one of the industries most impacted by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Since March 2020, when heightened concerns about the pandemic began to take hold, retailers have had to cope with government-mandated business closures and, later, slow and inconsistent guidance on reopening, as well as the need to implement new social distancing and health and safety protocols. In addition, retailers have had to pivot their business models and reimagine their businesses in ways that allow them to service their customers in a new normal and take into account a new paradigm of not only government-imposed social distancing, but also consumers’ increased wariness for public spaces and crowds, particularly indoors.

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Statement by Chairman Clayton on Regulation Best Interest and Form CRS

Jay Clayton is Chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on Chairman Clayton’s recent public statement. The views expressed in this post are those of Mr. Clayton and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff.

Good afternoon and welcome to the SEC’s Staff Roundtable on Regulation Best Interest and Form CRS. [1] We hope that this event provides useful information to broker-dealers and investment advisers in complying with these key regulatory enhancements. Staff from the Commission’s Division of Trading and Markets, Division of Investment Management and Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, together with staff from FINRA, will present some insights and feedback as we approach the four-month anniversary of the June 30 Reg BI and Form CRS compliance date.

The Commission adopted Regulation Best Interest, or Reg BI, and Form CRS to enhance significantly the quality and transparency of relationships between broker-dealers and investment advisers—together, “firms”—and retail investors. Reg BI and Form CRS, together with related interpretations adopted at the same time by the Commission, are designed to bring the legal requirements and mandated disclosures for firms serving retail investors in line with reasonable investor expectations. Collectively, they also are designed to preserve retail investor access—in terms of both choice and cost—to a variety of investment services and products, fostering healthy, transparent competition.

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Short-Termism, Shareholder Payouts, and Investment in the EU

Jesse Fried is the Dane Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Charles C.Y. Wang is the Glenn and Mary Jane Creamer Associate Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School. This post is based on their recent paper. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value by Lucian Bebchuk (discussed on the Forum here); The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum here); The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders by Jesse Fried (discussed on the Forum here); and Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law by Leo E. Strine (discussed on the Forum here).

In both the US and the EU, commentators and policymakers have expressed concern that shareholder-driven “short-termism” (or “quarterly capitalism”) has become a critical problem for public firms and the economy. Frequently, the main evidence offered for short-termism is cash payouts to shareholders, through share repurchases and dividends, that are large relative to firms’ net income. The leading exponent of this view is William Lazonick, who has argued that high ratios of shareholder payouts to net income impair firms’ ability to invest, innovate, and provide good wages.

The high ratio of shareholder payouts to net income has been cited by corporate lawyers such as Marty Lipton and asset managers such as BlackRock’s CEO Larry Fink as evidence that market pressures deprive firms of the capital needed for long-term investment. Lazonick’s payout-ratio figures for the US have been cited by Joe Biden as evidence of short-termism, and by Senator Elizabeth Warren as justification for her 2018 Accountable Capitalism Act.

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NYSE Extends Waiver of “Related Party” and “20%” Stockholder Approval Rules

Eleazer Klein is partner and Adriana Schwartz and Clara Zylberg are special counsel at Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. This post is based on their SRZ memorandum.

Recognizing that companies need quick access to capital due to the unprecedented disruption caused by COVID-19 and to mitigate against the NYSE stockholder approval rules presenting a hurdle to raising capital, the NYSE and the SEC approved the temporary waiver (“NYSE Waiver”) of certain NYSE stockholder approval rules set forth in Section 312.03 of the NYSE Listed Company Manual (“NYSE Manual”). The NYSE Waiver was last set to expire on Sept. 30, 2020, but, effective Sept. 28, 2020, has been extended through Dec. 31, 2020. [1] The relevant NYSE rules require a listed company to obtain stockholder approval before it issues 1% (or, in certain circumstances, 5%) of its outstanding shares of common stock or voting power pre-issuance to certain Related Parties [2] and before issuing in excess of 20% of its outstanding shares of common stock or voting power pre-issuance at a discount to the “NYSE Minimum Price.” [3]

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